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2014 DIGILAW 119 (CHH)

San Fit v. Kishan Lal Tuteja

2014-03-12

C.B.BAJPAI, T.P.SHARMA

body2014
ORDER T.P. Sharma, J: 1. This reference has been made by the learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manindra Mohan Shrivastava) under Rule 32 (2) (ii) of the High Court of Chhattisgarh Rules, 2007 for placing it before Hon'ble the Chief Justice with a recommendation to place the same before Division Bench. Vide order dated 29-1-2014, Hon'ble the Chief Justice has directed to place the reference before this Bench to answer the following referred question of law: "Whether a revision against an interlocutory order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority in proceedings of eviction under the provisions contained in Chapter III A of the C.G. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 would be maintainable under Section 23-E of the Act?" 2. Scope of revisional jurisdiction and its limitation was earlier considered by the learned Single Judge of this Court (Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dhirendra Mishra) in the case of Kanti Prasad Rathor v. Smt. Gunwantin Ben Tank, 2007(3) CGLJ 387 and held that revision against an order interlocutory in nature passed by the Rent Controlling Authority is not maintainable. Subsequently, contrary view was taken by another Single Bench of this Court (Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.K. Agarwal) in the matter of Sitaram Mohabia v. Paramanand Painter, 2012(4) CGLJ 316. 3. The learned Single Judge making the reference (Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manindra Mohan Shrivastava) took view that the ambit of revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 23-E of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act of 1961') is wider than that of revisional jurisdiction exercisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'the Code') as amended vide Act No.46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002, and in the light of aforesaid two contrary views taken by coordinate Benches, formulating the question directed to place the matter before Hon’ble the Chief Justice with a recommendation to place it before a Bench of two Judges for decision. 4. Counsel for the parties are heard and records of both writ petitions in which the matter has been referred perused. 5. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe and Mr. Amrito Das, learned counsel for the petitioners, submit that revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 is subject to revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 115 of the Code. 5. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe and Mr. Amrito Das, learned counsel for the petitioners, submit that revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 is subject to revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 115 of the Code. Before amendment and insertion of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Code, revision against interlocutory order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority (for short 'the RCA') was maintainable, but after amendment in Section 115 of the Code, revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 has been curtailed and revision is maintainable against final order passed by the RCA or other orders passed by it if proceeding before the RCA would finally terminate on allowing of revision. Learned counsel further submit that in the light of dictum of the Coordinate Bench in the matter of Kanti Prasad (supra), the subsequent Bench in the matter of Sitaram Mohabia (supra) could not have taken contrary view and in case of any disagreement, it should have referred the matter under Rule 32 (ii) of the High Court of Chhattisgarh Rules, 2007. Learned counsel while placing reliance in the matter of Kanti Prasad (supra) further submit that aforesaid dictum still holds field and has correctly been decided. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent opposes the above submissions and submits that after considering all aspects, learned Single Judge has referred the matter after formulating the question of law. Revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Section 115 of the Code and Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 are not similar. Wider jurisdiction has been conferred upon the High Court against the order passed by the RCA. Remedy of first appeal and second appeal has also been provided in the Code against final judgment and decree passed in civil suits, but order passed under Chapter III A is only revisable under Section 23-E of the Act of 1961. Legislature does not provide any remedy against the order passed by the RCA except the remedy of revision provided under Section 23-E of the Act of 1961. Legislature does not provide any remedy against the order passed by the RCA except the remedy of revision provided under Section 23-E of the Act of 1961. Learned counsel further submits that question of maintainability of revision against interlocutory order passed by the RCA after insertion of the proviso to subsection (1) of Section 115 of the Code was referred by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh before the Division Bench and while answering the question, the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held in Surtyomal v. Smt. Chandabai, 2005(5) MPHT 333 (DB) that revision against the order passed by the RCA deciding interlocutory order is maintainable even after amendment and insertion of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Code. Learned counsel further placed reliance in the matter of Tarabai v. Second Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Gwalior, AIR 1990 MP 167 in which the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that revision against interlocutory orders passed by the RCA is maintainable. 