Mahesh Yadav @ Bahira v. State of Bihar, Through The Principal Secretary, Home (police) Department
2014-11-19
AMARESH KUMAR LAL, DHARNIDHAR JHA
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
Order Dharnidhar Jha, J. Heard. The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking the quashing of orders contained in Annexure-3 dated 12.06.2014, passed by the District Magistrate, Patna consequent upon which the government had finally passed an order contained in Annexure-5 directing the detention of the petitioner up to 11.06.2015. An order contained in Annexure-4 was also passed by the Government of Bihar approving of the initial detention order dated 12.06.2014, passed by the District Magistrate, Patna contained in Annexure-3. 2. The ground upon which the detention order was passed was Kadirganj P.S. Case No. 79 of 2013 under various sections of the Indian Penal Code including Section 307, some sections of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Sections 10/11/13 of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967. The cases which were cited as criminal antecedents of the petitioner were Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 11 of 2013 under Sections 395 of the Indian Penal Code and Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 89 of 2013 under Sections 395 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code in which the petitioner had not been named as an accused and it is not controverted that he was implicated through confessional statements of co-accused. 3. The District Magistrate, Patna had perused the report submitted to him by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna by his Letter No. 119/DCB, dated 16.01.2014 which had as its annexure Letter No. 40/13, dated 07.01.2014 of the Dy. S.P., Masaurhi. The District Magistrate on the basis of the above documents noted that the petitioner was a notorious, professional and accomplished criminal whose activities had affected Masaurhi area of Patna district and further, that the petitioner was a professional dacoit whose pastime was to keep fire arms. In addition to the above, it was also stated that the petitioner had formed a gang of criminals which was engaged in committing crimes so as to terrorizing the society and upsetting its peaceful environment. It was lastly observed by the District Magistrate that the petitioner was in custody and he was attempting to get released from it by obtaining order of bail. Annexure-3 which is a long order and contains the extracts of the report submitted by the police officer also. Being satisfied on the basis of those documents, the District Magistrate directed the petitioner to be detained in custody. 4.
Annexure-3 which is a long order and contains the extracts of the report submitted by the police officer also. Being satisfied on the basis of those documents, the District Magistrate directed the petitioner to be detained in custody. 4. The solitary contention was that if a person was in custody, his detention could not be ordered unless he was attempting to get out of custody by virtue of an order of bail passed by a competent court. In support of the contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before us the decision of this Court in Kaushal Mahto Vs. State of Bihar reported in 2014 (4) PLJR 204 in which it has been observed after relying upon some of the decisions of the Supreme Court which had been discussed in paragraphs no. 12 and 13 of the judgment that an order of detention in respect of a person who is already in custody is not sustainable in law unless there could be some grounds to support the detention on the basis that the legally confined detenue was attempting to get out of jail by virtue of an order of bail passed by a court. 5. We have referred to the grounds in appropriate details and the factual data which were taken into consideration for passing the order and we find it undisputed that the petitioner was in custody on the day the impugned detention order was passed. However, the last line of paragraph-2 of the detention order itself indicates that the petitioner was attempting to come out of prison by getting an order of bail from any competent court. This line of observation could have obstructed granting the relief which was sought by the petitioner in the present petition, but we have some other circumstances appearing from the facts of the case. 6. The solitary case which was the basis for passing the detention order of the petitioner was dated 26.07.2013 in which the petitioner was definitely named as an accused. We do not have any hesitation in pointing out that a solitary case may not be sufficient for passing a detention order because if an authority was inclined to detain a person, it was required of him to hold the person either a habitual offender or an anti-social element. A habitual offender presupposes the quick and regular indulgence of a person in commission of a crime.
A habitual offender presupposes the quick and regular indulgence of a person in commission of a crime. The frequency in commission of crimes which could be detrimental to the peace and well being of the society should not be ignored but something which may be manifest from the meaning of the word 'frequent' has to be shown as regards the criminal acts committed by the person. It should be as a matter of vocation or calling which a person could have adopted for sustaining his life and thereby putting the society at stake. Solitary instance of being accused in a case, as such, has not been held to be good ground for sustaining the detention order. 7. As regards the antecedents of the petitioner, we find that the two cases, i.e., Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 11 of 2013 and Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 89 of 2013 were against unknown and the submission was that the petitioner's name was implicated in both the cases through confessions of one accused or the other. Thus, there was no concrete fact showing that indeed the petitioner had indulged into commission of dacoity or had caused injuries during the course of commission of dacoity. The third reason which appears to us is the stale nature of the ground. The date of occurrence of Kadirganj P.S. Case No. 79 of 2013 was 26.08.2013 and the detention order was passed on 12.06.2014, that's, almost after ten months of the commission of the offence. Besides being the solitary instance of a criminal activity in which the petitioner was cited as an accused, the time period which had elapsed in between the commission of the offence and passing of the detention order was rendering it not proximate to the alleged commission of the offence by the petitioner. Staleness of an order of detention, in our opinion, could be sufficient enough to set aside such an order. 8. On the grounds which we have just noticed from the facts of the case we find that the present petition is meritorious. It is accordingly, allowed. The orders contained in Annexures 3, 4 and 5 are hereby set aside. Let petitioner Mahesh Yadav @ Bahira be released forthwith from custody, if he is not wanted in any other case.