JUDGMENT 1. - The office has reported that the appeal is barred by 523 days. 2. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed by the appellant, inter alia, with the submissions that the appellant has got a strong case, inasmuch as, the Division Bench judgment, which forms the basis of the impugned decree has been overruled by a Larger Bench of this Court; the appellant Govind Singh Parihar resides in England and his affairs are looked after by his power of attorney holder Deepak Parihar, who did not contact the counsel representing the appellant in the trial court as he was informed about pendency of issue before the Larger Bench and as soon as the power of attorney holder received information from the counsel in September, 2009, the appeal was filed without any further loss of time. It has been prayed that the delay in filing the appeal be condoned and the same may be heard on merits. The application is supported by affidavit of Deepak Parihar, the power of attorney holder. 3. A reply to the application has been filed by the respondents, inter alia, opposing the prayer for condonation of delay. It is, inter alia, indicated that the judgment impugned was passed based on the law as it then prevailed and there is no reason for the power of attorney holder not to contact his lawyer. It is further submitted that contention about lawyer informing about pendency of the issue before the Larger Bench is apparently baseless as the issue was referred to the Larger Bench only after the impugned judgment and decree was passed. Ultimately, it was prayed that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the appeal be dismissed. 4. Making submissions on behalf of the appellant learned counsel submitted that though appellant may be guilty of a bit of negligence, the circumstances of the case are such that the delay deserves to be condoned. It is submitted that admittedly the foundation of the impugned judgment and decree already stands overruled by the Larger Bench of this Court and the respondents can at best be compensated by payment of cost. It is submitted that admittedly the foundation of the impugned judgment and decree already stands overruled by the Larger Bench of this Court and the respondents can at best be compensated by payment of cost. It is further pointed out that a similar nature of appeal with a similar delay was filed by the appellant, wherein, the delay was condoned by this Court in S.B. Civil Regular First Appeal No.626/2011 (Govind Singh Parihar v. LRs of Bhikam Chand Bohra) decided on 15.12.2012. Reliance was also placed on Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 107 , N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy : (1998) 7 SCC 123 , Union of India v. Giani : (2011) 11 SCC 480 , State of Maharashtra v. Maimuna Begam : AIR 1994 Bom 353 and Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah : AIR 1955 SC 425 . 5. Learned counsel for the respondents opposed the submissions and submitted that the appellant has apparently not brought out the true facts before this Court and the plea raised by the appellant is apparently contrary to the record. It is, inter alia, submitted that the impugned judgment was passed on 18.03.2008 based on judgment dated 07.12.2007 passed in the case of Kamal Kishore & 16 Ors. v. State of Rajasthan : 2007 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1743 , where-after the said judgment in the case of Kamal Kishore (supra) was referred to the Larger Bench in Bhag Chand v. Addl. District Judge No.5, Kota & Ors. on 25th April, 2008 : 2008 (3) RLW 1857 (Raj.) and the said Larger Bench reference was decided on 04.05.2009 in Bhag Chand v. Addl. District Judge No.5, Kota & Ors. : 2009 (2) DNJ (Raj.) (FB) 704 , whereby, the judgment in the case of Kamal Kishore (supra) was overruled. As on the date of passing of the impugned decree the matter had not even been referred to the Larger Bench, therefore, the plea raised in this regard is apparently incorrect. It was further submitted that the appellant had accepted the impugned judgment, however, in view of the Larger Bench decision, the appeal has been preferred and the fact that the judgment has been subsequently overruled cannot be a sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Reliance was placed in the case of Basdeo & Ors. v. Murli Dhar Singh & Ors. Reliance was placed in the case of Basdeo & Ors. v. Murli Dhar Singh & Ors. : AIR 1942 Oudh 447. 6. I have considered the rival submissions. 7. The suit was filed by the appellant under Section 6 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 ('the Act of 1950') for determination of standard rent. During pendency of the said proceedings, the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 ('the Act of 2001') came into force and this Court in the case of Kamal Kishore (supra) held that proceedings initiated under the Act of 1950 would also be governed by the Act of 2001 and consequently, the impugned judgment and decree based on the law laid down in Kamal Kishore (supra) was delivered. The law laid down in the case of Kamal Kishore (supra) came to be overruled by Larger Bench in the case of Bhag Chand (supra), wherein, it was held that the proceedings initiated under the Act of 1950 would continue to be governed by the provisions of the said Act and the Act of 2001 would have no application. 