7. The answer to the referred question would unfold on analysis of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 conferring powers of revisions exercisable by the High Court with respect to the orders passed by the RCA to find out whether it is mere extension of powers of revisions exercisable by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code with respect to the orders passed by the subordinate courts or it is an independent and new statutory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by the CG Act 27 of 1983 vide Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 containing Section 23-E of the Act of 1961. The analysis would essentially require an enquiry as to the nature of the reference, which is made to Section 115 of the Code in the wordings / language of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 and consequent thereupon, in case if it is found to be a referential incorporation then to again decipher from the wordings of Section 23E of the Act of 1961, whether interlocutory orders of the RCA are covered in the ambit of the statutory revisional powers conferred on the High Court by Section 23-E of the Act of 1961. 8. 8. Bare provisions of the statute contained in Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 and Amended Section 115 of the Code read thus, Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 “23-E. Revision by High Court.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 31 or Section 32, no appeal shall lie from any order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority under this Chapter. (2) The High Court may, at any time “suo motu” or on the application of any person aggrieved, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, propriety or correctness of any order passed by or as to the regularity of the proceedings of the Rent Controlling Authority, call for and examine the record of the case pending before or disposed of by such Authority and may pass such order in revision in reference thereto as it thinks fit and save as otherwise provided by this section, in disposal of any revision under this section, the High Court shall, as far as may be, exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as it does for disposal of a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) as if any such proceeding of the Rent Controlling Authority is of a Court subordinate to such High Court: Provided that no powers of revision at the instance of person aggrieved shall be exercised unless an application is presented within ninety days of the date of the order sought to be revised.” Amended provision of Section 115 of the Code “115. Revision.—(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears— (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. (Emphasis added) (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. (3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court. Explanation.—In this section, the expression “any case which has been decided” includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding.” 9. The Act of 1961 provides remedy of eviction of tenant on the grounds mentioned in Section 12 of the said Act. It further provides procedure and provision for eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide requirement of landlords detailed in Section 23-J under Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 which was inserted vide Act No.27 of 1983 with effect from 16-8-1983. Remedy of first appeal and second appeal has been provided under Sections 31 & 32 of the Act of 1961, however, vide Section 23-E such appeal is barred when the RCA passes orders while exercising jurisdiction under Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961. Orders passed during eviction proceeding are revisable. Remedy of first appeal and second appeal has been provided under Sections 31 & 32 of the Act of 1961, however, vide Section 23-E such appeal is barred when the RCA passes orders while exercising jurisdiction under Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961. Orders passed during eviction proceeding are revisable. The Act of 1961 provides remedy of appeal against orders passed by the RCA and also provides remedy against judgments & decrees passed by the civil courts, but does not provide remedy against the order of eviction passed under Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 except of revision under Section 23-E of the Act of 1961. 10. Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 provides procedure for eviction of tenants on ground of bona fide need of special category of landlord. Section 23-A provides special provision for eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide requirement. Section 23-B provides for issuance of summons to tenants in relation to the application filed under Section 23-A. Section 23-C restricts tenant to contest except in terms of Section 23-C of the Act without leave to contest. Section 23-D provides procedure for contesting after grant of leave to the tenant to contest. Section 23-E provides remedy of revision against the order passed by the RCA in a pending proceeding or case disposed of by it. Section 23-F provides specific provision for stay. Section 23-G provides procedure for recovery of possession. Section 23-H makes provision for deposit of rent. Section 23-I further provides procedure for false and frivolous application. Section 23-J defines the word “landlord” entitled for eviction under Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961. 11. Thus, Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 provides limited remedy of challenge to the order of the RCA before the High Court. Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 curtails the right of appeal. 12. No appeal lies against any order passed by the RCA under Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961, which contains the provision of eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement. Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 curtails the right of appeal. 