JUDGMENT : Indira Banerjee, J. These appeals, being CRA 633 of 2009, hereinafter referred to as the first appeal, and CRA 646 of 2009, hereinafter referred to as the second appeal, are against the judgment dated 30th July, 2009 and the order dated 31st July, 2009 passed by the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Bankura, in Sessions Trial No.1 of November 2006, corresponding to Sessions Case No.26 of May 2006, whereby the appellants in the first appeal, Ramesh Pain, Sova Pain and Kanchan Pain, and the appellant in the second appeal, Nanda Chatterjee, have been convicted under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life, in addition to fine of Rs. 2,000/- each, in default of payment whereof, they would have to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months. 2. The accused appellant No.3 in the second appeal, Kanchan Pain, is the husband of the deceased, Rumpa Pain, and the accused appellant Nos.1 and 2 in the said appeal, Ramesh Pain and Sova Pain are his father and mother respectively. The accused appellant in the second appeal, Nanda Chatterjee is accused appellant Kanchan Pains cousin (mothers brothers son). 3. The de facto complainant, in this case, is the father of the deceased. The de facto complainant and the accused appellants were next door neighbours. It is the case of the prosecution that the deceased, Rumpa, had a love marriage with accused appellant Kanchan Pain. The marriage was by registration before the Marriage Registrar concerned. 4. The marriage was socially solemnised sometime in the month of April 2000. At the time of social solemnisation of the marriage, the accused appellant Nos.1 and 2, in the second appeal, being the parents-in-law of Rumpa, allegedly demanded Rs. 1,00,000/- in cash, apart from other valuables. 5. After marriage, Rumpa started residing in her matrimonial home, along with her husband, accused appellant Kanchan Pain and other members of his family. 6. It is the case of the prosecution that the de facto complainant could not pay the entire sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- demanded by the parents-in-law of the deceased, but could pay only Rs. 55,000/-. 7. 5. After marriage, Rumpa started residing in her matrimonial home, along with her husband, accused appellant Kanchan Pain and other members of his family. 6. It is the case of the prosecution that the de facto complainant could not pay the entire sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- demanded by the parents-in-law of the deceased, but could pay only Rs. 55,000/-. 7. It is the further case of the prosecution, that Rumpa used to be tortured by her husband and her in-laws, for the remaining part of the dowry and whenever she visited her parents she would tell them of the torture inflicted upon her. 8. On 12th August, 2005, at about 12 mid-night, accused appellant Kanchan Pain, being the husband of the deceased, came to the residence of the de facto complainant and informed him that Rumpa had hanged herself. 9. Immediately on hearing this, the de facto complainant went to the residence of the accused appellants, along with others, and found Rumpa lying on a bed, facing the ceiling with her eyes open, and accused appellant Kanchan Pain fanning her. The deceased was later taken to hospital where she was declared brought dead. 10. Inquest was carried out over the body of the deceased. The inquest report reveals that the deceased, Rumpa, appeared to be pregnant. The report also indicates that there was white substance oozing from her mouth. However to ascertain the actual cause of death, the Officer-in-charge, Bankura Police Station was directed to arrange for Post Mortem examination of the dead body. 11. Post Mortem was conducted. The post mortem report indicates that the death was due to the effect of asphyxia, ante mortem in nature. However, further opinion was to be given on receipt of the chemical examination report. The post mortem report reveals that there was one pale indistinct non-continuous ligature mark on the neck, above the hyoid and the throat. 12. On 13th August 2005, the de facto complainant lodged a complaint in the Bankura Police Station, pursuant to which Bankura Police Station Case No.201/05 dated 3rd August, 2005 was started under Sections 498A/304B/302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. 13. After investigation was completed, the learned Judicial Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions, where the case was registered as Sessions Case No.26 of 2006. 13. After investigation was completed, the learned Judicial Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions, where the case was registered as Sessions Case No.26 of 2006. The learned Sessions Judge later transferred the case to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Bankura, after which charges were framed under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, against the accused appellants in these appeals and against one Bacchu alias Durlav Nag, who has been acquitted by the learned Sessions Court. 