8. From the averments made in the application, the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and the submissions made by learned counsel for the respondents, it appears that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay has been drafted in a manner so as to deflect the charge of negligence from the appellant, placing the onus on the counsel and further ensuring that the counsel representing the appellant in the trial court also does not face the heat of the said averments. The plea regarding pendency of Larger Bench reference has been raised as if the reference happened during pendency of the suit, however, though not indicated but it is apparent that the appeal has been filed only as a consequence of overruling of the judgment in the case of Kamal Kishore (supra). 9. The Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition (supra) laid down the reasons requiring liberal approach in condonation of delay as under:- "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." Further in the case of N. Balakrishnan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be un-condonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest republican up sit finis litmus (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and State of W.B. v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality. 13. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and State of W.B. v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay, the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 10. Similarly, in the case of Union of India (supra) the delay was condoned as the Court found a strong arguable case on behalf of the appellants. 11. From the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as noticed hereinbefore, it is settled that the Court is expected to take a pragmatic view and the approach also is expected to be justice oriented. 12. In the present case, the judgment impugned has been passed by the trial court based on the law as it then existed i.e. law laid down by this Court in the case of Kamal Kishore (supra), resulting in the standard rent of the suit premises being determined at Rs. 1,759/- per month against the claim of Rs. 21,000/- per month. The judgment in the case of Kamal Kishore (supra) came to be overruled resulting in the fact that if the present appeal is to be considered on merit, the appellant has a strong case in his favour. 1,759/- per month against the claim of Rs. 21,000/- per month. The judgment in the case of Kamal Kishore (supra) came to be overruled resulting in the fact that if the present appeal is to be considered on merit, the appellant has a strong case in his favour. The effect of the impugned judgment is permanent/long term, inasmuch as, once the determination as made by the trial court is upheld on account of dismissal of the appeal as barred by limitation, any further increase would only be governed by provisions of Act of 2001, whereas, in the case of other tenants of the appellant, as noticed in a similar case hereinbefore, the tenants would be paying much8 more rent for their tented premises, resulting in apparent injustice to the appellant. 13. So far as the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents in the case of Basdeo (supra) is concerned, there is no doubt that mere change in law by itself is not a sufficient reason for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, which philosophy is statutorily reflected in Explanation to Order 47, Rule 1 CPC, which provides that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. 14. However, a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Prem Chand Bansal & Sons v. Income Tax Officer : (1992) 237 ITR 65 condoned delay of about 2 years in filing petition under Section 256(2) of the Income Tax Act as the foundational judgment was reversed by Hon'ble Supreme Court. 15. Therefore, keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as noticed in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition (supra) and N. Balakrishnan (supra), the fact that the foundational law of the impugned judgment and decree already stands overruled by a Larger Bench, in an application with similar nature averments filed by the appellant delay has been condoned and in the interest of justice, it would be appropriate to condone the delay in filing the appeal. However, taking cue from the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan (supra) and the observations made in the case of State of Maharashtra (supra) from Cropper v. Smith, (1884) 26 CD 700 that 'there is one panacea which heals every sore in litigation, and that is costs' the appellant would be required to pay a cost of Rs. 7,500/- to the respondents. 16. Consequently, the application is allowed and the delay in filing the appeal is condoned on payment of costs of Rs. 7,500/- within a period of ten days.Office to proceed.Application allowed. *******