JUDGMENT : M. Satyanarayana Murthy, J. 1. The unsuccessful plaintiff in Original Suit No. 25 of 1989, on the file of the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge (Now, Senior Civil Judge), Vijayawada, Krishna District (for short, the 'trial Court') preferred this Appeal against the decree and judgment dated 30.04.1994. For convenience of reference, the ranks given to the parties in O.S. No. 25 of 1989 will be adopted throughout this judgment. 2. The plaintiff filed the Suit for specific performance of conditional agreement of sale dated 15.11.1987 (Ex. A-1), seeking a direction against the defendant to execute registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff or his nominee, after complying all formalities, as per the terms and conditions of conditional agreement of sale and, in case, the defendant failed to execute registered sale deed, sought permission to obtain registered sale deed through process of the Court, including liquidated damages of Rs. 30,000/- for breach of contract, alleging that the defendant approached the plaintiff for financial assistance for construction of a building in vacant site purchased near V.B.M. College, Vijayawada, requested him to advance an amount of Rs. 60,000/- and after due deliberations, plaintiff and defendant came to an understanding, in pursuance to the understanding, both of them entered into a conditional agreement of sale dated 15.11.1987, for sale of the schedule property; accordingly, the plaintiff advanced a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the defendant on the even date and defendant undertook to repay the said amount with compound interest at the rate of 18% p.a. with yearly rests, within nine months from the date of agreement i.e., by 15.08.1988. It is further agreed that, in the event, the defendant failed to pay the amount as agreed, shall execute registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff or his nominee treating the amount of Rs. 50,000/- paid on 15.11.1987, as advance of sale consideration, execute registered sale deed receiving balance of sale consideration of Rs. 70,000/-. Thus, the total consideration agreed under the agreement is Rs. 1,20,000/-. Both the parties agreed that the time is essence of the contract. Despite the demands made by the plaintiff for repayment of amount received by her, she failed to repay the same, thereupon the plaintiff demanded the defendant to receive balance sale consideration of Rs. 70,000/- and execute registered sale deed, but she failed to comply the legitimate demand. 3. Both the parties agreed that the time is essence of the contract. Despite the demands made by the plaintiff for repayment of amount received by her, she failed to repay the same, thereupon the plaintiff demanded the defendant to receive balance sale consideration of Rs. 70,000/- and execute registered sale deed, but she failed to comply the legitimate demand. 3. The plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform his part of obligation, under the conditional agreement of sale dated 15.11.1987, but the defendant herself did not co-operate for completion of the transaction, though she handed over the title deed pertaining to the schedule property to the plaintiff on the date of execution of agreement (Ex. A-1). Therefore, he is entitled to claim first charge over the schedule property. 4. The plaintiff got issued a legal notice dated 09.07.1988, marked as Ex. A-2, calling upon the defendant to perform her part of obligation under the conditional agreement of sale. The defendant having received the same got issued belated reply with frivolous allegations; thereupon, a rejoinder was sent to the reply by the plaintiff through his advocate. As the defendant failed to avail the option under the conditional agreement of sale, it is obligatory on her part to execute registered sale deed, receiving balance of sale consideration, she also committed breach of conditional agreement of sale; thereby, the plaintiff incurred liquidated damages of Rs. 30,000/-. Hence, the claim. 5. The defendant filed written statement denying material allegations of the plaint and resisted the claim of the plaintiff inter-alia raising the following contentions: (a) The defendant denied the very transaction of conditional agreement of sale while contending that she completed construction of schedule house and house warming ceremony was performed in the month of October, 1987, the question of approaching the plaintiff for financial assistance does not arise and she raised funds for construction of house by obtaining gold loan in Tanuku Bank and also from private individuals; she also has withdrawn the amount lying in her Savings Bank Account No. 6881 with Central Bank of India, Benz Circle, Vijayawada; (b) The Municipal Corporation of Vijayawada filed a complaint in STC No. 712 of 1987 against her in the Court of Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Vijayawada, for constructing the building without obtaining permission, wherein she was sentenced to fine of Rs. 500/- paid fine amount under receipt No. 6215 on 19.10.1987, and also paid Rs. 405/- to Municipal Corporation Authorities for approval of construction of the building and, accordingly, permission was given on 29.07.1987 by the