14. The accused appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The Sessions Case was re-numbered as Sessions Trial No.1 of 2006. In course of the trial the prosecution examined about 16 witnesses. 15. The de facto complainant, being the father of the deceased, deposed as the first prosecution witness. He deposed that the marriage of the deceased, Rumpa, which was initially a registered marriage, was socially solemnised in a temple, according to religious rites, in April 2000. At the time of the social ceremony, the accused appellant No.1, in the second appeal, Ramesh Chandra Pain, father-in-law of the deceased, demanded dowry of Rs. 1,00,000/- in cash, out of which the de facto complainant could pay only Rs. 55,000/-. 16. This witness deposed that, after the social solemnisation of the marriage, as per religious rites, the deceased Rumpa started living in her matrimonial home, along with the accused appellants, that is, her parents-in-law, her husband Kanchan and his aforesaid cousin Nandalal Chatterjee (mothers brothers son). From the evidence on record, it appears that the de facto complainant and the accused appellants were next door neighbours. 17. The first prosecution witness deposed that all the accused appellants, i.e. Rumpas husband, Kanchan Pain, his parents, Ramesh Pain and Sova Pain as well as his cousin, Nandalal Chatterjee (mothers brothers son), accused appellant in the first appeal, tortured the deceased, as the de facto complainant had not been able to pay the balance dowry. PW 1 has deposed that every alternate two or three days, the deceased Rumpa used to come across to her paternal home to take her meal, as she was denied food. 18. This witness stated that on 12th August, 2005, at about 11-40 P.M., his son-in-law, Kanchan, that is the accused appellant No.3 in the second appeal, called him from outside the boundary wall, and told him that Rumpa had hanged herself. 18. This witness stated that on 12th August, 2005, at about 11-40 P.M., his son-in-law, Kanchan, that is the accused appellant No.3 in the second appeal, called him from outside the boundary wall, and told him that Rumpa had hanged herself. This witness being the de facto complainant rushed to the matrimonial home of the deceased, Rumpa and found that the deceased Rumpa was lying on the cot in her bed room, facing the ceiling, with her eyes lids open and her husband was fanning her, sitting beside her, on the bed. 19. Immediately after the PW 1 arrived, Kanchans father, that is, accused appellant no.1, in the second appeal and Kanchans cousin Nanda being the accused appellant in the first appeal also rushed into the room. Kanchans father said that Rumpa should immediately be removed to hospital. 20. The deceased Rumpa was, thereafter, taken to Hospital in a taxi, accompanied by the de facto complainant, his wife, his son-in-law Kanchan, (husband of the deceased) and two neighbours. One Bacchu alias Durlav Nag, a tenant of the accused appellants, also went to the hospital. Doctors in the emergency department examined Rumpa and informed them that she had died about 2 to 3 hours prior to her arrival in the hospital. 21. From the FIR lodged by the first prosecution witness as also tenor of his evidence, one thing is absolutely clear, that is, even the prosecution witness no.1 being the father of the deceased and his wife had not realised that their daughter Rumpa had died, until after she was actually taken to the hospital, and declared dead. His evidence shows that Rumpas husband and in-laws had also not realised that she had died. The husband of the deceased, Kanchan fanned her, and his father Ramesh Chandra Pain suggested that she be removed to hospital. There is evidence that Kanchans mother was sitting on the bed on which the deceased was lying. The in-laws of the deceased did not try to run away, but remained at home, and some of them accompanied the deceased to hospital. 22. The 2nd and the 3rd witnesses are not material. There is evidence that Kanchans mother was sitting on the bed on which the deceased was lying. The in-laws of the deceased did not try to run away, but remained at home, and some of them accompanied the deceased to hospital. 22. The 2nd and the 3rd witnesses are not material. It appears that the conviction is based on the oral evidence of the 4th prosecution witness, Doyel Pain, the eldest daughter of the deceased Rumpa and the accused appellant No. 3 in the 2nd Appeal, Kanchan Pain, who was only four years old at the time of the incident. 23. This four year old child was first called as a witness on 4th January, 2007, when she was about six years of age. On 4th January, 2007 this child witness was reluctant to say anything, except where she was residing and which school she went to. Even though the learned Judge made continuous efforts, he could not make her speak further. 