Rameshwar Singh Malik, J. 1. Defendant is in second appeal against the concurrent findings of fact, recorded by both the learned courts below in a suit for specific performance, whereby suit of the plaintiff-respondents was decreed. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that plaintiff/respondent No. 1 filed a suit for specific performance, on the allegations that defendant No. 1 Dharampal entered into an agreement to sell dated 22.9.1992 with the plaintiff-respondent No. 1, to sell the agricultural land comprised in Khewat No. 41, Khatoni No. 65 measuring 49 kanals 14 marlas to the extent of 1/8th share i.e. 6 Kanals 4 marlas, Khewat No. 43, Khatoni No. 67 measuring 39 Kanals 14 marlas to the extent of 1/16th share measuring 2 Kanals 10 marlas, Khewat No. 50, Khatoni No. 77 measuring 12 kanals 2 marlas to the extent of 5/1536 share. It was alleged that at the time of agreement it was stated by defendant No. 1 that he was owner in possession of the land in dispute vide judgment and decree dated 12.3.1987 passed in Civil Suit No. 120 dated 10.3.1987 titled Balbirv. Bihari Lal. As per terms of the agreement, the total consideration of the land was agreed to be ` 70,000/- out of which` 60,000/- were paid on 22.9.1992 as earnest money, while ` 10,000/- were agreed to be paid on the date of execution of the sale-deed on 15.6.1993 and the possession was delivered to the plaintiff. It was alleged that the plaintiff requested defendant No. 1 several times to perform his part of contract but he avoided the matter by one and other pretext. The plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract. On 15.6.1993, the plaintiff visited the office of Sub Registrar Mahendergarh alongwith the balance sale consideration but defendant No. 1 did not turn up and the plaintiff got marked his presence before Sub Registrar. It was alleged that the plaintiff secretly got transferred the land in dispute by way of consent decree dated 25.9.1992 in civil suit titled Savita v. Dharam Singh in favour of his wife. It was alleged that the defendant No. 1 could not get entered mutation of collusive decree dated 25.9.1992 because the plaintiff had already purchased 1/4th share of the property of defendant No. 1 comprised in Khewat No. 40, Khatoni No. 64 measuring 103 Kanals 10 marlas. It was alleged that the defendant No. 1 could not get entered mutation of collusive decree dated 25.9.1992 because the plaintiff had already purchased 1/4th share of the property of defendant No. 1 comprised in Khewat No. 40, Khatoni No. 64 measuring 103 Kanals 10 marlas. The defendant No. 1 with malafide and dishonest intention alienated the disputed land in favour of defendant No. 3 who was uncle of defendant No. 1 vide sale-deed No. 517 dated 5.6.1993 for consideration of ` 60,000/- and in fact no consideration passed for execution of false sale-deed dated 5.6.1993. On the basis of impugned sale deed dated 5.6.1993 wrong and illegal mutation No. 1230 dated 14.6.1993 has been incorporated and sanctioned in favour of defendant No. 3. The plaintiff requested the defendant No. 1 several times to perform his part of contract dated 22.9.1992 and get set aside the collusive decree dated 25.5.1992 and sale-deed dated 5.6.1993 and mutation No. 1230 dated 14.6.1994 and to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff after getting the balance amount in accordance with terms of agreement dated 22.9.1992 but defendant No. 1 avoided the matter and the plaintiff served a registered notice dated 7.6.1993 upon defendant No. 1 but it was of no avail. It is alleged that in case the court comes to the conclusion that agreement cannot be specifically enforced then decree for recovery of amount of ` 80,000/- be passed in favour of plaintiff including a sum of ` 20,000/- as damages/compensation along with interest and decree of declaration be passed to the effect that the consent decree passed in favour of his wife by defendant No. 1 dated 25.9.1992 and sale deed executed in favour of defendant No. 3 on 5.6.1992 and sale deed executed in favour of defendant No. 3 on 5.6.1993 and mutation No. 1230 dated 14.6.1994 were wrong illegal, null and avoid and have been created and procured by defendant No. 1 along with other defendants for defeating the interest of the plaintiff. 2. Upon notice, defendants No. 2 and 3 appeared and filed their separate written statements. In the written statement filed by defendants No. 2 and 3 similar averments were taken by defendant No. 1. 3. 2. Upon notice, defendants No. 2 and 3 appeared and filed their separate written statements. In the written statement filed by defendants No. 2 and 3 similar averments were taken by defendant No. 1. 3. The defendants denied that defendant No. 1 entered into an agreement dated 22.9.1992 in favour of plaintiff for selling the disputed land and the agreement was false and fabricated document which was based on fraud. It was denied that defendant No. 1 ever entered into an agreement to sell the disputed land to the plaintiff and no earnest money was paid to defendant No. 1 and it was also denied that the date of execution of the sale deed was fixed to be 15.6.1993 and possession of the disputed land was delivered to the plaintiff. It was submitted that defendant No. 1 entered into an agreement to sell dated 30.5.1992 with regard to suit property in favour of defendant No. 3 for consideration of ` 60,000/- and at the time of execution of agreement dated 30.5.1992 an amount of ` 35,000/- as earnest money was paid to defendant No. 1 and possession was delivered to defendant No. 3 on the same day. On 1.10.1992 the