Municipal Corporation, levied tax of Rs. 345.20 p.s. for half year. These facts would go to show that the construction was completed in the month of September, 1987 itself. Therefore, the alleged financial assistance under the conditional agreement of sale would not arise; (c) The value of the schedule property at Rs. 1,20,000/- on the date of alleged conditional agreement is too low and that the plaintiff has no capacity to lend Rs. 50,000/- on the relevant date, the descriptive particulars of the property including boundaries and extent are false on the face of the record; (d) The defendant never borrowed and agreed to sell the schedule property incorporating any conditions as the alleged agreement is false and un-enforceable under law; (e) M. Chandrasekhara Rao, northern boundary owner filed a Suit in O.S. No. 740 of 1988 on the file of III Additional District Munsiff's Court, Vijayawada, claiming permanent injunction, she contested the suit by filing written statement and came to know that the plaintiff is a distant relative of Chandrasekhara Rao. Therefore, the alleged conditional agreement is brought into existence by Chadnrasekhara Rao and the plaintiff, the defendant has no obligation to receive balance of sale consideration and execute registered sale deed and as such the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any relief much-less charge over the schedule property; (f) The defendant purchased Ac. 0.40 cents of land for a consideration of Rs. 32,000/- on 29.08.1985 under registered sale deed bearing document No. 4908 of 1985, purchased stamp papers on 28.06.1985; wherein her vendors Valluri Basavaiah and his brother Ravindranadh Babu signed on the sale deed and the original title deed from the Sub-Registrar's Office was taken return by attestor Ravi Kumar, after obtaining authorization from her. Therefore, the said Ravi Kumar is in possession of the sale deed, retained possession of the same promising that he would hand over the sale deed to her; later informed her that he would secure good price for the suit land of the defendant in case she wants to sell the property in plots to individuals. Therefore, the said Ravi Kumar is in possession of the sale deed, retained possession of the same promising that he would hand over the sale deed to her; later informed her that he would secure good price for the suit land of the defendant in case she wants to sell the property in plots to individuals. Thus, the said Ravi Kumar who retained the original sale deed might have handed over the same to the plaintiff; and (g) The signatures of the defendant on the stamp paper is forged or utilized the blank signed papers of the plaintiff for fabricating the conditional agreement of sale with the help of V. Sivanath Babu and Ravi Kumar. Thus, Ex. A-1 agreement of sale is not valid and enforceable under law and as such plaintiff is not entitled to claim any of the reliefs claimed in the Suit, finally prayed to dismiss the Suit. 6. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the alleged conditional agreement dated 15.11.1987 is true and valid? (2) Whether the plaintiff has no capacity to advance Rs. 15,000/- (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 16.11.1987? (4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the liquidated damages as prayed for? (5) To what relief? 7. During course of trial, on behalf of the plaintiff, PWs. 1 and 2 were examined and Exs. A-1 to A-11 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, DWs. 1 to 3 were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-22 were marked. 8. Upon hearing argument of both the counsel, considering oral and documentary evidence available on record, the trial Court dismissed the Suit holding all the issues in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff. 9. Aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the trial Court, the unsuccessful plaintiff therein preferred this Appeal raising following contentions: (a) The trial Court did not consider the evidence on record with regard to date of completion of construction and repairs of the building. The observation of the trial Court that the plaintiff has got capacity to lend Rs. 50,000/- is sufficient to conclude that Ex. A-1 is true; (b) The finding of the trial Court that construction of the building was completed by the date of execution of Ex. The observation of the trial Court that the plaintiff has got capacity to lend Rs. 50,000/- is sufficient to conclude that Ex. A-1 is true; (b) The finding of the trial Court that construction of the building was completed by the date of execution of Ex. A-1 is false on the face of the record and on erroneous appreciation of oral and documentary evidence dismissed the Suit; (c) The trial Court did not consider handing over of title deeds to the plaintiff-appellant, which clinches the issue about execution of Ex. A-1, and also failed to consider the financial condition of the defendant on the date of execution of Ex. A-1 at least ought to have granted an alternative relief of refund of advance paid, together with interest and committed an error; Finally, it is contended that when the plaintiff proved execution of Ex. A-1, discretionary relief available under the provisions of Specific Relief Act cannot be denied, but the trial Court failed to consider oral and documentary evidence, more particularly, the plea of the defendant in the written statement in proper perspective, committed an error in dismissing the Suit and prayed to allow the Appeal setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court. 