24. The examination in chief of prosecution witness No. 4 was resumed on 5th January, 2007. On that day she stated that she was sleeping with her mother in the bed room. She woke up hearing her brother cry. Thereafter, she refused to say anything further, in spite of persuasion by the learned Public Prosecutor, as well as the Presiding Officer. This child witness remained mum and did not answer any further questions put to her. The learned Sessions Court found that this witness was not in the mood to answer any further questions, and accordingly she was discharged and her evidence remained incomplete. 25. However, on 4th August, 2008, over a year and a half later, the examination-in-chief of PW 4 was resumed. This time, she deposed that her mother had died on the cot of their room. 26. She stated in Court that her mother had been smothered to death with a pillow, by her father, her grand parents, her uncle, Nanda Chatterjee and also 'Bacchu Mama, i.e., Bacchu alias Durlav Nag, the tenant. 27. This Bacchu alias Durlav Chatterjee was also charged with murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code but acquitted by the Sessions Court. 28. 27. This Bacchu alias Durlav Chatterjee was also charged with murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code but acquitted by the Sessions Court. 28. The evidence of this child witness, in her examination in chief, as recorded, is extracted hereinbelow :- "When my mother died, I was reading in K.G. Section At present, I am reading in Class-III in Lalbazar Primary School. My mother died in the khat of our room. My father, my grandfather, my grandmother, my uncle Nanda, and my maternal uncle Bachchu, killed my mother. My father caught hold of the legs of my mother. My grandmother pressed a pillow on the mouth of my mother. My uncle, Nanda, and my maternal uncle, Bachchu, caught hold of the hands of my mother. Ultimately, my mother died for such thing. My father and my maternal grandfather and maternal grand mother took my mother to the hospital. My mother was brought back to our house by a car. My grandfather put the light of cigarette on my person by saying that I must say to others that my mother committed suicide by hanging. I am residing in my maternal uncles house. My grandfather was trying to go out by taking me, but the sister of my mother brought me from my fathers house to my maternal uncles house. Police brought me to the court of the Judicial Magistrate. One Judicial magistrate recorded my statement and I signed my said statement (the signature of this witness in the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. have already been marked as exhibits)." 29. The 5th Prosecution Witness is the Judicial Magistrate who had recorded the statement of the child witness under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In cross-examination this witness admitted that, in the statement under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Doyel Pain, he had not recorded that there was no other person in his chamber, besides himself and the child witness when her statement was being recorded. Significantly, the child witness has, in her cross-examination, stated that her grandmother was present when her statement under Section 164 was recorded by the Magistrate. 30. The evidence of Prosecution Witness Nos.6, 7 and 8 is not of much significance. They were not present when the incident occurred or immediately afterwards. Their evidence is based on what they heard from others. 30. The evidence of Prosecution Witness Nos.6, 7 and 8 is not of much significance. They were not present when the incident occurred or immediately afterwards. Their evidence is based on what they heard from others. Of course, the Prosecution Witness No.8, a relative of the deceased, also deposed that the deceased Rumpa, had, during her lifetime told her of the torture inflicted on her by her in-laws. She also stated that the deceased Rumpa was tortured by her inlaws for money. However, there are some major discrepancies between her evidence and the evidence given by the de facto complainant (PW 1), father of the deceased Rumpa, which shall be discussed afterwards. 31. Smt. Kalpana Kumbhokar, mother of the deceased, Rumpa deposed before the Sessions Court as Prosecution Witness No.9. This witness corroborated the evidence given by the PW 1, that is, father of the deceased, with regard to the marriage of the deceased Rumpa with the accused appellant Kanchan Pain and also with regard to the dowry demand of Rs. 1,00,000/- made by Kanchans father at the time of social solemnization of marriage. 32. This witness also corroborated that Rumpas family could only pay Rs. 55,000/- apart from 5 bhories of gold. However, while the PW 1 deposed that the three accused appellants in the Second Appeal and the accused appellant in the First Appeal used to torture the deceased, Rumpa, after marriage since he could not pay the balance dowry, PW 9, mother of the deceased stated that the deceased Rumpa lived in her matrimonial home happily till the birth of her second girl child, but thereafter she was subjected to torture by her husband and parents-in-law. 33. The Prosecution Witness No.8, who claimed that Rumpa had, during her lifetime, told her about the torture inflicted upon Rumpa by her in-laws for money, has stated that Rumpa lived happily with her in-laws till the birth of her third child. Thereafter she was subjected to torture for money. 