JUDGMENT : Rekha Mittal, J. The present appeal has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 15.12.1989 passed by the Additional District Judge, Ferozepur accepting the appeal of the respondents and dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellant. 2. The facts relevant for disposal of the present appeal are that the appellant filed suit for recovery of Rs.4,722/- by way of refund of house tax paid in excess while challenging the assessment made by the Municipal Committee, Zira (for brevity "the Committee") for the year 1986-87 to be null and void and against the principles of natural justice. It was averred that the Committee wrongly and arbitrarily assessed the house tax amounting to Rs.5,832/- for the year 1985-86 and the amount was deposited on 14.11.1985 to avoid any complicacy of fine etc. The site in dispute remained vacant from 10.5.1985 to 30.5.1985. The Committee assessed house tax at the rate of 15% of the annual rental value of the building or the site and in this way, the house tax should have been assessed at Rs.7376.51 it being the rental value of the property in dispute. The building in dispute was vacated by the Food Corporation of India on 30.3.1986 and lying vacant till today, therefore, the Committee wrongly assessed the house tax for the year 1986-87 on the basis of previous year without hearing the plaintiff and without serving any notice upon him. 3. The defendants-respondents filed written statement seriously contesting the claim of the plaintiff-appellant. The Committee assessed house tax for the year 1985-86 after giving notice to the plaintiff but he did not raise any objection to the assessment and has paid house tax. In view of the provisions contained in Section 68 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (for short "the Act"), there is no need for new assessment of house tax. It has challenged the maintainability of the suit in the present form, suit being bad for want of notice and jurisdiction of the court being barred under Section 86 of the Act. 4. The controversy between the parties led to framing of the following issues by the trial court:- 1. Whether the assessment made by the Municipal Committee for the year 1985-86 was wrong and against the facts? OPP 2. Whether the assessment made by the M.C. for the year 1986- 87 is also wrong and against the facts. OPP 3. 4. The controversy between the parties led to framing of the following issues by the trial court:- 1. Whether the assessment made by the Municipal Committee for the year 1985-86 was wrong and against the facts? OPP 2. Whether the assessment made by the M.C. for the year 1986- 87 is also wrong and against the facts. OPP 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any refund money from the M.C. If so, to what extent? OPP 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 5. Whether no notice has been given to M.C.? OPD 6. Whether the jurisdiction of this court is barred under Section 86 of the Municipal Act? OPD 7. Relief. 5. The trial court permitted the parties to lead evidence in support of their respective claims. After having heard counsel for the parties and appraisal of evidence on record, the learned trial court decreed the suit for recovery by holding that assessment made by the Committee for the year 1986-87 on the basis of assessment of the previous year is null and void. 6. The appeal preferred by the respondents against the judgment and decree dated 3.8.1988 passed by the trial court was accepted primarily on the ground that the civil court has got no jurisdiction to decide the matter and as a result, findings of the trial court on issue No. 6 were reversed and no finding was recorded on other issues with the observation that these have have become redundant. 7. Counsel for the appellant contends that the learned trial court recorded a finding that the appellant did not receive any notice or an opportunity of being heard before the assessment of house tax for the year 1986-87 was made by the Committee, therefore, the order of assessment being without jurisdiction is amenable to challenge before the civil court in view of the judgment passed by this court in Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana v. M/s Ram Parshad Kidar Nath, 1988 (2) PLR 219. It is further contended that the learned appellate court without adverting to the findings of the trial court with regard to non-receipt of notice by the appellant and order of assessment being violative of the principles of natural justice held that the civil court has got no jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter in dispute in view of the judgment passed by this court in Romesh Kumar and others v. The Municipal Committee, Gurdaspur and others, AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 295. It is further submitted that in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case that no notice was served upon the appellant before making assessment for the year 1986-87, the ratio laid down in Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana's case (supra) squarely covers the present controversy. 8. No one is present on behalf of the respondents to contest the claim of the appellant. 9. I have heard counsel for the appellant and perused the case file. 10. The substantial question of law which arises for adjudication is "Whether the appellate court has rightly placed reliance upon the judgment in Romesh Kumar and others case (supra) to hold that jurisdiction of the civil court is barred to deal with the matter in dispute. 11. The appellant in the plaint has raised a specific plea that he did not receive any notice before the assessment for the years 1985-86 and 1986-87 was made by the Committee assessing the amount of house tax of Rs.5,832/-. He reiterated his version during his examination as a witness. Any notice sent by the Committee was not put to the witness. However, while adducing evidence, the Committee produced one notice with the purported signatures of the plaintiff in token of its receipt. The learned trial court recorded its findings in para 11 that signatures at the back of notice Ex. D2 is a clear cut forgery and the notice alleged to have been served upon the plaintiff has no sanctity in the eyes of law, therefore, the provisions envisaged in Section 65 of the Act have not been complied with. As a result, the Court held that as no notice was served upon the appellant before making house tax assessment, the judgment passed by this court in Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana's case (supra) would squarely cover the controversy in regard to jurisdiction of the civil Court and held in favour of the appellant. As a result, the Court held that as no notice was served upon the appellant before making house tax assessment, the judgment passed by this court in Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana's case (supra) would squarely cover the controversy in regard to jurisdiction of the civil Court and held in favour of the appellant. The learned appellate court without adverting to the issue if any notice was served upon the appellant before making assessment and addressing findings recorded by the learned trial court in this regard relied upon the judgment in Romesh Kumar and others' case (supra) to reverse the findings of the learned trail court by holding that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in view of the provisions of Sections 84 and 86 of the Act. As the appellate court did not deal with the factual controversy whether any notice was served upon the appellant before making assessment, the learned appellate court has committed a grave error by placing reliance upon the judgment in Romesh Kumar and others' case (supra) to hold that the civil court has no jurisdiction to decide the matter. 12. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, the findings recorded by the learned appellate court on Issue No. 6 cannot be allowed to sustain and accordingly set aside. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is partly allowed, the judgment and decree dated 15.12.1989 passed by the appellate court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the appellate court for decision afresh, in accordance with law.