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, during course of argument, mainly contended that execution of agreement is proved by examining the plaintiff and the attestor, as required under law, and when the defendant took a specific plea of forgery and fabrication, the burden regarding proof of genuineness of the document is initially on the plaintiff, but the trial Court did not consider shifting the burden of proof in proper perspective. The trial Court also failed to consider as to how Ex. A-6, registered sale deed dated, 29.06.1986 came into possession of the defendant though she contended that the original document from the Registrar's office was taken by Ravi kumar under her authorization, the same was not established by examining the said Ravi kumar and Basavaiah and Raavindranadh Babu, vendors of the defendant. Therefore, the defendant failed to establish as to how Ex. A-6 came into her possession. The oral evidence on record with regard to capacity of the plaintiff to lend amount is sufficient to establish his capacity to lend amount, but the trial Court on erroneous appreciation of evidence disbelieved the suit claim. Therefore, the defendant failed to establish as to how Ex. A-6 came into her possession. The oral evidence on record with regard to capacity of the plaintiff to lend amount is sufficient to establish his capacity to lend amount, but the trial Court on erroneous appreciation of evidence disbelieved the suit claim. Learned counsel further contended that when a particular fact was not put to the witness during cross-examination, it amounts to admission and placed reliance on decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in A.E.G. Carapiet vs. A.Y. Derderian, AIR 1961 Cal 359 and decisions of the Apex Court in M.B. Ramesh (D) by L.Rs vs. K.M. Veemje Urs (D) by L.Rs. and Others, AIR 2013 SC 2088 and Thiruvengada Pillai vs. Navaneethammal and Another, AIR 2008 SC 1541 . 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the defendant-respondent argued totally in support of the finding of the trial Court, pointing out several improbabilities in the case of the plaintiff, which are as follows: (1) Stamp paper, on which Ex. A-1 was executed, was purchased by the defendant herself on 14.06.1985, whereas the alleged Ac. 0.40 cents was purchased subsequent to purchase of stamps and obtained the agreement after two years from the date of purchase of stamp paper i.e., on 15.11.1987 is unusual and execution of the document cannot be believed; (2) By the date of execution of Ex. A-1, construction of the entire building was completed; the Municipality assessed the property to tax and also filed a Criminal case for construction of the house without obtaining prior permission. Therefore, question of obtaining loan by executing Ex. A-1 does not arise in normal course of events; (3) No ordinary prudent person would complete and sell the schedule property situated in an extent of 250 Sq. yards for a meagre price of Rs. 1,20,000/- in a big Town like Vijayawada for the reason that by the date of alleged agreement of sale, the construction was completed except finishing work. Therefore, it is a serious improbability in the case of plaintiff and it is against the normal course of conduct, on this ground alone the Suit is liable to be dismissed; (4) At best, the transaction covered by Ex. A-1 is only loan and not an agreement of sale, but the plaintiff conveniently created the document taking advantage of the stamp papers available with him and filed the present suit. A-1 is only loan and not an agreement of sale, but the plaintiff conveniently created the document taking advantage of the stamp papers available with him and filed the present suit. If the contents of Ex. A-1 are analyzed in proper perspective, it is a clear transaction of loan and not an agreement of sale. 12. Learned counsel further contended that the plaintiff failed to establish his capacity to pay Rs. 50,000/- as he is only an agent in Margadarshi Chits and his son was working as an LIC agent. Ex. A-11 is sufficient to prove the capacity to lend Rs. 50,000/- and no documentary proof is produced to establish possessing Ac. 8.00 cents of agricultural land and getting income thereon. On the other hand, the defendant produced Exs. B-19 and B-22 to establish that the plaintiff sold away his property and destroyed the contention of the plaintiff regarding means to advance Rs. 50,000/-. However, he possessed only Ac. 1.50 cents of land. Ex. B-5 is sufficient to prove completion of work and the value of the building was more than Rs. 3,00,000/- as on the date of execution of Ex. A-1 and the claim of the plaintiff is hit by Section 20(1) and sub-section 2(c) of Specific Relief Act. Therefore, the trial Court rightly declined to grant any of the reliefs and prayed to dismiss the Appeal. 13. Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record, the points that arise for consideration are as follows: (1) Whether the conditional agreement of sale dated 15.11.1987, marked as Ex. A-1, is true, valid and enforceable under law? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of specific performance of conditional agreement of sale, Ex. A-1? 14. POINT No. 1: The basis for claiming relief in this suit is execution of Ex. A-1 borrowing Rs. 50,000/- by the defendant from the plaintiff with a condition to execute registered sale deed, in the event she failed to discharge the debt within nine months from the date of execution of Ex. A-1 i.e. 15.08.1988 together with interest at 18% p.a. with yearly rests. The defendant shall execute registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff by receiving balance of sale consideration of Rs. 70,000/-. The contention of the defendant is two fold: the first contention is that Ex. A-1 is forged document, the 2nd contention is that Ex. A-1 i.e. 15.08.1988 together with interest at 18% p.a. with yearly rests. The defendant shall execute registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff by receiving balance of sale consideration of Rs. 70,000/-. The contention of the defendant is two fold: the first contention is that Ex. A-1 is forged document, the 2nd contention is that Ex. A-1 is a fabricated document. These two pleas are inconsistent to one another. Forgery is totally distinct from the fabrication. However, the defendant may take inconsistent pleas but she has to confine to any one of the pleas during trial. However, in the present case, the defendant herself admitted in her cross-examination that the signatures appearing on Ex. A-1 are that of her. Yet, in the cross-examination dated 03.03.1993, the defendant admitted that signatures on Exs. A-7 to A-10 at page Nos. 1 to 3 are her signatures. Thus, it is clear from the oral admissions in the cross-examination of DW. 1, defendant signed on Ex. A-1. 15. The word 'Forgery' is not defined in any civil law, but defined under Section 463 of I.P.C. which is as follows: "Whoever makes any false document or part of a document with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery." 16. Similarly, fabrication of a document is also not defined anywhere, but it means creating document and it is an offence punishable under Section 464 of I.P.C. and according to Section 464 of I.P.C. making a false document is stated as follows: "464. Similarly, fabrication of a document is also not defined anywhere, but it means creating document and it is an offence punishable under Section 464 of I.P.C. and according to Section 464 of I.P.C. making a false document is stated as follows: "464. Making a false document - A person is said to make a false document: Firstly - Who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document, or makes any mark, denoting the execution of a document, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was made, signed, sealed or executed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed, or at a time at which he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed; Secondly - Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part thereof, after it has been made or executed either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; Thirdly - Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document, knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practiced upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration." 17. In the instant case, the contention of defendant as stated above is two fold; one is forgery and the other is fabrication. When the defendant herself admitted her signature on Ex. A-1, the question of forgery does not arise, but at best it may attract Section 464 of I.P.C. i.e., fabrication of a document. In the absence of any definition under Civil Law the Court may fall back on the definition of fabrication of document under Section 464 of I.P.C. fabrication means woven together. So, the contention of the defendant that Ex. A-1 was created taking advantage of signed stamp papers available with Sivanath, who sold the property to her under Ex. A-6, the original title deed relating to the schedule property. In fact, the stamp papers were purchased in the name of the defendant on 14.06.1985, whereas Ex. So, the contention of the defendant that Ex. A-1 was created taking advantage of signed stamp papers available with Sivanath, who sold the property to her under Ex. A-6, the original title deed relating to the schedule property. In fact, the stamp papers were purchased in the name of the defendant on 14.06.1985, whereas Ex. A-1 was obtained on 15.11.1987 and she explained the reason in her cross-examination dated 30.10.1992. According to DW. 1, Sivanath obtained her signatures on blank papers and stamp papers for the purpose of obtaining permission from the Urban Land Ceiling Authority. So, taking advantage of the signed stamp papers of the defendant, Sivanath created Ex. A-1 in collision with the plaintiff and filed the present suit. In such a case, the burden heavily lies on the defendant to prove fabrication of Ex. A-1 by Sivanath in collision with the plaintiff and filed the present suit basing on Ex. A-1. She explained so many reasons in the evidence of DW. 1 as to how Ex. A-1 was created, but it is not her plea that Sivanath obtained signatures on blank papers and stamp papers utilized those stamp papers for creating Ex. A-1; but for the first time, she invented a theory of fabrication of Ex. A-1 taking advantage of the signed stamp papers available with Sivanath; but her evidence is not totally reliable under what circumstances she handed over the signed stamp papers to Sivanath, who sold the property to her under the original of Ex. A-6. Therefore, the contention of the defendant that Ex. A-1 is fabricated taking advantage of the signed stamp papers available with Sivanath is not believable. 18. Normally, when the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance based on Ex. A-1 and when the defendant disputed execution of Ex. A-1, it is for the plaintiff to establish due execution of Ex. A-1 and its genuineness. To substantiate the contentions, the plaintiff himself was examined as PW. 1 as he narrated about execution of Ex. A-1 and handing over of Ex. A-6 so also registered correspondence prior to filing of the suit. In the cross-examination, the plaintiff testified that the sale transaction was settled on the suit property and except himself and the defendant none were present at that time, but he does not know whether the defendant intended to sell the property even before she purchased the property under Ex. A-6 so also registered correspondence prior to filing of the suit. In the cross-examination, the plaintiff testified that the sale transaction was settled on the suit property and except himself and the defendant none were present at that time, but he does not know whether the defendant intended to sell the property even before she purchased the property under Ex. A-6 and he does not how as to why she purchased stamps on 16.04.1985, used for execution of Ex. A-1 and admitted that the stamps for execution of Ex. A-1 were purchased on 14.06.1985, whereas the registered sale deed marked as Ex. A-6 was obtained on 29.06.1985 and document was written on the stamp papers produced on 28.06.1985. This is an improbability pointed out by the learned counsel for the defendant during argument. If really, the defendant wanted to purchase the property she would have utilized the stamps available with her for obtaining document or any subsequent date from the date of purchase of the stamps, but strangely in the present case Ex. A-1 was engrossed on the stamps purchased on 14.06.1985, whereas Ex. A-6 which is the source of title of the plaintiff for the schedule property was engrossed on stamp papers purchased on 18.06.1985. Thus, there is a gap of 14 days between purchase of stamps for execution of Ex. A-1 and A-6. This is an improbable circumstance to believe execution of Ex. A-1 and on this ground alone the execution of Ex. A-1 cannot be thrown out for the reason that Ex. A-1 was engrossed on stamps worth Rs. 5/- only, whereas Ex. A-6 was engrossed on 8 stamp papers worth Rs. 500/- each and one stamp paper worth Rs. 200/-. Therefore, Rs. 5/- stamp is not at all convenient to engross a sale deed, Ex. A-1. Perhaps, this may be the reason for not utilizing the stamp worth Rs. 5/- on which Ex. A-1 was engrossed. According to Rule 35 of Rules under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the purchaser has to obtain stamps in his name but contrary to the rule, the vendor herself purchased stamps. Therefore, on the ground of utilization of stamp papers purchased on 14.06.1985 the document cannot be disbelieved. 19. 5/- on which Ex. A-1 was engrossed. According to Rule 35 of Rules under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the purchaser has to obtain stamps in his name but contrary to the rule, the vendor herself purchased stamps. Therefore, on the ground of utilization of stamp papers purchased on 14.06.1985 the document cannot be disbelieved. 19. The learned counsel for the plaintiff - appellant in support of his contention placed reliance on Thiruvengada AIR 2008 SC 1541 (supra), wherein the Apex Court held that there is no impediment for stamp paper purchased more than six months prior to proposed date of execution and execution of agreement of sale on very old stamp papers may be one of the circumstances that can be used as piece of evidence to cast doubt on authenticity on the agreement but that cannot be clinching evidence. 20. The principle laid down by the Apex Court in the decision cited supra, is directly applicable to the present facts of the case. Therefore, basing on execution of a document on old stamp paper, the agreement of sale cannot be disbelieved. Yet, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contended that no suggestions were put to PWs. 1 and 2 that Ex. A-1 was either forged or fabricated document, in support of his contention, in the absence of any cross-examination directly putting the specific plea raised by the defendant to the witnesses, whatever evidence adduced by the defendant in support of such contention cannot be said to be sufficient for the reason that the plaintiff has no opportunity to refute specific plea urged by the defendant. Undoubtedly, on verification of the entire cross-examination of PWs. 1 and 2, I find no suggestion directly suggesting that Ex. A-1 is forged or fabricated document. In such circumstances, the evidence adduced by the defendant in support of the plea is insufficient to hold that Ex. A-1 is either forged or a fabricated document, in view of the principles laid down by the Calcutta High Court in A.E.G. Carapiet AIR 1961 Cal 359 (supra), which principle is reiterated by the Apex Court in M.B. Ramesh AIR 2013 SC 2088 (supra). 