34. The Prosecution Witness No.10, a cousin of the deceased, Rumpa, is only a signatory to the inquest report and her evidence is not of much significance. The Prosecution Witness Nos.11, 12 and 13 are police witnesses. The Prosecution Witness No.14 is the BDO who held inquest over the body of the deceased. The Prosecution Witness No.15, Dr. Swapan Kr. 34. The Prosecution Witness No.10, a cousin of the deceased, Rumpa, is only a signatory to the inquest report and her evidence is not of much significance. The Prosecution Witness Nos.11, 12 and 13 are police witnesses. The Prosecution Witness No.14 is the BDO who held inquest over the body of the deceased. The Prosecution Witness No.15, Dr. Swapan Kr. Bhowmik, was the doctor who conducted the post mortem examination and the Prosecution Witness No.16, Dr. Parag Baran Pal, had concurred with the post mortem report prepared and signed by Dr. Swapan Kr. Bhowmik. 35. The statement given by PW 8 and PW 9, that is, the aunt (fathers younger brothers wife) and the mother of the deceased Rumpa, demolishes the case of the prosecution that the deceased Rumpa was tortured because of the inability of her family to pay the full dowry amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- demanded at the time of marriage. While PW 9, Rumpas mother, deposed that Rumpa lived happily till the birth of her second girl child, PW 8 deposed that Rumpa lived happily till the birth of her third girl child. The evidence of PW 8 and PW 9, being the mother and the aunt of the deceased, reveals that Rumpa lived happily after marriage and there was no torture on her, atleast till the birth of her second child. 36. A careful reading of the evidence of PW 1, 8 and 9 indicates that matrimonial discord started a few years after Rumpas marriage with the accused appellant Kanchan Pain. This was after the birth of the second girl child or perhaps the birth of the third girl child. From the evidence, it is not very clear whether the birth of successive daughters was the cause of the matrimonial discord. Rumpas mother deposed that Rumpa used to be depressed as she was giving birth to successive girls. Possibly the story of torturing Rumpa to pressurise her to bring money, was an after thought with a view to avenge the death of Rumpa, by implicating the accused appellants under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. 37. If inability of Rumpas family to pay the full dowry demanded at the time of her social marriage, had been the reason for her torture, Rumpa would have been tortured from the very beginning. 37. If inability of Rumpas family to pay the full dowry demanded at the time of her social marriage, had been the reason for her torture, Rumpa would have been tortured from the very beginning. Rumpa would not have been happy during the first few years of her marriage and till the birth of her second girl child or may be third girl child, as stated in Court by her mother and her aunt. 38. In this context, it may perhaps be noted that, as per the evidence given by Rumpas parents, Rumpa became pregnant within six months of registration of her marriage and from the tenor of the examination and suggestions on behalf of the accused appellants, it appears that the social marriage has itself been disputed by the accused appellants. In any case, the evidence given by Rumpas parents indicates that the marriage was solemnized as per Hindu rites in a temple. There does not appear to have been any celebration. The story of the demand of Rs. 1,00,000/- and the torture for inability to meet the demand, in full, appears to be an afterthought. 39. Significantly, allegations in the FIR of torture of the deceased Rumpa are allegations of a general nature devoid of particulars. None of the relatives of the deceased who have deposed as witnesses have given any details of kind of torture meted out by the accused appellants to the deceased. Inconsistencies in the evidence of Rumpas father, that is PW 1, Rumpas mother PW 9 and Rumpas aunt PW 8, with regard to the torture allegedly meted out by the accused appellants to the deceased casts serious doubts with regard to the credibility of these witnesses in this regard. 40. As observed above, this child witness was only four years of age, when the incident took place. She was apparently asleep but was woken up by the sound of her sister crying. On two occasions, she did not say anything with regard to how her mother died. On the third occasion, she stated that when she woke up she saw her father catching hold of the legs of her mother. Her uncle, Nanda and her maternal uncle, Bacchu alias Durlav caught hold of the hands of her mother and her grandmother pressed a pillow on her mothers face. On the third occasion, she stated that when she woke up she saw her father catching hold of the legs of her mother. Her uncle, Nanda and her maternal uncle, Bacchu alias Durlav caught hold of the hands of her mother and her grandmother pressed a pillow on her mothers face. Significantly, this child witness did not attribute any