JUDGMENT : VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR, J. This review petition is filed by the petitioner in W.P. No. 13469 of 2013 seeking review of the order of the Division Bench dated 31-7-2013. 2. By the aforesaid order, the Division Bench declined to entertain the writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the A.P. State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Hyderabad in F.A. No. 909 of 2010 dated 23-8-2012 and petitioner was relegated to effective alternative remedy of appeal to the National Commission under Section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The Division Bench also relied upon the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Saini v. DCM Ltd. ( AIR 2010 SC 2608 ) and recorded that there is no compelling circumstance to bypass the said statutory remedy and entertain the writ petition. 3. The present review petition is filed by, primarily, contending that under Section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short the Act) the appellate jurisdiction of the National Commission is provided only against orders of the State Commissioner in the original proceedings and not against the orders in appellate jurisdiction of the State Commission. The aforesaid contention, based on Section 21 of the Act, is raised to contend that no such appeal lies to National Commission against the orders of the State Commission, referred to above and consequently, there is an error in the order of the Division Bench declining to entertain the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of appeal. Reliance is placed upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in R. R. Upadhyay v. State Commission for Consumer Disputes, Bombay, AIR 2010 Bombay 139. 4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner based on the above aspect give rise to following points for consideration : 1. Whether the order of the Division Bench under review directing the petitioner to avail appellate remedy before the National Commission suffers from error apparent on the face of the record? 2. If the answer to the above question is in affirmative, whether the order under review deserves to be set aside and the writ petition deserves to be entertained? Point No. 1 : 5. 2. If the answer to the above question is in affirmative, whether the order under review deserves to be set aside and the writ petition deserves to be entertained? Point No. 1 : 5. In order to deal with the said contention it is necessary to reproduce Section 17 of the Act, which deals with jurisdiction of the State Commission; Section 19 of the Act, which provides for appeal against orders of the State Commission and Section 21 of the Act, which provides for jurisdiction of the National Commission. 17. Jurisdiction of the State Commission. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the State Commission shall have jurisdiction (a) to entertain (i) complaint where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed exceeds rupees twenty lakhs but does not exceed rupees one crore; and (ii) appeals against the orders of any District Forum within the State; and (b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is pending before or has been decided by any District Forum within the State, where it appears to the State Commission that such District Forum has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. (2) A complaint shall be instituted in a State Commission within the limits of whose jurisdiction, (a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain; or (b) any of opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the permission of the State Commission is given or the opposite parties who do not reside or carry on business or have a branch office or personally or for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. 19. Appeals. 19. Appeals. Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 17 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed : Provided that the National Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period. Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the State Commission, shall be entertained by the National Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of the amount or rupees thirty-five thousand, whichever is less. 21. Jurisdiction of the National Commission. Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall have jurisdiction (a) to entertain (i) complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed exceeds rupees one crore; and (ii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission; and (b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is pending before or has been decided by any State Commission where it appears to the National Commission that such State Commission has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. 6. It would be evident from the above that the State Commission exercises powers to entertain 1) original complaints of a specified value, 2) appeal against orders of District Forum within the State and 3) power of revision with respect to any consumer dispute pending before any of the forums within the State. Thus, the jurisdiction exercised by the State Commission comprises of original, appellate and revisional jurisdiction, as provided under Section 17 of the Act. Section 19 of the Act provides for appeals against orders of State Commission to the National Commission with regard to powers exercised by the State Commission under Section 17(a)(i) of the Act viz. original complaints of specified value. Section 19 of the Act provides for appeals against orders of State Commission to the National Commission with regard to powers exercised by the State Commission under Section 17(a)(i) of the Act viz. original complaints of specified value. Obviously, therefore, the appeals against orders of the State Commission in exercise of its appellate or revisional powers are not provided before the National Commission. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, right to that extent that though the writ petition was dismissed by directing to prefer an appeal before the National Commission against the orders passed by the State Commission in appellate jurisdiction; the appeal does not lay to the National Commission against such order of the State Commission exercising appellate jurisdiction. 