Judgment : As the issues involved in both the writ petitions are one and the same, the writ petitions are disposed of by way of this common order. 2. The above writ petitions have been filed seeking to call for the records pertaining to the impugned order dated 23.10.2013 passed by the Tamil Nadu Wakf Board (1st respondent) taking over the management of the wakf viz., Kazimar Periya Pallivasal, vide proceedings in Na.Ka.No.13575/02/B8/Madurai, which was published in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette in publication No.VI-3(a)/11/2014, dated 22.01.2014, and consequential proceedings of the 1st respondent in Na.Ka.No.13575/02/B8/Madurai, dated 24.01.2014, appointing an Executive Officer to manage the said wakf/Pallivasal, and to quash the same as illegal. 3. The brief facts, which are necessary to decide the issues involved in these writ petitions, are as follows:- 3(1) The petitioners herein are the trustees of Kazimar Periya Pallivasal / Wakf. The said wakf was founded by the petitioners' ancestor namely Kazi Syed Tajudeen. The descendants of the founder are the Huqdars and they are the beneficiaries of the said wakf/pallivasal. The said wakf/pallivasal has been administered for centuries by the Huqdars. 3(2) On the enactment of the Wakf Act, 1995, the properties of the said Wakf/Pallivasal were surveyed and notified under Section VI of the Act, as a wakf property for the purpose of the Act. However, the administration of the said wakf property continued to be with the governing committee / Trustees of the said wakf, as the same was a religious institution established and administered by the Huqdars with the object of preserving the unique cultural identity of the linguistic and religious minority Muslim community of that area. Thus, the management of the said wakf was protected by the rights of the Huqdars, under Article 26 & 29(1) of the Constitution of India. The office of muthavallis/trustees is hereditary in nature and the managers were to be selected by the beneficiaries from and out of the male descendants of the founder and this custom is in vogue for the past several centuries, right from the date, when the said wakf/pallivasal came into existence. The wakf/pallivasal was being managed by the descendants of the founder in a disciplined and regulated manner. While so, some of the persons, who aimed at the management of the said wakf/pallivasal sought to claim interest over the management of the wakf. The wakf/pallivasal was being managed by the descendants of the founder in a disciplined and regulated manner. While so, some of the persons, who aimed at the management of the said wakf/pallivasal sought to claim interest over the management of the wakf. 3(3) When the factual matrix stood thus, at the instance of few other residents in that area, who were not the descendants of the founder and not the aboriginal residents of Kazimar Street, few complaints were preferred to the Tamil Nadu Wakf Board, alleging mismanagement by the trustees, which resulted in passing the order dated 10.08.2004 by the 1st respondent, by which it was decided to frame a scheme for the proper management of the said wakf/pallivasal. Aggrieved over the said resolution of the 1st respondent dated 10.08.2004, the persons who were in the management/trustees had approached the Principal Bench of this Court by way of filing writ petition in W.P.No.7865 of 2005 to quash the resolution of the Wakf Board. But, the said writ petition was disposed of on 30.06.2005 directing the writ petitioners therein to approach the Wakf Tribunal for ventilating their grievances by invoking Section 83 of the Wakf Act. Pursuant to the said direction, an appeal was filed by the then trustees against the resolution, dated 10.08.2004, of the Wakf Board before the Wakf Tribunal (Principal Sub-Court), Madurai, in W.A.No.1 of 2005 and the same was dismissed by the Wakf Tribunal on 16.06.2006 confirming the order of the Board. 3(4) Aggrieved over the order passed by the Wakf Tribunal in W.A.No.1 of 2005, the petitioners therein preferred a revision before this Court in C.R.P.(NPD)(MD).No.491 of 2006. But, the said revision was also dismissed by this Court by order dated 22.02.2007. Thus, the order/resolution of the 1st respondent dated 10.08.2004 came to be confirmed in W.A.No.1 of 2005 by the Wakf Tribunal and also by the order of this Court dated 22.02.2007 in C.R.P.(NPD)(MD).No.491 of 2006. Further, while dismissing the said revision, this Court had observed that it is for the Wakf Board (1st respondent herein) to decide, who are the persons entitled to manage the wakf/pallivasal and to settle a scheme and regulatory measures for the better administration of the Wakf. 3(5) After dismissal of the said revision, both the parties had submitted their draft schemes with the Wakf Board. While the same was under scrutiny, the 2nd respondent in CRP.(NPD) (MD).No.491/2006, viz. 3(5) After dismissal of the said revision, both the parties had submitted their draft schemes with the Wakf Board. While the same was under scrutiny, the 2nd respondent in CRP.(NPD) (MD).No.491/2006, viz. one H.A.Mohameed Sherfudeen filed a writ petition in W.P. (MD).No.404 of 2008 seeking for a direction to the Wakf Board to post an Executive Officer for the administration of the said Wakf, pending consideration of the scheme by the Board. When the said writ petition came up for hearing on 23.05.2008, the learned counsel appearing for the Wakf Board produced a copy of the proceedings dated 06.02.2008 before the learned Single Judge, wherein it had been stated that the by-laws submitted by the parties are under the consideration and scrutiny of the Wakf Board. Hence, this Court by recording the instructions given by the Wakf Board to its counsel, closed the said writ petition on 23.05.2008. 3(6) Thereafter, the Wakf Board took up the matter for consideration. At this juncture, the petitioner in W.P.No.404 of 2008, again filed another writ petition in W.P.(MD).No.6365 of 2008 challenging the inclusion of the sitting M.L.A. of Madurai Central Constituency as one of the Members of board meeting. The said writ petition was filed seeking for a mandamus directing the Wakf Board to constitute a body excluding the 3rd respondent therein or any other existing Huqdars of the said Wakf/Pallivasal, who claim to be a past/present/future member of the Wakf Board and to enquire, decide and frame a scheme for the administration of the said Wakf/Pallivasal and its implementation. The said writ petition was dismissed by this Court on 12.08.2008 and the appeal filed in W.A.No.521 of 2008 was also dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court on 22.08.2008 by confirming the order passed in W.P.No.6365/2008. 3(7) Thereafter, the matter was taken up by the Wakf Board for consideration on 27.08.2008 and the majority of the members participated in the said meeting had held that the management with regard to the said Wakf/Pallivasal has to be continued as on date and the scheme submitted by the persons in the management of the Wakf is acceptable one, and approved the same by a majority decision of the board members and the said resolution was passed by the Wakf Board on 21.10.2008 in Resolution Na.Ka.No.13575/02/B14/Madurai, Item No.143/08. 3(8) But, the said settlement scheme made by the Wakf Board was challenged before this Court in W.P.(MD).No.10056 of 2008. When the said writ petition was pending, a revised resolution was passed by the Wakf Board as the earlier resolution dated 21.10.2008 does not reflect the full views expressed by the members at the time of the deliberation of the issue. The Wakf Board had issued the revised resolution on 06.11.2008 in Na.Ka.No.13575/02/B14/Madurai incorporating the views expressed by the members at the time of the deliberation. The said revised resolution of the Wakf Board was also challenged in W.P.(MD).No.10422 of 2009. While the said two writ petitions were pending for consideration, a Contempt Petition No.4 of 2009 was also filed before this Court complaining that the order in C.R.P.(NDP)(MD).No.491 of 2006 has been violated. This Court by a common order dated 22.12.2011, while dismissing the contempt petition, allowed the said two writ petitions and remitted the matter back to the Wakf Board for fresh consideration and further directed the Wakf Board to issue notices to both parties and hold a proper hearing by allowing both parties to file documents and make submissions, and thereafter to frame a scheme, taking into account all the aspects, making it clear that this Court was not pronouncing opinion on the merits of the claim of both parties. 3(9) At this juncture, another writ petition in W.P.No.6074 of 2012 was filed before the Principal Bench of this Court by the petitioner, who had earlier filed the writ petition in W.P.(MD).404 of 2008. The said writ petition was filed for a mandamus directing the Wakf Board to consider the representation of the petitioner dated 17.02.2012 praying for appointment of an Executive Officer. The said writ petition was disposed of on 19.03.2012 by directing the Wakf Board to consider the representation of the petitioner therein and to pass orders on merits, after affording opportunity to the petitioner and others, if any, as expeditiously as possible. 3(10) Again, the petitioner in W.P.(MD).No.404 of 2008 viz., Haji H.A.Mohammed Sherfudeen, filed another writ petition in W.P.No.16216 of 2013 for a mandamus directing the Wakf Board to consider the representation dated 06.05.2013 submitted by him for the purpose of appointing an Executive Officer for managing the affairs of the said Wakf/Pallivasal. 3(10) Again, the petitioner in W.P.(MD).No.404 of 2008 viz., Haji H.A.Mohammed Sherfudeen, filed another writ petition in W.P.No.16216 of 2013 for a mandamus directing the Wakf Board to consider the representation dated 06.05.2013 submitted by him for the purpose of appointing an Executive Officer for managing the affairs of the said Wakf/Pallivasal. This court by order dated 10.07.2013 again directed the Wakf Board to consider his representation and dispose of the same in accordance with law within a period of three months. 3(11) Thereafter, the Wakf Board took up the matter for enquiry and issued notices upon the petitioners herein as well as 19 others, calling upon them to attend the enquiry on 22.10.2013. Thereafter, the Wakf Board has passed an order on 23.10.2013 under Section 38 of the Wakf Act, taking over the management of the said wakf/Pallivasal under its direct control for a period of two years from the date of the order and also appointing the 2nd respondent as Executive Officer for the administration of the said Wakf. Challenging the same, the present writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners stating that the impugned order has been passed without issuing notice to the interested parties and moreover, when the Wakf Board exercised the powers under Section 38 of the Wakf Act, impugned notification does not specifically state the necessity or reason for that conclusion. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents contending that Wakf Board in exercise of power vested on it, under Sections 65 & 38 of the Wakf Act, passed the impugned order as an interim measure to protect the interest of the institution, after strictly complying with the above said provisions. It has been further stated in the counter affidavit that it was found that there was a diversion of funds belonging to the wakf and exclusion of a large section of the worshippers from one of the institutions in Madurai. Once the Wakf is taken over under the direct management of the Wakf Board, in order to supervise and manage the wakf, and as the wakf has income of more than Rs.500,000.00, an Executive Officer has been appointed. In terms of Section 65 of the Wakf Act, the Wakf Board has issued the gazette notification and the 2nd respondent had assumed the charge as Execution Officer of the wakf on 25.01.2013. In terms of Section 65 of the Wakf Act, the Wakf Board has issued the gazette notification and the 2nd respondent had assumed the charge as Execution Officer of the wakf on 25.01.2013. Aggrieved over the same, the petitioners have filed the present writ petitions, as if they were not put on notice. But, actually the petitioners were put on notice, which is evident from the summons issued to them. The petitioners' submission with regard to their hereditary succession to the office management of the Wakf cannot hold good, for the simple reason that such a plea had already been negatived by the Board in the year 2004 itself, which had been upheld by the Wakf Tribunal. When such a plea of the petitioners attained finality, they cannot re-agitate the same. Further, no notice is necessary for assumption of direct management of Wakf, to the persons who were in management whose term had already expired. Since the petitioners' contention regarding their continuance in the office based on hereditary succession, which had already been negatived and become final, it cannot be said that they are still holding the office. However, the petitioners were given due notice before passing the impugned orders. The attitude of the petitioners would show that by hook or crook, they want to stick on to the office of the Wakf. Thus, the respondents prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. 5. Heard the submissions made on either side and perused the materials available on record. 6. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners are the trustees of the Kazimar Periya Pallivasal. The said Pallivasal is a wakf and the said Pallivasal had been managed by the descendants of the founder of the said Wakf, viz., Kazi Syed Tajudeen. Some of the persons, who aimed at the management of the said Wakf, sought to claim management of the said Wakf, which ultimately resulted in passing of the order dated 10.08.2004 by the Wakf Board, deciding to frame a scheme for proper administration of the said wakf/Pallivasal. The said order dated 10.08.2004 was subsequently confirmed in W.A.No.1 of 2005 on the file of the Wakf Tribunal (Principal Sub-Court, Madurai), and also in C.R.P.(NDP)(MD).491/2006 by this Court. The said order dated 10.08.2004 was subsequently confirmed in W.A.No.1 of 2005 on the file of the Wakf Tribunal (Principal Sub-Court, Madurai), and also in C.R.P.(NDP)(MD).491/2006 by this Court. Pursuant to the resolution dated 10.08.2004, which was confirmed by the Wakf Tribunal as well as this Court, a draft scheme came to be presented by either parties. Thereafter, the matter was taken up by the Wakf Board for consideration on 27.08.2008 and the majority of the members who participated in the said meeting had held that the management with regard to the said Wakf/Pallivasal has to be continued as on date and the scheme submitted by the persons in the management of the Wakf is acceptable one and it was approved by a majority decision of the board members and the said resolution was passed by the Wakf Board on 21.10.2008 Vide Resolution in Na.Ka.No.13575/02/B14/Madurai, Item No.143/08. But, the said settlement scheme made by the Wakf Board was challenged before this Court in W.P.(MD).No.10056 of 2008. When the said writ petition was pending, a revised resolution was passed by the Wakf Board as the earlier resolution dated 21.10.2008 does not reflect the full views expressed by the members at the time of the deliberation of the issue. The Wakf Board had issued the revised resolution on 06.11.2008 in Na.Ka.No.13575/02/B14/Madurai incorporating the views expressed by the members at the time of the deliberation. The said revised resolution of the Wakf Board was also challenged in W.P.(MD).No.10422 of 2008. While the said two writ petitions were pending for consideration, a Contempt Petition No.4 of 2009 was also filed before this Court complaining that the order in C.R.P.(NDP)(MD).No.491 of 2006 has been violated. By a common order dated 22.12.2011, the learned single judge of this Court, while dismissing the contempt petition, allowed the said two writ petitions by setting aside the draft scheme, and remitted the matter back to the Wakf Board for fresh consideration. 7. In the meantime, one Haji H.A.Mohammed Sherfudeen filed W.P.No.6074 of 2012 before the Principal Bench of this Court seeking for a direction to the Wakf Board to consider his representation dated 17.02.2012 praying for appointment of an Executive Officer. 7. In the meantime, one Haji H.A.Mohammed Sherfudeen filed W.P.No.6074 of 2012 before the Principal Bench of this Court seeking for a direction to the Wakf Board to consider his representation dated 17.02.2012 praying for appointment of an Executive Officer. The said writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 19.03.2012 by directing the Wakf Board to consideration his representation and to pass orders on merits, after affording opportunity to him and others, if any, as expeditiously as possible. The same person viz. Haji H.A.Mohammed Sherfudeen again filed another writ petition in W.P.No.16216 of 2013 for a mandamus directing the Wakf Board to consider his representation dated 06.05.2013 to appoint an Executive Officer for managing the affairs of the said Wakf/Pallivasal. In the said writ petition, on 10.07.2013 a direction was issued to the Wakf Board by this Court to dispose of his representation in accordance with law within a period of three months. Thereafter, by referring the orders passed in W.P.(MD).Nso.10056 & 10422 of 2008, Cont.P.(MD).No.4 of 2009, W.P.Nos.6074 of 2012 and W.P.No.16216 of 2013, the Wakf Board on 23.10.2013/19.11.2013 and 24.01.2014 has passed the impugned orders under Sections 65 & 38 of the Wakf Act taking over the management of the said wakf for a period of two years and appointing an Executive Officer for the proper management of the wakf, and the same was published in the government gazette vide No.3, Part VI-Section 3(a), dated 22.01.2014. 8. It is the specific submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned orders have been passed without conducting any enquiry in respect of taking over the management or appointing an Executive Officer. The impugned orders dated 23.10.2013/19.11.2013 and 24.01.2014, taking over the management by the Wakf Board and appointing an executive officer, respectively, were passed without any notice to the petitioners and interested parties. Therefore, the impugned orders have been passed in violation of principles of natural justice. Since there is a violation of principles of natural justice in passing the impugned order, even though there is an alternative remedy, the writ petition is maintainable. For this proposition, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions reported in (1998) 8 SC 1 [Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others) and (2005) 6 SCC 321 [Canara Bank Vs. V.K.Awasthy]. 9. For this proposition, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions reported in (1998) 8 SC 1 [Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others) and (2005) 6 SCC 321 [Canara Bank Vs. V.K.Awasthy]. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that this Court has granted a direction, by a common order dated 22.12.2011 in W.P.(MD).No.10056 & 10422 of 2008 and Cont.P.(MD).No.4 of 2009, to the Wakf Board to hold a proper hearing, by allowing both parties to file documents and make submissions and to frame a scheme taking into account all the aspects. But, without framing the scheme, the Wakf Board has passed the impugned orders taking over the management of the wakf under its control and appointing an Executive Officer, which is apparently illegal. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that without passing any final order with regard to framing of scheme, the impugned orders have been passed, which is ultra vires. 10. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order has been passed under Section 38 of the Wakf Act and therefore, the Wakf Board should confine only relating to the power of appointing an executive officer under Section 38 of the Act and it cannot embark on any other provisions, including Section 69 of the Act, which deals about the taking over of the administration of the wakf, pending framing of a scheme. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Wakf Board is making an attempt to substantiate the impugned order, as if the said order has been passed under Section 69(5) of the Act, whereas the contents of the impugned order would show that the said order has been passed only under Section 38 of the Act. Under Section 38 of the Act, to appoint an Executive Officer, the Wakf Board has to form an opinion that it is necessary to do so in the interest of the Wakf. But, in the instant case, no such opinion was formed by the Wakf Board before passing the impugned order. The power to appoint an executive officer has to be exercised in terms of the policy of the Act. The said power shall be exercised coupled with the duty. But, in the instant case, no such opinion was formed by the Wakf Board before passing the impugned order. The power to appoint an executive officer has to be exercised in terms of the policy of the Act. The said power shall be exercised coupled with the duty. Therefore, it is the duty of the Wakf Board to see whether the Executive Officer has been appointed for proper and better administration of the wakf, for which necessary opinion has to be formed by the Wakf Board. 11. In this regard, by inviting the attention of this Court to the impugned order, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the impugned order has been passed by the Wakf Board only relying upon the opinion of the Law officer. The Wakf Board should come to conclusion on its own or on the basis of the decision taken by the Board Directors and not on the opinion of the law officer. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(MD).No.1977/2014 relied upon the judgment reported in 2006(2) CTC 49 [N.Sivasubramanian Vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu by Secretary, H.R & C.E] and submitted that in that case, while dealing with Section 45 of the HR & CE Act, which deals about the appointment of executive officer for a temple, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when the rights of the parties are likely to be affected by virtue of appointing the Executive officer, it is incumbent on the part of the Department to issue notice to them, for the compliance of principles of natural justice. For the same proposition, the learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment reported in (1955) AIR (Mad) 430 [T.Krishnaswamy Chetty Vs. C.Thangavelu Chetty and others]. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(MD).No.5424 of 2014 submitted that the impugned order has been passed in violation of the fundamental rights and principles of natural justice and without jurisdiction. Therefore, the writ petition is maintainable. In support of his contention, he has also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1980 SC 1157 [Nasir Ahmed Vs. Astt, Cutodian – General, Evacuee Property]. Therefore, the writ petition is maintainable. In support of his contention, he has also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1980 SC 1157 [Nasir Ahmed Vs. Astt, Cutodian – General, Evacuee Property]. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that under Section 65 of the Act, when no suitable person is available for appointment as a mutawalli of a wakf or where the Board is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that the filling up of the vacancy in the office of a mutawalli is prejudicial to the interests of the wakf, the Board may by notification in the official Gazette, assume direct management of the wakf for such a period or periods, not exceeding five years in the aggregate, as may be specified in the notification. Similarly, under Section 38 of the Act, the Board has to form an opinion before appointing an Executive Officer. In the instant case, the pre-condition for invoking Section 65 of the Act has not been complied with by the Board. There was also no formation of opinion under Section 38 of the Act by the Board before appointing the executive officer. 14. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.5424/2014, by relying upon the judgment reported in (2008) 4 SCC 144 [Bhikhubhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarath] submitted that formation of opinion though subjective must be based on materials. In the impugned order, no such material was available. Only based on the opinion given by the law officer, taking over the management of the wakf and for appointment of executive officer were made by the Board. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 15. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Huqdars are a religious denomination being a collection of individuals having common belief and identifiable by a distinct name called the Huqdars of Kazimar Peria Pallivasal. Thus, the Huqdars have a right to establish and administer religious institutions of their choice and to manage its own affairs in the matter of religion as guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel further submitted that the right to management of religious institutions vested on religious denomination, being a fundamental right, cannot be divested by any legislation or any executive order. The learned counsel further submitted that the right to management of religious institutions vested on religious denomination, being a fundamental right, cannot be divested by any legislation or any executive order. In support this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners have also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1954 SCR 1055 [R.P.Gandhi Vs. State of Bombay]. 16. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it is incorrect to state that before passing the impugned orders, no opportunity was given to the petitioners. In this regard, the learned counsel for the respondents, by inviting the attention of this Court to the enquiry notice dated 09.10.2013, submitted that pursuant to the common order dated 22.12.2011 passed by this Court in W.P.(MD).No.10056 & 10422 of 2008 and Cont.P.(MD).4 of 2009, the Board took up the matter for enquiry and issued notices to the petitioners and other interested persons; thereafter only the impugned order has been passed. 17. The learned counsel for the Wakf Board further submitted that the petitioners cannot maintain the writ petitions, as they have alternative remedy before the Government. In this regard, the learned counsel for the Wakf Board relied upon the judgment reported in 2011(1) CTC 636 [Board of Wakf, West Bengal U & another Vs. Anis Fatma Begum & another] and submitted that the High Court should not straight-away entertain writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India concerning Wakf. 18. Further, the learned counsel for the respondents, by relying upon the decision reported in 2010(2) CTC 699 [Tamil Nadu Wakf Board Vs. Janab K.S.M.A.Mohamed Mansoor], submitted that against the order passed under Section 65(1) of the Act, remedy lies only by way of Revision before the State Government. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that against the notification of the Wakf Board under Section 65(1) of the Wakf Act, in assumption of direct management of a Wakf, any person interested in the wakf may make an application to the State Government against the notification of the Board and the Government will test the correctness, legality or propriety of the said notification issued under Section 65(1) of the Act and the order of the State Government shall be final. 19. 19. The learned counsel for the Wakf Board, by relying upon the unreported judgment of this Court delivered in W.P.No.30 of 2001, dated 23.09.2005, submitted that the interest of the Wakf must be protected and if there was no suitable person to be appointed as Mutawalli, the Wakf must be administered by the Board. The learned counsel for the Wakf Board also relied upon the decision reported in 2014 (1) SCC 603 [Commissioner of Income Tax & Others Vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal], in support of his contention that even if there is any violation of the principles of natural justice, the High Court should not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 20. With regard to the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since the impugned order was passed under Section 38 of the Wakf Act, the Wakf Board has to confine only relating to its powers to appoint an Executive officer under Section 38 of the Act and it cannot import any other provision, including Section 69(5) of the Act, the learned counsel for the Wakf Board submitted that the nature of exercise of power under Section 65 is similar to that of Section 38. In the instant case, during the framing of scheme as well as in the appeal and revision, it was inter alia found that there was diversion of funds belonging to the Mosque and exclusion of a large section of the worshippers from one of the wakf institutions in Madurai, which necessitated the Board to take control of the management. Above all, in the instant case, by order dated 10.08.2004, the claim of the petitioners with regard to hereditary succession was negatived, which was confirmed in W.A.No.1 of 2005 on the file of the Wakf Board (Principal Sub-Court), Madruai, as well as in CRP.