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2014 DIGILAW 1174 (AP)

Srisailam Naresh v. State of A. P. Rep. by its Public Prosecutor High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad

2014-09-17

B.SIVA SANKARA RAO

body2014
Judgment 1. The Criminal Petition is filed under Section Cr.P.C. by the petitioner/accused aggrieved by the impugned order, dated 10/09/2014, in Crl.M.P.No.85 of 2014 in Crl.A.No.176 of 2014 passed by the XI Additional Sessions Judge, Piler. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner is the sole accused in Crime No.33 of 2010 of Piler Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 324, 354 and 307 IPC. The police after registration of crime and investigation, filed charge sheet, that was taken cognizance by the Committal Magistrate and thereafter the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. As per the cognizance taken by the Court of Sessions, Sessions Case No.301 of 2010 was allotted and the same was made over to the Assistant Sessions Judge, Piler, where after full-fledged trial, vide judgment dated 28/08/2014, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced him to undergo five years imprisonment and to pay a fined of Rs.5,000/- for the offence under Section 307 IPC, three years imprisonment for the offence under Section 324 IPC and two years imprisonment for the offence under Section 353 IPC and all the sentences to run concurrently. Having aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred regular Crl. Appeal No.176 of 2014, which is pending on the file of the XI Additional Sessions Judge, Piler. The petitioner moved an application in Crl.M.P.No.85 of 2014 under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C., for suspension of sentence and the same was ended in dismissal, vide order, dated 10/09/2014, by the learned X Additional Sessions Judge, Tirupati as in-charge of XI Additional Sessions Judge, Piler, with observations, particularly, at paras 7 and 8, that the conviction maintained against the accused is for assaulting an excise constable while in custody of the Excise police and in relation to the offence having caused grievous injuries while attempting to escape from custody and that the trial Court judgment shows there is a prima facie case with strong grounds and considering the grave nature of the offence, not chosen to suspend the sentence. 3. 3. It is impugning the same, the present application is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with contentions that the impugned order of the learned Sessions Judge is contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case and it is premature to arrive a finding of substantial matter in the conviction judgment only for the purpose of suspend of sentence that too not to suspension of sentence. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the Additional Public Prosecutor. Perused the material placed on record. 5. Now the point for consideration is: “1. Whether the impugned order requires interference of this Court while sitting against it within the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.? 2. To what relief?” POINT No.1: 6. The Apex Court well settled the law in its three judge bench expression in Madhu Limaye Vs State of Maharasthra (1977) 4 SCC 551 , referring to earlier two judge bench expressions in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana 1977 (4) SCC 137 , holding that application granting bail or refusal of bail or even cancellation of bail are only interlocutory in nature and against which no revision is maintainable from the bar under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., but for to invoke the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The same is also reiterated by another two judge bench expression of the Apex Court in Mohit @ Sonu v. State of U.P. 2013 (7) SCC 789 . Same is also the law laid down way back in three judge bench expression in Talab Haji Hussain Vs. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar AIR 1958 SC 376 , that the Court which granted bail or any superior Court even can cancel the bail, but need not be of non-bailable offence and even can be in a bailable offence, and once bail is cancelled being interlocutory in nature, the interference is only under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Section 561-A Cr.P.C.), which was incorporated in the Criminal Procedure Code by amended Act in the year 1923. The same was referred with approval by the five judge bench expression in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani Vs. The same was referred with approval by the five judge bench expression in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani Vs. Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1639 , holding that grant or cancel or refusal of bail being interlocutory, where it requires to interfere, it shall be only within the inherent powers of the Court and it was observed that these inherent powers inhers in the High Court and not newly conferred by the Code, but for saved, springs from its very nature and consideration as a Court of superior jurisdiction and the Section inserted by amendment Act No.18 of 1923 as 561-A in the Cr.P.C. is to obviate any doubt that inherent powers have been take away. The Criminal Procedure Code in terms of this Section did not confer any new powers. It only declared that the Courts inherent powers by virtue of the Code shall not be deemed to be limited or effected for its exercise by the High Court. It was ultimately observed that the High Court cancelled the previous bail orders as found circumstances from the conduct of accused and the finding no way requires interference, but for to hold, the High Court is right in reserved the liberty to the appellant to move High Court on or after the particular date for a fresh order of bail. It is to say even bail order dismissed earlier or even cancelled, that is not a bar for subsequent maintained of fresh bail application. 7. Having regard to the above, the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is maintainable to interfere with the impugned order of the learned Session Judge within the discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., but for to say, it requires to satisfy to invoke the inherent power from no other specific provision to invoke and that to make such order as may be necessary (a) to give effect to any order under this Code, (b) to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, and (c) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The impugned order of the learned Sessions Judge, no doubt, is supported by the conclusion that material on record no way deserves suspension of sentence within the discretionary under Section 389 Cr.P.C., which cannot be called as abuse of the process of the Court to interfere and it is not even to implement or give effect to any order. The impugned order of the learned Sessions Judge, no doubt, is supported by the conclusion that material on record no way deserves suspension of sentence within the discretionary under Section 389 Cr.P.C., which cannot be called as abuse of the process of the Court to interfere and it is not even to implement or give effect to any order. Thus, there remained to decided whether it is necessary to sub serve the ends of justice to exercise in the factual matrix or not of interference with the order. In this regard it is premature, in fact for the learned Sessions Judge to give a finding so far as the suspension of sentence concerned as finding already given by the trial Court and the appeal is filed impugning the legality and correctness of the findings in seeking entitled to acquittal and the only thing to be considered is whether the accused earlier on bail or not and ever abused the concession or not. From the material it shows he was earlier on bail and faced trial and nothing to show jumped the bail or abused the concession. 8. Having regard to the above and also from the spirit of the scope of Section 389 Cr.P.C. for disposal of the appeal, even the accused-appellant failed to attend and remained with no representation, the Court need not issue any N.B.W. to secure presence, much less, wait for submission of arguments by the counsel for accused/appellant for non availment of opportunity, but for decide the appeal on merits, if necessary from any complicated factual or legal matrix to take any assistance of Legal Aid Counsel or the like. When such is the law as also laid down by the Apex Court three judge bench expressions in Bani Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1996 SC 2439 , the lower appellate Courts order dismissing suspension to sentence pending appeal is to be set aside by its granting. Accordingly, point No.1 is answered. POINT No.2: 9. In the result, the petition is allowed, suspending the sentence of imprisonment passed by the XI Additional Sessions Judge, Piler, pending appeal, subject to execution of self bond for Rs.25000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) with two sureties for the like sum to the satisfaction of the trial Court concerned.