Judgment Ashim Kumar Banerjee. J. The respondent no.1 Chittranjan Das was a class II officer of Calcutta Dock Labour Board. He resigned from service with effect from December 16, 1982 after serving the Board for about 22 years. He availed all his retiral benefit that the Board extended to him. In 1985 the Board formulated a scheme giving option to the retirees as on that date to switch over from the CPF scheme to GPF scheme having pensionery benefit. Pertinent to note, he availed all terminal benefit as on the date of resignation including the amount payable as per Contributory Provident Fund scheme. The circular dated February 13, 1985 permitted inter-alia the class II officers to come within the pension scheme within May 31, 1985. Chittaranjan complained, he did not know of this scheme as it was not properly circulated to the retirees. He came to know about the circular in 1991 and as such applied on March 18, 1991. Circular provided, the officers who were in service as on August 1, 1982 would be entitled to apply for such switching over. Chittaranjan was thus entitled to apply. The Board did not consider his application. He filed a writ petition being WP No. 2018 of 1992 that the learned Single Judge disposed of vide judgment and order dated May 13, 2008 appearing at pages 34-36 of the paper book. His Lordship observed, since he was a retiree and it was not proved that he had knowledge about the circular the application could not be rejected for being made beyond the cut off date. His Lordship set aside the order dated November 18, 1991 passed by the Board rejecting his application. His Lordship directed Board to consider the application on merit and dispose of the same by a reasoned order. The authority accepted the said order and disposed of his application by a reasoned order appearing at pages 38-48 of the paper book. The reasoned order would depict, the Board again rejected his application on a different plea that they did not take earlier. By the reasoned order the Board observed, the application was belated hence, not maintainable. His Lordship rejected such plea and directed the application to be considered afresh, the Board took mainly two pleas while rejecting his application again. The reasoned order would depict, the Board again rejected his application on a different plea that they did not take earlier. By the reasoned order the Board observed, the application was belated hence, not maintainable. His Lordship rejected such plea and directed the application to be considered afresh, the Board took mainly two pleas while rejecting his application again. According to Board, he consciously opted for the Contributory Provident Fund scheme as he would have difficulty in collecting pension; and since he had resigned he would not be entitled to the benefit of the said circular for switching over. Chittaranjan filed a writ petition again being WP No. 129 of 2009, challenging the reasoned order appearing at pages 38-48. Chittaranjan contended the order was not a reasoned one. His Lordship rejected such contention holding it a reasoned order. His Lordship rejected the contention of the petitioner when the petitioner would equate the petitioner with the families of the deceased employee who died in harness as on August 1, 1982. The learned Judge however, allowed the writ petition rejecting the contention of the respondent, since he had resigned from service, his pensionable service, if any, would be deemed to have been forfeited. Learned Judge relied on the Apex Court decision in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain Vs. New India Assurance Company Limited and others reported in 2011 Volume-XII Supreme Court Cases Page-197. His Lordship observed, the Chittaranjan should be treated at per with the employees those who had retired voluntarily. His Lordship set aside the reasoned order. His Lordship directed the Board to consider the application afresh by extending the pension in accordance with the relevant scheme following the decision of the Apex Court referred to supra. Mr. Arunava Ghosh learned Counsel appearing for the Board would assail the judgment by contending, voluntary retirement and resignation could not be treated at per. He would submit, the facts involved in Sheel Kumar Jain (supra) would have a distinguishing feature. According to him, the scheme before the Apex Court did provide for the benefit to the persons having voluntarily retired. Such clause being conspicuously absent in the present case, the benefit of the said decision could not be had in the present case. Per contra, Mr. According to him, the scheme before the Apex Court did provide for the benefit to the persons having voluntarily retired. Such clause being conspicuously absent in the present case, the benefit of the said decision could not be had in the present case. Per contra, Mr. Durga Prasad Mazumder learned Counsel appearing for Chittaranjan would contend, once the order dated May 13, 2008 condoned the delay and/or latches, if any, made in the process of making of the application, the learned Judge should have held, the authority did not consider the application on merit. He would submit, after serving 22 years Chittaranjan did complete the required pensionable