12. No appeal lies against any order passed by the RCA under Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961, which contains the provision of eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement. The remedy of appeal which has been provided in Section 31 or Section 32 has been excluded for Chapter III-A. Sub-section (2) of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 provides that the High Court can call for examining the record of the case pending before or disposed of by such authority so as to satisfy itself as to the legality, propriety or correctness of any order passed or as to the regularity of the proceedings of the RCA. The words “any order” used in the first part are wide enough to cover beyond pale of doubt the interlocutory order passed in pending proceeding. This part deals with the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the revision. The latter part of sub-section (2) of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 provides that the High Court “as far as may be“ exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure 275/2013 as it does for the disposal of revision under Section 115 of the Code. It is true that the High Court has to follow the power and procedure as prescribed under Section 115 of the Code as far as possible but the latter part of Section 23-E (2) of the Act of 1961 cannot affect the power of this Court to call for and examine the record of pending proceeding with respect to “any order” passed or as to the regularity of the pending proceedings provided in sub-section (2) of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961. First part gives the wider power, the latter part of sub-section (2) of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 tries to put a rider on the power and procedure of the Court. The power and procedure “as far as may be” has to be read in the context of the words used “save as otherwise provided by this Section”. There is clearly a saving provided in Section 23-E (2) of the Act of 1961 as to the jurisdiction of the Court in the first part. 13. The power and procedure “as far as may be” has to be read in the context of the words used “save as otherwise provided by this Section”. There is clearly a saving provided in Section 23-E (2) of the Act of 1961 as to the jurisdiction of the Court in the first part. 13. The scope and ambit of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of B. Johnson Bernard v. C.S. Naidu, 1985 MPLJ 675 and by examining Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 with the provisions of revision in the Code of Civil Procedure (before amendment of 1999), the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that power of revision under Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 is wider than under Section 115 of the Code, but the same is narrower than the appeal, and observed in para 24 as follows: - “24. It would be appropriate to examine briefly the scope of the revisional power of the High Court contained in sub-section (2) of Section 23-E, since this question is bound to be of frequent occurrence. No doubt, this provision is ill-drafted wherein the first part appears to be of wide import, while the latter part attempts to limit the first part, but margin for exercise of discretion is given by using the words ‘as far as may be’, to connect the two parts. It is clear from sub-section (1) that no appeal lies against an order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority and, therefore, the scope of revision provided in sub-section (2) has to be narrower than the scope of appeal. The first part of sub-section (2) appears to give comparatively wider power of revision by using the words ‘for the purpose of satisfying itself as to legality, propriety or correctness of any order passed by or as to the regularity of the proceeding…and may pass such order in revision as it thinks fit’. The first part of sub-section (2) appears to give comparatively wider power of revision by using the words ‘for the purpose of satisfying itself as to legality, propriety or correctness of any order passed by or as to the regularity of the proceeding…and may pass such order in revision as it thinks fit’. Thereafter, in the latter part, it says, in substance, that ‘as far as may be’, for the disposal of the revision, the High Court shall ‘exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure, as it does for disposal of revision under section 115, Civil Procedure Code,’ as if the Rent Controlling Authority is a Court subordinate to such High Court. Thus, in the latter part of sub-section (2), the indication is that ‘as far as may be’ the power of revision to be exercised by the High Court is to be the same as given by section 115 Civil Procedure Code, which is undoubtedly narrower than the wider power given by the first part of subsection (2).” 14. While dealing with the question of ambit and scope of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961, a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Tara Bai (supra) has held that the word "any order" used in Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 also includes interlocutory order. 15. While referring to Section 115 of the Code in sub-section (2) of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961, the legislature has used the words “as far as may” and “as it does”. Sub-section (1) of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 curtails the right to appeal against the order of the RCA passed under Chapter III-A which is otherwise available under Sections 31 & 32 of the Act of 1961. Sub-section (2) of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 provides the remedy of revision against the order passed by the RCA in a case pending before it or disposed of by it. Sub-section (2) of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 provides the remedy of revision against the order passed by the RCA in a case pending before it or disposed of by it. Sub-section (2) of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 is in two parts, first part provides remedy of revision against the order passed by the RCA in a pending proceeding and against the final order whereas, second part makes provision 275/2013 that in disposal of revision, the High Court shall exercise the same power and follow the same procedure as far as may be, as it does for disposal of revision under Section 115 of the Code as if any such proceeding of the RCA is of a Court subordinate to such High Court. The RCA is an independent authority. In absence of making such provision that the RCA would be a Court subordinate to such High Court, the order passed by the RCA would not have been revisable under Section 115 of the Code, though the RCA would have been amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 provides complete procedure for eviction and remedy against the order passed by the RCA. It is not dependent upon other provisions of the Act of 1961. It is not also supplemental to other laws. 17. Mention of Section 115 of the Code in sub-section (2) of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 