Judgment : R.M. Borde, J. 1. The instant Reference as well as the First Appeal are directed to be placed before us in view of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 2nd September, 2004, for consideration of issues, as to: (1) Whether the Full Bench was justified in directing disposal of Reference by an order dated 19.08.1997 in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in M.J.Suit No.455 of 1995 (Mrs.Pragati Varghese Vs. Cyril George Varghese), decided on 6th & 7th May, 1997, reported in 1997 IV LJ 241 = (1997) 3 MhLJ 602 ; and (2) Whether the amendment directing omission of provisions contained in Section 17 requiring confirmation of decree for dissolution passed by the District Judge, by the High Court i.e. the Court composing of three Judges of the High Court operates retrospectively thereby rendering the Reference, in a pending matter, infructuous. 2. In order to understand the controversy giving rise to the appeal and Reference, some relevant facts, in brief, need to be recorded. One Anna Balaji Gaikwad presented Regular Civil Suit No.1 of 1991 in the District Court, Jalna, claiming decree of dissolution of marriage solemnized with Kamal Gaikwad. Respondent No.2 is impleaded in the proceedings since there are allegations of keeping illicit relations with Kamal. It is not disputed that the parties profess Christian religion. 3. After recording evidence before the trial Court, at the conclusion of the trial, the learned District Judge passed decree on 13.10.1995 directing dissolution of marriage. The decree passed by the District Judge came to be forwarded to the High Court for confirmation, as required under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. (for short, 'Act of 1869'). 4. Feeling aggrieved by the decree, wife Kamal preferred a First Appeal in this Court and same is registered as First Appeal No.7 of 1996. 5. Reference No.1 of 1996 was placed for consideration before the Full Bench, as required under the provisions of Section 17 of the Special Marriage Act and the Full Bench directed that the First Appeal be heard along with the Reference. The Full Bench, on 19.08.1997, was pleased to pass order disposing of the Reference, however, the First Appeal remained pending for disposal. The Full Bench, on 19.08.1997, was pleased to pass order disposing of the Reference, however, the First Appeal remained pending for disposal. The text of the order, passed by the Full Bench on 19.08.1997, reads thus: "Both the learned Counsel appearing for the parties state that the Reference need not be answered in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in M.J.Suit No.455/1995 (Mrs.Pragati Varghese Vs. Cyril George Varghese) decided on 6th and 7th May, 1997." The Full Bench further directed that the appeal be placed for final hearing before the Division Bench and same was accordingly placed before the Court on 02.09.2004 and the Division Bench passed the order, as recorded in the first paragraph. 6. In the matter of Mrs.Pragati Varghese Vs. Cyril George Varghese, reported in 1997 IV LJ 241 = (1997) 3 MhLJ 602 , decided on 6th/7th May, 1997, various suits were filed by Christian wives for dissolution of their marriages under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. Each of them impugned the vires of the provisions of Section 10 of the Act which provides for the grounds on which husband or wife can sue for dissolution of marriage. 7. It was contended by the wives in Pragati Varghese's case that provisions contained in the Act of 1869 are archaic and adversely discriminate wives as against husbands on the ground of sex and as such, are violative of Article 15 of the Constitution. It is also contended that the aforesaid provisions adversely discriminates them vis-a-vis wives governed by other religions. It is, thus, contended that the provisions are also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was also contended that as a result of the discriminatory provisions, they are forced to continue to live with their husbands even though they are subjected to cruelty and desertion. The wives contend that they are deprived of their right to life and personal liberty, dignity, as such, the provisions of the Act contravene Article 21 of the Constitution. The plaintiffs/wives have also impugned certain ancillary provisions of the Act of 1869, namely Sections 17 and 20, which provide for requirement of confirmation of decrees of dissolution of marriage or nullity, passed by the District Judge, by the High Court, that too normally by a Bench of not less than three Judges. 8. The plaintiffs/wives have also impugned certain ancillary provisions of the Act of 1869, namely Sections 17 and 20, which provide for requirement of confirmation of decrees of dissolution of marriage or nullity, passed by the District Judge, by the High Court, that too normally by a Bench of not less than three Judges. 8. The Full Bench, while deciding the matter, upheld the contentions raised by the plaintiffs/wives and directed striking down provisions of Section 10 of the Act which are found to be offending Articles, 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. The Court also declared that the procedure contemplated under Sections 16, 17 and 20 of the Act is unreasonable and are arbitrary in nature and same achieves no useful object or purpose. The procedure provided tends to perpetuate the agonies of the affected parties. If such procedure is absent in other enactments, there is no propriety in application of said procedure to Christian spouses. The said procedure is held to be liable of striking down by suitable amendments. In paragraph no.56 of the judgment, the Court has observed: "56. In the result, we hold that the indicated portions of section 10 of the Act are ultra vires Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution and the same are accordingly struck down. We further find the provisions of sections 16, 17 and 20 of the Act are also arbitrary and unreasonable. We suggest that the legislature should intervene and carry out suitable amendments to 'the Act' at the earliest. We direct that a copy of this order may be forwarded forthwith to the Ministry of Law and Justice for such action as they may deem fit to take." 9. After the decision of the Full Bench in Pragati Varghese's matter, the Parliament introduced a Bill for bringing amendment in the Act of 1869 and amended certain provisions of the Act by enacting Indian Divorce Act, 2001 (Act No.51 of 2001). The provisions of the Amending Act were enforced since 03.10.2001. 