JUDGMENT : Akil Abdul Hamid Kureshi, J. 1. Since barring some cosmetic differences, issues are identical, we may refer to the facts as emerging in Letters Patent Appeal No. 478 of 2014. The appeal is filed calling in question the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 26-2-2014 in Special Civil Application No. 11552 of 2012. Such petition was filed by the State Government challenging a judgment dated 26-10-2011 passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal ('the Tribunal' for short). 2. Facts are as under: 2.1. Appellant was appointed in the erstwhile Bombay State as an Agricultural Assistant. Upon bifurcation of the Gujarat and Maharashtra States, he was allocated to the State of Gujarat. By an order dated 18th March, 1961, he was promoted to the post of Agricultural Supervisor on purely temporary basis pending finalization of seniority list. He resumed the duty on the promotional post on 1st April, 1961. He was reverted to his original post of Agricultural Assistant by an order dated 9-2-1968. He challenged his reversion before this Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 1710 of 1972. Pending such petition, the Director of Agriculture issued a communication dated 3rd September, 1973 to the Superintending Agricultural Officer, Baroda in which it was stated that the Superintending Agricultural Officer was instructed to supply information regarding the entitlement or otherwise of regularization of the petitioner and other similarly situated officers for the purpose of assigning deemed date on the basis of the final gradation list of Agricultural Assistant as on 1-11-1956 published by Maharashtra Government. This would consume some time. It was further stated that: "Secondly, even three petitioners out of four of above matters, are eligible for their continuance as Agricultural Supervisor because of their completing seven years service as Agril. Supervisor on 1-2-1968 on the basis of deem dates to be assigned to them as per final gradation list of Agricultural Assistant as on 1-11-1956 as can be confirmed from the details given hereunder: Sr. No. Name Deem date admissible as per final gradation list of Agril. Assistance as on 1-11-1956 1 Shri H.J. Choudhari 22-12-1959 2 Shri  M.A. Patel 25-1-1960 3 Shri R.M. Patel 30-1-1960 N.B.: Deem dates are taken as per statement given by your office personally to Office Superintendent Shri H.K. Desai. However, this may again be verified. No. Name Deem date admissible as per final gradation list of Agril. Assistance as on 1-11-1956 1 Shri H.J. Choudhari 22-12-1959 2 Shri  M.A. Patel 25-1-1960 3 Shri R.M. Patel 30-1-1960 N.B.: Deem dates are taken as per statement given by your office personally to Office Superintendent Shri H.K. Desai. However, this may again be verified. You are therefore, requested to restore the original position of these three petitioners immediately under intimation to this department and to send proposals for creation of supernumerary posts of Agril. Supervisor for the spell of period in between dates of reversion and dates of restoring their petition." 2.2. On 5-9-1974, the Government Counsel conveyed to the Court in writing that final gradation list of Agricultural Assistant on 1-11-1956 is now received from the Director of Agriculture, Puna. As per this, the petitioner would have completed 7 years of service on 1-2-1968. In view of this position, the petitioner has now been promoted to the post of Agricultural Supervisor and the petition, has therefore, become infructuous. 2.3. On the basis of such developments, the petitioner withdrew the said writ petition on 12-9-1974. 2.4. Later on, however, since the interregnum period from the date of reversion till the date of re-promotion was not regularized, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Tribunal and prayed inter alia that his order of reversion be quashed and he may be paid the salary for the entire intervening period between date of reversion till re-promotion. 2.5. At one stage, the Tribunal dismissed such a petition on the ground of delay. Petitioner approached the High Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 8710 of 1993. Learned Single Judge allowed the petition by a judgment dated 5-8-2010 and passed the following order: "6. The petition is allowed. The judgment and order of the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal dated 15th December, 1992, passed in Appeal Nos. 561, 562 and 563 of 1981 is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal for decision of the dispute on merits. Considering the fact that the petitioners are Senior Citizens and are of an advanced age, it would be reasonable to expect the Tribunal to decide the matter expeditiously, preferably, within six months from the date of receipt of the order. Direction accordingly. Rule is made absolute accordingly. No costs." 2.6. Thereupon, the Tribunal proceeded to decide the issue on merits. Considering the fact that the petitioners are Senior Citizens and are of an advanced age, it would be reasonable to expect the Tribunal to decide the matter expeditiously, preferably, within six months from the date of receipt of the order. Direction accordingly. Rule is made absolute accordingly. No costs." 