(NPD)(MD).No.491 of 2006 by this Court. Therefore, under such circumstances, absolutely there is no need to give any notice to the petitioners before taking over the management of the wakf. But, inspite of that, notices were issued to the petitioners. Hence, if they have any grievance, they have to file a revision before the Government under Section 65 of the Act. 21. Therefore, under such circumstances, absolutely there is no need to give any notice to the petitioners before taking over the management of the wakf. But, inspite of that, notices were issued to the petitioners. Hence, if they have any grievance, they have to file a revision before the Government under Section 65 of the Act. 21. In view of the rival submissions made on either side, now, the questions, which fall for consideration are_ 1) Whether the impugned order has been passed in violation of the fundamental rights and principles of natural justice and without jurisdiction? 2) Whether the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent taking over the management of the wakf is liable to be set aside since the said order has been passed without framing the scheme and without forming an opinion as required under Section 38 of the Wakf Act? 3) Whether the writ petition is liable to be dismissed, since there is an alternative remedy available to the petitioners? 22(a). Question No.(1):-With regard to the allegation of violation of fundamental rights and principles of natural justice, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order has been passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners by issuing notice and conducting proper enquiry. But, on perusal of the materials available on records, I find that while passing the common order dated 22.12.2011 in Cont.P.(MD).No.4 of 2009 & W.P.(MD).Nos.10056 & 10422 of 2008, the learned single judge of this Court has set aside the earlier draft scheme framed by the Wakf Board and by directing the Wakf Board to hold a proper enquiry by allowing both parties to file documents and make submissions and to frame a scheme taking into account all the aspects, remanded the matter to the Wakf Board for fresh consideration. While setting aside the earlier draft scheme framed by the Wakf Board, the learned single judge of this Court has observed in his order that the earlier draft scheme has been framed without any notice to the petitioners therein and without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners therein and even without looking into the draft scheme submitted by the petitioners therein and without considering the order passed in the CRP.(NPD)(MD).No.491 of 2006. Thus, the matter was remanded back to the Wakf Board for fresh consideration. 22(b). Thus, the matter was remanded back to the Wakf Board for fresh consideration. 22(b). Thereafter, the Wakf Board took up the matter for enquiry and issued notice dated 09.10.2013 upon the petitioners in W.P.(MD).No.1977 of 2014 as well as 19 others, named therein, calling upon them to attend for an enquiry. In fact, the copy of the said notice was also produced before this Court to show that notice was sent to the petitioners in W.P.(MD).1977 of 2014 and 19 others. On perusal of the said notice, I find that the 1st respondent herein by referring the common order passed by this Court in Cont.P.(MD).No.4 of 2009 & W.P. (MD).Nos.10056 & 10422 of 2008, had issued notice to the parties to attend for an enquiry on 22.10.2013. Further, a perusal of the impugned order would show that some of the parties/petitioners have not attended the enquiry inspite of receipt of the said notice. Whereas some of the parties namely JanabM.Musthafa Ali, Janab A.Aynul Yakheen, Janab M.Mohamed Ghouse, Janab S.M.S.Ibrahim, Janab S.I.Hussaindeen, Janab M.A.Ibrahim Shazuli and Janab S.A.Fakrudeen attended the enquiry. Further, in the said enquiry, Janab S.A.K.Ibrahim and Janab S.I.Quadiri, Janab S.A.Fakrudeen Ibrahim and Janap S.I.Hussaindeen were represented through their counsel Mr.Velumani. Janab M.A.Ibrahim Shazuli was represented through his counsel Mr.Janab.I.S.A.K.Ibrahim. Janab.M.Musthafa Ali, Janab.A.Aynul Yakheen and Janab.M.Mohamed Ghouse were represented by their counsel Janab.Nizaar Ahamed. 22(c) Thus, a perusal of the notice as well as impugned order would show that the petitioners were put on notice and they had been heard by the Wakf Board before passing the impugned order. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that they have not been issued with any notice before passing the impugned order cannot be sustained. Therefore, I find that absolutely there is no violation of principles of natural justice in passing the impugned order. Since there is no violation of principles of natural justice, the judgements relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case. Therefore, I find that absolutely there is no violation of principles of natural justice in passing the impugned order. Since there is no violation of principles of natural justice, the judgements relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case. Even assuming for a moment that no notice was issued before passing the impugned order for assumption of direct management of the Wakf by the 1st respondent, the same will not serve as a ground to approach this Court directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, contending that there is a violation of principles of natural justice in passing the impugned order, since an effective alternative remedy is available to the petitioner under the Wakf Act. Further, in the instant case, the claim of the petitioners that they are administering the Wakf as descendants of the founder of Wakf was negatived by the 1st respondent, by resolution dated 10.08.2004, which was subsequently confirmed in W.A.No.1 of 2005 by the Wakf Tribunal and in C.R.P.No.491 of 2006 by this Court. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners claiming themselves as Huqdars of the Wakf after 10.08.2004 is without authority of law. Under such circumstances, as observed earlier, even if no notice is issued to the petitioners before assumption of direct management of the Wakf by the 1st respondent, the same cannot be taken as a ground to approach this Court directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, alleging that there is a violation of principles of natural justice. In this regard, a useful reference can be placed in the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (MD).No.2170 & 6457 of 2011, dated 25.07.2012 (Janab Abdul Ali Mohammed and others vs. The Tamil nadu Wakf Board and others), wherein it has been held as follows:- “17. But unfortunately for the petitioners, the impugned orders have to be seen as comprising of two things. The first is the finding recorded against the petitioners. The second is that of bringing the Wakf under the direct management of the Wakf Board. In so far as the first thing that the impugned order has done, there is no doubt that the said portion is vitiated for violation of principles of natural justice. 