8. Section 21 of the Act, however, provides for jurisdiction of the National Commission, which is again comprised of three categories as that of the State Commission viz. (1) original complaints of specified value, (2) appeals against orders of the State Commission and (3) revisional jurisdiction against any consumer dispute decided by the State Commission. In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that point No. 1 deserves to be answered in favour of the petitioner. Point No. 2 : 9. In order to get over availability of revisional remedy under Section 21(b) of the Act before the National Commission, as above, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the availability of revision remedy cannot be treated as an effective alternative remedy. Learned counsel also contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Saini v. DCM Ltd., AIR 2010 SC 2608 , which was relied upon by the Division Bench, is distinguishable inasmuch as that was a case dealing with appeal before the National Commission against the original jurisdiction exercised by the State Commission. 10. Learned counsel also contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Saini v. DCM Ltd., AIR 2010 SC 2608 , which was relied upon by the Division Bench, is distinguishable inasmuch as that was a case dealing with appeal before the National Commission against the original jurisdiction exercised by the State Commission. 10. The distinction, on facts, pointed out with reference to the ratio in Om Prakash Saini s case ( AIR 2010 SC 2608 ) (supra), in our view, is rightly raised but it was also held in Om Prakash Saini s case (supra) in para 12 as extracted hereunder : Since the 1986 Act is a special statute enacted by the Parliament for better protection of the interest of consumers and a wholesome mechanism has been put in place for adjudication of consumer disputes, the remedy of appeal available to a person aggrieved by an order of the State Commission cannot but be treated as an effective alternative remedy. 11. We are, however, unable to accept the further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the revisional remedy before the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the Act cannot be treated as an effective alternative remedy. 12. It would be noticed from a reading of Section 17(b) of the Act dealing with the State Commission s revisional power as well as Section 21(b) of the Act dealing with the National Commission s revisional power that both the said revisional powers can be exercised by the respective Commissions to satisfy itself of the legality and validity of any orders passed by the District Forum/State Commission below, as the case may be. It is, therefore, open for the State Commission/National Commission, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, to satisfy itself with regard to the jurisdiction exercised by the District Forum/State Commission, as the case may be and also to satisfy itself that such jurisdiction is not exercised illegally or with material irregularity. The said revisional jurisdiction so conferred on the State Commission/National Commission is, therefore, similar to the revisional power vested in the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 13. The revisional power is also not hedged with any pre-conditions nor is the revisional power exercisable only after complying with onerous conditions so as to diminish its efficacy. 13. The revisional power is also not hedged with any pre-conditions nor is the revisional power exercisable only after complying with onerous conditions so as to diminish its efficacy. The revisional power of the State Commission/National Commission, as the case may be, having not been subjected to any limitation on exercise of such revisional power, it cannot be said to be not an alternative remedy so as to justify the maintainability of the writ petition. The efficacy of an alternative remedy has, therefore, to be ascertained on the basis of the language employed by the Statute in providing the remedy. 14. Reference may profitably be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in The British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1451 and Durga Prasad v. Naveen Chandra (1996) 3 SCC 300 . The relevant portion of that decision is as under : In fact, the question as to whether the writ jurisdiction of the High Court could be successfully invoked by a party immediately after an order is passed against him by the Collector of Customs under Section 167(12A) and Section 183, does not appear to have been argued before the Calcutta High Court when it entertained the writ proceedings from which Appeal No. 299 of 1963 has been brought to this Court. As was observed by this Court in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collegeor of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, 1962 (1) SCR 753 : (AIR SC 1506) the rule that a party who applies for the issue of a high prerogative writ should, before he approaches the Court, have exhausted other remedies open to him under the law, though not one which bars the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the petition or to deal with it, but is a rule which Courts have laid down for the exercise of this discretion. That is one aspect which has to be borne in mind in dealing with C.A. No. 299 of 1963, and the other writ petitions in this group. 8. That is one aspect which has to be borne in mind in dealing with C.A. No. 299 of 1963, and the other writ petitions in this group. 