2.6. Thereupon, the Tribunal proceeded to decide the issue on merits. By a judgment dated 26-10-2011, the Tribunal allowed the appeal. The Tribunal relied on two circulars issued by the State Government dated 16-3-1968 and 5-8-1968 and held that the petitioner was entitled to the benefits of such circulars. The Tribunal observed and held as under: "On going through the above material, in our view, it is clear that the agriculture supervisors who were completing 7 years of service on the basis of deemed date suffice to them were to be retained in the same rank. The respondent No. 1 then also was of the same view but the regional agriculture officer, Vadodara held out his own view against the order of Director of Agriculture in the spirit of amended Recruitment Rules dated 16-3-1968 and the Government memo dated 5-8-1968. The order of promotion of the appellant in the year 1973 were issued which were fresh. In our view, the above reproduced order of the Head of the Department is correct interpretation of the amended Recruitment Rules of 16-3-1968. Therefore, it is our view that in view of he above-mentioned position, the appellants are entitled to be retained in the agriculture supervisor cadre with continuity. ORDER Appeal No. 561 of 1981: Appeal is allowed and the impugned orders dated 19-6-1981 and 14-8-1981 of Joint Director and Director of Agriculture respectively as also order dated 26-6-1967 of Divisional Agricultural Officer, Baroda Division are hereby quashed and set aside and it is ordered that appellant is retained in the post of Agricultural Supervisor with continuity from the date of his promotion on 25-3-1961 and his pay and allowances be fixed accordingly and he be paid arrears that may be found due." 2.7. The State Government challenged the said order of the Tribunal by filing Special Civil Application No. 11552 of 2012. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment allowed the writ petition of the State. The learned Judge held and observed as under: "16. The State Government challenged the said order of the Tribunal by filing Special Civil Application No. 11552 of 2012. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment allowed the writ petition of the State. The learned Judge held and observed as under: "16. In Special Civil Application No. 1890 of 1972, the question was about placing those persons in the seniority list of Agricultural Supervisors who had put in seven or more years of continuous service in the cadre of agricultural supervisor as on 1st February, 1968 as per Government Resolution dated 5-8-1968. The Court concluded that by virtue of the Government Resolution dated 16th March, 1968 read with Government Resolution dated 5th August, 1968, appointment of agricultural assistants as agricultural supervisor must be taken to have been made in supersession of the quota rule, and therefore, they should be treated to have been appointed and absorbed as such in the higher cadre for all practical purposes, and directed to place them in seniority list by determining their seniority as per G.R. dated 5-8-1968. 17. From what was held above, it clearly appears that the benefit of deemed date as per resolution dated 5th August, 1968 was only to ensure that the agricultural supervisors retain their seniority as per the date of their appointment in the cadre of agricultural assistant so that they may not have to suffer as regards seniority in the cadre of agricultural supervisor but that does not mean that they were actually entitled to the benefit of deemed date of promotion in the cadre of agricultural supervisor. Additionally, when the petitioners had unconditionally withdrawn their petition wherein challenge to the reversion orders was made, by principles of constructive res judicata, they were not entitled to challenge the same in appeals. Therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in giving pay and allowances to the respondents for the period from the date of their reversion to the date they were again promoted. As stated by learned A.G.P. Mr. Raval, the seniority of Agricultural Supervisor was finalized long back. However, even if there remains any grievance about fixation of seniority, it cannot be decided at this belated stage. 18. The contention that the petitions at the instance of the State authorities are not maintainable cannot be accepted as all the appeal preferred by respondents were virtually for benefits of the deemed date of promotion. However, even if there remains any grievance about fixation of seniority, it cannot be decided at this belated stage. 18. The contention that the petitions at the instance of the State authorities are not maintainable cannot be accepted as all the appeal preferred by respondents were virtually for benefits of the deemed date of promotion. The State therefore is entitled to challenge the order of the Tribunal whereby it held the respondents entitled to pay and allowances by giving deemed date to them. In view of the above, the oral judgment dated 4-3-2011 in Spl. C.A. No. 5356 of 2011 relied on by Mr. Thakar will have no application to the facts of the cases. 19. For the reasons stated above, these petitions are allowed. The common judgment and order dated 26th October, 2011 passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal in Appeal Nos. 561 of 1981; 562 of 1981 and 560 of 1981 are hereby quashed and set aside. The appeals of the respondents are dismissed. Rule is made absolute in each of the petitions." 