10. In the instant matter, as observed above, a decree for dissolution of marriage has been passed by the District Judge on 13.10.1995 and thereupon the decree has been referred to this Court for confirmation in accordance with Section 17 of the Act whereupon, Reference Case No.1 of 1996 came to be registered. 10. In the instant matter, as observed above, a decree for dissolution of marriage has been passed by the District Judge on 13.10.1995 and thereupon the decree has been referred to this Court for confirmation in accordance with Section 17 of the Act whereupon, Reference Case No.1 of 1996 came to be registered. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, the wife has filed instant appeal i.e. First Appeal No.7 of 1996 in this Court. The question that falls for determination is: "As to whether the provisions of Indian Divorce Act, 2001 (Act No.51 of 2001) can be applied to the instant proceedings retrospectively?" 11. It would be appropriate to refer to certain provisions of the Act of 1869 as applicable prior to passing of Act No.51 of 2001. Section 3(2) defines "District Judge". District Judge means Judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction however designated. Section 3(3) defines "District Court". District Court means, in the case of any petition under this Act, the Court of the District Judge within the local limits of whose ordinary jurisdiction, or of whose jurisdiction under this Act, the husband and wife reside or last resided together. Section 3(4) "Court" - Court means the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be. District Court means, in the case of any petition under this Act, the Court of the District Judge within the local limits of whose ordinary jurisdiction, or of whose jurisdiction under this Act, the husband and wife reside or last resided together. Section 3(4) "Court" - Court means the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be. Section 14 provides for power of the Court to pronounce decree for dissolution of marriage, which reads thus: "14 Power to Court to pronounce decree for dissolving marriage:- In case the Court is satisfied on the evidence that the case of the petitioner has been proved, and does not find that the petitioner has been in any manner accessory to, or conniving at, the going through of the said form of marriage, or the adultery of the other party to the marriage, or has condoned the adultery complained of, or that the petition is presented or prosecuted in collusion with either of the respondents, the Court shall pronounce a decree declaring such marriage to be dissolved in the manner and subject to all the provisions and limitations in sections sixteen and seventeen made and declared; Provided that the Court shall not be bound to pronounce such decree if it finds that the petitioner has, during the marriage, been guilty of adultery, or if the petitioner has, in the opinion of the Court, been guilty of unreasonable delay in presenting or prosecuting such petition, or of cruelty towards the other party to the marriage, or of having deserted or wilfully separated himself or herself from the other party before the adultery complained of, and without reasonable excuse, or of such wilful neglect or misconduct of or towards the other party as has conducted to the adultery. Condonation: No adultery shall be deemed to have been condoned within the meaning of this Act unless where conjugal cohabitation has been resumed or continued." Section 16 relates to decree of dissolution to be nisi, which reads thus: "16. Decrees for dissolution to be nisi. Condonation: No adultery shall be deemed to have been condoned within the meaning of this Act unless where conjugal cohabitation has been resumed or continued." Section 16 relates to decree of dissolution to be nisi, which reads thus: "16. Decrees for dissolution to be nisi. Every decree for a dissolution of marriage made by a High Court not being a confirmation of a decree of a District Court, shall, in the first instance, be a decree nisi, not to be made absolute till after the expiration of such time, not less than six months from the pronouncing thereof, as the High Court, by general or special order from time to time, directs. Collusion: During that period any person shall be at liberty, in such manner as the High Court by general or special order from time to time directs, to show cause why the said decree should not be made absolute by reason of the same having been obtained by collusion or by reason of material facts not being brought before the Court. On cause being so shown, the Court shall deal with the case by making the decree absolute, or by reversing the decree nisi, or by requiring further inquiry, or otherwise as justice may demand. The High Court may order the costs of Counsel and witnesses and otherwise arising from such cause being shown, to be paid by the parties or such one or more of them as it thinks fit, including a wife if she have separate property. Whenever a decree nisi has been made, and the petitioner fails, within a reasonable time, to move to have such decree made absolute, the High Court may dismiss the suit." Section 17 relates to confirmation of decree for dissolution by District Judge, which reads thus: "17 Confirmation of decree for dissolution by District Judge: Every decree for a dissolution of marriage made by a District Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court. Cases for confirmation of a decree 'for dissolution of marriage shall be heard (where the number of the Judges of the High Court is three or upwards) by a Court composed of three such Judges, and in case of difference the opinion of the majority shall prevail, or (where the number of the Judges of the High Court is two) by a Court composed of such two Judges, and in case of difference the opinion of the Senior Judge shall prevail. The High Court, if it thinks further enquiry or additional evidence to be necessary, may direct such enquiry to be made, or such evidence to be taken. The result of such enquiry and the additional evidence shall be certified to the High Court by the District Judge, and the High Court shall thereupon make an order confirming the decree for dissolution of marriage, or such other order as to the Court seems fit; Provided that no decree shall be confirmed under this section till after the expiration of such time, not less than six months from the pronouncing thereof, as the High Court by general or special order from time to time directs. During the progress of the suit in the Court of the District Judge, any persons suspecting that any parties to the suit are or have