18. The first is the finding recorded against the petitioners. The second is that of bringing the Wakf under the direct management of the Wakf Board. In so far as the first thing that the impugned order has done, there is no doubt that the said portion is vitiated for violation of principles of natural justice. 18. But in so far as the second part is concerned, there is some difficulty for the petitioners. Admittedly, the petitioners were appointed by an order dated 11.11.2002, for a period of 3 years. A careful perusal of the order dated 11.11.2002, appointing the petitioners, would show that it was subject to certain terms and conditions. Condition No.1 incorporated in the said order reads as follows:- “On expiry of 3 years, the Committee will automatically ceases its tenure of office and shall not have any right to function further on any ground unless it is renewed or extended by the Tamil Nadu Wakf Board.” 19. Therefore, after the expiry of 3 years, the petitioners were continuing to manage the Wakf, without the authority of law. There is a world of difference between (i) the removal of a Mutawalli whose tenure has not come to an end and (ii) the automatic cessation of office of a Mutawalli whose tenure had expired long back. It is only in the former cases that a notice and an opportunity of hearing is mandatory. 20. In other words, a person whose tenure of office has not come to an end, would suffer civil consequences and would have his rights infringed, if he is removed even during the subsistence of the tenure. But a person who merely continued to manage the Wakf by default, after the expiry of the tenure, has no vested right. Unless a right vested in a person is sought to be taken away by an order, he may not be entitled to a notice and an opportunity of hearing.” The dictum laid down in the above said judgment is squarely applicable to the facts of this case also. Even in the case on hand, as observed above, the claim of the petitioners that they are administering the Wakf as the descendants of the founder of the Wakf was negatived by the 1st respondent by resolution dated 10.08.2004. The said finding has also reached the finality in subsequent proceedings. Even in the case on hand, as observed above, the claim of the petitioners that they are administering the Wakf as the descendants of the founder of the Wakf was negatived by the 1st respondent by resolution dated 10.08.2004. The said finding has also reached the finality in subsequent proceedings. Therefore, on the date of passing the impugned order, i.e., 23.10.2013, the petitioners have no vested right to manage the Wakf. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, though I am of the opinion that no notice to the petitioner is necessary before passing the impugned order for assumption of direct management of the Wakf, in the instant case, notice was served on the petitioners and enquiry was also conducted and thereafter only, the impugned order has been passed by the 1st respondent; hence, at any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that the impugned order has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice. 22(d) According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Huqdars are a religion denomination, being a collection of individuals, having common belief and identifiable by a distinct name called the Huqdars of Kazimar Peria pallivasal. Thus, the Huqdars have a right to establish and administer religious institutions of their choice and to manage its own affairs in the matter of religion as guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution of India. Now, in view of the impugned order, the 1st respondent has taken over the management of the Wakf/Pallivasal, which is in violation of the Article 26 of the Constitution of India. 22(e). But, on perusal of the impugned order, I find that the management of the wakf/pallivasal was taken over by the Wakf Board only for better and proper administer of the wakf. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that before taking over the management / passing the impugned order, sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioners. The management of the wakf/pallivasal was taken over by the Wakf Board for better administration of the wakf/pallivasal, only after holding a proper enquiry. Further, from the materials placed on record, I find that by resolution dated 10.08.2004, the 1st respondent has held that the petitioners are not the descendants of the wakif and there is no evidence of there being a Wakif or a Wakf Nama to decide the line of succession. Further, from the materials placed on record, I find that by resolution dated 10.08.2004, the 1st respondent has held that the petitioners are not the descendants of the wakif and there is no evidence of there being a Wakif or a Wakf Nama to decide the line of succession. The relevant portion in the Resolution of the Wakf Board dated 10.08.2004 runs as follows:- “From what is stated by the respondent, there is nothing to substantiate that they are the descendants of the Wakif. There is no evidence of their being a Wakif or a Wakf Nama to decide the line of succession. At best they are the descendants of the Inamdar who have been named in the Inam Register, and only a Wakif or his descendant could claim the line of succession for management towards the enjoyment for management of the Wakf property and none other. As it is not the case of the respondent that they are the direct descendants of the Wakif, they do not enjoy undisturbed lineage in succession. Under the Wakf Law only the Wakif and his lineal descendants would have the right to succeed to the office in the case of hereditary claim. As the Muthawalli has not been Wakif he cannot claim similar rights. In this scenario can the existence of a Jamath be ignored. The answer would be 'No'. As there have been serious allegations it would be appropriate that this Wakf be administered under scheme so as to eliminate areas of ambiguity and vagueness and also crystallize the obligations of those in the administration of the Wakf.” The above said Resolution of the Wakf Board dated 10.08.2004 was also subsequently confirmed by the Wakf Tribunal in W.A.No.1 of 2005 and also in CRP.(NPD)(MD).No.491 of 2006 by this Court. Further, the order passed in CRP.(NPD)(MD).No.491 of 2006 was not challenged by the petitioners. When it has been clearly held that only the wakif and his descendant could claim the line of succession for the management towards the enjoyment of management of the Wakf property and none other, including the petitioners, now the petitioners cannot say that the impugned order has been passed in violation of Article 26 of the Constitution of India. The Wakf Act, 1995 (Act 43 of 1995) was made with the object of providing better administration of Wakf. The Wakf Act, 1995 (Act 43 of 1995) was made with the object of providing better administration of Wakf. The statement of objects and reasons appended to the Act also state that the main object was to provide for a better management of all Wakfs and also appointment of a Wakf Tribunal to consider all questions and disputes pertaining to the Wakf. When that being so, the petitioners cannot contend that the excise of statuary power by the Wakf Board, which it derived under the Wakf Act is a colorable excise of power. Under such circumstances, I find that there is no violation of fundamental rights of the petitioners, in passing the impugned order. 