is a piece of referential legislation. It is common practice to refer to the provisions of the existing statute while enacting new laws. Reference to an earlier law in the latter law could be a simple reference of provisions of earlier statute or a specific reference where the earlier law is made an integral part of the new law i.e. by incorporation. In the case of legislation by reference, it is fictionally made a part of the latter law. All amendments to the former law, though made subsequent to the enactment of the latter law, would ipso facto apply and one finds mention of this particular aspect in Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In the case of legislation by reference, it is fictionally made a part of the latter law. All amendments to the former law, though made subsequent to the enactment of the latter law, would ipso facto apply and one finds mention of this particular aspect in Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In contrast to such simple reference, when the provisions of an Act are specifically referred and incorporated in the latter statute, then those provisions alone are applicable and the amending or repealing provisions of the former Act would not become part of the latter Act. This principle is generally called legislation by incorporation. Legal incidents of legislation by incorporation is that it becomes part of the existing law which implies bodily lifting provisions of one enactment and making them part of another and in such cases subsequent amendments in the incorporated Act could not be treated as part of the incorporating Act. 18. While dealing with the question whether the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 which defines the expression 'manufacture' as defined in the said Act which came to be in charge by amendment of the definition in the year 1982 would apply to the provisions of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance ) Act, 1957 and whether such an amendment of the Central Excise Act was ultra vires to Entry 84 List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and therefore, beyond the competence of the Parliament, the Supreme Court in the matter of M/s Ujagar Prints and others (II) v. Union of India and others, (1989) 3 SCC 488 has held that referential legislation is of two types. One is where an earlier Act or some of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a later Act and second by reference. The Supreme Court has observed in paras 93 and 94 as follows: - "93. Referential legislation is of two types. One is where an earlier Act or some of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a later Act. In this event, the provisions of the earlier Act or those so incorporated, as they stand in the earlier Act at the time of incorporation, will be read into the later Act. Referential legislation is of two types. One is where an earlier Act or some of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a later Act. In this event, the provisions of the earlier Act or those so incorporated, as they stand in the earlier Act at the time of incorporation, will be read into the later Act. Subsequent changes in the earlier Act or the incorporated provisions will have to be ignored because, for all practical purposes, the existing provisions of the earlier Act have been re-enacted by such reference into the later one, rendering irrelevant what happens to the earlier statute thereafter. Examples of this can be seen in Secretary of State v. Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society, AIR 1931 PC 149 : 1931 ALJ 864 : 58 IA 259, Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1947) 2 SCC 777 : AIR 1975 SC 17 , Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 529 : AIR 1979 SC 798 : (1979) 49 Com Cas 419 W.P. (Art. 227) Nos.441/2012 & 275/2013. On the other hand, the later statute may not incorporate the earlier provisions. It may only make a reference of a broad nature as to the law on a subject generally, as in Bhajiya v. Gopikabai, (1978) 2 SCC 542 : (1978) 3 SCR 561 , or contain a general reference to the terms of an earlier statute which are to be made applicable. In this case any modification, repeal or reenactment of the earlier statute will also be carried into in the later, for here, the idea is that certain provisions of an earlier statute which become applicable in certain circumstances are to be made use of for the purpose of the later Act also. Examples of this type of legislation are to be seen in Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, (1962) 3 SCR 786 : AIR 1962 SC 316 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ 364, New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, (1970) 2 SCC 820 : (1971) 2 SCR 92 and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. City Improvement Trust, (1976) 4 SCC 697 : (1977) 1 SCR 549 . Whether a particular statute falls into the first or second category is always a question of construction. In the present case, in my view, the legislation falls into the second category. Whether a particular statute falls into the first or second category is always a question of construction. In the present case, in my view, the legislation falls into the second category. Section 3(3) of the 1957 Act does not incorporate into the 1957 Act any specific provisions of the 1944 Act. It only declares generally that the provisions of the 1944 Act shall apply 'so far as may be'', that is, to the extent necessary and practical, for the purposes of the 1957 Act as well. 94. That apart, it has been held, even when a specific provision is incorporated and the case apparently falls in the first of the above categories, that the rule that repeals, modifications or amendments of the earlier Act will have to be ignored is not adhered to in certain situations. These have been set out in State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan, (1975) 2 SCC 377 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 589 : (1976) 1 SCR 6 . In that case, the Supreme Court was considering the question whether the amendment of Section 21 of the Penal Code by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, was also applicable for purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which by Section 2 incorporates, for the purposes of that Act, the definition of 'public servant' in Section 21 of the Penal Code. Answering the question in the affirmative, the court outlined the following propositions : (SCC p. 385, para 15) Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases : (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other ; (b) where the two Acts are in pari materia ; (c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual ; and (d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act." The Supreme Court has further held that it was a case of legislation by reference. 