been acting in collusion for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, shall be at liberty, in such manner as the High Court by general or special order from time to time directs, to apply to the High Court to remove the suit under section eight, and the High Court shall thereupon, if it thinks fit, remove such suit and try and determine the same as a Court of original jurisdiction, and the provisions contained in section sixteen shall apply to every suit so removed; or it may direct the District Judge to take such steps in respect of the alleged collusion as may be necessary to enable him to make a decree in accordance with the justice of the case." Section 20 provides for confirmation of District Judge's decree, which reads thus: "20 Confirmation of District Judge's decree: Every decree of nullity of marriage made by a District Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court, and the provisions of section seventeen, clauses one, two, three and four, shall mutatis mutandis apply to such decrees. Section 55 provides for enforcement of, and appeal from, orders and decrees, which reads thus: "55 Enforcement of, and appeal from, orders and decrees: All decrees and orders made by the Court in any suit or proceeding under this Act shall be enforced and may be appealed from, in the like manner as the decrees and orders of the Court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction are enforced and may be appealed from, under the laws, rules and orders for the time being in force: Provided that there shall be no appeal from a decree of a District Judge for dissolution of marriage or if nullity of marriage; nor from the order of the High Court confirming or refusing to confirm such decree: No appeal as to costs. No appeal as to costs:- Provided also that there shall be no appeal on the subject of costs only." 12. The unamended provisions of Section 14 of the Act of 1869 relates to power of the Court to pronounce the decree for dissolving the marriage, which is subject to all the provisions and limitations in Sections 16 and 17 made and declared. Section 16 of the Act provides that the every decree for dissolution of marriage made by the District Court being a decree nisi, not to be made absolute till expiration of period of six months from the date of pronouncement of the decree. Whereas, Section 17 provides for confirmation of the decree of dissolution made by the District Judge, subject to confirmation by the High Court. Cases for confirmation are required to be heard by a Court composed of 3 Judges and in case of difference of opinion, the majority shall prevail. The decrees in respect of nullity of marriage, passed by the District Judge, are subject to confirmation by the High Court, in the same manner, as provided in Section 17. 13. The Act of 1869, prior to its amendment, did not provide for remedy of appeal for challenging the decree passed by the District Judge and proviso to Section 55 of the Act specifically provided that there shall be no appeal from the decree of the District Judge for dissolution of marriage or nullity of the marriage. Therefore, as on the date of presentation of instant appeal, the Act of 1869 did not provide for such remedy. 14. Therefore, as on the date of presentation of instant appeal, the Act of 1869 did not provide for such remedy. 14. The Amendment Act of 2001 (Act No. 51 of 2001) introduced major changes in the Act of 1869. Apart from introducing additional grounds for dissolution of marriage, consistent with the provisions of other enactments, Section 10A provides for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. The provision requiring confirmation of decree for dissolution of marriage passed by the District Judge, by the Bench of three Judges of the High Court, has been deleted and Section 17 has been amended empowering the High Court to remove certain suits. In the same fashion, Section 20 requiring confirmation of a decree of nullity, passed by the District Judge, by the Bench of Three Judges of the High Court, has also been deleted. An appellate remedy has been provided in respect of decrees passed by the District Judge by removing the embargo contained in the first proviso to Section 55. 15. There can be no dual opinion in respect of the proposition that statutory provisions creating substantive right or taking away substantive rights are ordinarily perspective. They are retrospective only if by express words or by necessary implication the Legislature has made them retrospective; and the retrospective operation will be limited only to the extent to which it has been so made by express words or necessary implication. (See Mahadeolal Kanodia Vs. The Administrator General of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1960 SC 936 ). 16. In the matter of Jose Da Costa and another Vs. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornin & others, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1843 , the facts giving rise to the dispute are thus: The plaintiff instituted a suit before the Court of Judge of Quepem Comarca in accordance with the Portuguese Law, then in force in the territory of Goa, for ejectment of defendants from the suit property. The suit was decreed, against which, the defendant preferred an appeal, which came to be dismissed by the Additional Judicial Commissioner. As such, an appeal was carried to the Supreme Court. The argument before the Court was that notwithstanding the fact that a plea of acquisition of title by prescription was specifically raised in the pleadings, the grounds of appeal, so also put in issue, the Court below has failed to give a finding on the same. As such, an appeal was carried to the Supreme Court. The argument before the Court was that notwithstanding the fact that a plea of acquisition of title by prescription was specifically raised in the pleadings, the grounds of appeal, so also put in issue, the Court below has failed to give a finding on the same. In answer, it was contended that the appellant is precluded from agitating the plea of prescription, because he had not filed a review application (reclamacao) in the appropriate Court to get that nullity i.e. omission to decide this plea, rectified within limitation in accordance with Articles 668, 669 and 717 of the Protuguese Civil Code. It was contended that since the suit was filed before the extension of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to Goa, Daman and Diu, the Portuguese Civil Code will continue to govern the rights of the parties in the matter of appeal. The question, that arose for