21. A-1 is either forged or a fabricated document, in view of the principles laid down by the Calcutta High Court in A.E.G. Carapiet AIR 1961 Cal 359 (supra), which principle is reiterated by the Apex Court in M.B. Ramesh AIR 2013 SC 2088 (supra). 21. In view of the principles laid down by Calcutta High Court and Apex Court in the decisions cited supra, whatever evidence adduced by the defendant in support of his plea without suggesting any specific defence in the cross-examination of the plaintiff witnesses is of no use, on the basis of such evidence it is difficult to hold that Ex. A-1 is either forged or fabricated document. 22. In ordinary course of events, when the plaintiff set-up an agreement of sale and the defendant pleaded that the document is a fabricated one taking advantage of her singed stamp papers available with third person, the burden heavily lies on the person who raised such plea. Therefore, it is for the defendant to discharge the burden by adducing cogent and satisfactory evidence. In a similar case, the Division Bench of this Court in B. Jogi Reddy vs. Baldev Singh (died) by LRs. 2003 (4) ALD 276 (DB), held as follows in Para 7: "In our view, it is settled provision of law that when once signatures are admitted the burden to establish that the document is a fabricated one is heavily on the defendants. The learned Single Judge, however, opined "the burden is on the plaintiff to show that it has been executed by the deceased, first defendant." In our opinion, such a view is wrong. On the other hand, the Trial Court recorded a categorical finding that Ex. A. 1 is a document recorded on stamp paper of the year 1986. Admittedly the money lending transaction was of the year, 1982. The theory of obtaining signatures on blank papers does not fit in, in view of the above-mentioned facts." 23. In the facts of the decision cited supra, when a suit is filed for specific performance of agreement of sale, defendant set-up a similar plea which the defendant herein raised in the present suit, but in such case the burden heavily lies on the defendant to establish signing or execution of a document on stamp papers in the circumstances pleaded by her. In the written statement filed by the defendant in the present case regarding the circumstance under which her signatures were obtained, to substantiate the said fact, she did not examine any witness to prove the same. In fact, Sivanath is the person who allegedly obtained her signatures in connection with obtaining permission from the Urban land Ceiling Authority, but he was not examined, and not even summoned to examine him as a witness for the reason that he is closely related to the plaintiff, but that by itself is not sufficient to believe her contention. When similar situation came up for consideration before this Court in Veeramareddy Nagabhushana Rao vs. Jyothula Venkateswara Rao, 2011 (1) ALT 600 (DB) : 2011 (2) ALD 629 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court in Para 18 held as follows: "The best person to speak about the circumstances under which defendant signed on blank papers and handed over them to the plaintiff was Lakshmi Tulasi, sister of the defendant. D.W. 1 in his evidence stated that there are no disputes between him and his sister Lakshmi Tulasi, but she was not examined, who is a crucial witness as per the stand taken in the written statement and no other witness also examined by the defendant, inspite of the facts that the burden of proof is exclusively rests on him and thereby drawn an adverse inference." 24. Even according to the principles laid down in the decision cited supra, the burden of proof exclusively rests on the person who set-up the document. Obviously for different reasons, the defendant did not examine any witness to prove the circumstances under which she signed on blank stamp papers. Even otherwise, in the registered correspondence between the plaintiff and defendant, Ex. A-2 legal notice got issued by the plaintiff, in reply Ex. A-3 was issued by the defendant without disclosing anything about the circumstances under which she signed on blank stamp papers but requested the plaintiff to send a copy of Ex. A-J. However, in Para 3 of the notice, marked as Ex. A-3, she contended that agreement is forged and fabricated one. Accordingly, as requested by the defendant photostat copy of the agreement of sale dated 15.11.1987 was furnished to her along with a rejoinder notice marked as Ex. A-4. After receiving the rejoinder, the defendant did not issue any reply to it. A-3, she contended that agreement is forged and fabricated one. Accordingly, as requested by the defendant photostat copy of the agreement of sale dated 15.11.1987 was furnished to her along with a rejoinder notice marked as Ex. A-4. After receiving the rejoinder, the defendant did not issue any reply to it. Thus, it appears from the record that the defendant raised a total inconsistent defence that is forgery and fabrication. If Ex. A-1 is forged, the question of fabrication does not arise; if it is a fabricated document, forgery does not arise. Therefore, these two inconsistent pleas create any amount of suspicion about the credibility in the plea raised by the defendant. 