19. 19. While dealing with the question of subsequent amendment after the date of incorporation in case of applicability of amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 in which reference of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been made, the Supreme Court in the matter of Bhatinda Improvement Trust v. Balwant Singh and others, (1991) 4 SCC 368 has observed that whether the statute has been incorporated or referred to in the subsequent statute depends upon language used in the latter statute and other circumstances, and held that reference in latter statute in aforesaid case was legislation by reference and not by incorporation, therefore, subsequent amendment to former statute would also be applicable to latter statute. The Supreme Court has observed in para 8 as follows: "8. We find ourselves unable to accept the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant. As pointed out by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee in the aforesaid decisions, it is well-settled law that where a statute is incorporated by a reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute does not affect the second. Similarly, in a case where a statute is incorporated by a reference into another statute an amendment of the statute so incorporated after the date of incorporation does not affect the second statute and the provisions of the latter statute remain the same as they were at the time of incorporation. It is again well-settled that where one statute is referred to in another, it may be merely by way of reference or by way of incorporation of the same. This depends on the language used in the latter statute and other relevant circumstances. In the present case, however, we find that there is no question of incorporation of any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act into the said Act at all. The said Act does not deal with acquisition of land for the purposes of a scheme as contemplated under the said Act. The acquisition of such land for the purposes of the scheme is left to the general law of the land in that connection, namely, the Land Acquisition Act, which has to be resorted to for the purposes of acquisition of land for the purposes of the schemes contemplated under the said Act. The acquisition of such land for the purposes of the scheme is left to the general law of the land in that connection, namely, the Land Acquisition Act, which has to be resorted to for the purposes of acquisition of land for the purposes of the schemes contemplated under the said Act. The only difference is that some of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as referred to in the relevant sections of the said Act, are given effect to as amended by the relevant sections of the said Act. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have been incorporated into the said Act and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which have to be applied, are the provisions as they stand at the relevant time, namely, at the time of acquisition, in the absence of a contrary intention. There is nothing to indicate that there was any such contrary intention in the present case. In these circumstances the notification under Section 42 should have been published within the period of three years of the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, as required under the first proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Under sub-clause (1) of clause (2) of the Schedule to the said Act, which we have referred to earlier, the first publication of a notice of any improvement scheme under Section 36 of the said Act, is substituted for and has the same effect as the publication in the Government Gazette of a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The notice under Section 36 of the said Act is required to be published, inter alia, in a newspaper or newspapers as set out in Section 36(2)(a) of the said Act. In the present case, such a notice was first published in the daily 'Ajit' on May 30, 1977, and hence, the notification under Section 42 of the said Act should have been published on or before May 30, 1980. In fact, the notification under Section 42 of the said Act, admittedly, was published on June 30, 1980, and hence, was clearly beyond time. In fact, the notification under Section 42 of the said Act, admittedly, was published on June 30, 1980, and hence, was clearly beyond time. In these circumstances, the notice under Section 36 of the said Act lapsed on the expiry of three years from May 30, 1977, and no action pursuant to the said notice could be taken thereafter. The notification under Section 42 of the said Act was clearly beyond time and bad in law, as it was not published within the period provided. The acquisition proceedings lapsed. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant must be rejected. No other point was canvassed before us." 20. The question of legislation by reference or incorporation came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the matter of Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2011) 3 SCC 1 W.P. (Art. 227) Nos.441/2012 & 275/2013 in which while considering its earlier dictum in the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 where the reference of former statute i.e. the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 subsequently amended vide Act 68 of 1984, the Supreme Court has held that the Courts are required to examine the object and provisions of both the Acts whether they are self-contained codes and whether complete machinery or mechanism has been provided under an Act to ensure effective execution of the functions assigned therein with due protection of the rights of the interested persons within the framework of law. The Supreme Court has further held that later