consideration, was as to whether it was imperative for the defendants to file a "reclamacao" under Article 669 in regard to Issue No.3 in the Court of first instance? And the second question that arose was, when and to what extent did the provisions of Protuguese Civil Court cease to be applicable to the case? 17. In order to consider the question raised before the Supreme Court, it was necessary to deal with the question as to whether presentation of reclamacao, as prescribed under Article 669 of the Protuguese Law is a part of procedural requirement or is a substantive right. While dealing with the issue, the Supreme Court, in paragraphs no.28 to 31, has observed thus: "28 Before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid passed by the Central Legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would be appropriate to bear in mind two well established principles. The first is that "while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment" (see Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income tax Commr.), 54 Ind App 421 = (AIR 1927 PC 242). Ltd. v. Income tax Commr.), 54 Ind App 421 = (AIR 1927 PC 242). The second is that a right of appeal being a substantive right the institution of a suit carried with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest of the career of the suit. There are two exceptions to the application of this rule, viz. (1) when by competent enactment such right of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly with retrospective effect and (2) when the court to which appeal lay at the commencement of the suit stands abolished (see Garikapatti Veerava v. N. Subbiah Choudhry 1957, SCR 488 = ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ) and Colonial Sugar Refining Co.Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369)." "29 In the light of the above principles, these points arise for consideration: Are the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Reclamacao merely matters of procedure? Or, do they create or affect vested rights and remedies? That is to say, does a Reclamacao have all the attributes of a substantive right of appeal existing at the commencement of the suit? Did the superior Court of Appeal at Lisbon stand abolished as an appellate forum in relation to Goa, Daman and Diu from 20-12-1962? If so, what is its effect on the right of appeal given by Articles 677 and 722 of the Portuguese Civil Code and their application to the present case? Was the Portuguese Supreme Court at Lisbon succeeded by the Supreme Court of India, for the purpose of the aforesaid Articles 677 and 722 of the Portuguese Code? If so, did this position hold good after 15-6-1966? Does the Central Act 30 of 1965 read with Notification No. S.O. 1597, issued thereunder, expressly or impliedly, make inapplicable the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code in the matter of Reclamacao in respect of a decision or judgment rendered by the Court of Judicial Commissioner after 15-6-1966? That is to say, have the rights, remedies or obligations arising out of the Portuguese Law relating to Reclamacao saved by any of the clauses (a), (b) or (c) of the first Proviso to Section 4(1) of Act 30 of 1965?" "30. That is to say, have the rights, remedies or obligations arising out of the Portuguese Law relating to Reclamacao saved by any of the clauses (a), (b) or (c) of the first Proviso to Section 4(1) of Act 30 of 1965?" "30. It may be noted that while a right of appeal from court to court is a substantive right which under the then law, exists on and from the date of the institution of the suit, the same cannot be said with regard to Reclamacao. The provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Reclamacao lay down only special rules of procedure which have to be gone through before a litigant is entitled to raise in appeal a material point left undecided by the lower court. The object of requiring a party aggrieved by a 'nullity' is to save the time of the appellate Court by precluding a party to reagitate in appeal pleas that had been left undecided by the lower court. It also minimises the necessity of remands to the lower court for trial of particular issues and thus shortens litigation. The requirement of obligation to file a Reclamacao is not an obligation to esse or / and from the institution of the suit. Nor is the procedural right to file Reclamacao -if at all it can be called a 'right' - a vested right existing from the date of the suit. The filing of a Reclamacao is dependent upon the happening of an uncertain event. It arises only when a judgment suffering from a 'nullity' is passed. Such a contingency may or may not arise. On the other hand, in the case of a suit, it can be predicated that it would normally result in a decree entitling the aggrieved party to have the suit reheard and redecided in a higher forum by filing an appeal provided of course such a right is available under the law prevailing at the institution of the suit." "31. In the present case, the judgment of the Additional Judicial Commissioner in which the alleged "nullity" or "omission to adjudicate" on the point of prescription occurs was delivered on 20-1-1968, that is, long after the extension of Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the Constitution. Rules framed under Article 145 of the Constitution and Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure to Goa, Daman and Diu. Rules framed under Article 145 of the Constitution and Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure to Goa, Daman and Diu. The procedural provisions of the Portuguese Code relating to Reclamacao, and appeal from a decision on Reclamacao, from the High Court in Goa, Daman and Diu stood repealed and superseded by the extended Indian laws when the judgment now under appeal was rendered." 18. It was concluded by the Supreme Court that the Portuguese Law relating to reclamacao stood repealed and no substantive right or obligation had been acquired or incurred under the repealed law, within the meaning of the first proviso to S.4(1) of Act 30 of 1965, the appellants cannot be debarred from canvassing in this appeal under Article 136, the plea of prescription notwithstanding the fact that they did not file any Reclamacao in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and as such, the preliminary objection raised by the plaintiff came to be rejected. 