3. It is this judgment of the learned Single Judge, which is impugned in the present Letters Patent Appeal. 4. Appearing for the appellants, learned Counsel Shri G.R. Thakar raised following contentions: (i) That the writ petition filed by the State Government was not maintainable. He submitted that under the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal Act, 1972 ('the Act of 1972' for short), the Tribunal is vested with the powers, which the Government previously enjoyed. When such powers are vested with the Tribunal and exercised by it, State Government itself cannot question any decision of the Tribunal in exercise of such powers. He placed reliance on the decisions of two learned Single Judges of this Court dated 5-12-1987 rendered in Special Civil Application No. 6003 of 1987 and in case of State of Gujarat v. A.V. Mankad, dated 4-3-2011 in Special Civil Application No. 5356 of 2001. (ii) The Counsel submitted that the Tribunal had correctly interpreted the Government Circulars. The petitioners were covered by such circulars and were entitled to the benefits of regularization of the intervening period on the promotional post of Agricultural Supervisor. The learned Single Judge committed an error in reversing such a decision. (ii) The Counsel submitted that the Tribunal had correctly interpreted the Government Circulars. The petitioners were covered by such circulars and were entitled to the benefits of regularization of the intervening period on the promotional post of Agricultural Supervisor. The learned Single Judge committed an error in reversing such a decision. (iii) He pointed out that during the pendency of the earlier writ petition, the Director of Agriculture had already passed an order granting deemed date of promotion to the petitioners and the State Counsel had conveyed that the petitioners have already been re-promoted. It was on account of such developments that the petitioners were persuaded to withdraw the petition. When the benefits flowing from such promise were not released, the petitioners were compelled to start fresh litigation. Counsel drew our attention to previous judgments rendered by this Court on the issue of seniority and promotions in the cadre of Agricultural Assistant and Supervisor to contend that the appellants were rightly granted benefit of the Government Circulars by the Tribunal. 5. On the other hand, learned A.G.P. Shri Kashyap Pujara opposed the appeals on the following grounds: (i) The Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable. The writ petition was filed urging the Court to exercise powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution. The Tribunal was not joined as a respondent. He relied on the judgment of the Full Bench in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Firoze M. Mogal, reported in 2014 (1) GLH 1 (FB) : [ 2014 (2) GLR 1373 (FB)]. (ii) The appellants had previously filed petitions but withdrew the same unconditionally. In view of unconditional withdrawal of the petition, their fresh challenge to the orders of reversion was not maintainable. (iii) Even on merits, the learned Single Judge committed no error. The Tribunal had wrongly granted the benefits to the Government Servants which did not flow from the circulars of the Government. The communication dated 3-9-1973 of the Director of Agriculture was only for the purpose of gathering information about the status of the employees. This was not an order either granting promotion or granting deemed date of promotion. To regularize the period of break in the promotional post, supernumerary posts would have to be created, which was never done. In short, this communication was never acted upon by the Government. 6. This was not an order either granting promotion or granting deemed date of promotion. To regularize the period of break in the promotional post, supernumerary posts would have to be created, which was never done. In short, this communication was never acted upon by the Government. 6. We may, at the outset, settle the issues of the maintainability of the letters patent appeal and the writ petition respectively. 7. Learned Counsel Shri Pujara placed heavy reliance on Clause (x) of Para 254 of the final conclusion in the Full Bench Judgment in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, 2014 (1) GLH 1 (FB) : [ 2014 (2) GLR 1373 (FB)]. He would contend that since the writ petition was filed both under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the Tribunal, whose order was under challenge, was not made a party, the Court could not have issued a writ of certiorari in absence of the concerned Tribunal or the Court on record. Learned Counsel Shri G.R. Thakar, however, placed reliance on Clause (xii) of the said Paragraph, and in our opinion, correctly so. Clause (xii) of Para 254 reads as under: "(xii) If a learned Single Judge, in exercise of a purported power under Art. 227 of the Constitution modifies the order of Tribunal/Authority or Court below, and thereby, partly allows a petition to a certain extent, then in such circumstances, it could not be said that the Court exercised its certiorari jurisdiction and no appeal will be maintainable