23(a). Question No.(2):-With regard to the second question, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that this Court has granted a direction, by a common order dated 22.12.2011 in Cont.P.(MD).No.4 of 2009 & W.P.(MD).Nos.10056 & 10422 of 2008, to the Wakf Board to hold a proper enquiry by allowing both the parties to file documents and make submission, and to frame a scheme taking into account all aspects. But, without framing a scheme, the Wakf Board has passed the impugned order taking over the management of the Wakf/pallivasal under its control and appointed an Executive officer, which is apparently illegal. 23(b) But, on a perusal of the materials on record, I find that the learned single judge of this Court, by the common order in Cont.P.(MD).No.4 of 2009 & W.P.(MD).Nos.10056 & 10422 of 2008, has set aside the earlier draft scheme framed by the Wakf Board for the reason that the said draft scheme was framed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners therein. The said order does not speak anything about taking over the management of the Wakf/pallivasal by the 1st respondent, pending framing of a scheme. When that being so, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent taking over the management of the wakf/pallivasal pending framing of a scheme. The said order does not speak anything about taking over the management of the Wakf/pallivasal by the 1st respondent, pending framing of a scheme. When that being so, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent taking over the management of the wakf/pallivasal pending framing of a scheme. In fact, appointment of executive officer to manage the wakf cannot be found fault with, for a simple reason that the petitioners' contention that they are the descendants in wakf had already been negatived by the Wakf Board as early as in the year 2004, which has also been confirmed by the Wakf Tribunal and this Court and the same has attained finality by virtue of the order passed in CRP.(NPD)(MD).No.491 of 2006. Above all, before taking over the management by the Wakf Board, as observed earlier, the petitioners were served with notice and enquiry was conducted. 23(c) It is further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order has been passed without forming any opinion by the Wakf Board as required under Section 38 of the Wakf Act. But, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the Wakf Board that the Wakf Board in exercise of power vested on it under Sections 65 & 38 of the Act, has taken over the management of the wakf/pallivasal and appointed the executive officer, as an interim measure to protect the interest of the institution, after strictly complying with the above provisions. But, it is the reply of the learned counsel for the petitioners that now the Wakf Board is making an attempt to substantiate the impugned order, as if the said order has been passed under Section 69(5) of the Act, whereas the contents of the impugned order would show that the said order has been passed only under Section 38 of the Act. Under Section 38 of the Act, to appoint an Executive Officer, the Wakf Board has to form an opinion that it is necessary to do so in the interest of the Wakf. But, in the instant case, no such opinion was formed by the Wakf Board before passing the impugned order and the impugned order has been passed only based on the opinion given by the Law Officer. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. But, in the instant case, no such opinion was formed by the Wakf Board before passing the impugned order and the impugned order has been passed only based on the opinion given by the Law Officer. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 23(d) But, a perusal of Section 65(1) of the Act, I find that the Wakf Board is empowered to take over the administration of the Wakf, if no suitable person is available for appointment as a mutawalli of the wakf. But, it is the categorical statement of the petitioners that the contents of the impugned order would show that it was passed under Section 38 of the Act and under such circumstances, the Wakf Board ought to have formed an opinion and they cannot justify the impugned order by relying upon Section 69 of the Act. But, as observed earlier, the nature of exercise of power under Section 65 of the Act is similar to that of Section 38 of the Act. In the impugned order, it has been clearly stated that the management of the wakf/pallivasal was ordered to be taken over by the Wakf Board only for better and proper management of the wakf/pallivasal. Moreover, the impugned order has been passed only as an interim measure to protect the interest of the institution pending the framing of scheme. Under such circumstances, it has to be construed that the impugned order has been passed in terms of Section 65 of the Act also. Since the impugned order has been passed by the 1st respondent only after conducting due enquiry, I am not inclined to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order has been passed only based on the opinion of the Law Officer. 24. Question No.(3):- Since there is no violation of principles of natural justice and fundamental right in passing the impugned order by the Wakf Board, if the petitioners are aggrieved over the impugned order, they have to seek remedy only before the Government by way of revision. In this regard, it would appropriate to refer some of the decisions_ (i) In the judgment reported in 2011(1) CTC 636 [Board of Wakf, West Bengal & another Vs. Anis Fatma Begum & another] it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:- “10. In this regard, it would appropriate to refer some of the decisions_ (i) In the judgment reported in 2011(1) CTC 636 [Board of Wakf, West Bengal & another Vs. Anis Fatma Begum & another] it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:- “10. In our opinion, all matters pertaining to Wakfs should be filed in the first instance before the Wakf Tribunal constituted under Section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995 and should not be entertained by the Civil Court or by the High Court straight-away under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. It may be mentioned that the Wakf Act, 1995 is a recent parliamentary statute which has constituted a special Tribunal for deciding disputes relating to Wakfs. The obvious purpose of constituting such a Tribunal was that a lot of cases relating to Wakfs were being filed in the courts in India and they were occupying a lot of time of all the Courts in the country, which resulted in increase in pendency of cases in the Courts. Hence, a special Tribunal has been constituted for deciding such matters. ............... 14. Thus, the Wakf Tribunal can decide all disputes, questions or other matters rTelating to a Wakf or Wakf property. The words “any dispute, question or other matters relating to a Wakf or Wakf property” are, in our opinion, words of very wide connotation. Any dispute, question or other matters whatsoever and in whatever manner which arises relating to a Wakf or Wakf property can be decided by the Wakf Tribunal. The word ‘Wakf’ has been defined in Section 3 (r) of the Wakf Act, 1995 and hence once the property is found to be a Wakf property as defined in Section 3 (r), then any dispute, question or other matter relating to it should be agitated before the Wakf Tribunal. 