19. In juxtaposition, in the instant matter, the requirement provided under Section 17 relating to confirmation of a decree passed by the District Judge, of dissolution of marriage, cannot be constructed as a procedural requirement. On the date of presentation of instant appeal, there was no provision providing for appellate remedy. The appeal presented by the wife challenging the decree, on the date of presentation, was not a proper appeal since Section 17 of the Act provides for confirmation of a decree by the Full Bench of the High Court. The party to the Reference i.e. wife in the instant case, can challenge validity of the decree at the time of consideration of Reference and confirmation by the Full Bench of the High Court. At that stage only, aggrieved party gets right to challenge the decree. From reading the provisions, it is evident that the confirmation of a decree is not an empty formality, as the provision confers a substantive right on the party to the proceedings to make grievance in respect of decree passed by the District Judge to make a prayer to the Bench of the High Court not to confirm the decree. In our opinion, the provisions contained in Section 17 (prior to its amendment), shall have to be construed as conferring substantive right on the party and the reference procedure, provided under the said provision, cannot be termed as a procedural requirement. 20. In our opinion, the provisions contained in Section 17 (prior to its amendment), shall have to be construed as conferring substantive right on the party and the reference procedure, provided under the said provision, cannot be termed as a procedural requirement. 20. An identical question in respect of confirmation of a decree of nullity under Section 20 of the Act by the Bench of the High Court vis-a-vis amended provisions of the Act had fallen for consideration before the Full Bench of the Patna High Court. The facts, governing the judgment delivered by the Full Bench of Patna High Court, are identical to the facts of the instant matter. (Mrs. Larley v. John @ Johny C.A.), reported in AIR 2004 Patna 53. In the reported matter, the petitioner therein instituted a suit claiming decree of nullity of marriage with Respondent on the ground that Respondent was an idiot at the time of marriage. The District Judge granted decree in favour of the petitioner subject to confirmation by the High Court under Section 20 of the Act. During course of hearing of the matter, petitioner presented an application stating that Section 20 of the Act has been omitted by the Indian Divorce Act, 2001 and, therefore, there is no requirement of confirmation of decree passed by the Court below and the Reference becomes redundant and infructuous. The Court proceeded to answer the question as to whether the amendment is made prospective or retrospective in its application. The Full Bench of the Patna High Court, while dealing with the issue, has observed in paragraphs no.6 to 9 of the judgment, as below: 6. From reading of the above provisions (as they stood) it is evident that confirmation of decree is not an empty formality or a routine affair. The High Court in the facts and circumstances of the particular case may get further enquiry made or evidence taken and thereafter either confirm the decree, or pass such other order as it deems fit. The section, thus creates right in favour of the unsuccessful party to object to confirmation of the decree. It may be clarified here that though Section 17 deals with decree for dissolution of marriage -whereas the instant case is one of nullity or marriage covered by Section 20 of the Act -Section 20 makes the aforequoted parts of Section 17 applicable mutatis mutandis. It may be clarified here that though Section 17 deals with decree for dissolution of marriage -whereas the instant case is one of nullity or marriage covered by Section 20 of the Act -Section 20 makes the aforequoted parts of Section 17 applicable mutatis mutandis. If a decree of nullity of marriage made by the District Judge is subject to confirmation by the High Court; in other words, it does not take effect unless and until confirmed by the High Court, it is plain that the confirmation provision cannot be said to be a mere matter of procedure. The provision confers substantive rights on the parties to he proceeding and therefore, amendment has to be given prospective effect. There is nothing in the amendment to suggest that the legislature intended it to be retrospective. For the sake of analogy reference may be made to Section 366 of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides for confirmation of death sentence by the High Court. Under that Section a sentence of death cannot be executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court and thus when the Court of Session passes such a sentence the proceedings are to be submitted to the High Court for confirmation. Theoretically, thus, where the accused does not prefer appeal from the conviction, or ever where he prefers appeal, he may alternatively argue that the death sentence was not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. We could not lay our hands on any direct decision relating to retrospective or prospective effect of amendment relating to confirmation provision. However, there are decisions galore relating to amendment of appeal provisions under different statutes. Though, it is true, confirmation is not the same thing as appeal, nevertheless having regard to the fact that the High Court can make "such other order" as it deems fit under Section 17 of the Act, there cannot be any doubt that the Court may decline to confirm the decree on one or the other ground. It is true that in the present case the defendant did not choose to contest the proceeding either in the Court below or in this Court. But this would hardly have any bearing on the question - the true test being as to whether in the event of contest by the respondent, the reference could have become infructuous by reason of the amendment. But this would hardly have any bearing on the question - the true test being as to whether in the event of contest by the respondent, the reference could have become infructuous by reason of the amendment. The answer has to be in the negative. 