8. If an appeal is entertained against an order passed by the Collector of Customs and our jurisdiction is allowed to be invoked under Article 136, it would lead to this anomalous result that questions of fact determined by the Collector of Customs may have to be re-examined by us as a Court of facts and an argument impeaching the validity or propriety of the order of fine may also have to be considered, and these precisely are the matters which the legislature has left to the determination of the appellate and the revisional authorities as prescribed by Sections 190 and 191 of the Sea Customs Act. Besides, the High Court should be slow in encouraging parties to circumvent the special provisions in respect of orders which they seek to challenge by writ petition under Article 226. In the present case, however, these writ petitions were presumably admitted because they raised a question of some importance which had already been raised by some appeals properly brought before this Court under Article 136, and so, we have allowed the counsel to argue these writ petitions on the question of construction alone. (Emphasis supplied) The relevant portion of the decision in Durga Prasad s case (supra) is as under : The appellant s counsel contended that three remedies are open to the appellant under the CPC, namely, right of appeal under Section 96 or appeal under Order 43 read with Section 104 or a revision under Section 115, CPC. In view of the fact that the matter does not come within the four corners of any of the three remedies, the appellant is left with no other remedy except approaching the High Court under Art. 226. It is true that the impugned order is not appealable one either under Section 26 or under Order 43, Rule 1 read with Section 104, CPC. But still a revision would be maintainable and whether the order could be revised or not is a matter to be considered by the High Court on merits. It is true that the impugned order is not appealable one either under Section 26 or under Order 43, Rule 1 read with Section 104, CPC. But still a revision would be maintainable and whether the order could be revised or not is a matter to be considered by the High Court on merits. But instead of availing of that remedy, the appellant has invoked jurisdiction under Art. 226 which is not warranted and the procedure prescribed under the CPC cannot be by-passed by availing of the remedy not maintainable under Article 226. (Emphasis supplied) 15. Latest decisions of the Supreme Court also may be noted wherein similar question was considered. We feel it appropriate to notice at least three of the important decisions on the subject. The Supreme Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : ( AIR 2010 SC 3413 , Paras 18, 19, 20, 21 & 24) held as under : 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. 47. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. 47. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a Court of appeal against the decision of a Court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up. (Emphasis supplied) 48. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433 : ( AIR 1983 SC 603 ) a three-Judge Bench considered the question whether a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should be entertained in a matter involving challenge to the order of the assessment passed by the competent authority under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and corresponding law enacted by the State legislature and answered the same in negative by making the following observations : 11. Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate redress against the wrongful acts complained of. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the Prescribed Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford (1859) 6 CBNS 336, in the following passage : There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute ......But there is a third class, viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to. The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co. Ltd. and Secretary of State of Mask & Co. ( AIR 1940 PC 105 ). It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine. 49. The views expressed in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa were echoed in CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985) 1 SCC 260 : ( AIR 1985 SC 330 ) in the following words : 3. Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. 49. The views expressed in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa were echoed in CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985) 1 SCC 260 : ( AIR 1985 SC 330 ) in the following words : 3. Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged. 52. In City and Industrial Development Corporation v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala (2009) 1 SCC 168 : ( AIR 2009 SC 571 , para 22) the Court highlighted the parameters which are required to be kept in view by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Paragraphs 29 and 30 of that judgment which contain the views of this Court read as under : 29. In our opinion, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration and decide for itself even in the absence of proper affidavits from the State and its instrumentalities as to whether any case at all is made out requiring its interference on the basis of the material made available on record. There is nothing like issuing an ex parte writ of mandamus, order or direction in a public law remedy. There is nothing like issuing an ex parte writ of mandamus, order or direction in a public law remedy. Further, while considering the validity of impugned action or inaction the Court will not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State but would be free to satisfy itself whether any case as such is made out by a person invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether : (a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; (b) the petition reveals all material facts; (c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches; (e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors. The Court in appropriate cases in its discretion may direct the State or its instrumentalities as the case may be to file proper affidavits placing all the relevant facts truly and accurately for the consideration of the Court and particularly in cases where public revenue and public interest are involved. Such directions are always required to be complied with by the State. No relief could be granted in a public law remedy as a matter of course only on the ground that the State did not file its counter-affidavit opposing the writ petition. Further, empty and self-defeating affidavits or statements of Government spokesmen by themselves do not form basis to grant any relief to a person in a public law remedy to which he is not otherwise entitled to in law. Further similar view is also expressed by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal (2014) 1 SCC 603 . 11. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would notice the principle of law as laid down by this Court. It is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. It is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. (See : State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 ; Titaghar Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433 : ( AIR 1983 SC 603 ); Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2120 ); State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. ( (2005) 6 SCC 499 ) : ( AIR 2005 SC 3936 ) : (2005 AIR SCW 3727). 12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K. S. Rashid and Sons v. Income-tax Investigation Commisison, AIR 1954 SC 207 ; Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal AIR 1955 SC 415; Union of India v. T. R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 ; State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 and K. S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 have held that though Article 226 confers a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewwhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewwhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted. (See : N. T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422 ; Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar (1965) 2 SCR 653 : ( AIR 1965 SC 1321 ); Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, (1984) 2 SCC 436 : ( AIR 1984 SC 653 ); S. T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan (1988) 1 SCC 572 : ( AIR 1988 SC 616 ); Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant (1995) 5 SCC 75 : ( AIR 1995 SC 1715 ); Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil (2000) 6 SCC 293 : ( AIR 2000 SC 2573 ); A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695 : ( AIR 2000 SC 3032 ); L. L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC 634 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3205 ); Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 8 SCC 509 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3982 ); Pratap Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) 7 SCC 484 : ( AIR 2002 SC 3385 ) and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72 ). 14. In Union of India v. Guwahati Carbon Ltd. (2012) 11 SCC 651, this Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle and observed : 8. Before we discuss the correctness of the impugned order, we intend to remind ourselves the observations made by this Court in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta (1979) 3 SCC 83 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1250 , p. 1254, para 24). In the said decision, this Court was pleased to observe that : (SCC p. 88, para 23). 23... When a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all the other forums and modes of seeking (remedy) are excluded . 15. 23... When a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all the other forums and modes of seeking (remedy) are excluded . 15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognized some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titaghar Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 16. In the instant case, the Act provides complete machinery for the assessment/re-assessment of tax, imposition of penalty and for obtaining relief in respect of any improper orders passed by the Revenue Authorities, and the assessee could not be permitted to abandon that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when he had adequate remedy open to him by an appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The remedy under the statute, however, must be effective and not a mere formality with no substantial relief. In Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana (1985) 3 SCC 267 : ( AIR 1985 SC 1147 ) this Court has noticed that if an appeal is from ' Caesar to Caesar s wife the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility. In addition thereto, under the very same Consumer Protection Act, with which we are concerned, the Supreme Court in Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India (2011) 14 SCC 337 held as follows : ' 11. In addition thereto, under the very same Consumer Protection Act, with which we are concerned, the Supreme Court in Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India (2011) 14 SCC 337 held as follows : ' 11. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions. There cannot be any dispute that the power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary legislation- L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 : ( AIR 1997 SC 1125 ). However, it is one thing to say that in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order passed by a quasi judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether different thing to say that each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 16. It can, thus, be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy. However, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal v. Suptd. of Taxes AIR 1964 SC 1419 and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that a remedy of revision available under the Act cannot be treated as an efficacious alternative remedy. 16. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that a remedy of revision available under the Act cannot be treated as an efficacious alternative remedy. 16. It would be evident from the above, therefore, that in terms of the ratio aforesaid, the petitioner has remedy of revision before the National Commission and the Division Bench having already declined to exercise discretion to entertain the writ petition, that does not deserve to be reviewed even if the first contention is answered in favour of the petitioner. It is well settled that jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and for good reasons, the Division Bench declined to exercise the said jurisdiction, which cannot be said to suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record and as such, review petition cannot be accepted. Rev. WPMP. No. 11781 of 2014 is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.