period of agreement to sell for the purpose of execution of sale-deed was extended and further amount of ` 15,000/- was paid to defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff has no concern with the property in dispute. It was submitted that on 22.9.1992 Dharm Singh defendant No. 1 was not owner of the disputed land so question of entering into agreement with the plaintiff by defendant No. 1 does not arise. It was averred that on 15.6.1992 plaintiff did not turn up in the office of Sub Registrar along with balance amount. It was reiterated that as there was no agreement between the parties, so question of marking the presence before Sub Registrar by the plaintiff does not arise. It was averred that defendant No. 1 vide Civil Suit No. 1015 of 22.9.1992 decided on 25.9.1992 titled Savita v. Dharm Singh had given the disputed property along with other property to defendant No. 2 and it was denied that mutation of decree could not be effected due to the reason that plaintiff has already purchased the 1/4th share of 103 kanals 10 marlas land. It was denied that defendant No. 3 is uncle of defendant No. 1 and for this reason the land was alienated for defendant No. 1 and for this reason the land was alienated for defeating the interest of plaintiff in the suit property. It was denied that the sale deed dated 5.6.1993 is wrong, illegal and liable to be set aside. Additional pleas regarding maintainability of the suit, limitation, locusstandi, cause of action were also taken. 4. On completion of pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned trial Court:-- "1. Whether defendant No. 1 executed an agreement to sell dated 22.9.1992 in regard to disputed property in favour of plaintiff for total consideration of ` 70000/-? OPP 2. Whether plaintiff paid ` 60,000/- as earnest money to defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 1 failed to perform his part of contract, while plaintiff has been and he is still ready and willing to perform his part of the contract? OPP 3. Whether the judgment and decree in civil suit No. 1015 dated 22.9.1992 decided on 25.9.1992 in case titled Savita v. Dharam Singh is wrong, illegal, null and void and not binding on the rights of the plaintiff? OPP 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPP 5. Whether the plaintiff has filed false and frivolous suit? OPD 6. Whether the suit is time barred? OPD 7. Whether the defendants are entitled for special cost? OPD 8. Relief." 5. To substantiate their respective stands taken, both the parties led their documentary as well as oral evidence. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the evidence brought on record, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that plaintiff has duly proved his case. Accordingly, the suit was decreed vide impugned judgment and decree dated 7.8.2007. Feeling aggrieved, defendant-appellant filed his first appeal which came to be dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Narnaul, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 23.4.2010. Hence this second appeal. 6. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that plaintiff has failed to prove his case. There was no sufficient evidence brought on record to decree the suit. However, since both the learned courts below proceeded on a misconceived approach, while passing the impugned judgments and decrees, the same were not sustainable in law. Hence this second appeal. 6. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that plaintiff has failed to prove his case. There was no sufficient evidence brought on record to decree the suit. However, since both the learned courts below proceeded on a misconceived approach, while passing the impugned judgments and decrees, the same were not sustainable in law. He also contended that the suit was time barred but the learned courts below illegally ignored this material aspect of the matter, while passing their respective impugned judgments. He prays for setting aside the impugned judgments and decrees, by allowing the present appeal. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that after having entered into an agreement to sell dated 22.9.1992 with plaintiff, defendant No. 1 turned dishonest, tried to play smart and suffered a collusive decree in favour of his wife-defendant No. 2 just three days thereafter, i.e. on 25.9.1992. He further sold the suit land in favour of defendant No. 3- present appellant on 5.6.1993. Thus, the defendants connived with each other, proceeded on their common malafide intention and they tried to frustrate the agreement to sell Ex. P1. He further submits that both the learned courts below have rightly appreciated the true facts of the case as well as the evidence available on record, so as to decree the suit of the plaintiff. There was no question of law involved which may warrant any interference at the hands of this Court in second appeal. On the issue of limitation, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that the suit was well within time, having been instituted on 14.6.1996 because pursuant to the agreement to sell, target date for execution of sale-deed was 15.6.1993. He prays for dismissal of the appeal. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, after careful perusal of record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions advanced, this Court is of the considered opinion that in the given fact situation of the present case, no interference is warranted at the hands of this Court, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC' for short). To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter. 9. To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter. 9. It is a matter of record and not in dispute that defendant No. 1 entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 on 22.9.1992 vide Ex. PI. The total sale consideration for the suit land was agreed at ` 70,000/-. As per the terms of agreement to sell, out of the total sale consideration of ` 70,000/-, an amount of ` 60,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to defendant No. 1 by way of earnest money, whereas remaining amount of ` 10,000/- was agreed to be paid on the date of execution of the sale-deed, i.e. 15.6.1993. 10. Immediately after agreement to sell dated 22.9.1992, defendant No. 1 got filed a civil suit against none else but himself by his own wife-defendant No. 2. A collusive decree was passed within a period of three days, i.e. on 25.9.1992, whereby defendant No. 1 transferred the suit property in favour of his wife Smt. Savita-defendant No. 2. As if defendant No. 1 was not satisfied by suffering the above-said collusive decree in favour of his wife qua the suit land, he sold the suit land vide sale-deed dated 5.6.1993 for an amount of ` 60,000/- in favour of defendant No. 3- present appellant. 11. Another important fact to be noticed herein is that defendant No. 3-appellant was none else but real uncle of defendant No. 1 and both were living together. Thus, it becomes crystal clear that after having turned dishonest, defendants made every possible effort to frustrate the agreement to sell Ex. P1. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that both the learned courts below committed no error of law, while passing their respective impugned judgments and the same deserve to be upheld. 12. Truth is the fountain head of our judicial system. A dishonest litigant has no place in a court of law. Over all conduct of the parties to the litigation has always been a relevant factor for consideration of the courts. As noticed hereinabove, after having entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiff for an amount of ` 70,000/- as sale consideration, defendant No. 1 received an amount of ` 60,000/- on the same day, as earnest money and handed over the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. As noticed hereinabove, after having entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiff for an amount of ` 70,000/- as sale consideration, defendant No. 1 received an amount of ` 60,000/- on the same day, as earnest money and handed over the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. The target date for execution of sale-deed was fixed as 15.6.1993. 13. However, defendants including the present appellant, all of whom were from the same family, conspired and colluded with each other, committed more than one illegal acts in furtherance of their common malafide intention, with a view to frustrate the agreement to sell dated 22.9.1992, to the detriment of plaintiff-respondent. Thus, it can be safely concluded that defendants including the present appellant were playing fraud not only with the plaintiff-respondent but with the court also. In the given fact situation of the present case, a collusive decree dated 25.9.1992 was nothing less than a fraud on the court as well as on the plaintiff. By doing so, defendants including the present appellant have rendered themselves totally disentitled, for any kind of relief at the hands of this Court. 14. Fraud vitiates every thing. It was so held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P. Changalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, 1994(1) R.R.R. 253 : 1994 (1) SCC 1 . The relevant observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras, 1, 7 and 8 of the judgment, which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:-- "Fraud-avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and nonest in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree by the first court or by the highest court - has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. xxxx xxxx The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went hay-wire and made observations which are wholly perverse. xxxx xxxx The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went hay-wire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that "there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence". The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Propertygrabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex. B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants-defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Ex. B-15 and nonsuited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party." 15. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jagannath's case (supra) has been consistently followed in the later judgments as well. 16. Coming to the issue of limitation, the learned trial Court while deciding issue No. 6, recorded cogent findings in para 25 of the impugned judgment and the same reads as under:-- "Counsel of defendant submitted that suit of plaintiff is time barred because plaintiff in cross examination has admitted that he got knowledge of the collusive decree dated 1 1/2 months. He submitted that period of limitation started from the date of knowledge of plaintiff and present suit was filed on 14.6.1996. He received knowledge that defendant No. 1 alienated the disputed property in favour of his wife defendant No. 2 Plaintiff in support of his contention referred case law titled Jagir Kaur v. Pal Singh (supra). The facts of above case are distinguishable to the case in hand. In case in hand decree has