8. Reference may be made to cases on the point of prospective effect of the appeal provision. The leading case on the point is Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhary, AIR 1957 SC 540 , where on review of various authorities the Constitution bench of the Apex Court, by majority, held that the right to appeal is not mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced, such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the ate of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment, and not otherwise. In State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. AIR 1960 SC 980 , the Supreme Court observed that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment. In Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornim, AIR 1975 SC 1843 , the Supreme Court observed that the right of appeal being a substantive right, the institution of suit carries with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout. In Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornim, AIR 1975 SC 1843 , the Supreme Court observed that the right of appeal being a substantive right, the institution of suit carries with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout. The Court pointed out that this rule was subject to two exceptions - (a) when by a competent enactment such right of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly with retrospective effect and (b) when the Court to which appeal lay at the commencement of the suit stands abolished. 9. In view of the clear pronouncement of law by the Apex Court, any amendment in the appeal provision has to be held to be prospective unless otherwise provided -expressly or by necessary implication. A fortiori any amendment in the confirmation provision must also be held to be prospective unless otherwise provided in the amendment. There is no such clause in the amendment by which Section 20 has simply been omitted, that is, deleted from the Act. It would thus follow that the deletion of Section 20 by the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 has no bearing on the present proceeding. The contention of the petitioner in the interlocutory application that there is no requirement of confirmation of the decree of the Court below and the reference has become redundant or infructuous, must therefore be rejected. 21. In yet another matter before the Patna High Court, the Full Bench considered an identical issue in the case of Deepa Raj Kumar Singh Vs. Deepak Kumar, reported in AIR 2005 Patna 71. In the reported matter, the decree was passed by the District Judge on 28.11.1998 decreeing the suit presented by husband for dissolution of marriage and the matter was referred to the High Court for confirmation of decree under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. The Full Bench has taken note of the fact that the provisions of Section 17 of the Act of 1869, mandating confirmation of decree passed by the District Court, has been deleted by virtue of Amendment Act of 2001. The Full Bench has taken note of the fact that the provisions of Section 17 of the Act of 1869, mandating confirmation of decree passed by the District Court, has been deleted by virtue of Amendment Act of 2001. However, taking note of the fact that the divorce case was filed in 1993 when Section 17 of the Act of 1869 was in force and that the decree was passed in 1998, the Court proceeded to take up the matter for confirmation. It is observed, in paragraph 4 of the judgment, thus: ".... It is well established rule of law that the provision/statute is prospective unless it is expressly made retrospective." 22. The Full Bench has also observed, taking note of decision in the matter of Mrs.Larley Vs. Mr.John (cited supra), thus: "..... It is well settled rule of interpretation that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect and has also held that there is no such clause in the amendment to show that the legislature had intention to make the amendment retrospective." 23. In the matter of Deepika Alizabeth Couto V. Gabriel Anthony Couto, reported in AIR 1978 Allahabad 27, where application for reference filed before the High Court under Section 17 of the Divorce Act, as amended in Uttar Pradesh, was found to be incompetent. The ex parte decree for dissolution of marriage was also found to have been passed by the District Judge without jurisdiction and as such, in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, the Full Bench directed to quash the decree and remitted the matter back to the District Judge. In the reported matter, the decree was passed on December 8, 1976, and the petition was presented to the High Court under Section 17 of the Act praying that the decree nisi be confirmed. Before the Allahabad High Court, no such issue as regards retrospective or prospective application of the provisions of the Amending Act was canvassed or considered. The decision rendered by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, therefore, is of little relevance. 24. In the matter of Thomas K. Varghese Vs. Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram and another, reported in AIR 2002 Kerala 380, a petition for divorce was filed before the Family Court at Thiruvananthapuram. The decision rendered by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, therefore, is of little relevance. 24. In the matter of Thomas K. Varghese Vs. Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram and another, reported in AIR 2002 Kerala 380, a petition for divorce was filed before the Family Court at Thiruvananthapuram. It was alleged in the petition that husband and wife last resided together in Thiruvananthapuram and, therefore, that Court has jurisdiction to hear the case. Before the written statement was filed in the original petition, Indian Divorce Act was amended and Section 3(3) provided that the District Court, within whose jurisdiction the marriage was solemnised, was also competent to decide the case. The question of jurisdiction, as such, was directed to be considered. The Indian Divorce act was amended with effect from 03.10.2001. The Family Court held that though it is not proved that the parties last resided together within Thiruvananthapuram district, by virtue of the amendment, Family Court has got jurisdiction and that the case could be continued. While dealing with the issue, the High Court has observed that the amendments which are affecting procedural rights of the parties are deemed to be retrospective in nature. Therefore, the question to be decided in the case whether amendment to Section 3(3) of the Divorce Act conferring the jurisdiction to District Court within whose jurisdiction the marriage was solemnised will validate the petition already filed, which, on the finding of facts, could not be filed before that Court but for the amendment. It is observed by the High Court that the statute relating to matters of procedure operates retrospectively, unless otherwise provided in the Statute. The question of change in the forum is a matter of procedure and the right of the parties to institute a suit is not affected. No substantive right of the petitioner, in the reported matter, was taken away by the amendment and change of Forum is only procedural in nature, as held by the Supreme Court in the matter of New India Insurance Co. Vs. Shanti Misra, reported in AIR 1976 SC 237 . 