against such order in view of the specific bar created under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent itself However, if a learned Single Judge, in purported exercise of power under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, issues a writ of certiorari, although, the same is not maintainable, an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent would nevertheless be maintainable against such order. To put it in other words, take a case where a party on his own invokes supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, and in such a petition, the Court issues a writ of certiorari, then against such an order an L.P.A. would be maintainable. To put it in other words, take a case where a party on his own invokes supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, and in such a petition, the Court issues a writ of certiorari, then against such an order an L.P.A. would be maintainable. To put it explicitly clear, take a case where in a petition neither there is a prayer for issue of a writ of certiorari nor the Tribunal/Authority or Court whose order is impugned is impleaded as a party respondent, and despite such being the position, if the Court proceeds to issue a writ of certiorari, then against such an order an L.P.A. would be maintainable." 8. In essence, what is held in the said portion of the judgment is that if the learned Single Judge has, in exercise of power under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, modified the order of the lower Tribunal or the Court and allowed the petition to a certain extent, it cannot be stated that the Court has exercised certiorari jurisdiction. However, if the learned Single Judge has exercised powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and issued a writ of certiorari though the same was not maintainable, L.P.A. would lie. 9. In the present case, we have perused the writ petition filed before the learned Single Judge as well as the judgment of the learned Judge. The petition, of course, is titled as one under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In the prayer clause, the petitioners have prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal. Thus, the prayer of the petitioner was for issuance of an appropriate writ, which in the context of challenge to the decision of the lower Tribunal, would mean a writ of certiorari. Even the perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge would demonstrate that he was exercising the powers of a writ jurisdiction in the nature of certiorari and not in the nature of superintending power under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Though, of course, not so specifically stated by the learned Judge in the impugned judgment, entire focus was on correctness or the propriety of the view expressed by the Tribunal. It was not confined to exercising superintending powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Though, of course, not so specifically stated by the learned Judge in the impugned judgment, entire focus was on correctness or the propriety of the view expressed by the Tribunal. It was not confined to exercising superintending powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution. In our opinion, therefore, the L.P.A. is maintainable. 10. We may now examine the issue of maintainability of the writ petitions filed by the State Government, raised by the Counsel for the appellant. 11. The Tribunal is constituted under Sec. 3 of the Act of 1972. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that for the purpose of securing in a more effective and satisfactory manner the just claims and interests of specified civil servants with respect to certain matters affecting their rights, the State Government shall, by notification, constitute a Tribunal to be called the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal. Section 10 of the Act of 1972 pertains to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and reads as under: "10. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide- (a) appeals filed by specified civil servants under Sec. 11; (b) any application filed by the State Government under Sec. 12; (c) appeals and applications transferred to it under Sec. 21." 12. Section 11 of the Act of 1972 pertains to appeal by specified civil servants. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that any specified civil servant aggrieved by an original or appellate order or decision of any officer or authority other than the State Government with respect to any of the matters specified in the Schedule may, within a period of 90 days from the date of such order or decision, appeal to the Tribunal against such order or decision, in a case where an appeal lies under the law to the State Government. Essentially, thus, all appeals of subordinate authorities and officers pertaining to specified officers and the matters specified in the Schedule, which were previously maintainable before the State Government would now be entertained by the Tribunal. 13. Section 12 of the Act of 1972 pertains to power of State Government to apply for modification or annulment of order or decision. Essentially, thus, all appeals of subordinate authorities and officers pertaining to specified officers and the matters specified in the Schedule, which were previously maintainable before the State Government would now be entertained by the Tribunal. 