not been challenged by parties to the same decree. The interest of plaintiff were prejudicially affected when 1st date of specific performance of contract Ex. PI came to existence, but other party did not turn up. This is what Article 54 of Indian Limitation Act says. Similarly law was laid down by Hon'ble High Court in case Bhagwan Singh v. Teja Singh (supra) to the effect that period of limitation of 3 years would start from the date fixed for performance of contract. PI came to existence, but other party did not turn up. This is what Article 54 of Indian Limitation Act says. Similarly law was laid down by Hon'ble High Court in case Bhagwan Singh v. Teja Singh (supra) to the effect that period of limitation of 3 years would start from the date fixed for performance of contract. On 15.6.2003 defendant No. 1 did not turn up, hence cause of action started and within the 3 years it was filed on 14.6.96. With regard to collusive decree dated 25.9.92 it was no concern of plaintiff till the date of specific performance of contract arrived as fixed by terms of agreement Ex. PI. When other party failed to perform his part of contract on the last date plaintiff challenged not only the alienation affected by collusive decree by defendant No. 1, but other alienation also which was got done by defendant No. 1 vide sale deed Ex. P7. Hence in my view suit was filed within period of 3 years and therefore, it is not bared by period of limitation. Consequently issue No. 6 is answered in favour of plaintiff and against the defendants". 17. Admittedly, the target date agreed between the parties for getting the sale-deed executed, pursuant to the agreement to sell was fixed as 15.6.1993. Plaintiff was challenging the decree dated 25.9.1992 as well as sale deed dated 5.6.1993 alleging that the same were based on fraud. In such a situation. Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will not be attracted. It is so said, because in view of the given fact situation of the present case, the case would be covered by Section 17 of the Limitation Act and Article 59 of the Limitation Act would apply. Thus, it is held that the suit of the plaintiff was well within limitation and the learned courts below have rightly appreciated the true facts of the case in the correct perspective as well as the law of limitation applicable to the facts of the present case, because of which, the impugned judgments and decrees deserve to be upheld, for this reason also. 18. 18. Before arriving at a judicious conclusion, the learned Additional District Judge, Narnaul, rightly appreciated the true facts of the case as well as the evidence available on record, while recording his cogent findings in paras 10 to 17 of the impugned judgment and the relevant part of the impugned judgment in paras 11 to 14, reads as under:-- "After seeking permission to lead secondary evidence to prove agreements dated 30.5.1992 and 1.10.1992 defendants examined DW3 Chand Ram and affidavit EX.DW3/A was produced. DW3 disclosed that a stamp paper for extension of time was purchased on 1.10.1992 by defendant Dharm Singh for executing the extension of time agreement in favour of defendant No. 3 and as such according to D W3 a stamp paper was purchased on 1.10.1992 for executing the extension of time for agreement whereas defendant No. 3 in his testimony as DW2 disclosed in his affidavit Ex. DW2/A that on 1.10.1992 another agreement was written and then after it is disclosed that under both the agreement dated 30.5.1992 and 1.10.1992 Dharm Singh defendant No. 1 had received ` 50,000/- as cash. Now the testimony of DW2 and DW3 are self-contradictory because according to DW2 the agreement dated 1.10.1992 was not the agreement for extension of time rather it was additional agreement whereas according to DW3 the stamp paper was purchased for agreement with respect to extension of time. DW3 stamp vendor admitted that on 30.5.1992 he did not sell any stamp paper for agreement to defendant No. 1 Dharm Singh and again stated that he cannot say as to whether on the stamp paper purchased on 1.10.1992 any agreement was written or not and as such again it is clear that defendant No. 3 could not prove that from whom the stamp papers for the alleged agreement dated 30.5.1992 were purchased. However, to prove the existence of agreement DW2 claimed that agreement was scribed by Prithivi Singh and this Prithvi Singh was examined as DWS deed-writer and DW5 stated that the sale-deed Ex. DW1/A was written by him and again stated that in his register whose extract is placed an record Ex. DW5/A there is a reference of agreement dated 1.10.1992. The extract Ex. DW1/A was written by him and again stated that in his register whose extract is placed an record Ex. DW5/A there is a reference of agreement dated 1.10.1992. The extract Ex. D5/A of the register of DW5 reflects that at serial No. 304 dated 1.10.1992 there is the reference of agreement regarding extension of time but there is addition in this entry regarding payment of ` 35,000/- on 30.5.1990 and then after there is a entry of ` 15000/- and date mentioned is 30.6.1993. Date 30.6.1993 was a date subsequent to. 1.10.1992 and as such mentioning the date as 30.6.1993 against the amount of ` 15000/- in the deed-writer register EX.D5/A itself reflects the manipulation of agreement dated 30.5.1990 as according to defendant No. 3 ` 35,000/- were paid an 30.5.1990 and ` 15000/- were paid an 1.10.1992 and as such if ` 15,000/- were paid on 1.10.1992 then there is no explanation as to how the date was mentioned as 30.6.1993 and when there is addition certainly one is bound