specific role to her grandfather, Ramesh and her grandfather, Ramesh even as per the evidence of the de facto complainant (PW1) was the one to suggest that the deceased Rumpa be shifted to the hospital. Significantly, this witness was accompanied to Court by her maternal grandparents and in her cross-examination, she stated that her grandmother was present when her statement was recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 of Cr. P.C. 41. Immediately after the incident, the accused appellants were arrested by the Police. As per the evidence of the de facto complainant, the Police entrusted the custody of this child to her maternal grand parents. However, the child witness has stated that her grandfather was trying to get away from his house with her, but her aunt (mothers sister) brought her from her fathers house, to her maternal uncles house. 42. It is important to note that when her evidence in Court was finally completed, she had been in the custody of her maternal grandparents for about two years. She was being looked after by her maternal aunt. The possibility of this child witness having been tutored and brainwashed by her maternal grandparents and maternal aunt cannot be ruled out. 43. Even if it is assumed that the child was not completely tutored, it is still possible that she may have been confused. It is the case of the accused appellants that Rumpa had hanged herself. This is what was told to the de facto complainant by his son-in-law, the accused appellant No. 3 in the second appeal, on the night of the incident. When Rumpas parents came to Rumpas matrimonial home, they found her lying on the cot. She was obviously placed on the cot by other members of the family. 44. The Prosecution has not conclusively been able to establish that the death of the deceased Rumpa, was caused by pressing a pillow against her face. When Rumpas parents came to Rumpas matrimonial home, they found her lying on the cot. She was obviously placed on the cot by other members of the family. 44. The Prosecution has not conclusively been able to establish that the death of the deceased Rumpa, was caused by pressing a pillow against her face. The Prosecution Witness No. 1 deposed that he had found the right eye of the deceased blackened, when he went to her matrimonial home. However, the inquest report does not indicate blackening of the eye. The inquest report notes that a white porous substance was oozing out of the mouth of the deceased. As per the inquest report, the actual cause of death had to be ascertained by post mortem examination. 45. The post mortem report also does not support the evidence of the Prosecution Witness No. 1 that he had found the right eye of the deceased blackened. However, the post mortem report indicates the mark of a bruise on one of the eye lids. As per the opinion given in the post mortem report, the death of the deceased Rumpa, was due to the effect of asphyxia, ante mortem in nature. 46. The Prosecution Witness No. 15, Doctor Swapan Bhowmik, who had conducted the post mortem, opined in Court, with reasonable certainty that the death was due to the effect of asphyxia, ante mortem in nature. As per the post mortem report, final opinion was to be given on receipt of the Chemical Examination report. However, on being specifically questioned, whether the bruise mark on the eye lid could have been caused by pressing a pillow, he answered that, having regard to all the findings, as noted in the post mortem report, it was not impossible to say that the bruise mark on the eye of the deceased might have been caused by pressing a pillow. 47. The Prosecution Witness No. 16, Dr. Parag Baran Pal, who had signed the post mortem report in concurrence, deposed that this type of death might be caused by pressing a pillow or any soft object on the face of the victim. Neither of the two doctors has opined with certainty that the death of the deceased, Rumpa had been caused by pressing a pillow on her face. 48. It is true that Prosecution Witness No. 16 opined that the death of the deceased was not by hanging. Neither of the two doctors has opined with certainty that the death of the deceased, Rumpa had been caused by pressing a pillow on her face. 48. It is true that Prosecution Witness No. 16 opined that the death of the deceased was not by hanging. Dribbling of saliva was the surest sign of ante mortem hanging. However, the prosecution has not been able to explain what was the white porous substance that was found oozing from the mouth of the deceased at the time of inquest. Furthermore, the Chemical Examination report was never received. The prosecution has also not explained the indistinct ligature mark round the neck of the deceased which could support the view of an attempt to commit suicide by hanging. 