Judgment : 1. The petitioners in both the Writ Petitions have challenged the Award, dated 23-03-2005, made in Claim Petition Nos.135 of 1992 and 155 of 1992 of the Labour Court Tirunelveli, dismissing their Claim Petitions. 2. The brief facts, which are common to both the Writ Petitions, are as follows: The petitioners are workers in the Tuticorin Port Trust. In 1983, after negotiations, a settlement under section 12(3) was entered into between the management and the unions of which the petitioners are members. As per the terms of the settlement, the workers were entitled to incentives for handling cargo in addition to their regular load. The incentive was fixed based on the basic wage of the shore worker. Subsequently, another settlement was arrived at, on 11.4.1984, whereby the earlier settlement was revised, but the revised basic wage was decided not to be considered for fixing the incentives for cargo lifting. Another settlement was entered into, on 12.06.1989 and though the incentive rates were revised, the revised basic rates were agreed not to be considered for calculating incentives. Aggrieved over the same, the above said Claim Petitions were filed. The Claim Petitions were initially rejected as not maintainable and after the orders of this Court, the same were again taken on record and decided. After hearing all the parties, by order, dated 23.03.2005, the Claim Petitions were dismissed by the Labour Court. Aggrieved by the said Award, the petitioners have filed these Writ Petitions. 3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that despite the fact that the incentive rates have been increased, the same was calculated on the basic wage rage fixed in the year 1983. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that once the wage rate is increased, the incentives have to be calculated based on the revised wage rate. The learned Senior Counsel also laid emphasis on the saving clause 23 of the settlements entered into in the year 1984 and 1989. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that the benefits conferred under clause 12(3) settlement is more advantageous, which will have a overriding effect even on the national level settlement. The learned Senior Counsel also attributed the delay in the challenge to the Award on the union leaders contending that the petitioners were under the impression that their Claim Petitions were still pending. The learned Senior Counsel also attributed the delay in the challenge to the Award on the union leaders contending that the petitioners were under the impression that their Claim Petitions were still pending. The learned Senior Counsel further assailed the Award of the Labour Court contending that the Award has been passed by just following the counter and therefore sought the setting aside of the Award. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the Port Trust would contend that the Award of the Labour Court is sound and warrants no interference. The learned counsel further contended that the fact that basic wages was agreed not to be considered while refixing the incentive rates is evident from the agreements entered into in the year 1984 and 1989. The learned counsel further contended that as per clause 15 only incentive rate was agreed to be revised by 14 %. Having accepted all the benefits of the agreement, the petitioners cannot be permitted to contend that the incentives have to be calculated on the revised basic wage rate. The learned counsel further contended that a reference to the demand of the petitioners was made to the Chairman as per the terms of the settlement. The Chairman has already clarified that the incentive can be calculated only at base output and the same has also been confirmed by the Ministry of shipping and Transport, Government of India. The learned counsel also contended that the Writ Petitions are not maintainable on the ground of laches, as the Award of the Labour Court has been challenged after six years. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the Port Trust makes reliance upon the following Judgments:- (i). Herbertsons Limited, Vs. The Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and others, reported in 1976 4 SCC 736 ; (ii).Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., reported in AIR 1990 SC 1801 ; (iii). T.I.Cycles of India, Ambattur, Vs. M.K.Gurumani, reported in AIR 2001 SC 3465; (iv). State of U.P. and another Vs. Brijpal Singh, reported in 2005 (8) SCC 58 ; (v).Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. T.T.Murali Babu, reported in 2014 (1) LLN 559 [SC]. 6. I have considered the above submissions and perused the records carefully. 7. Before going into the merits of the case, the issue of laches is taken up. The Award was passed, on 23.03.2005. Brijpal Singh, reported in 2005 (8) SCC 58 ; (v).Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. T.T.Murali Babu, reported in 2014 (1) LLN 559 [SC]. 6. I have considered the above submissions and perused the records carefully. 7. Before going into the merits of the case, the issue of laches is taken up. The Award was passed, on 23.03.2005. The present Writ Petitions have been filed in the year 2011, i.e., after six years. The petitioners have contended that they were not aware of the Award and all along the union leaders have been projecting as if the claim is still pending. This Court is unable to accept the reasons for delay. The Claim Petition is of the year 1992. The Claim Petitions were filed by the individuals and not by the Union. On 08.11.2004, this Court allowed the Writ Petitions filed against the earlier order of the Labour Court on maintainability and directed the Labour Court to dispose of the Claim Petitions within three months. Accepting the order of this Court, the petitioners cannot now, for the sake of maintaining the Writ Petition, put the blame on Union Leaders. It can also be seen that out of 75 claimants, only 6 of them have come forward to challenge the Award belatedly after 6 years. Therefore, it can only be inferred that initially they had accepted the Award and as an after though these Writ Petitions have been filed. When a case is filed by the petitioners in their individual capacity, it is for them to meticulously follow the same. 8. In the Judgment in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. T.T.Murali Babu, reported in 2014 (1) LLN 559 [SC], the Apex Court has held as under: 13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and others the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall, and John Kemp, which is as follows: - "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall, and John Kemp, which is as follows: - "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 14. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar8, while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person's entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct. 15. In State of M.P. and others etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc. etc. 15. In State of M.P. and others etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc. etc. the Court observed that it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been further stated therein that if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice. 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons -who compete with 'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold." 9. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court fits the four corners of this case. The reasons given by the petitioners are inexplicable. If there is no response from the union leaders, they could have very well contacted the counsel. It is strange that none of 75 claims had taken any initiative in the last six years to know the status of their claim. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the claim of the petitioner is unsustainable on the ground of laches. 10. Now, going into the merits of the case, as evident from the settlement entered in the year 1983, the incentive rate was fixed taking into consideration the basic wage rate. In subsequent settlements, only the incentive rates were revised. 11. Clause 15 of the 12 (3) Settlement dated 01.01.1984 reads as under; "The rates of existing Incentive/Payment by Results Schemes will be revised by 14 percent and the revised rates will be made applicable from 1st January, 1984. In subsequent settlements, only the incentive rates were revised. 11. Clause 15 of the 12 (3) Settlement dated 01.01.1984 reads as under; "The rates of existing Incentive/Payment by Results Schemes will be revised by 14 percent and the revised rates will be made applicable from 1st January, 1984. The demands for revision of such schemes to new categories will be discussed by the Port Trusts and Dock Labour Boards locally with the concerned Unions. Such schemes wherever introduced will be made applicable prospectively from the date of agreement." 12. The above clause reveals that only the incentive rate has been revised. Nothing is mentioned about the basic wage rate. In fact, the clause reveals that the demands for revision to new categories will be discussed locally. 13. clause 18 of the settlement, dated 12.06.1989, reads as follows: "The demand for revision of piece-rates and incentive rates under the existing Payment by Results Schemes will be discussed and settled separately." 14. It is clear from the above clause that not only the incentive revision but also the piece rates were also agreed to be decided later. Even before any decision could be taken, the claim petitions have been filed. 15. The petitioners have relied upon clause 23 and pari materia clause 19 of the settlements, which read as under: "Protection of Existing Benefits: Merely as a consequence of the implementation of this settlement, any facility, privilege, amenity, right, benefit, monetary or otherwise, or concession to which an employee or a category of employees might be entitled to by way of any Award, practice, or usage, shall not be withdrawn, reduced or curtailed, except to the extent and manner as explicitly provided for in this Settlement." 16. The Labour Court, after considering the above clause, had held that the protection under the clause is not applicable to a settlement. This Court finds no reasons to interfere with the same. The settlement is arrived at on consensus. It is not based on practice or usage. The right of incentive was not taken away in the settlement entered in the year 1984. It could be seen that the rate of incentives have been increased by 14% granting more benefits to the shore workers. Greedy, they wanted the same to be fixed based on their revised basic wage rates. It is not based on practice or usage. The right of incentive was not taken away in the settlement entered in the year 1984. It could be seen that the rate of incentives have been increased by 14% granting more benefits to the shore workers. Greedy, they wanted the same to be fixed based on their revised basic wage rates. Obviously, if that was the intent, then either the same would have been specifically mentioned in the settlement or the management would not have agreed for increasing the incentive rates, as the incentive received by the employee would automatically get increased by calculating the same at revised basic wage rate with incentive as constant. Therefore, there is no irregularity in the Award of the Labour Court in treating the incentive rate as variable and the basic wage rate in the year 1983 as constant. Further, as rightly pointed out by the Labour Court, the demand of the petitioners was rejected by the Chairman and the order of Chairman was also confirmed by the Ministry, which warrants no interference. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, the petitioners cannot accept one portion of the settlement and challenge the other portion. 17. In the Judgment in Herbertsons Limited, Vs. The Workmen of Herbert sons Limited and others, reported in 1976 4 SCC 736 , the Apex Court has held as follows: "27. It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad. Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settlement as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court the third respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired and we are informed that the employer and the third respondent are negotiating another settlement with further improvements. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired and we are informed that the employer and the third respondent are negotiating another settlement with further improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement." 18. In the Judgment in Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., reported in AIR 1990 SC 1801 1, the Apex Court has held as follows: "9. The settlement does not make any specific mention about the age of retirement. Clause 19 of the settlement, however, provides that such terms and conditions of service as are not changed under this settlement shall remain unchanged and operative for the period of the settlement. The age of retirement prescribed by clause 20 of the certified Standing Orders was undoubtedly a condition of service which was kept intact by clause 19 of the settlement. The provisions of the Standing Orders Act to which we have adverted earlier clearly show that the purpose of the certified Standing Orders is to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment of workman and to acquaint them with the same. The charter of demands contained several matters touching the conditions of service including the one concerning the upward revision of the age of retirement. After deliberation certain conditions were altered while in respect of others no change was considered necessary. In the case of the latter clause 19 was introduced making it clear that the conditions of service which have not been changed shall remain unchanged, i.e. they will continue as they are. That means that the demand in respect of