statute is self-contained code and reference of former statute i.e. of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which is only limited to the extent of acquisition of land, payment of compensation and recourse of legal remedies provided under the said Act. The Supreme Court has also held that it is question of construction that a particular statute falls into which type of referential legislation and before coming to any conclusion courts are also required to look for the intention of the legislature and to determine the workability of the statute on adopting a particular construction. Workability of the statute has to be the paramount consideration for attaining which exceptions even to the principle of legislation by reference could be carried out. The Supreme Court observed that "149. Workability of the statute has to be the paramount consideration for attaining which exceptions even to the principle of legislation by reference could be carried out. The Supreme Court observed that "149. It will be useful to apply the "test of intention" and "test of unworkability" with their respective contextual reference while determining the applicability of either of the doctrines and for that matter, even on the applicability of the amended law to the later law. Impact analysis on the workability of the respective legislation shall be a relevant consideration for resolving such an issue. There can be instances where the amended law, if applied and treated as incorporated in the principal legislation, may be apparently unadjustable to the scheme of that legislation. In that circumstance, it will be unfair to interpret the amended law as deemed to be incorporated, irrespective of its consequences on the implementation of the provisions of the principal Act. 150. It is emphasized that the object of the principal Act should not be permitted to be defeated on the basis of either of the doctrines abovereferred. Hence, there is need for carving out exceptions to the rule of legislation by reference as well. Examples where such reference would be impermissible are as follows : (a) Legislation by reference should not result in defeating the object and purpose of the later Act; (b) Where the amendments to the earlier law are read into the subsequent law as a result of legislation by reference, if the result is irresolvable conflict between their provisions or it results in destroying the essence and purpose of the principal Act (later law). The above exceptions to the doctrine are not exhaustive but are merely indicative. The possibility of other exceptions to this doctrine cannot be ruled out as it is difficult for this Court to state all such exceptions with precision. Furthermore, defining such exceptions with exactitude will not even aid the ends of justice. We have already noticed that all the learned counsel appearing for the parties are ad idem that it would be necessary to carve out such exceptions to apply the doctrine appropriately, advantageously and objectively." 21. Furthermore, defining such exceptions with exactitude will not even aid the ends of justice. We have already noticed that all the learned counsel appearing for the parties are ad idem that it would be necessary to carve out such exceptions to apply the doctrine appropriately, advantageously and objectively." 21. The Supreme Court in the matter of Girnar Traders (3) (supra) also held that in the case of legislation by incorporation, it is a statute existing at that time which stands incorporated in the latter law to the extent it is adopted by the legislature and subsequent amendments are inconsequential for implementation of the law contained in the subsequent Act. The Supreme Court has observed as follows: - "120. The principle of legislation by incorporation as stated in Secy. of State for India in Council v. Hindusthan Coop. Insurance Society Ltd., (1930-31) 58 IA 259 : AIR 1931 PC 149, had been followed in subsequent cases as well. It was clearly stated that in the case of legislation by incorporation, it is a statute existing at that time which stands incorporated in the later law to the extent it is adopted by the legislature and subsequent amendments are inconsequential for implementation of the law contained in the subsequent Act." 22. Self-contained enactment should be clearly distinguished from supplemental law. When the latter law depends on the former law for procedural / substantive provisions or is to draw its strength from the provisions of the former Act, the latter Act is termed as the supplemental to the former law and the subsequent amendments to former law would be treated as part of the incorporating Act. 23. In M.V. Narasimhan's case (supra), the Supreme Court while applying the principle of legislation by incorporation had read amendment to Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code defining a ‘public servant’ into the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Court clarified that when the provisions of a latter Act borrowed the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the same became an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and, therefore, usually remained unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. The Court clarified that when the provisions of a latter Act borrowed the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the same became an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and, therefore, usually remained unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. But the Court, while spelling out the exceptions to the rule of legislation by incorporation, had applied one of such exceptions where the reading of the amended provisions of the earlier statute into the latter enactment becomes necessary as non-incorporation thereof would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual. The significant dictum of the Court in this case after noticing other judgments was, “It seems to be no less logical to hold that where certain provisions from an existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it, at all events if it is possible for the subsequent Act to function effectually without the addition”. 