25. In the instant matter, however, it cannot be said that the amendment, introduced by the Amendment Act of 2001, is merely a procedural one, however, the requirement of confirmation of a decree passed by the District Court is a substantive right. Vs. Shanti Misra, reported in AIR 1976 SC 237 . 25. In the instant matter, however, it cannot be said that the amendment, introduced by the Amendment Act of 2001, is merely a procedural one, however, the requirement of confirmation of a decree passed by the District Court is a substantive right. The Act, prior to its amendment, did not provide for remedy of appeal and as such, it is only at the stage of consideration of the matter in Reference, an aggrieved party would have an opportunity to raise objection to the decree. The confirmation of decree is not an empty formality or a routine matter. The Section creates a right in favour of unsuccessful party to raise objection to the confirmation of decree. 26. A cursory reference can be made to certain judgments. In the matter of Kanak Vinod Mehta Vs. Vinod Dulerai Mehta, reported in 1991 Mh.L.J. 1064, wherein, a question was raised as to whether, by virtue of provisions contained in Family Courts Act, namely clause (a) of Section 8 of the Family Courts Act, the suits presented to the High Court shall stand transferred to Family Court in view of clause (c) of Section 8 of the Family Courts Act. The Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with the issue, has expressed an opinion that though the area, within which the High Court exercises original jurisdiction, is a district Court, the High Court is not a District Court for exercise of jurisdiction on its appellate side. In the result, the question raised before the Court has been answered in the negative. 27. The decision rendered by the Division Bench in Kanak Mehta's case, has been overruled by the Full Bench in the matter of Romila Jaidev Shroff Vs. Jaidev Rajnikanth Shroff, reported in 2000 (3) Mh.L.J. 468 , and it is held by the Full Bench, that the expression "district court", as used in Section 8 of the Family Courts Act, will include High Court exercising Original Civil Jurisdiction under clause 12 of the Letters Patent and in view of Section 20 of the Family Courts Act, it is the Family Court which will have jurisdiction with respect to suits which are covered by the provisions of the Explanation to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act and not the High Court. 28. 28. A difficulty was encountered in respect of decree nisi passed by the High Court during the intervening period until decision in the matter of Romila Jaidev Shroff. While dealing with the peculiar problems, the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Maria Sera Pinto Vs. Milton Dias, reported in 2000 (4) Mh.L.J. 633 , ruled that the law laid down by the Full Bench in Romila's case, must be deemed to have been brought into effect prospectively. It was, therefore, ordered that all the petitions under Indian Divorce Act, in which, a decree nisi has already been made prior to the judgment of the Full Bench in Romila's case (i.e. 05.05.2000), shall continue to be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act. The Division Bench has issued directions in the aforesaid matter, taking into consideration peculiar facts and circumstances and finding that there are hardly 300 matters, which are required to be dealt with wherein decree nisi has been passed by the High Court while the view of the Division Bench, taken in the matter of Kanak Mehta, was holding the field. 29. It would also be advantageous to refer to provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It is provided under Section 6: "6 Effect of repeal:- Where this Act, or any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a) ...... ....... (b) ...... ....... (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed : or any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." 30. In view of the reasons set out above, we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Full Bench of Patna High Court in the matter of Mrs. Larley Vs. John (supra). On consideration of the provisions, it is evident that the confirmation of a decree is not an empty formality or routine affair. The Section creates right in favour of the unsuccessful party to object for confirmation of a decree. Larley Vs. John (supra). On consideration of the provisions, it is evident that the confirmation of a decree is not an empty formality or routine affair. The Section creates right in favour of the unsuccessful party to object for confirmation of a decree. The substantive provision relating to confirmation of a decree will continue to hold the field and will continue to operate. The amendment affecting vested right would operate prospectively and there is no sufficient indication in the statute to show that the intention of the Legislature was to affect the existing rights. The amending provisions brought into existence by virtue of Amending Act of 2001 shall have prospective effect and that the decree passed by the District Court, prior to enforcement of the amendment, as in the instant case, needs confirmation in view of Section 17 of the Act of 1869 (prior to its amendment). 31. Similarly, the appeal provision contained in Section 55 of the Act also have to be construed to have prospective effect. The day, on which instant appeal was presented by appellant Kamal, it was incompetent in view of the prohibition contained in proviso to Section 55. The amendment, whereby proviso to Section 55 has been deleted will not validate the act of presentation of appeal and will not vest in the appellant a right to tender an appeal. The right to the litigant to present an appeal against a decree passed under Indian Divorce Act by the District Judge, is available only after enforcement of Amendment Act of 2001. 32. In this view of the matter, the appeal presented by the appellant, being incompetent, deserves to be dismissed and same is accordingly dismissed. The Full Bench of this Court was not justified in directing disposal of Reference by an order dated 19.08.1997 in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the matter of Mrs.Pragati Varghese Vs. Cyril George Varghese (supra)., decided on 6th/7th May, 1997. 