revision of the age of retirement was not acceded to. 10. By clause 21 of the settlement extracted earlier the Union agreed that during the period of the operation of the settlement they shall not raise any demand which would throw an additional financial burden on the management, other than bonus. Of course the proviso to that clause exempted matters covered under Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act from the application of the said clause. Of course the proviso to that clause exempted matters covered under Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act from the application of the said clause. However, Section 9-A is not attracted in the present case. The High Court was, therefore, right in observing: "when the settlement had been arrived at between the workmen and the company and which is still in force, the parties are to remain bound by the terms of the said settlement. It is only after the settlement is terminated that the parties can raise any dispute for fresh adjudication." The argument that the upward revision of the age of superannuation will not entail any financial burden cannot be accepted. The High Court rightly points out : "workmen who remain in service for a longer period have to be paid a larger amount by way of salary, bonus and gratuity than workmen who may newly join in place of retiring men". The High Court was, therefore, right in concluding that the upward revision of the age of superannuation would throw an additional financial burden on the management in violation of clause 21 of the settlement. Therefore, during the operation of the settlement it was not open to the workmen to demand a change in clause 20 of the certified Standing Orders because any upward revision of the age of superannuation would come in conflict with clauses 19 and 21 of the settlement. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the High Court is unassailable." 19. In the Judgment in T.I.Cycles of India, Ambattur, Vs. M.K.Gurumani, reported in AIR 2001 SC 3465, the Apex Court, while dealing with Incentive Bonus Scheme, has held as follows; "16. Incentive payment is based on two components: group performance index and individual/sectional performance index. It was made clear that no incentive will be payable to workmen on leave, absent, away from duty or on holidays. The minimum performance level is indicated in each sectional incentive table and below which no incentive will be paid for any reason whatsoever. If a person works for more than one group during the month, he will be awarded incentive as per the performance of each group in the respective periods. The minimum performance level is indicated in each sectional incentive table and below which no incentive will be paid for any reason whatsoever. If a person works for more than one group during the month, he will be awarded incentive as per the performance of each group in the respective periods. Clause 9.1 also sets out that incentive payment payable under the Scheme will not be regarded as wages and, therefore, the payment shall not be taken into account for the purpose of leave wages, overtime wages, wages in lieu of notice, provident fund contributions, bonus, gratuity or any other allowance. However, this clause is subject to review in case of statutory amendments, if any. 17. The authorities were carried away by considering that the bonus is payable on the basis of output equivalent to certain pieces per man day. But it is made clear in the Scheme that each payment will be made not on the basis of pieces of per man day nor is it a piece-rate work for which wages are paid but it is an additional incentive for payment of bonus in respect of extra work done. The measure of extra work done is indicated by pieces and not wages as such that are paid on that basis. It is not that in respect of each piece any wages are paid but altogether if certain number of pieces are produced, additional incentive will be payable at a particular rate. Therefore, the authorities have completely missed the scope of the scheme and have incorrectly interpreted the same. Inasmuch as both the High Court and the authorities have incorrectly understood the position in law and have wrongly held that the concept of "wages" under the Act would include bonus and that even on facts the Scheme would attract Section 4(2) of the Act. Proviso to Section 4(2) of the Act is to the effect that in case of a piece-rated employee, daily wages shall be computed in a particular manner but that is not the rate at which the wages are paid in the present case at all. Therefore, Section 4(2) of the Act is not attracted in the case of the present Scheme with which we are concerned. 18. Hence this appeal is allowed setting aside the orders made by the authorities and the High Court. Therefore, Section 4(2) of the Act is not attracted in the case of the present Scheme with which we are concerned. 18. Hence this appeal is allowed setting aside the orders made by the authorities and the High Court. If the payments have already been made to the respective respondents in terms of the orders made by the authorities, we do not think, we should disturb the same in these proceedings which have been mainly filed for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of law and the scheme. Therefore, no recovery shall be effected in respect of payments that may have been made pursuant to the orders under appeal." 20. The ratio laid down in the above judgments is squarely applicable to the present case also. Even after the settlements of the years, 1984 and 1989, many settlements have been entered into by the management and the employees without touching the issue of basic rates and incentives together. The same is binding on the petitioners also. As already stated, the petitioner have accepted all the other benefits including the increase in incentive rate, and therefore, they cannot now seek a revision of the same based on basic wage. Incentive is not a right. It is only a grant to motivate to do extra work. The incentive here is given in addition to the minimum rate. In other words, it is given only to person, who do extra lifting to encourage them. Therefore, there can only be a revision of either the incentive or the basic wage but not the both. 21. The learned counsel appearing for the Port Trust has also relied upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in State of U.P. and another Vs. Brijpal Singh, reported in 2005 (8) SCC 58 to reiterate that the Claim Petition is not maintainable. However, since the Claim Petition was entertained after the earlier orders of this Court, which was not taken on appeal, this Court is of the view that it is not necessary to go into the maintainability of the Claim Petition. 22. For the reasons stated above, this Court finds no valid reasons to interfere with the Award of the Labour Court, Tirunelveli, dated 23.03.2005, made in C.P.Nos.135 and 155 of 1992. Hence, the Writ Petitions are dismissed. No costs.