JUDGMENT MR. S. VAIDYANATHAN, J. 1. This appeal arises out of the judgment and decree, dated 22.12.2010 in O.P. No. 1714 of 2004, passed by the learned I Addl. Principal Judge, Chennai, in and by which, the petition filed by the appellant herein against his wife/respondent for divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion under Sections 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of Hindu Marriage Act came to be dismissed. 2. The brief facts, necessary for disposal of the appeal, are as follows: Marriage between the appellant and the respondent was solemnized on 11.03.2001 at Jalore Town, Rajasthan as per Hindu rites and customs. Out of their wedlock, the respondent/wife gave birth to a male child in February, 2002. Disputes arose between the couple when the appellant came to know that the respondent is elder to the appellant. According to the appellant, the age of the respondent was suppressed and performed the marriage and she is more educated and acted in superior manner and used to insult and tease the appellant and his family members by stating that the appellant is not even a graduate and she studied in a convent and got good manners and the appellant and his family members are of minimum standards and she was unfortunately given in marriage to a family, where nobody is having minimum educational qualifications. The respondent always acts in such a manner that her word should be obliged by everybody and they should act to her choice. Though the appellant tried to adjust with the attitude of the respondent, the family members of the respondent were not in a position to adjust since they were insulted frequently by her. She is very arrogant and proud of her educational qualifications and developed the habit of not moving with the family members of the respondent closely and affectionately. Thus, the respondent created an unhealthy atmosphere in the family and she started insisting the appellant to live separately apart from his parents, when this was not accepted by the appellant, she blamed that her brother-in-law and father-in-law became hurdles. Whenever the appellant failed to encourage her opinion in any of the matters, she used to pick up quarrels and throws articles available nearby. Therefore, according to the appellant, the attitude of his wife became unbearable. Whenever the appellant failed to encourage her opinion in any of the matters, she used to pick up quarrels and throws articles available nearby. Therefore, according to the appellant, the attitude of his wife became unbearable. The respondent always used to threaten by stating that she would expose the family matters in a bad manner to the public and if they failed to heed her words, she would pour kerosene on her and give paper publication and see that they would be arrested and punished before Court of law. She also threaten that she would make herself some injuries to her body and convince the public and the respondent and his family members harassed her and attempted to kill her and she would leave the matrimonial home and would not provide conjugal life. The appellant suffered pain and mental agony. The respondent used to visit her parents home frequently without informing to the in-laws and also to the appellant. She also attributed adultery to against his brother and she lodged a criminal complaint on 16.11.2002 before the Inspector of Police, Women Police Station (South Zone), Hyderabad under Sections 498-A and 323 r/w 34 IPC. She also filed a private complaint under Sections 307 , 354 , 420 r/w 120 B IPC before the II Metropolitan Magistrate, which was referred to Police Station, Charminar under Section 15 (3) Cr.P.C. for investigation. She made allegations that her brother-in-law tried to outrage her modesty and her in-laws attempted to kill her. She described herself as a daughter of N. Ram Ratan without mentioning as wife of the appellant, which reflects her intention that she no longer wants to be with the appellant. Having decided not live with the appellant and his family members, the respondent lodged criminal complaints with baseless allegations. Therefore, according to the appellant, her acts amount to cruelty and she also deserted him. With these averments, the appellant filed a divorce petition on the above mentioned grounds. 3. This petition was resisted by the respondent/wife by way of counter affidavit, wherein, it has been stated that the marriage was solemnized on 11.03.2011 at Rajasthan as per Hindu rites and customs and the couple started living in joint family and out of their wedlock, a male child was born. 3. This petition was resisted by the respondent/wife by way of counter affidavit, wherein, it has been stated that the marriage was solemnized on 11.03.2011 at Rajasthan as per Hindu rites and customs and the couple started living in joint family and out of their wedlock, a male child was born. The appellant was feeling jealous that the respondent/wife is more qualified and though she hails from a middle class family, her parents spent a huge amount in marriage. She never visited her parents house without informing her in-laws and the appellant. The family members of the appellant started ill-treating the respondent and abused her in filthy language, which compelled her to lodged a complaint, seeking protection to save herself from in-laws since she was alone in Hyderabad. With these averments, the respondent/wife sought for dismissal of the petition. 4. In order to prove their respective case, the appellant/husband got himself examined as PW.1 and two documents, viz., Marriage Invitation and Paper Publication were marked as Exs.P1 and P2, while the respondent/wife was examined as RW.1 apart from examining her father, N. Ram Ratan as RW.2 and no documents were marked. 5. On consideration of the pleadings, the Family Court has framed an issue, whether the marriage has to be declared as null and void on the ground of desertion and cruelty and divorce has to be granted? 6. On evaluation of entire evidence adduced by both parties both oral and documentary, the Family Court denied the relief of granting divorce on the either ground of cruelty or desertion. The Family Court was of the view that the acts alleged by the appellant towards his wife, viz., the behaviour of the respondent/wife in a superiority complex being more qualified and arrogant towards him and his parents and lodging a police complaint by her against them and being elder to the appellant in age, would not constitute ground of cruelty and that since the respondent/wife was driven out from the matrimonial home, she was constrained to live with her parents and though she gave birth to a male child, the appellant did not even visit her to see the child and hence, the ground of desertion was also not made out. 7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and perused the entire materials on record. 8. 7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and perused the entire materials on record. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the Family Court has not considered the established aspects, viz., the behaviour of the respondent/wife in insulting the appellant/husband and his family members by acting in superiority complex, picking up quarrels for no reason, defaming and humiliating the family members of the appellant in front of relatives and society, threatening to commit suicide, showing superiority complex as if she is the only educated, repeated demands for separate home from joint family, frequently leaving matrimonial home without prior intimation, willfully and consciously failing to provide conjugal life, lodging police complaints against the appellant and his family members with wild allegations and making a public notice with false allegations in a daily news paper widely circulated in Jain community, maligning and tarnishing the image of the appellant’s family. According to the learned counsel, these factors would cause mental cruelty to the appellant, by which, he cannot peacefully live with the respondent/wife. He also contended that the respondent/wife has left her matrimonial home as early as 13.11.2002 on her own for no reason and not taken any steps to join with her husband, which amounts to willful desertion and the Family Court has not properly analyzed the concept of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage” where, admittedly, there is no possibility of re-union since the couple were living separately for more than a decade and no purpose would be served even if ordered to live together. Therefore, the learned counsel would contend that family Court ought to have granted the relief of divorce on these grounds and hence the order of the Court below is liable to be set aside. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/wife would contend that the appellant has filed the petition for divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion which as rightly held by the Court below, have been not proved by the appellant. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/wife would contend that the appellant has filed the petition for divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion which as rightly held by the Court below, have been not proved by the appellant. The allegations of cruelty as stated by the appellant, viz., suppressing the age of the wife since she is elder than the husband; acting in a superiority complex; used to pick up quarrels without reasons; threatening the husband and his family members to focus their attempt to kill her to the public by causing injuries by herself and visiting parents home without informing to the in-laws, etc., would not fall within the purview of cruelty. As regards lodging criminal complaints against the husband and his family members is concerned, the learned counsel contended that being an ordinary hindu woman, she was constrained to lodge the complaint since she was beaten and brutally assaulted and subjected to cruelty and harassed by her husband and in-laws. He also contended that she had not left the matrimonial home on her own, but she was driven out forcibly, which made her to take shelter with her parents and though she gave birth to a male child, none of the members including the husband had visited even to see the child. He pointed out that within one and half month after the respondent/wife was driven out from the matrimonial home, the appellant/husband got married another woman, namely, Saritha and begotten a child, while subsisting the first marriage. The learned counsel contended that the marriage cannot be dissolved on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, inasmuch as, all along the wife has been fighting to join her husband to lead a peaceful life by giving a quietus to the problems and in fact, after dismissal of the divorce petition, she joined her husband and she is always ready and willing to join him. 10. The issue arises for consideration in this appeal is, whether the Family Court is right in rejecting the relief of granting divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion? 11. Before dealing with the above issue, it is very relevant to extract the events that had taken place subsequent to the filing of the present appeal. 10. The issue arises for consideration in this appeal is, whether the Family Court is right in rejecting the relief of granting divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion? 11. Before dealing with the above issue, it is very relevant to extract the events that had taken place subsequent to the filing of the present appeal. a) The petition filed by the appellant/husband in HMOP No. 1714 of 2004 before the Family Court for grant of divorce came to be dismissed on 22.12.2010. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed the present appeal on 21.04.2011 before this Court. While so, the respondent/wife claimed that after dismissal of the divorce petition, the appellant husband sent a letter, dated 31.5.2011 to her, requesting her to come and join him by forgiving all the past incidents done against her and she further claimed that since no response was given by the respondent/wife, the appellant had sent a telegram on 31.06.2011 to her stating that the appellant had realized his mistakes and requested her to come along with son Rishab immediately and join his house at Hyderabad and also assured that nobody would harm her. b) The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that there is no need for the appellant to send such letter and telegram since he filed the appeal and pursuing the same and the above so-called letter and telegram were fabricated which was established by the fact that the signature of the appellant contained in the telegram is in Hindi and the appellant never signs in Hindi, but he signs only in English. c) It is also stated that taking advantage of the above said fabricated letter and telegram, the respondent/wife and her members had forcibly barged into the house of appellant, at Hyderabad on 14.07.2011 at 12.00 Noon. It is to be noted that on the said date, i.e. 14.07.2011, the case relating to the dowry harassment filed by the respondent/wife in C.C. No. 393 of 2010 before the XV Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad was posted for orders and while the appellant and his family members were getting ready to attend the Court, the respondent/wife and her members had forcibly entered the house of the appellant and she occupied the bed room of the appellant and bolted from inside. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad was posted for orders and while the appellant and his family members were getting ready to attend the Court, the respondent/wife and her members had forcibly entered the house of the appellant and she occupied the bed room of the appellant and bolted from inside. On 15.7.2011, the father of the appellant lodged a private complaint against her and her members, alleging criminal trespass against them before the IX Additional Chief Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad. This incident prompted the appellant to install CC cameras in his entire house, which was strongly objected by the respondent wife and on the next day night, she destroyed cameras installed in the house of the appellant. d) On 8.8.2011, orders were pronounced in C.C. No. 393 of 2010 by the XV Addl.Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, acquitting the appellant and his family members, having found not guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 323 IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, by categorically holding that the evidence of the prosecution do not inspire confidence to believe that PW.1 (respondent/wife herein) was subjected to harassment and cruelty with a demand to get additional dowry and was beaten by the accused 1 to 5 (appellant and his members). e) After dismissal of the above said dowry harassment case, the respondent/wife lodged a complaint under Domestic Violence Act against the appellant and his family members and a case in Crime No. 332 of 2011 on the file of Narayanaguda Police Station has been registered on 17.9.2011 and on 18.9.2011, the appellant and others were arrested and sent for remand. On 24.09.2011, the Sub Inspector of Police, Narayanaguda made a requisition to the IX Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad seeking custody of the appellant for interrogation. Thereafter, by order, dated 27.9.2011 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad in Crl.P. No. 8778 of 2011, the appellant and others came to be released on bail and subsequently, by order, dated 28.9.2011 in Crl.P. No. 9959 of 2011, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderbard granted interim stay in respect of the proceedings in Crime No.332 of 2011 on the file of the Narayanaguda Police Station, Hyderabad. f) It is also stated that during the pendency of the litigation, the appellant started living with one Saritha and through her, he begotten a child also. f) It is also stated that during the pendency of the litigation, the appellant started living with one Saritha and through her, he begotten a child also. Against this, the respondent/wife lodged a complaint for bigamy. According to the appellant, after divorce with the respondent wife, he would legalize the marriage with Saritha and after fully knowing all the facts including first marriage with respondent/wife and pendency of litigation, she accepted and starting living with the appellant without marriage and she has given birth to a child and that the petitioner is the father of the said child. 12. All the above narrated subsequent events and the documents thereof filed by way of additional set of papers, would play a significant role for deciding the issue in this appeal. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent/wife would strongly object for consideration of the above said subsequent events, contending that the said subsequent events after passing the decree rejecting the divorce by the Family Court, are not relevant and the documents cannot be admitted as evidence in the appeal and it would cause great prejudice to the respondent. He pointed out that the consideration by this Court is only whether the grounds, viz., cruelty and desertion were made out by the appellant for the grant of divorce. 14. On the other, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the events occurred subsequent to the passing of the decree by the Family Court, can be taken for consideration since the appeal is nothing but a continuation of the petition and in a proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, the relief can be moulded according to the situation on the date of the decree. He also contended that in order to shorten the litigation and to do complete justice between the parties, this Court can certainly take note of the subsequent events. 15. In this regard, we wish to refer the relevant decisions as below. a) In M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Others AIR 1981 SC 1113 : (1981) 3 SCC 36 : LNIND 1981 SC 213, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under in para 18. “18. 15. In this regard, we wish to refer the relevant decisions as below. a) In M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Others AIR 1981 SC 1113 : (1981) 3 SCC 36 : LNIND 1981 SC 213, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under in para 18. “18. … And even if this event occurred subsequent to the passing of the decree by the trial Court, this subsequent event should have been noticed at the appellate stage because the appeal is nothing else but a continuation of the suit and in a proceeding under the Rent Act, the relief as to be moulded according to the situation on the date of the decree; the decree would mean the decree which is final and not correctible by any judicial proceeding. …” b) In Amarendranath Sanyal v. Krishna Sanyal 1993 Civil CC 109, wherein, allegations made by the wife against her husband as to his character after institution of suit, a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta was of the view that such post suit allegations or events can be taken into consideration to shorten litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. It has been held so in para 4 as under: “4. …. We respectfully agree with and rely upon the decision as referred to above. It is true that the allegations, as to character of the petitioner-husband were made by the respondent-wife after institution of the instant suit. But it is well settled that such post suit allegations or events may be taken into consideration to shorten the litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shikhar Chand v. Digambar Jain, the Division Bench of this Court has held in the case of Harendra Nath Burman v. Suprova Burman (supra) that the allegation made in the written statement and in the deposition can and should be taken note of in matrimonial proceeding without driving the petitioner to another proceeding on the ground of such cruelty. It has further been held that it is open to a Court, including a Court of appeal, to take notice of events which happened after the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties where it is necessary to do in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. It has further been held that it is open to a Court, including a Court of appeal, to take notice of events which happened after the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties where it is necessary to do in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. The same view has also been expressed by the Division Bench in the case of Smt. Santana Banerjee v. Sachtndra Nath Banerjee (supra). We see no reason to take a different view. So, though the allegation was made by the respondent-wife regarding the character of petitioner-husband in the written statement and was repeated in her deposition, such post-lis allegation can and should be taken note of in the instant matrimonial proceeding without driving the petitioner-husband to another proceeding on the ground of such cruelty. Thus on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and also having regard to the decisions as referred to above, we hold that the aforesaid unfounded and baseless allegations made by the respondent-wife against the character of the petitioner-husband in written statement and also in her deposition constitute mental cruelty of the gravest character to warrant a divorce.” (emphasis applied) c) c) In Vishwanath v. Sau. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal LNIND 2012 SC 374, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held under in para 32. “32. … That apart, the allegations made in the written statement, the dismissal of the case instituted by the wife under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, the non-judging of the material regard being had to the social status, the mental make up, the milieu and the rejection of subsequent events on the count that they are sub sequent to the filing of the petition for divorce and also giving flimsy reasons not to place reliance on the same, we are disposed to think, deserve to be tested on the anvil of “perversity of approach”. Quite apart from the above, a significant question that emerges is whether the reasons ascribed by the Courts below that the allegations made in the written statement alleging extra marital affair of the appellant husband with Neeta Gujarathi has been established and, therefore, it would not constitute mental cruelty are perverse and unacceptable or justified on the basis of the evidence brought on record. These are the aspects which need to be scrutinized and appositely delved into.” d) In Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal (2002) 1 SCR 359 : AIR 2002 SC 665 : (2002) 2 SCC 256 : LNIND 2002 SC 47, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “11. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystalised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied : (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the Court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise.” e) In R.B. Kapoor v. Manek N. Dastur AIR 1988 Delhi 257 : LNIND 1987 DEL 490, the Delhi High Court has held as under in para 10. “10. … In fact, this question would have a significant bearing on the whole subject matter of controversy. The subsequent events have decisive bearing on the issues involved in this case. The Courts have to take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings and so doing the rules of fairness to both the sides are scrupulously to be followed. It is well settled that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in may cases must, take cautious cognizance of such events (See: Pasupuleti Venkateswarly v. Motor & General Traders,”. f) In Pushpa Rani v. Krishnan Lal AIR 1982 Del 107 : LNIND 1981 DEL 141, the Delhi High Court has observed as under in para 9. “9. f) In Pushpa Rani v. Krishnan Lal AIR 1982 Del 107 : LNIND 1981 DEL 141, the Delhi High Court has observed as under in para 9. “9. … Exceptions must be applied in matrimonial cases in order to subserve the interest of justice and not to compel the parties to begin another round of litigation on the basis of subsequent events and allow the precious period of their life to go waste. It must be so done, depending, of course, on the nature of the case, because it is not only the parties which are concerned in the case but the Court has a certain amount of duty and discretion to exercise. The relief entirely depends upon its satisfaction.” 16. In the above said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to the following observations made by a three-Judge Bench in the case of A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur AIR 2005 SC 534 : LNIND 2004 SC 1202 : “The matter can be looked at from another angle. If acts subsequent to the filing of the divorce petition can be looked into infer condonation of the aberrations, acts subsequent to the filing of the petition can be taken note of to show a pattern in the behavior and conduct.” 17. Therefore, having regard to the above, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that if the events occurred subsequent to the passing decree by the trial Court, such events certainly be taken note of at the appellate stage in order to shorten litigation and to do substantial justice to the parties. In the present case, the subsequent events narrated above by us, would certainly have a considerable impact on the issue and we are of the view that those events are relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue. We cannot ignore such events by which, the behavior of the respondent/wife would explicit towards the appellant/husband in a very rude manner. In fact, the above said subsequent events are not in dispute. Now we need to see the effect of the above events. During pendency of the appeal, the respondent/wife has continuously started lodging criminal proceedings one after another and she made the appellant and his family members restless since they were arrested and remanded to judicial custody. In fact, the above said subsequent events are not in dispute. Now we need to see the effect of the above events. During pendency of the appeal, the respondent/wife has continuously started lodging criminal proceedings one after another and she made the appellant and his family members restless since they were arrested and remanded to judicial custody. In fact, the case in C.C. No. 393 of 2010 regarding dowry harassment alleged against the appellant and his family members on the file of the XV Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, came to be dismissed, acquitting the appellant and his family members, having found not guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 323 IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Thereafter, the respondent/wife also initiated proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act and as detailed above, the appellant and his family members were arrested and remanded to judicial custody. It is also not in dispute that the respondent/wife has been living separate for more than 9 years and her attitude is well established that at no point of time, she had taken steps to join her husband and it is not the case of her that she filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights after she was alleged to have been driven out from the matrimonial home. Therefore, we are of the view that the respondent/wife, instead of trying to solve the disputes amicably and to join her husband, she had been continuously going on initiating the proceedings one after another which clearly indicate that she made all attempts to ensure that the appellant and his family members are put in jail and he should not live in peace. We also found that only just not to make living relationship of the appellant/husband with one Saritha and their marriage should not become legalize, the respondent/wife has expressed her willingness to live with the appellant. Therefore, we are of the view that the acts committed by the respondent-wife would amount to mental cruelty, by which, the appellant cannot be expected to live peacefully. 18. It is well settled that mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to behavior or behavioural pattern by the other. Therefore, we are of the view that the acts committed by the respondent-wife would amount to mental cruelty, by which, the appellant cannot be expected to live peacefully. 18. It is well settled that mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to behavior or behavioural pattern by the other. Mental cruelty cannot be established by direct evidence and it is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. A feeling of anguish, disappointment, and frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can only be appreciated on assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which the two partners of matrimonial life have been living. The facts and circumstances are to be assessed emerging from the evidence on record. From the facts narrated above including the subsequent events, it is established and an inference can legitimately be drawn that the treatment of the respondent/wife is such that it causes an apprehension in the mind of the appellant about her mental welfare and the same would certainly amount to mental cruelty. 19. The criminal Court disbelieved the dowry theory as put forth on behalf of the respondent/wife. As such there would have been some chance of reunion between the couple, as the matter stood as on the date of filing of the petition for divorce, but because of the respondent/wife’s acts subsequent to the filing of the appeal, the rift in the matrimonial relationship between the husband and the wife got widened abysmally in addition to getting snowballed to such an extent that each one projecting oneself before the Court that they could not see eye to eye on any issue and they tried to cut the ground under the feet of each other. 