Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 1176 (MP)

State of M. P. v. Omveer Singh

2014-09-18

ROHIT ARYA

body2014
JUDGMENT Rohit Arya, J. 1. Heard on I.A. No. 1306/2012, an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 2. The appeal, as per office report is barred by 1468 days. 3. The averments made in the application are to the effect that against the impugned award passed by President, MACT, Morena dated 15/12/2007 in Claim Case No. 1/2005, on 3/11/2011, S.P. Bhind, written a letter to Collector, Bhind for taking necessary action in the matter. Thereafter, legal advise was sought and appeal was filed on 13/3/2012. 4. Heard. 5. The Claims Tribunal vide impugned award has passed a compensation of Rs. 93,000/- in favour of the respondent No. 1. Impugned award was passed on 15/12/2007 and so called letter by S.P.Bhind to Collector, Bhind was written on 3/11/2011. There is no explanation for the period 15/12/2007 to 3/11/2011. Now this skeleton application under Section 5 of Limitation Act has been filed for condonation of avoidable delay of 1468 days, in filing the appeal. 6. Nature and scope of jurisdiction under Section 5 of Limitation Act have been succinctly explained and laid down by the Apex Court in catena of decisions. For ready reference some of the judgments since year 1962 are being referred, to support the view being taken by this Court in the instant case. In the case of Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 , Hon. Supreme Court in para 7 has held as under:- "7. In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act) it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light- heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay in shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay in shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice." 7. Further in the case of N.Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurty, (1998) 7 SCC 123 , Hon. Supreme Court in paras 9,11 and 13 has held as under:- "9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 8. Hon. Supreme Court in the case of P.K.R. Amachandran Vs. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 , has held in para 6 as under:- "6. law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds." 9. Hon. Supreme Court in a recent decision Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held in para 24 as under:- "24. Hon. Supreme Court in a recent decision Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held in para 24 as under:- "24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay." 10. On the touchstone of aforesaid consideration, the application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act needs to be addressed. Therefore, even if there is an inordinate delay but explanation offered is found to be bona fide and satisfactory in nature, same can be condoned and on the other hand, if the delay is short but the explanation offered is found to be lacking in bona fide, same cannot be accepted as sufficient cause to record satisfaction with regards to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Section 5 of Limitation Act. 11. True it is, Section 5 of Limitation Act has been engrafted in the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice between parties. As expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. But at the same time, relativity of expression 'sufficient cause' in its application would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. 12. The factual matrix of the case in hand has been considered by this Court. There is a delay of 1468 days. There is no plausible explanation on record explaining the delay. The explanation offered is lacking in bona fides. The appellant appears to have no explanation to offer. As a matter of fact the appellant has been totally negligent in filing the appeal. 13. Even otherwise, after having perused the impugned award passed by Claims Tribunal, it appears that impugned award is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record. 14. The explanation offered is lacking in bona fides. The appellant appears to have no explanation to offer. As a matter of fact the appellant has been totally negligent in filing the appeal. 13. Even otherwise, after having perused the impugned award passed by Claims Tribunal, it appears that impugned award is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record. 14. In view of the foregoing I.A. is dismissed finding no satisfactorily explanation for the unreasonable delay of 1468 days. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed.