JUDGMENT 1. - The present second appeal has been filed by the appellant-plaintiff, challenging the judgment & decree dated 28.05.2009 passed by the District Judge, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as "the appellate court") in Civil Regular Appeal No.88/2007, whereby the appellate court has allowed the said appeal, and set-aside the judgment & decree dated 05.09.2007 passed by the Civil Judge (J.D.) Chomu, District Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as "the trial court") in Civil Suit No.117/94. 2. The short facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the decessed-Smt. Gulab Devi widow of Gendalal, and the present appellant Smt. Govindi wife of Mohanlal Sharma (original-plaintiffs) had filed the suit against the respondents (original-defendants) seeking permanent injunction, alleging interalia that the plaintiffs as well as the defendants were the pujari of the temple known as Thakurji Shri Laxminathji and Thakurji Hanumanji situated at village Chomu. According to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs and the defendants had the right of worshiping in the said temple (OSRA) since the time of their ancestors, and the said rights were also determined in a case by the Additional Munsiff No.2, Jaipur District, Jaipur as per the decree dated 08.05.1979. However, the defendant No.6 (respondent No.6) did not hand over the 'OSRA' i.e. right of worshiping to the plaintiffs, and therefore the suit was filed seeking permanent injunction for restraining the defendants from performing any sewa puja in the said temple, and further directing the defendants to hand over the 'OSRA' to the plaintiffs. The said suit was resisted by the respondents-defendants by filing the written statement, denying the allegations made in the plaint, and further contending inter-alia that during the life time of the husband of the plaintiff No.1, the worship in the temple was being performed by the defendants only as the plaintiffs did not have any son, and the worshipping could not be performed by the females. It was also contended that the plaintiffs had never worshipped at any point of time in the said temple, and therefore the suit was liable to be dismissed. The trial court after appreciating the evidence on record, decreed the suit in favour of the appellant-plaintiff No.2 by restraining the respondents-defendants from causing any obstruction to her in carrying out the sewa-puja during the 'OSRA', and further directing the respondents to hand over the 'OSRA' to the appellant. The trial court after appreciating the evidence on record, decreed the suit in favour of the appellant-plaintiff No.2 by restraining the respondents-defendants from causing any obstruction to her in carrying out the sewa-puja during the 'OSRA', and further directing the respondents to hand over the 'OSRA' to the appellant. Being aggrieved by the said judgment & decree passed by the trial court, the respondents-defendants had filed the appeal before the appellate court, which has been allowed by the appellate court vide the judgment & decree dated 28.05.2009, by setting-aside the judgment & decree passed by the trial court. 3. It is sought to be submitted by the learned counsel Mr. Kapil Bardhar for the appellant that the appellate court has committed an error of law in reversing the findings recorded by the trial court, and in holding that the appellant being female could not have performed the sewa-puja in the temple. Relying upon the decision of this Court in case of Mst. Champa Devi v. Chothmal, RLW 1956, page 509 , and the decision of the Apex Court in case of Raj Kali Kuer v. Ram Rattan Pandey, AIR 1955 SC 493 , he submitted that a Hindu female could succeed in the hereditary priestly office of a pujari. According to Mr. Bardhar, though the decree was passed in the earlier suit on 08.05.1979, recognising the right of the appellant with regard to the 'OSRA', the appellant did not file the execution proceedings in respect of the said decree as the same would have been barred by law of limitation in view of Article 135 of the Limitation Act. He further relied upon the decision of Apex Court in case of Ajit Chopra v. Sadhu Ram And Others, (2000) 1 SCC 114 , to submit that fresh suit was maintainable for fresh cause of action and that the appellate court has committed an error in not permitting the appellant to enforce the right of 'OSRA' pursuant to the decree passed in the earlier suit. However, the learned counsel Mr. Gajendra Vyas for the respondents-defendants has supported the findings recorded by the appellate court and submitted that even as per the admission made by the original-plaintiff No.1 Gulab Devi, the decree passed in the year 1979 in the earlier suit was never acted upon, as she did not have any son and the present appellant also did not have any son. He further submitted that the suit at the instance of the appellant for execution of the decree passed in the earlier suit was not maintainable, which decree even otherwise was never acted upon. 4. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, and to the impugned judgment & decree passed by the appellate court, it appears that the appellate court after considering the evidence of the original-plaintiff No.1 Gulab Devi, had held that the appellant did not have the right of 'OSRA' as claimed by her, as the original-plaintiff No.1 Gulab Devi had admitted in her evidence that the sewa-puja of Thakurji Shri Laxminathji could be performed by males only and not by the females, and that she did not have any son. It is also pertinent to note that the present appellant-plaintiff No.2 in the suit had not stepped into the witness box to substantiate her case. In any case, even if the evidence of the original-plaintiff No.1 Gulab Devi is considered then also she had categorically admitted in her evidence that she had never performed any sewa-puja and after the death of her husband, the respondents-defendants were performing the sewa-puja of the said temple. There cannot be any disagreement with the ratio of judgments of the Apex Court and of this Court to that effect that the Female is not dis-entitled to succeed to priestly office, however it is also observed in the said decisions that the burden of proof lies on the contesting party to show that there was custom in the family or the community to which the parties belonged, that the females were entitled to take part in the management of the temple or inherit the priestly office. In the instant case, as stated here-in-above, the plaintiff No.1 herself had categorically admitted that the worship of the disputed temple could be performed only by the males and not by the females, and therefore the appellate court has rightly held that the appellant did not have right of 'OSRA' as claimed by her. 5. In the instant case, as stated here-in-above, the plaintiff No.1 herself had categorically admitted that the worship of the disputed temple could be performed only by the males and not by the females, and therefore the appellate court has rightly held that the appellant did not have right of 'OSRA' as claimed by her. 5. The Court also finds substance in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appellant was required to file execution proceedings for the execution of the decree dated 08.05.1979 passed by the court in the earlier suit, however the appellant having preferred to file the suit instead of execution proceedings, the said issue has lost its significance. Though, it was sought to be submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the execution proceedings were barred by law of limitation in view of Article 135, the Court does not find any substance in the same, inasmuch as from the decree dated 08.05.1979 it transpires that the said decree was not of a mandatory nature but was of declaratory in nature, and was for permanent injunction, for which Article 136 of the Limitation Act would apply. The appellate court having rightly considered the factual and legal aspects of the matter in the right perspective, the Court does not find any substance in the present appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant has also failed to point out any substantial question of law being involved in this appeal, and therefore the present appeal deserves to be dismissed, and is accordingly dismissed. *******