20. In the light of the above, we are of the considered view that the appellant/husband has established the ground of cruelty and thereby he is entitled to the decree of divorce against the respondent/wife. 21. As regards desertion, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent/wife had left the matrimonial home for the past nine years and she never turned back. This Court, in a decision reported in Ms. 21. As regards desertion, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent/wife had left the matrimonial home for the past nine years and she never turned back. This Court, in a decision reported in Ms. P. Manimekalai v. R. Kothandaraman LNIND 2010 MAD 3436 : (2010) 7 MLJ 417 , has considered the issue of ‘desertion’ in para 31 which is extracted hereunder: “31. “Desertion” for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s consent and without reasonable cause. In other words, it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations i.e., not permitting or allowing and facilitating cohabitation between the parties. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case. The party seeking divorce on the ground of desertion is required to show that he or she was not taking the advantage of his or her own wrong. (vide Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey (2002) 2 SCC 73 ).” 22. This Court has also relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein, it has been specifically observed that the wife was forced to live because of ill-treatment, it cannot amount to desertion. In this case, the respondent/wife had been living separately for more than nine years. So, the factum of separation is proved and it is to be noted that she had not taken any steps in a considered manner to resolve the disputes and to join her husband in order to live together. Therefore, we are of the view that the appellant/husband has also established the ground of desertion, based on which, decree of divorce can be granted. 23. Therefore, we are of the view that the appellant/husband has also established the ground of desertion, based on which, decree of divorce can be granted. 23. Though we accepted the case of the appellant having satisfied with the established facts and circumstances by evidence and granted divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion, i.e. under Section 13(i-a)(i-b) of the Act, the learned counsel for the appellant/husband contended that there would be no possibility of re-union by the parties and by efflux of time and the behavior of the spouses, the marriage has virtually become dead and hence, sought for divorce on the ground of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage”. He invited our attention on the aspect of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage” and sought for consideration of the claim of the appellant for grant of divorce on the said ground. 24. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides various grounds for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce, such as adultery, cruelty, desertion, conversion to another religion, unsoundness of mind, virulent and incurable form of leprosy, venereal disease in a communicable form, renouncement of the world and not heard as being alive for a period of seven years or more. Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 similarly provides grounds for grant of divorce in the case of a marriage solemnized under the Act. However, the said Acts do not provide “irretrievable breakdown of marriage” as a ground for divorce. 25. When there is no statutory provision in the Matrimonial Acts, to maintain the claim for divorce by the aggrieved party on the ground of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage”, whether it is appropriate for the Courts to grant such relief and if granted, whether it would be a precedent? In the present scenario, in the interest of public more particularly, quarrelling spouses, whether it is necessary to incorporate “irretrievable breakdown of marriage” as a ground for grant of divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by way of amendment?, are the issues to be dealt with in this appeal. 26. The meaning of the word “Irretrievable”, according to “Mac Millan Dictionary, is, “impossible to get back or return to good condition” according to Webster Dictionary, “impossible to return or to get back”. 26. The meaning of the word “Irretrievable”, according to “Mac Millan Dictionary, is, “impossible to get back or return to good condition” according to Webster Dictionary, “impossible to return or to get back”. So, the concept of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage” can be termed in simple words, viz., “there is no possibility of reconciliation beyond all best efforts and no purpose would be served even if reunion is suggested or ordered on the failure in establishing the grounds for divorce by the spouse”. 27. It is inhuman to order or to compel two persons to live together against their wishes and when they cannot live peacefully and where their wedlock has become a deadlock since they are living separately on the account of their contributory acts of commission and omission and no useful purpose would be served by keeping the marriage alive. The sanctity of marriage cannot be left at the whims of one of the annoying spouses. 28. In fact, on this issue, i.e. granting divorce on the ground of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage”, there are conflict views of the two learned Judge Benches and three learned Judge Benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 29. The sanctity of marriage cannot be left at the whims of one of the annoying spouses. 28. In fact, on this issue, i.e. granting divorce on the ground of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage”, there are conflict views of the two learned Judge Benches and three learned Judge Benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 29. There are as many as 9 two-Judge Benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and 3 three-Judge Benches have considered and granted the divorce on the ground of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage”, viz., Two-Judge Benches Judgments: i) Satish Sitole v. Ganga AIR 2008 SC 3093 : (2008) 7 SCC 734 : LNIND 2008 SC 1379 : (2008) 7 MLJ 1238 ii) Sanghamitra Ghosh v. Kajal Kumar Ghosh (2007) 2 SCC 220 : LNIND 2006 SC 996 iii) Sujata Uday Patil v. Uday Madhukar Patil (2006) 13 SCC 272 : LNIND 2006 SC 1140 : (2007) 8 MLJ 797 iv) Manjula v. K.R. Mahesh AIR 2006 SC 2750 : (2006) 5 SCC 461 : LNIND 2006 SC 490 : (2006) 3 MLJ 296 v) Vanita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit AIR 2006 SC 1662 : (2006) 3 SCC 778 : LNIND 2006 SC 191 : (2006) 2 MLJ 383 vi) Durga Prasanna Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy AIR 2005 SC 3297 : (2005) 7 SCC 353 : LNIND 2005 SC 626 vii) Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706 : LNIND 2002 SC 428 viii) Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri AIR 1997 SC 1266 : (1997) 4 SCC 226 : LNIND 1997 SC 414 ix) V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat AIR 1994 SC 710 : (1994) 1 SCC 337 : LNIND 1993 SC 972 Three-Judge Benches Judgments: i) Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli AIR 2006 SC 1675 : (2006) 4 SCC 558 : LNIND 2006 SC 192 : (2006) 2 MLJ 241 ii) A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur (supra) iii) Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh AIR 2007 SC 1426 : (2007) 4 SCC 511 : LNIND 2007 SC 387 : (2007) 2 MLJ 1185 