13. Section 12 of the Act of 1972 pertains to power of State Government to apply for modification or annulment of order or decision. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that where it appears to the State Government that any order or decision of any officer or authority in relation to any specified civil servant with respect to any of the matters specified in the Schedule against which an appeal lies to the Tribunal under Sec. 11 requires to be modified, annulled or reversed on the ground of such order being contrary to law or inconsistent with the material on record or for any other sufficient reason, the State Government may, in the interest of justice, apply to the Tribunal within specified time to modify, annul or reverse such an order or decision. 14. Section 21 of the Act of 1972 pertains to bar of jurisdiction of Government and transfer of pending proceedings to Tribunal. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that neither the State Government nor any officer or authority empowered to exercise the powers of the State Government shall, with effect on and from the date on which the Tribunal is constituted under Sec. 3, be competent to entertain or hear appeals or applications against, or to revise, orders or decisions of any officer or authority in relation to specified civil servants with respect to any of the matters specified in the Schedule, in cases where an appeal lies to the Tribunal against such orders or decision under Sec. 11 and all such appeals and such other proceedings pending before the State Government or any officer or authority shall stand transferred to the Tribunal for disposal in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 15. Perusal of the above provisions contained in the Act of 1972, would demonstrate that the Tribunal would exercise appellate or revisional powers, which hitherto were enjoyed by the State Government and exercised either by the State Government or by an officer or authority specified for such purpose. Under Sec. 11, a specified civil servant with respect to the matters specified in the Schedule, would now appeal to the Tribunal where previously the appeal lied before the Government. Under Sec. 11, a specified civil servant with respect to the matters specified in the Schedule, would now appeal to the Tribunal where previously the appeal lied before the Government. Under Sec. 12, the State Government would apply to the Tribunal for modification, annulment or reversal of an order or decision of an officer or authority in relation to any specified civil servant concerning the matters specified in the Schedule. Section 21 provides that with effect from the constitution of the Tribunal, the State Government or any officer or authority empowered to exercise the powers of the State Government, would be incompetent to entertain or hear appeals or applications and to revise the orders or decision of any officer or authority in relation to the specified civil servants with respect to the matters specified in the Schedule. In other words, the Tribunal was given exclusive jurisdiction to decide such matters to the total exclusion of the jurisdiction of the State Government. This was, clearly, thus, not a case of delegation of powers by the State Government to the Tribunal, but it was the case of creation of a statutory Tribunal to exercise powers of appellate and revisional jurisdiction, which the State Government hitherto enjoyed with respect to the specified civil servant concerning the matters specified in the Schedule. In a case of delegation, the delegation always enjoys concurrent jurisdiction and may even withdraw the authority of the delegatee. In the present case, the jurisdiction of the State Government is totally ousted upon creation of the Tribunal under Sec. 3 of the Act of 1972 and vesting of the powers to the Tribunal under Sec. 10 of the Act of 1972. Significantly, under Sec. 12 of the Act of 1972, the State Government itself can be a petitioner before the Tribunal. An order or decision of the officer or authority, which was till the constitution of the Tribunal, was appealable or revisable by the State Government would now have to be questioned before the Tribunal by the State Government, if it was of the opinion that such order was contrary to law or inconsistent with the material on record or required modification, annulment or reversal on any other sufficient reasons in the interest of justice. It can easily be conceived that the order that the Tribunal may pass on such a petition of the State Government, in a given case, may even aggrieve the State Government. It would be incorrect, therefore, to suggest that the State Government would be bound by the view of the Tribunal and would be compelled to accept the finality of the view of the Tribunal prohibiting a writ before the High Court at the hands of the State Government. 