to infer that addition was made in D5/A and deed writer DW5 admitted in his cross-examination that no agreement dated 30.5.1992 was scribed by DW5 and DW5 again stated that he did not see the agreement dated 30.5.1992. DW5 has proved the extract of register Ex. D5/A and in the entry Ex. D5/A there is no reference of agreement dated 30.5.1992 rather reference with respect to the payment of ` 35,000/-dated 30.5.1990 is there and as such it is established on record that no agreement came into existence on 30.5.1990 as no stamp or deed-writer has been examined so as to prove that any agreement came into existence either on 30.5.1990 or 30.5.1992. However, one glaring thing is again there as in the sale-deed Ex. However, one glaring thing is again there as in the sale-deed Ex. P7 there is a reference of agreement dated 30.5.1990 and agreement dated 1.10.1992 but the witnesses are deposing with respect to the agreement dated 30.5.1992 and later on vide order dated 19.7.2007 the amendment was sought that the agreement dated 30.5.92 be substituted as 30.5.1990 but after amendment no fresh evidence was given and as such contradictory evidence is there as vide order dated 19.4.2007 permission for secondary evidence was sought for agreement dated 30.5.1992 whereas no agreement dated 30.5.1992 could be proved and similarly after seeking amendment neither the existence of agreement dated 30.5.1992 nor the agreement dated 30.5.1990 introduced by way of amendment, could be proved. The defendants No. 1 to 3, are from one and the same family and according to defendant No. 3 defendants No. 1 to 3 are related to each other as defendant No. 3 when appeared as DW2admitted that defendant No. 1 is real nephew of defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 2 is wife of defendant No. 1 and DW2 again admitted that he is issueless and is residing with defendant No. 2 and as such when DW2 is issueless and is residing with defendants No. 1 and 2 it was very easy to have colluded and have procured the sale-deed EX.DW1/A while showing the earlier transaction dated 30.5.1990 with a view to frustrate the fruits of Ex. P1 favour of the plaintiff. In addition to this if the decree had been suffered by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 on 25.9.1992 defendant No. 1 was no more owner of the land and was not competent to transfer the title in favour of defendant No. 3 while executing the sale deed Ex. P7/DWl/A on 5.6.1993 because after suffering the decree dated 25.9.1992 defendant No. 1 had no title to transfer to defendant No. 3 vide sale deed dated 5.6.1993 and as such if the decree dated 25.9.1992 was suffered by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 on 5.6.1993 defendant No. 1 could not pass any title in favour of defendant No. 3 by way of sale-deed Ex. P7 and as such the successive attempts were made by the defendants while in collusion with each other to frustrate the fruits of agreement Ex. P1 as after executing the agreement Ex. P7 and as such the successive attempts were made by the defendants while in collusion with each other to frustrate the fruits of agreement Ex. P1 as after executing the agreement Ex. P1, defendant No. 1 got filed the suit against himself through his wife defendant No. 2 and that suit was got decreed within three days and later on apprehending that the decree suffered in this manner may not be sustained before the court in a civil suit for specific performance again sale deed dated 5.6.1993 was manipulated wherein the existence of earlier agreements dated 30.5.1990 and agreement dated 1.10.1992 was shown whereas existence of none of these documents could be established on record. When the existence of agreement dated 1.10.1992 or 30.5.1990 could not be proved certainly the sale-deed EX.P7 cannot be said to be based on prior agreement in favour of defendant No. 3 executed prior to agreement Ex. P1 in favour of the plaintiff and as such the sale-deed EX.P7 is proved to be result of collusion and was procured as a result of collusion in between defendant No. I and 3 and as such the sale deeds in favour of defendant No. 3 and decree in favour of defendant No. 2 are mere paper transactions and were manipulated with a view to defeat the rights of the plaintiff." 19. During the course of hearing, learned senior counsel for the appellant failed to point out any jurisdictional error or patent illegality apparent on the record of the case, in either of the impugned judgments. He also failed to put into service any substantive argument, so as to convince this Court to take a different view than the one taken by the learned courts below. Further, no question of law much less substantial question of law has been found involved in the present case, which is sine qua non for interference at the hands of this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100CPC. Thus, the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned courts below deserve to be upheld, for this reason as well. 20. No other argument was raised. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that the present appeal is misconceived, bereft of merit and without any substance. Thus, it must fail. 20. No other argument was raised. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that the present appeal is misconceived, bereft of merit and without any substance. Thus, it must fail. No case for interference has been made out. Consequently, the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned courts below are upheld. Resultantly, the instant appeal stands dismissed. Pending application also stands disposed of. No costs.