30. In Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (supra), three-Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under in para 72 to 74 as under: “72. In Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (supra), three-Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under in para 72 to 74 as under: “72. Once the parties have separated and the separation has continued for a sufficient length of time and one of them has presented a petition for divorce, it can well be presumed that the marriage has broken down. The court, no doubt, should seriously make an endeavour to reconcile the parties; yet, if it is found that the breakdown is irreparable, then divorce should not be withheld. The consequences of preservation in law of the unworkable marriage which has long ceased to be effective are bound to be a source of greater misery for the parties. “73. A law of divorce based mainly on fault is inadequate to deal with a broken marriage. Under the fault theory, guilt has to be proved; divorce courts are presented concrete instances of human behaviour as bring the institution of marriage into disrepute. “74. We have been principally impressed by the consideration that once the marriage has broken down beyond repair, it would be unrealistic for the law not to take notice of that fact, and it would be harmful to society and injurious to the interests of the parties. Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be surmised that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction, though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie the law in such cases do not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. Public interest demands not only that the married status should, as far as possible, as long as possible, and whenever possible, be maintained, but where a marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest lies in the recognition of that fact.” 31. While so, it is pertinent to note that in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Maju Sharma AIR 2009 SC 2254 : (2009) 6 SCC 379 : LNIND 2009 SC 488 : (2009) 4 MLJ 296, two-Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has declined to grant divorce on the ground of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage”, with the following observation in para 10 to 12: “10. On a bare reading of Section 13 of the Act, reproduced above, it is crystal clear that no such ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is provided by the legislature for granting a decree of divorce. This Court cannot add such a ground to Section 13 of the Act as that would be amending the Act, which is a function of the legislature. “11. Learned counsel for the appellant has stated that this Court in some cases has dissolved a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. In our opinion, those cases have not taken into consideration the legal position which we have mentioned above, and hence they are not precedents. A mere direction of the Court without considering the legal position is not a precedent. “12. If we grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be adding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the effect that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is also a ground for divorce. In our opinion, this can only be done by the legislature and not by the Court. It is for the Parliament to enact or amend the law and not for the Courts. Hence, we do not find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. “13. Had both parties been willing we could, of course, have granted a divorce by mutual consent as contemplated by Section 13B of the Act, but in this case the respondent is not willing to agree to a divorce.” 32. In above decision, the Hon’ble two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has not only declined to consider and grant the relief on the ground of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage”, but it is to be noted that the Bench has observed that earlier decisions in which, the Hon’ble Supreme Court granted the relief, would not be taken as precedent inasmuch as those cases have not taken into consideration the legal position. 33. 33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision reported in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2005 SC 752 : (2005) 2 SCC 673 : LNIND 2004 SC 1256 has held that the law declared by the Supreme Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or equal strength and in case a Bench of lesser quorum disagrees or dissents from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum, it has to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of co-equal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of co-equal strength, whereupon the matter would be placed before the larger Bench. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision reported in Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik AIR 2002 SC 296 : (2002) 1 SCC 1 : LNIND 2001 SC 2759, has held that the judicial discipline and propriety demands that a Bench of two learned Judges should follow a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges. There are ample powers conferred by Article 32 read with Article 142 to make orders which have the effect of law by virtue of Article 141 and it is mandatory that everyone should act in terms of the orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Therefore, having regard to the same, till such time the decision being taken by the Legislature, the decisions rendered by the three-Judge Bench in A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur (supra) and in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (supra) will prevail unless and otherwise, they are modified or changed by a Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, having regard to the same, till such time the decision being taken by the Legislature, the decisions rendered by the three-Judge Bench in A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur (supra) and in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (supra) will prevail unless and otherwise, they are modified or changed by a Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, having regard to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik (supra) that the judicial discipline and propriety demands that a Bench of two learned Judges should follow a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges, this Court cannot take a different view and it is bound to follow the decisions of the three learned Judges in Naveen Kohili v. Neelug Kohli (supra), A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur reported in (supra) and in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (supra). 34. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (supra), has the Supreme Court recommended to the Union of India to seriously consider bringing an amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to incorporate irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce in the following words: “Before we part with this case, on the consideration of the totality of facts, this Court would like to recommend the Union of India to seriously consider bringing an amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to incorporate irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for the grant of divorce. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for taking appropriate steps” 35. It is pertinent to note that on 26.08.2013, the Rajya Sabha has passed the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Bill 2010 to amend the Hindu Marriage Act (1955) and the Special Marriage Act (1954) that provides for “irretrievable breakdown on marriage” as a ground for divorce subject to certain safeguards to wives and affected children. However, it will have to be passed by the Lok Sabha before it can become law and bring to force. 36. The State of Objects and Reasons as well as the proposed amendment as set out in Chapter-II of the Bill, read as under: “Chapter II Amendments to The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 2. However, it will have to be passed by the Lok Sabha before it can become law and bring to force. 36. The State of Objects and Reasons as well as the proposed amendment as set out in Chapter-II of the Bill, read as under: “Chapter II Amendments to The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 2. In the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereafter in this Chapter referred to as the Hindu Marriage Act ), in section 13B, in sub-section (2), for the words, brackets and figure “On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime”, the words, brackets and figure “Upon receipt of a petition under sub-section (1)” shall be substituted. 3. After section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, the following sections shall be inserted, namely:— “13C (1) A petition for the dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district court by either party to a marriage [whether solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 2010], on the ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. (2) The court hearing a petition referred to in sub-section (1) shall not hold the marriage to have broken down irretrievably unless it is satisfied that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of not less than three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. (3) If the court is satisfied, on the evidence, as to the fact mentioned in subsection (2), then, unless it is satisfied on all the evidence that the marriage has not broken down irretrievably, it shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, grant a decree of divorce. (4) In considering, for the purpose of sub-section (2), whether the period for which the parties to a marriage have lived apart has been continuous, no account shall be taken of any one period (not exceeding three months’ in all) during which the parties resumed living with each other, but no other period during which the parties lived with each other shall count as part of the period for which the parties to the marriage lived apart. (5) For the purposes of sub-sections (2) and (4), a husband and wife shall be treated as living apart unless they are living with each other in the same household, and reference in this section to the parties to a marriage living with each other shall be construed as reference to their living with each other in the same household. 13D. (1) Where the wife is the respondent to a petition for the dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce under section 13C, she may oppose the grant of a decree on the ground that the dissolution of the marriage will result in grave financial hardship to her and that it would in all the circumstances be wrong to dissolve the marriage. (2) Where the grant of a decree is opposed by virtue of this section, then,— (a) if the court finds that the petitioner is entitled to rely on the ground set out in section 13C; and (b) if, apart from this section, the court would grant a decree on the petition, the court shall consider all the circumstances, including the conduct of the parties to the marriage and the interests of those parties and of any children or other persons concerned, and if, the court is of the opinion that the dissolution of the marriage shall result in grave financial hardship to the respondent and that it would, in all the circumstances, be wrong to dissolve the marriage, it shall dismiss the petition, or in an appropriate case stay the proceedings until arrangements have been made to its satisfaction to eliminate the hardship. 13E. The Court shall not pass a decree of divorce under section 13C unless the court is satisfied that adequate provision for the maintenance of children born out of the marriage has been made consistently with the financial capacity of the parties to the marriage. Explanation.— In this section, the expression “children” means— (a) minor children; (b) unmarried or widowed daughters who have not the financial resources to support themselves; and (c) children who, because of special condition of their physical or mental health, need looking after and do not have the financial resources to support themselves.’. 4. Explanation.— In this section, the expression “children” means— (a) minor children; (b) unmarried or widowed daughters who have not the financial resources to support themselves; and (c) children who, because of special condition of their physical or mental health, need looking after and do not have the financial resources to support themselves.’. 4. In section 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, in sub-section (1), after the word and figures “section 13 ”, at both the places where they occur, the words, figures and letter “or section 13C” shall be inserted. 5. In section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act, in sub-section (1), in clause (a), after the word and figure “section 5 ”, the words, figures and letter “or in cases where the petition is presented under section 13C” shall be inserted. “Statement of Objects and Reasons The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was enacted on the 18th May, 1955 to amend and codify the law relating to marriage among Hindus. Similarly, the Special Marriage Act, 1954 was enacted on the 9th October, 1954 to provide a special form of marriage in certain cases, for the registration of such and certain other marriages and for divorce. The provisions of the said Acts have proved to be inadequate to deal with the issue where there has been irretrievable breakdown of marriage and therefore a need has been felt for certain amendments therein. 2. In view of the demand from various quarters for making irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Central Government referred the matter to the Law Commission of India for its consideration. The Law Commission in its 71st Report titled “The Hindu Marriage Act , 1955 — Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage as a Ground of Divorce” submitted in April, 1978 had examined the issue in detail and recommended amendments to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to make irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a new ground for granting a decree of divorce among the Hindus. Accordingly, a Bill, namely, the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Bill, 1981, further to amend the Hindu Marriage Act , 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954, was introduced in Lok Sabha on the 27th February, 1981. However, before the Bill could be considered and passed by Lok Sabha, the Seventh Lok Sabha was dissolved on 31st December, 1984, and hence the Bill lapsed. 3. However, before the Bill could be considered and passed by Lok Sabha, the Seventh Lok Sabha was dissolved on 31st December, 1984, and hence the Bill lapsed. 