16. In the case of Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1503 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question of powers of the State Government to revise an order passed by the officer, who was delegated such powers by the State Government. In the majority opinion, it was held that where the State Government has delegated its powers to hear appeals to an officer, the order passed by such officer is an order passed by the State Government itself and not an order passed by any officer under the Act. The provision providing for revision contemplated an order passed by an officer in his own right and not as a delegate. It was, therefore, held that the State Government was not entitled to call for and examine the record of the case disposed of by the officer acting as a delegate. In the present case, we are not dealing with the situation where the powers of the State Government has been delegated to the Tribunal but, as noted above, the Tribunal is exercising its independent statutory powers vested under Sec. 10 of the Act of 1972. In the said decision, in the minority opinion, it was expressed that the appellate powers of the State Government are exercised by the officer to whom such powers are delegated and the officer though exercising such powers possessed by the State Government, is still an officer of the State Government. The power of the State Government for revision is distinct from the power exercised by the delegate. The revisional powers give overall control to the State Government to see that the appellate orders passed by its officers are legal and proper because one illegal or improper order may start a chain of reaction which may disturb the whole scheme of consolidation of land and prevent such scheme from coming into existence. 17. The revisional powers give overall control to the State Government to see that the appellate orders passed by its officers are legal and proper because one illegal or improper order may start a chain of reaction which may disturb the whole scheme of consolidation of land and prevent such scheme from coming into existence. 17. As is well known, Sec. 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code pertains to the revision and authorises the State Government and any revenue authority not inferior in rank to an Assistant or Deputy Collector or Superintendent of Survey, to call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate revenue officer for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer. 18. In the context of the revisional order passed by an officer for and on behalf of the State Government, the question of challenging such an order by the Collector came up before this Court. The learned Single Judge in case of Collector v. Bavabhai Karshanbhai Patel, vide judgment dated 17-10-2002 in Special Civil Application No. 3486 of 2002, held that the Principal Secretary has exercised the powers under Sec. 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and thus exercised the powers of the State Government itself. It was, therefore, highly improper on the part of the Collector, Deputy Collector or Mamlatdar to challenge the decision of the Principal Secretary by filing a writ petition. It was observed that it was not open for the subordinate officer to challenge the order of the superior officer by filing the petition to challenge the said decision unless specifically authorized by the State Government in that behalf. 19. Such decision was carried in appeal. The Division Bench, in a judgment dated 16-6-2004 upheld the view of the learned Single Judge and observed that "Thus, in our considered opinion, the main writ petition filed by the present appellant - original petitioners before this Court, itself was not maintainable in their individual capacity." Such decisions were carried in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Division Bench, in a judgment dated 16-6-2004 upheld the view of the learned Single Judge and observed that "Thus, in our considered opinion, the main writ petition filed by the present appellant - original petitioners before this Court, itself was not maintainable in their individual capacity." Such decisions were carried in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal observing as under: "In both the orders the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench were of the view that since the order of the Secretary to the State Government has been challenged by the Collector the writ petition is not maintainable, according to them the Collector is subordinate to the Secretary in the Government, and therefore, he is incompetent to challenge the order passed by the Secretary to the State Government. We have perused ground 'A' taken in this appeal which shows that the appeal was preferred by the Collector of Rajkot on the expressed direction given by the Ministry of Revenue. Apart from that, we are of the view that when an illegality is committed it is open to the Collector to change the same to protect the interest of the State. Therefore, both the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court were not correct in saying that the Collector cannot change the order passed by the Secretary to the State Government." 20. It can thus be seen that even in a case where the powers were exercised by the Principal Secretary under Sec. 