service for 20 years hence, he should be equated with the other retirees. He would submit, while in case of death, benefit could be extended there was no reason why Chittaranjan would be kept out of the purview. We have considered the rival contentions. The issue of delay reached finality by the judgment and order dated May 13, 2008. Having not preferred any appeal, the authority was precluded from taking a contrary stand. The authority was asked to consider the application on merit hence, the first plea taken by the authority referred to above, could not be sustained. The only question that would be germane in the present case, as to whether Chittaranjan was at all entitled to apply for pension. The scheme admittedly did not make any such provision. It was for the retired employees and the family of the deceased employees. The employees who resigned, were not extended the benefit. Question would still remain, in such a situation whether Chittaranjan would be entitled to the benefit in view of the proposition of law so settled by the Apex Court Sheel Kumar Jain (supra) or whether the facts involved therein would distinguish this case to keep him out of the purview. If we look to the facts involved in Sheel Kumar Jain (supra) we would find, Jain was appointed as an inspector in September 1984. He got subsequent promotions in 1991. He expressed his desire to resign and ask the authority to treat his letter as a three months’ notice. He was duly relieved from service on the expiry of the three months period i.e. on December 19, 1991. He got subsequent promotions in 1991. He expressed his desire to resign and ask the authority to treat his letter as a three months’ notice. He was duly relieved from service on the expiry of the three months period i.e. on December 19, 1991. The authority framed a scheme in 1995 that would be applicable to the employees who were in service on or after January 1, 1986 but had retired before November 1, 1993 provided, he would refund the entire amount of company’s contribution to the Provident Fund including interest. Jain applied under the scheme with an undertaking to refund the employer’s contribution along with interest. The authority however, denied him the benefit. He filed a writ petition that the learned Single Judge dismissed. He challenged the order before the Division Bench. The Division Bench observed, paragraph 2 of the pension scheme clearly provided, in case of resignation there would be forfeiture of past service and he could not be equated with an employee who had taken voluntary retirement as per paragraph 30 of the scheme. Hence, he was not entitled to the benefit. The Apex Court allowed his prayer dealing with paragraph 22 and 30 of the scheme that would relate to resignation and pension on voluntary retirement. The Apex Court observed, the scheme came in 1995 where paragraph 22 and 30 could not be construed so as to deprive an employee to get such benefit which he was otherwise entitled to. Mr. Ghosh would contend, such forfeiture clause was absent in the scheme before us. We do not find any relevance of such submission. If one would read the judgment as a whole in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain (supra) it would be clear, the pension scheme subsequently introduced, cannot deprive someone by putting a fetter clause that was not within his contemplation. In that case the authority otherwise accepted the pensionable service of Jain to allow him the benefit but denied in view of paragraph 22 and 30 that the Apex Court rejected. The case before us would certainly stand on a different footing, it is rather on a better footing. Chittaranjan served the authority for more than 20 years having pensionable service. There was nothing on record to claim, his service could be forfeited in case of resignation, as per the service rules prevalent during his service tenure. The case before us would certainly stand on a different footing, it is rather on a better footing. Chittaranjan served the authority for more than 20 years having pensionable service. There was nothing on record to claim, his service could be forfeited in case of resignation, as per the service rules prevalent during his service tenure. The authority in their wisdom wanted to introduce the pension scheme for those employees who had pensionable service as on a particular date having retired from service. It is true in the present case, there was no voluntary retirement, at least not to our knowledge. If the authority would extend the benefit to the retirees we do not see any reason why the others could be deprived even after serving the authority for more than 20 years. Although the Pension Scheme was in vogue when Chittaranjan was in service, he did not opt for the same and availed the benefit of Contributory Provident Fund. Similarly, some of his colleagues did the likewise yet, they got the benefit of the fresh option and as the Government consciously extended such benefit. We wonder, how Chittranjan could be denied such benefit only because, he had resigned from service. Learned Judge rightly allowed the writ petition that would deserve no interference. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. Ashis Kumar Chakraborty, J. I agree.