3. Subsequently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ms. Jorden Diengdeh v. S.S. Chopra AIR 1985 SC 935 had pointed out the necessity to introduce irretrievable breakdown of marriage and mutual cosent as grounds for grant of divorce in all cases. Similarly in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli AIR 2006 SC 1675 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court recommended to the Union of India to seriously consider bringing an amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to incorporate irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce. 4. Further, the 18th Law Commission of India suo motu took up the mater and in its 217th Report titled ‘Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage —Another Ground for Divorce’ presented to the Government in March, 2009 recommended that ‘Irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ should be incorporated as another ground for grant of a decree of divorce under the aforesaid Acts. 5. Having regard to the recommendations of the Law Commission of India and the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as aforesaid and the demand from various quarters, it is proposed to amend the Hindu Marriage Act , 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954 so as to provide for irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground of divorce thereunder subject to certain safeguards to the wife and affected children. 6. At present, a petition for grant of a decree of divorce on the ground of mutual consent could be presented by both the parties to the marriage together before the court under sub-section (1) of section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and similarly under sub-section (1) of section 28 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Under sub-section (2) of section 13B and that of section 28 respectively, the parties have to move a motion jointly not earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the petition referred in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date for the said purpose. Under sub-section (2) of section 13B and that of section 28 respectively, the parties have to move a motion jointly not earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the petition referred in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date for the said purpose. It has been observed that in several cases one of the parties do not turn up for filing the motion jointly with the other party under sub-section (2) of section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or under sub-section (2) of section 28 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, as the case may be, leading the party desirous of obtaining a decree of divorce hapless and remediless. In order to mitigate such hardships and to allow divorce in cases of complete failure of such marriages, it is proposed to amend sub-section (2) of section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and sub-section (2) of section 28 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, respectively, by doing away with the aforesaid condition of moving motion subsequently. 7. In case the wife happens to be the respondent in respect of a petition for grant of a decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage under the proposed new section 13C of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or under the proposed new section 28A of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, as the case may be, the wife is entitled to oppose the grant of a decree of divorce on the ground that a dissolution of the marriage will result in grave financial hardship to her. Similarly, provision has been made to restrict grant of a decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage if the court is satisfied that adequate provision for the maintenance of children born out of the marriage has not been made consistently with the financial capacity of the parties to the marriage.” 37. By virtue of proposed amendment, the quarrelling spouses can get divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, provided they have lived separately for at least three years and their differences are irreconcilable. Divorce can be granted not only on a joint petition by both spouses but also on a single party petition. By virtue of proposed amendment, the quarrelling spouses can get divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, provided they have lived separately for at least three years and their differences are irreconcilable. Divorce can be granted not only on a joint petition by both spouses but also on a single party petition. In order to curb prolonged litigation for the years together in getting divorce, the proposed amendment allows the couple who trapped in unhappy marriages to part without waiting since there had been cases that were dragged on for more than 10 to 15 years because one party refuses to cooperate. Since the aforesaid provision has yet to be brought into force, we are not dealing further on this aspect. 38. However, in a recent decision in Darshan Gupta v. Radhika Gupta (2013) 9 SCC 1 : LNIND 2013 SC 568 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has declined to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, while taking note of the fervent wish of the wife to live with her husband. It has been held as under in para 52. “52. Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of this case (which are being highlighted while dealing with the appellant’s next contention), we cannot persuade ourselves to grant a decree of divorce, on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, for the simple reason that the breakdown is only from the side of the husband. The wife - Radhika Gupta has consistently maintained, that she was intensely concerned with her future relationship with her husband, and that, her greatest and paramount desire was to rejoin her husband, and to live with him normally in a matrimonial relationship, once again. Since in the present case, the respondent does not consent to the severance of matrimonial ties, it may not be possible for us to accede to the instant prayer, made at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant.” 39. In the instant case also the respondent/wife has consistently maintained that she had been intensely concerned with her future relationship with her husband and as the relief of granting divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown only from the side of the appellant/husband, we are unable to accede to the prayer made by the learned senior counsel for grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. However, since it is a question to be decided by a Bench consisting of four Judges or by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court, there is no need to go into the question of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage” and we are not expressing (we cannot express) anything on this issue of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage”. 40. In view of the above discussion, as the appellant/husband has proved the ground of cruelty and desertion, we are of the view that the appellant/husband is entitled for the relief of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion and there is no need to harp upon the issue of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage” any further. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed, granting decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, i.e. on the ground of ‘cruelty’ and ‘desertion’ and consequently, the judgment and decree, dated 22.12.2010 made in OP No.1714 of 2004 by the learned I Additional Family Court, Chennai is hereby set aside. No costs. Appeal allowed.