15. Under Section 83 (5) of the Wakf Act, 1995 the Tribunal has all powers of the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, and hence it has also powers under Order 39 Rules 1, 2 and 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure to grant temporary injunctions and enforce such injunctions. Hence, a full-fledged remedy is available to any party if there is any dispute, question or other matter relating to a Wakf or Wakf property. 16. Hence, a full-fledged remedy is available to any party if there is any dispute, question or other matter relating to a Wakf or Wakf property. 16. We may further clarify that the party can approach the Wakf Tribunal, even if no order has been passed under the Act, against which he/she is aggrieved. It may be mentioned that Sections 83 (1) and 84 of the Act do not confine the jurisdiction of the Wakf Tribunal to the determination of the correctness or otherwise of an order passed under the Act. No doubt Section 83 (2) refers to the orders passed under the Act, but, in our opinion, Sections 83 (1) and 84 of the Act are independent provisions, and they do not require an order to be passed under the Act before invoking the jurisdiction of the Wakf Tribunal. Hence, it cannot be said that a party can approach the Wakf Tribunal only against an order passed under the Act. In our opinion, even if no order has been passed under the Act, the party can approach the Wakf Tribunal for the determination of any dispute, question or other matters relating to a Wakf or Wakf property, as the plain language of Sections 83 (1) and 84 indicates. 17. We may clarify that under the proviso to Section 83 (9) of the Wakf Act, 1995 a party aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal can approach the High Court which can call for the records for satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the decision of the Tribunal. This provision make it clear that the intention of Parliament is that the party who wishes to raise any dispute or matter relating to a Wakf or Wakf property should first approach the Tribunal before approaching the High Court. ........ 19. It is well-settled that when there is a special law providing for a special forum, then recourse cannot be taken to the general law vide Justice G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edn. 2004, pp 133-134). 20. In Chief Engineer, Hydel Project & Ors vs. Ravinder Nath & Ors. (2008) 2 SCC 350 , this Court held that when the matter fell in the area covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction. In the above decision the Court has referred to several earlier decisions on this point. 21. 20. In Chief Engineer, Hydel Project & Ors vs. Ravinder Nath & Ors. (2008) 2 SCC 350 , this Court held that when the matter fell in the area covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction. In the above decision the Court has referred to several earlier decisions on this point. 21. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that since the matter fell under the purview of the Wakf Act, only the Wakf Tribunal has jurisdiction in the matter, and not the Civil Court. ” (ii) In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax & others Vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal reported in (2014) 1 SCC 603 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even though the principles of natural justice is violated, the High Court should not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statue under which the action complained of itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. A relevant portion in the said judgment reads as follows:- “19. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognized some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, i.e., where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titagarh Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.” (iii) The Principle Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.30 of 2001 (Niana Mohammed Jamaath Pallivasal Vs. Tamil Nadu Wakf Board and others), by order dated 23.09.2005 held has follows:- “30. The writ petitioner attacked the impugned proceedings on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. Tamil Nadu Wakf Board and others), by order dated 23.09.2005 held has follows:- “30. The writ petitioner attacked the impugned proceedings on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. In 1977 (2) S.C.C. 256 [THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF MINING EXAMINATION AND CHIEF INSPECTOR OF MINES VS. RAMJEE], the Supreme Court observes tellingly thus :- "The last violation regarded as a lethal objection is that the Board did not enquire of the respondent, independently of the one done by the Regional Inspector. Assuming it to be necessary, here the respondent has, in the form of an appeal against the report of the Regional Inspector, sent his explanation to the Chairman of the Board. He has thus been heard and compliance with Regulation 26, in the circumstances, is complete. Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the main proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt - that is the conscience of the matter." 31. The impugned proceedings show clearly the frustration of the Board, as could be seen from the following extract :- "The conduct of the Thangal Katchi deserves to be condemned as they have no regard for the directions of the Wakf Board. Presently, Thangal Katchi is holding the management of this Wakf and it appears that in order to keep the management with them, they are playing all sorts of tactics, thus defeating the very object of the scheme which was framed earlier for the better administration of this Wakf." If we keep in mind the words extracted from the Supreme Court's decision referred to above, the petitioner's complaint that opportunity was not given must be rejected. The Board rightly was of the opinion that the interest of the Wakf must be protected and if there was "no suitable person" to be appointed as Mutawalli, the Wakf must be administered by the Board.” A reading of the above said judgements would show that the petitioners herein cannot straightaway approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when effective alternative remedy is available to them, even if there is violation of principles of natural justice. In the instant case, the management of the Wakf was taken over by the 1st respondent only for the better administration of the Wakf as an interim measure, pending the framing of scheme. Hence, absolutely there is no violation of principles of natural justice in passing the impugned order. When that being so, I am of the opinion that the writ petition itself is not maintainable. If the petitioners feel aggrieved by the impugned order, they have to work out their remedy by way of revision before the State Government, if they so desire. 25. For the foregoing reasons, both the writ petitions fail and the same are dismissed accordingly. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. There is no order as to costs.