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, which were vested with the Government, the Supreme Court held that such a decision could be challenged by the State Government or even by a lower authority under the instructions of the State Government. In case of decision dated 5-12-1987 in Special Civil Application No. 6003 of 1987, the learned Single Judge primarily proceeded on the basis that the Act of 1972 did not think it proper to provide for an appeal by the officer whose order was set aside by the appellate authority. It was, therefore, observed that it is doubtful whether the officer whose order has been set aside by the appellate authority can approach this Court by filing a writ petition under Arts. 226 or 227 of the Constitution. 21. It was, therefore, observed that it is doubtful whether the officer whose order has been set aside by the appellate authority can approach this Court by filing a writ petition under Arts. 226 or 227 of the Constitution. 21. Relying on this decision, the learned Single Judge in case of A.V. Mankad (supra), held that the writ petition filed through the District Education Officer to challenge the judgment of the Tribunal was not maintainable. 22. We have already held that a writ petition at the hands of the State Government, if it is otherwise aggrieved, calling in question the decision of the Tribunal, would be maintainable. Our view is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Roop Chand, [ AIR 1963 SC 1503 ]. Besides, the present is not a case where the writ petition was filed by an officer subordinate in rank than the officer whose order was challenged. It was a case where the Government itself approached the High Court by filing writ petition. For all these reasons, the challenge to the maintainability of the State Government's writ petitions must fail. 23. On merits, we may recall that the appellants were promoted on temporary basis in March, 1961. The order clearly specified that the promotion was by way of temporary measure pending final action of preparation of combined seniority list and the promotees were liable to reversion at any time and they will not claim seniority over others by virtue of the promotion orders. Thus, in plain terms, the order of promotion was purely provisional vesting no right of seniority or any other benefits other than discharging their duty on the promotional posts with a matching remuneration. They were reverted in February, 1968. They challenged their reversion nearly 5 years later by filing writ petition before this Court. Before, the issues in the writ could be decided on merits, on the basis of two fold representation from the State Government, they withdrew the writ petition. In the communication dated 3rd September, 1973, the Director of Agriculture considered granting them deemed date and also regularization of break in the period of promotion. In the letter dated 5-9-1974, the Government Counsel conveyed that the petitioners had been re-promoted and that the petitions have, therefore, become infructuous. In the communication dated 3rd September, 1973, the Director of Agriculture considered granting them deemed date and also regularization of break in the period of promotion. In the letter dated 5-9-1974, the Government Counsel conveyed that the petitioners had been re-promoted and that the petitions have, therefore, become infructuous. We do not find any fault in the petitioners in withdrawing the writ petitions and re-agitating the question later before the Tribunal since despite this communication, their services were not regularised on the promotional post. However, that does not necessarily mean that their grievances were justified and had to be redressed by accepting their prayer for quashing of the order of reversion and granting them salary and other allowances of the promotional post for the interregnum. Their cases were based solely on two circulars issued by the State Government dated 16th March, 1968 and 5th August, 1968. In the Circular dated 16th March, 1968, it was provided that 5% posts in the promotional cadre of Agricultural Supervisor are to be filled up by promotion from the cadre of Agricultural Assistant and 95% of the vacancies to be filled up by direct recruitment. However, large number of posts were filled up by promotion which situation continued for a long time. Of nearly 50% of vacancies of direct recruitment, approximately 33 % of such vacancies were occupied by promotees continuously for more than 7 years. To resolve such a situation, the Government decided to regularize the promotion of all Agricultural Assistants, who had been holding the promotional posts of Agricultural Supervisor continuously for a period of 7 years as on 1-2-1968 even exceeding the quota for promotees. In the latter resolution dated 5th August, 1968, it was clarified that without disturbing the original seniority in the cadre of Agricultural Assistants, the deemed date of seniority should be given in the cadre of Agricultural Supervisors and on the basis of such date, if any officer has completed 7 years of continuous service, he should be absorbed as Agricultural Supervisor. 