Surya Kant, J. 1. The defendants have preferred this Regular Second Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 08th December, 1986 passed by Sub Judge 1st Class, Amritsar, duly upheld by the Additional District Judge, Amritsar vide judgment and decree dated 25th May, 1987, whereby suit for redemption of mortgage filed under Section 12 of the Redemption of Mortgage [Punjab] Act, 1913 filed by the respondent-plaintiffs has been decreed. The substantial questions of law that arise for consideration are [i] whether the period spent in pursuing the application under Section 4 of the Redemption of Mortgage [Punjab] Act, 1913 is required to be excluded from the period of limitation for the purpose of institution of suit for redemption under Section12 of the Act?; [ii] Is there any prescribed period of limitation for the redemption of a usufructuary mortgage? and if so, [iii] when does such period start running? 2. The facts may be briefly noticed. 3. Teja Singh and his six sons filed the instant suit for declaration under Section 12 of the 1913 Act, inter-alia, averring that the suit land was mortgaged with possession by Sadha Singh and Ralla Singh on 11th April, 1951 in favour of Chanan Singh, predecessor-in-interest of the appellant-defendants and the first plaintiff having purchased the same vide sale deeds dated 21st October, 1976 for a consideration, had stepped into the shoes of the original mortgagors and was entitled to seek its redemption. The plaintiff preferred an application under Section 4 of the Act for redemption of the suit land on payment of the mortgage amount of Rs. 999/- and 6 Annas but the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Baba Bakala dismissed their application vide order dated 7th October, 1980. The plaintiffs challenged the said order and also sought redemption of the suit land through the civil suit filed under Section 12 of the Act on 6th October, 1981, which has been decreed by the Courts below, giving rise to this second appeal. 4. One of the plea taken by the appellant-defendants is that since the suit land was mortgaged on 11th April, 1951, the civil suit for its redemption could be filed within thirty years therefrom, hence the civil suit filed in October, 1981 was barred by limitation. 5. 4. One of the plea taken by the appellant-defendants is that since the suit land was mortgaged on 11th April, 1951, the civil suit for its redemption could be filed within thirty years therefrom, hence the civil suit filed in October, 1981 was barred by limitation. 5. The trial Court struck eight issues on the basis of pleadings of the parties including Issue No. 1 as to "whether the suit of the plaintiff is within time?". 6. The trial Court answered Issue No. 1 in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs for two reasons. Firstly, it held that as per the recital in the Register of Deed Writer [Ex. D1] the mortgaged land could be redeemed by Sadha Singh and Ralla Singh by the month of March, 1952 on payment of Rs. 999 and six Annas. The limitation period for redeeming the land thus started running from March, 1952, therefore, the suit filed on 5th October, 1981 was well within time. Secondly, even if the period of limitation is assumed to have commenced from the date of creation of mortgage on 11th April, 1951, yet the suit was well within limitation as the time consumed in prosecuting application under Section 4 of 1913 Act before the Assistant Collector was liable to be excluded for determining the period of limitation. 7. On merits also, the trial Court found that the respondent-plaintiffs had stepped into the shoes of the mortgagors and were entitled to redeem the land. 8. The defendants in their first appeal assailed the finding of the trial Court particularly on Issue No. 1 as to whether the civil suit was within limitation period. The first Appellate Court in Para No. 9 of its judgment observed that Issue No. 1 was quite crucial and then took notice of one of the reason assigned by the trial Court, namely, that the time spent in pursuing the redemption application before the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade from 12th April, 1979 to 07th October, 1980 "has to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act". The first Appellate Court then proceeded to hold that the suit is within time and the issue has been rightly decided by the learned trial Court. The second reasoning given by the trial Court, namely, whether or not the limitation would start running from March, 1952: has not been discussed by the first Appellate Court. 9. The first Appellate Court then proceeded to hold that the suit is within time and the issue has been rightly decided by the learned trial Court. The second reasoning given by the trial Court, namely, whether or not the limitation would start running from March, 1952: has not been discussed by the first Appellate Court. 9. Learned counsel for the parties were heard. The record has been perused. 10. For answering the question as to whether the redemption suit filed by the respondents is well within limitation, it is essential to determine the nature of the mortgage. The Courts below have on consideration of the evidence on record held that the mortgagors delivered possession of the suit land to the mortgagees. The revenue entries reveal that as per the mortgage deed, "interest to be accrued on this amount and the produce of land shall be kept at par with each other". Such a transaction, thus, fully satisfies the ingredients of usufructuary mortgage within the meaning of Section58[d] of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 11. The Register of the Deed Writer [Mark A-1] though inadmissible in evidence also suggests that the mortgagors agreed to repay the mortgage money in Chaitra, i.e., March, 1952. There was apparently a clog on the right to redeem the mortgaged property for a period of one year. 12. Having held that it was a case of usufructuary mortgage, the question as to whether there is any limitation period within which suit for its redemption need to be filed and if so, how the limitation period [of thirty years] prescribed in Article 61[a] of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be calculated, need not detain for a long as this question has been squarely answered by a Full Bench of this Court in Ram Kishan and others v. Sheo Ram and others, (2008-1) 149 P.L.R. 1, holding as follows:- "Therefore, we answer the questions framed to hold that in case of usufructuary-mortgage, where no time limit is fixed to seek redemption, the right to seek redemption would not arise on the date of mortgage but will arise on the date when the mortgagor pays or tenders to the mortgagee or deposits in Court, the mortgage money or the balance thereof. Thus, it is held that once a mortgage always a mortgage and is always redeemable". 13. Thus, it is held that once a mortgage always a mortgage and is always redeemable". 13. In view of the fact that the limitation period of thirty years prescribed under Article 61[a] of the Limitation Act, 1963 would commence when the 'right to redeem' or to recover possession' accrues and such a right accrues only when the mortgagor returns the mortgage money, the civil suit filed by the respondents within thirty years after offering payment of full mortgage money was indeed within limitation. 14. Since the limitation period starts running only from the date when the mortgagor of a usufructuary mortgage offers to pay the mortgage money, the appellants' contention that the period spent by the respondents in prosecuting their petition for redemption under Section 4 of the 1913 Act can not be excluded for the purpose of computing limitation period or the period spent in pursuing that petition would not extend the period of limitation, carries no significance and is redundant. 15. The trial court appears to be right in observing that the limitation period of thirty years would otherwise start from March, 1952 as there was a clog against redemption of the suit property till then. The suit in question, therefore, was filed within the limitation period. For the reasons afore-stated, I do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. No costs.