49. Considering the post mortem report, the inquest report and the evidence of the two doctors referred to above, it cannot conclusively be held that the death could not have been caused by strangulation as a result of an attempt by the deceased, Rumpa to hang herself. It was the duty of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the death had been caused by pressing a pillow. The prosecution had to prove that the death could not have occurred in any other way. The prosecution has failed to discharge its onus. 50. In any case, an opinion of a doctor with regard to the cause of death cannot be the basis of conviction, in the absence of corroboration, since the opinion need not necessarily be accurate. In this case, the conviction is based on the evidence of the Prosecution Witness No. 4, the daughter of the deceased Rumpa and accused appellant Kanchan, who was only 4 years of age when the incident took place. When the prosecution case rests solely on the evidence of a small child, the Court has to be extremely careful. The Court has to scrutinise the entire evidence on record very carefully, to ascertain whether the child witness was narrating what the child witness had seen, accurately. Any possibility of the child witness having been tutored, or of some imaginary exaggeration or embellishment or concoction would have to be ruled out. 51. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. reported in (2003) 3 SCC 21 , the Supreme Court held "19. Any possibility of the child witness having been tutored, or of some imaginary exaggeration or embellishment or concoction would have to be ruled out. 51. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. reported in (2003) 3 SCC 21 , the Supreme Court held "19. The law recognises the child as a competent witness but a child particularly at such a tender age of six years, who is unable to form a proper opinion about the nature of the incident because of immaturity of understanding, is not considered by the Court to be a witness whose sole testimony can be relied upon without other corroborative evidence. The evidence of a child is required to be evaluated carefully because he is an easy prey to tutoring. Therefore, always the Court looks for adequate corroboration from other evidence to his testimony. 20. In the case before us, the trial Judge has recorded the demeanour of the child. The child was vacillating in the course of his deposition. From a child of six years of age, absolute consistency in deposition cannot be expected but if it appears that there was a possibility of his being tutored, the court should be careful in relying on his evidence." 52. In Sashikala v. State of West Bengal reported in (2004) 13 SCC 249 , the Supreme Court found that it would not be safe to act on the evidence of two child witnesses who were aged 6 and 10 years at the time of incident, having regard to certain discrepancies noted in the evidence. 53. In Orsu Venkat Rao v. State of A.P. reported in (2004) 13 Supreme Court Cases 243, the Supreme Court refused to believe the testimony of child witness. The aforesaid judgment was however, rendered in the particular fact of the case and is of much relevance. 54. In Arbind Singh v. State of Bihar reported in 1994 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1418, the Supreme Court observed - "3. The entire case hinges on the evidence of the child witness PW 2 Poonam Kumari, the daughter of the deceased and appellant Arbind Singh. The incident occurred late in the night and she claims she was awakened by the noise of quarrelling. She further claims to have seen her father tying and nailing her mother before hanging her. At the date of the incident she was aged about 5 years. The incident occurred late in the night and she claims she was awakened by the noise of quarrelling. She further claims to have seen her father tying and nailing her mother before hanging her. At the date of the incident she was aged about 5 years. When her evidence was recorded she was aged about 9 years. The learned Trial Judge did not undertake a voir dire before recording her evidence on oath although he notes that she was capable of understanding and answering the questions. Be that as it may, the fact remains that there was a gap of 4 years between the incident and the date on which her evidence was recorded. Immediately after the incident she was interrogated but as she was weeping her statement was not recorded." There are also certain other statements made in the course of her deposition which would suggest that possibility of tutoring could not be ruled out. Having taken a careful look at the evidence of this child witness we are of the opinion that implicit faith and reliance cannot be placed on her testimony since it is not corroborated by any independent and reliable evidence. It is well-settled that a child witness is prone to tutoring and hence the could should look for corroboration particularly when the evidence betrays traces of tutoring. We, therefore, think that appellant I was entitled to benefit of doubt. 55. The law emerges is that the Court should be careful when the entire case hinges on the evidence of a child witness, who may be prone to tutoring. In the instant case the possibility of tutoring cannot be ruled out altogether. In this context we may also note the submission of Mr. Chatterjee that the incident took place on or about 12th August, 2005. The child witness allegedly told her grand parents about the murder of her mother four or five days later but her statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded many days thereafter and not immediately thereafter. Moreover, there are some discrepancies in her evidence. 