24. While dealing with the question of referential legislation by incorporation, the Supreme Court in M.V. Narasimhan's case (supra) has held that while a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act and held that the aforesaid principle will not apply in four categories of cases. The Supreme Court has observed in para 15 as follows: - "15. On a consideration of these authorities, therefore, it seems that the following proposition emerges: Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases: (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other; (b) where the two Acts are in pari materia; (c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and (d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act." 25. The distinction between the doctrine received new dimension founded upon a distinction between procedural and substantive provisions in the matter of State of Maharashtra and another v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh and others, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 475, in which the Supreme Court has held that in absence of separate procedure for determining compensation in the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, the reference of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 will apply with its provisions amended from time to time for the purpose of procedure and not for substantive provision. 26. In the light of aforesaid dicta of the Supreme Court relating to referential legislation by reference or incorporation, we now examine Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961, whether it is a complete legislation for the purpose for which it is enacted so that it can be said to be a self-contained code. 27. In the matters of Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai, (2005) 10 SCC 760 and Mariyappa v. State of Karnataka, (1998) 3 SCC 276 , the Supreme Court has held that statute providing adjudicatory mechanism is one of the most important facets of deciding whether a particular statute is a ‘complete code’ in itself or not. Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 aimed at achieving its object of adjudicating claims of a class of landlords specified in Section 23-J of the Act for eviction of tenants on grounds of their bona fide requirement which provides a self-contained adjudicatory machinery by laying down powers vested in it and procedures to be adopted by it. 28. The scheme of Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961, as discussed and detailed, leaves no room for doubt that the Chapter is a self-contained code. 29. Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 cannot be said to be either wholly unworkable or ineffectual if the subsequent amendments to the Code are not imported into consideration. On an overall consideration of the entire situation also it could not either possibly or reasonably be stated that the subsequent amendments to the Code get attracted or applied either due to any express provision or by necessary intendment or implication. On an overall consideration of the entire situation also it could not either possibly or reasonably be stated that the subsequent amendments to the Code get attracted or applied either due to any express provision or by necessary intendment or implication. When Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 expressly provides by specifically enacting the powers of revision as on the date of enactment i.e. 16-8-1983 inter alia by referring to Section 115 of the code, then the provision of revision under the Code, as amended by the amending Act of 1999 limiting the scope of revision, cannot be imported into consideration for purposes of Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 without doing violence to the language or destroying and defeating the very intendment of the State Legislature expressed by the enactment of its own special provisions in the special law falling under a topic of legislation exclusively earmarked for the State Legislature, particularly when the orders to be revised under Section 23E are original orders of the RCA which are final as per Section 36 of the Act of 1961 against which remedy of appeal is not available as per Section 23-E (1) and the remedy of revision is the only statutory remedy available curtailing the scope of which will hurt the frame of the Act as well as the principles of natural justice. Thus the reference to Section 115 of the Code made in Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 is no doubt made by way of legislation by incorporation and the subsequent amendments to Section 115 of the Code will not apply to or affect the powers of revision enacted in Section 23-E of the Act of 1961. 30. As already noticed and discussed, the powers of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 are independent and wider than the powers under Section 115 of the Code and looking to the plain language of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 which empowers the High Court to call for and examine the record of the case pending before or disposed of by the RCA, the conclusion that all the orders passed in pending proceedings by the RCA would be revisable under Section 23-E of the Act, becomes inevitable. 31. Thus, to sum up our conclusions, we hold that:- (a) Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 is a self-contained code. 31. Thus, to sum up our conclusions, we hold that:- (a) Chapter III-A of the Act of 1961 is a self-contained code. (b) Mention of Section 115 of the Code in Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 is by way of legislation by incorporation. (c) Amendments in Section 115 of the Code made after 16-8-1983 i.e. the date on which Section 23-E of the Act of 1961 was enacted would not be read into Section 23-E of the Act of 1961. (d) All orders, whether final, interim or interlocutory, passed by the RCA would be revisable by the High Court under Section 23-E of the Act of 1961. 32. In view of the legal opinion we have formed regarding the interpretation of Section 23-E of the Act of 1961, it is manifest that the decision of the learned Single Judge reported in the case of Kanti Prasad Rathor (supra) is legally erroneous as it had wrongly applied and misconstrued the provisions of law. With the deepest deference, we overrule Kanti Prasad Rathor (supra) and other rulings whose ratio run counter to the principles enunciated above. We answer the reference accordingly. 33. Let these matters be now listed before the concerned Bench.