33. For the reasons set out above, the order passed by the Full Bench dated 19.08.1997, deserves to be recalled and same is accordingly recalled. Reference Case No.1 of 1996 deserves to be decided in accordance with provisions of the Act of 1869, (in accordance with provisions of law operative on the date of presentation of the suit). 34. 33. For the reasons set out above, the order passed by the Full Bench dated 19.08.1997, deserves to be recalled and same is accordingly recalled. Reference Case No.1 of 1996 deserves to be decided in accordance with provisions of the Act of 1869, (in accordance with provisions of law operative on the date of presentation of the suit). 34. We have heard arguments advanced by learned Counsel for respective parties for consideration of the Reference. (The parties are referred to as per record of Reference No.1/96). 35. The petitioner-husband presented Regular Civil Suit No.1 of 1991 claiming decree of dissolution of marriage against his wife Sow.Kamal and her paramour - Respondent No.2 Padamsing. It is contended that the marriage was solemnised in accordance with Christian rites and after marriage the couple resided in Jalna city. The petitioner alleged act of commission of adultery by his wife; and Respondent No.2 is impleaded as her paramour in the petition for divorce. It is alleged that Respondent No.1 was leading adulterous life. She was found in compromising position with Respondent No.2 at petitioner's residence on 09.08.1989. The petitioner took both - Respondents No.1 and 2 to the Police Station. At the relevant time, both of them were found dressed in inner attire. The petitioner presented a complaint against Respondent No.2 to the Magistrate's Court for commission of an offence punishable under Section 497 of I.P.C. and at the conclusion of the trial, Respondent No.2 has been convicted for the offence charged against him. 36. It is also contended that Respondents No.1 and 2 were apprehended by the police at Aurangabad on the allegation that they were indulging in indecent act at public place. They were produced before the Magistrate on 26.08.1989 and both of them pleaded guilty and were convicted on 01.09.1989. The petitioner, apart from leading oral evidence of himself, has led evidence of his son, who was 16 years of age and of a neighbour. The son of the petitioner has supported the case as regards the incidence dated 10.08.1989 in respect of sexual intercourse between Respondents No.1 & 2. The son of the petitioner, in terms, deposed before the Court that he found his mother in the company of Respondent No.2 in the bed room sharing common bed on the relevant day. The son of the petitioner has supported the case as regards the incidence dated 10.08.1989 in respect of sexual intercourse between Respondents No.1 & 2. The son of the petitioner, in terms, deposed before the Court that he found his mother in the company of Respondent No.2 in the bed room sharing common bed on the relevant day. The neighbour examined by the petitioner has also supported his case in respect of taking Respondents No.1 and 2 on the relevant date to the Police Station and lodging of the complaint by him. 37. The trial Court has appreciated the oral and documentary evidence placed on record and has recorded a finding of fact that the allegations levelled against the wife of living in adultery have been established by the petitioner although Respondent wife has entered into witness box and denied the contentions. There is a little scope to draw any other inference except the one recorded by the trial Court. Although Respondent wife alleged that petitioner himself was keeping illicit relations with one Sulochana Poulas, an employee of Municipal Council, she has not led any evidence to substantiate the allegation. It was contended by the petitioner that there is no such employee in the Municipal Council, namely Sulochana Poulas. Respondent No.1, however, has not substantiated her allegations by leading cogent evidence. The Respondent No.1 has merely levelled unsubstantiated allegations against the petitioner as a counter blast to the case put up by him. 38. There is no reason as to why evidence of son of the petitioner shall be discarded. The ground raised in the petition, seeking divorce against Respondent-husband, is covered by Section 10 of the Act of 1869. Section 10 provides that any husband may present a petition to the District Court or High Court seeking declaration that his marriage may be dissolved on the ground that his wife has, since the solemnization thereof, been guilty of adultery. Section 11 provides that the adulterer be impleaded as co-Respondent. The Court is also required to be satisfied that there is an absence of element of collusion in seeking decree of dissolution. The petitioner has filed the petition seeking divorce on the ground of adultery provided under Section 10 of the Act and the adulterer has been impleaded as co-Respondent. The adulterer has not led any evidence nor has controverted the contentions raised by the petitioner. The petitioner has filed the petition seeking divorce on the ground of adultery provided under Section 10 of the Act and the adulterer has been impleaded as co-Respondent. The adulterer has not led any evidence nor has controverted the contentions raised by the petitioner. The District Court, while considering the matter, was satisfied as regards absence of collusion between the parties and we do not find any reason to record our disagreement. The decree passed by the District Judge, as such, cannot be said to be illegal. As laid down by the Special Bench of Mysore High Court in the matter of M. Clarance s/o Murugesh Vs. M. Raicheal d/o Mari Prakasham and another, reported in AIR 1964 Mysore 67, wherein it is observed that, it is equally the duty of the High Court, when the case comes up for confirmation under S.17 to look into it in the light of the scheme of the Act and to satisfy itself whether the decree nisi has been properly granted. We have examined the matter carefully and we are satisfied that decree nisi has been passed by the trial Court properly and the same deserves to be made absolute. 39. The objections raised by the Respondent-wife for confirmation of the decree do not deserve consideration. In the result, decree of dissolution of marriage, granted by the District Court on 13.10.1995, is confirmed and the Reference is accordingly answered. 40. Shri V.J. Dixit, learned Senior Counsel, appointed as amicus curiae, has rendered able assistance to us for disposal of instant reference. We place on record our appreciation for his valuable contribution. Ordered accordingly.