56. As observed above, there were no eye witnesses to the incident. From the post mortem report and considering the evidence of the doctor, who performed the post mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased, Rumpa, it may reasonably be concluded that the cause of her death was ante mortem, asphyxia. 56. As observed above, there were no eye witnesses to the incident. From the post mortem report and considering the evidence of the doctor, who performed the post mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased, Rumpa, it may reasonably be concluded that the cause of her death was ante mortem, asphyxia. This doctor opined that it was not impossible that the bruise over the eye lid may have been caused by pressing a pillow. The Prosecution Witness No. 16 being the 2nd doctor, in effect, opined that it was possible that the death may have been caused by smothering the deceased with a soft object. 57. Basically the conviction is based on the sole testimony of the Prosecution Witness No. 4, the four year old daughter of the deceased, Rumpa and the accused appellant No. 3 in the 2nd appeal, Kanchan. 58. In our view, on over all consideration of the entire evidence on record, it is unfair to convict the accused appellants of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentence them to rigorous imprisonment for life, on the basis of the evidence of this child witness for the following reasons :- i. The child witness was only four years of age when the incident took place. At this age, children tend to be imaginative. The possibility of some imaginary concoction or exaggeration cannot be ruled out. ii. The incident took place around midnight. The child witness deposed that she was fast asleep, but woken up hearing her younger sister cry. She might therefore have been too sleepy to appreciate and understand what exactly happened. iii. If the deceased had hanged herself, but brought down and laid on the bed, it is possible that the child might have seen some family members holding different parts of the body of the deceased, while they were putting her on the bed. iv. She did not speak about the incident even to her grandparents till after 5 or 6 days. It is unlikely that a child who saw her mother being killed in front of her eyes would keep quiet for 5/6 days. v. She made her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C a good number of days after the incident and after she had stayed with her maternal grandparents and maternal aunt for over two weeks. vi. It is unlikely that a child who saw her mother being killed in front of her eyes would keep quiet for 5/6 days. v. She made her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C a good number of days after the incident and after she had stayed with her maternal grandparents and maternal aunt for over two weeks. vi. When she made her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C, her maternal grandmother was present in the room, as per her evidence. vii. When she was called upon to give evidence on two successive dates, (4.1.2007 and 5.1.2007), she refused to say anything about the death of her mother. viii. She ultimately gave evidence in Court after 1½ years. By that time, she had been with her maternal grandparents for about 2 years. ix. The possibility of the child witness having been tutored or brain washed to believe that her mother had been killed, cannot be ruled out. x. There are some discrepancies in the evidence of this child witness with regard to what happened immediately after the incident and the circumstances in which she came to stay with her maternal grandparents. 59. In our criminal jurisprudence, a person is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. On overall consideration of the evidence on record, in its entirety, the demeanor and conduct of the accused appellants after the incident, the discrepancies in the evidence of some members of the family of the deceased and the unreliability of the evidence of the child witness for reasons discussed above, we are of the view that the accused appellants in the two appeals are entitled to the benefit of doubt. 60. For the reasons discussed above, both the appeals are allowed and the impugned Judgment and Order of conviction is set aside. 61. In view of disposal of these appeals, the connected criminal revisional application being C.R.R. 3702 of 2009 is also disposed of. 62. The Superintendent, Midnapore Correctional Home will take necessary steps for release of the accused appellants. 63. The Criminal Section is directed to send down the lower court records together with a copy of the judgment forthwith to the concerned learned Trial Court. Urgent xerox certified copy, if applied for, be delivered to the learned counsel for the parties, upon compliance of all usual formalities.