24. Admittedly, since the appellants had not completed 7 years of continuous service in the cadre of Agricultural Supervisor, Circular dated 16th March, 1968, therefore, did not cover their cases. When they had not held such posts continuously for a minimum period of 7 years, the question of applying the latter Circular dated 5-8-1968 to cover their cases, would not arise. Admittedly, since the appellants had not completed 7 years of continuous service in the cadre of Agricultural Supervisor, Circular dated 16th March, 1968, therefore, did not cover their cases. When they had not held such posts continuously for a minimum period of 7 years, the question of applying the latter Circular dated 5-8-1968 to cover their cases, would not arise. In any case, this would have no bearing on their reversions which they had challenged and which was their principal challenge. 25. The Director of Agriculture did communicate in his letter dated 3rd September, 1968 that these appellants be granted deemed dates. However, this was dependent on his further proposal for creation of supernumerary posts of Agricultural Supervisors for the spell of period between the date of their reversion or the date of restoring their promotion, which admittedly, was never accepted by the State Government. The communication itself would demonstrate that to grant continuity in the promotional post to the appellants for the period between their reversion and their re-promotion, there would be need to create supernumerary posts in the promotional cadre. The Director of Agriculture did not exercise any powers to create new posts. Such decision could only be taken by the State Government. Such a decision would have far-reaching effect and would not be confined to the cases of the present appellants. At any rate, the communication of the Director in question only called upon the Superintending Agricultural Officer to send a proposal for creation of supernumerary posts. He neither recommended nor as he could not have, created any such posts. If the State Government subsequently did not act on such initial attempt on the part of the Director of Agriculture and no supernumerary posts admittedly come into existence, obviously, the appellants cannot seek regularization of the break in service on the promotional post in excess of their quota and in fact in excess of the available vacancies merely on the recommendations of the Director of Agriculture. 26. For all these reasons, we do not think that the learned Single Judge has committed any error. The ground that the juniors were retained in the promotional post is not emerging clearly from the record. From the discussion of the Tribunal on the issue, it appears that the instances cited were of those, who were directly recruited to the posts of Agricultural Supervisor but after the appellants were provisionally promoted. The ground that the juniors were retained in the promotional post is not emerging clearly from the record. From the discussion of the Tribunal on the issue, it appears that the instances cited were of those, who were directly recruited to the posts of Agricultural Supervisor but after the appellants were provisionally promoted. As noted earlier, 5% of the posts of Agricultural Supervisor had to be filled up by promotion and 95% by direct recruitment. However, for various reasons, the promotees occupied the quota for direct recruitment for years together on ad-hoc basis. If, therefore, the promotees as the appellants were being reverted by cancellation of their provisional promotion, the cadre of Agricultural Supervisor may still have large number of officers, who are directly recruited but after the promotions were granted to the Agricultural Assistants provisionally and who could be technically called their juniors. The stand of the Government was turned down by the Tribunal observing that the High Court has declared that there cannot be two separate lists of seniority in the same cadre. Reliance was placed on the decision of learned Single Judge of this Court in case of H.M. Vyas v. State of Gujarat, dated 2/3-12-1971, which was rendered in absolutely different context. When the State Government tried to maintain two separate seniority lists in the cadre of Agricultural Supervisors, one for promotees and another for direct recruits, the High Court held that the same was wholly impermissible. Learned Counsel Shri Thakar, however, would contend that all the 19 officers were promoted and were retained in the cadre of Agricultural Supervisors to the exclusion of the appellants. If that be so, such facts have not been clearly brought on record. More importantly the appellants challenged their reversion of the year 1968 before the High Court only in the year 1973. They withdrew the challenge once when they were restored to the promotional post of Agricultural Supervisor. The only question now remains is, can they insist on regularization of the period during which they were reverted to their original posts, the answer for the reasons stated above, is in the negative. In case of Gandabhai Somabhai Patel in the judgment dated 19-12-1973, learned Single Judge upheld the Government Policy flowing from two circulars. The question of application of these circulars to the appellants was never at issue. In case of Gandabhai Somabhai Patel in the judgment dated 19-12-1973, learned Single Judge upheld the Government Policy flowing from two circulars. The question of application of these circulars to the appellants was never at issue. So also was the case in case of H.M. Vyas v. State of Gujarat, in the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 19-4-1977. In the result, the appeals are dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.