25. In the present case the plaintiff himself was examined as PW. 1 besides examining the attestor as PW. 2 and their evidence is consistent and whereas the plea set-up by the defendant cannot be believed for the reasons mentioned in the earlier paragraphs. However, a document can be proved in different modes as laid down by the Apex Court in State (Delhi Administration) vs. Pali Ram, AIR 1979 SC 14 , wherein it was held as follows at Para 23: "Just as in English Law, the Indian Evidence Act recognises two direct methods of proving the handwriting of a person: (i) By an admission of the person who wrote it. (2) By the evidence of some witness who saw it written. These are the best methods of proof. These apart, there are three other modes of proof by opinion. They are: (i) By the evidence of a handwriting expert. (Section 45) (ii) By the evidence of a witness acquainted with the handwriting of the person who is said to have written the writing in question. (Section 47). (iii) Opinion formed by the Court on comparison made by itself. (Section 73) All these three cognate modes of proof involve a process of comparison. In mode (i), the comparison is made by the expert of the disputed writing with the admitted or proved writing of the person who is said to have written the questioned document. In (ii), the comparison takes the form of a belief which the witness entertains upon comparing the writing in question, with an exemplar formed in his mind from some previous knowledge or repetitive observance of the handwriting of the person concerned. In (ii), the comparison takes the form of a belief which the witness entertains upon comparing the writing in question, with an exemplar formed in his mind from some previous knowledge or repetitive observance of the handwriting of the person concerned. In the case of (iii), the comparison is made by the Court with the sample writing or exemplar obtained by it from the person concerned". 26. One of the principles laid down in the decision cited supra is that the disputed document can be proved by any one of the modes. In the instant case, the plaintiff opted to prove the document following the second mode of proof i.e., by examining the attestors of the document as PW. 2 and his evidence remained un-rebutted despite marathon cross-examination by PWs. 1 to 3. Thus, the plaintiff succeeded in proving execution of Ex. A-1. 27. In view of my foregoing discussion, I find that Ex. A-1 is true, valid and genuine and enforceable under law, as it created a contractual obligation between the plaintiff and defendant. Accordingly, the point is decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 28. POINT No. 2: The plaintiff claimed the relief of specific performance based on Ex. A-1, conditional agreement of sale. As seen from the pleadings and evidence on record, including contents of Ex. A-1, registered correspondence between the parties, it is clear that the defendant approached the plaintiff for loan of Rs. 60,000/- and on negotiations, the plaintiff advanced an amount of Rs. 50,000/- on execution of conditional agreement of sale, to pay the same with interest at 18% p.a. within nine months i.e., on or before 15.08.1988 and in the event of failure to repay the amount as agreed, to execute registered sale deed receiving balance of Rs. 70,000/- i.e. agreed sale consideration is Rs. 1,20,000/-. Therefore, it is evident from the pleadings and evidence on record, the intention of the defendant is only to receive loan and never intended to sell the property. One of the contentions raised by learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant is that the defendant was in need of money to complete finishing work of the building. Therefore, he advanced Rs. 50,000/- under Ex. A-1 and the defendant agreed for the terms and conditions contained therein. However, the contention of learned counsel for the defendant-respondent is that by the date of execution of Ex. Therefore, he advanced Rs. 50,000/- under Ex. A-1 and the defendant agreed for the terms and conditions contained therein. However, the contention of learned counsel for the defendant-respondent is that by the date of execution of Ex. A-1, the construction was completed, thereby question of borrowing Rs. 50,000/- does not arise. To substantiate her contentions, the defendant produced Ex. B-1, counter-foil receipt for Rs. 500/- issued to the defendant in S.T.C. No. 712 of 1987 of Municipal Corporation Bill; Ex. B-2 is challan for Rs. 405/- paid by defendant to the Municipal Corporation, Vijayawada for building licence; Ex. B-3 is the property tax demand notice issued to the defendant by the Municipal Corporation, Vijayawada and Ex. B-4 is property tax receipt evidencing payment of property tax. 29. In view of these admissions, by the date of execution of Ex. A-1, construction of the building was completed and the Municipal Corporation, after following necessary procedure, levied tax on the property. Unless the construction is completed, the Municipal Corporation would not levy tax. Therefore, it is evident that construction of the building was completed by the date of execution of Ex. A-1 on 15.11.1987; no other proof is required to substantiate this contention. 30. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contended that the document Ex. A-1 was executed for completion of construction, since finishing work is also part of construction. This contention can be accepted for the reason that the evidence on record, more particularly, evidence of DW. 1 shows that the finishing work was not completed by the date of alleged execution of Ex. A-1. Hence, contention of the plaintiff that Ex. A-1 was executed only to complete the finishing work of the building already constructed and assessed by the Municipal Corporation, Vijayawada. Hence, borrowing of Rs. 50,000/- for construction though not accepted the amount was borrowed only for completion of finishing work of the building. 31. Learned counsel for the defendant-respondent contended that at best Ex. A-1 is a loan transaction and the defendant never intended to sell the property as admitted by PW. 1 in his evidence. Added to that, no ordinary prudent person would sell a newly constructed building in an extent of 270/- Sq. yards in a commercial town like Vijayawada and this is an unusual circumstance to believe execution of Ex. A-1 intending to sell the property. When the defendant requires an amount of Rs. 1 in his evidence. Added to that, no ordinary prudent person would sell a newly constructed building in an extent of 270/- Sq. yards in a commercial town like Vijayawada and this is an unusual circumstance to believe execution of Ex. A-1 intending to sell the property. When the defendant requires an amount of Rs. 60,000/- for finishing work of the building, the cost of the building would be more than lakhs and the site value may be more than a lakh or so, but taking advantage of the financial crisis of the defendant, the plaintiff obtained Ex. A-1 imposing certain conditions. If the intention of the parties is gathered from the circumstances of the case, conditional agreement of sale Ex. A-1 is only a transaction of loan not an agreement of sale. While dealing with similar circumstances, the Apex Court in Tejram vs. Patirambhau, (1997) 9 SCC 634 , held as follows in Para 4: "4................... It is an admitted position that the respondent is a money-lender. Under these circumstances, the document purporting to be an agreement for sale is in fact not an agreement for sale; it is towards the unpaid interest on the loan taken by the respondent. It is seen that the High Court also accepted that the appellant had taken a loan in 1965 for a sum of Rs. 1,500/- and repaid Rs. 3,500/-. Shri Deshpande says that the sum of Rs. 15,000/- is not factually correct; it is actually only Rs. 1,500/-. If it is true sale transaction and the respondent being a businessman and having purported to have paid Rs. 48,000/-, one would expect that he would seek possession or he would pay the balance consideration and request for execution of the sale deed. Instead, he kept quiet for full 3 years. Be that as it may, it would appear that there was money transaction between the appellant and the respondent and the respondent, being money-lender, was taking documents, purporting to be an agreement of sale, from the loanees. In the event of the loanees failure to pay the loan amount along with interest stipulated by him, the documents would, obviously, be executed, with a view to enforce the repayment of loan and interest accrued thereon. It is unlikely that being a moneylender and having parted with Rs. In the event of the loanees failure to pay the loan amount along with interest stipulated by him, the documents would, obviously, be executed, with a view to enforce the repayment of loan and interest accrued thereon. It is unlikely that being a moneylender and having parted with Rs. 48,000/- as cash, he would have kept quite either for seeking possession of the property or payment of Rs. 2,000/- immediately and then sought specific performance; it would be unlikely in the normal circumstances that he would have waited for 3 years for issuing notice and then filing suit on the last date. Under these circumstances, the Courts below rightly came to the conclusion that it is not an agreement for sale or purports to be a sale in truth and in reality, but in view of the admission made by the respondent by way of endorsement that he had received Rs. 48,000/- and in the absence of any specific circumstances and in view of the doubtful conduct of both the parties, it is not possible for us to reach any satisfactory conclusion on the basis of evidence as to what was the amount actually due and paid by the appellant to the respondent and what amount is still payable. Under these circumstances, we are of the considered view that the ends of justice would be met if the conclusion reached by the High Court that a sum of Rs. 48,000/- was paid by the respondent to the appellant, is confirmed, However, respondent is not entitled to payment of any interest or cost, as ordered by the High Court. Under these circumstances, the order of the Division Bench of the High Court for payment of Rs. 65,280/- is set aside. Instead, there will be a decree for a sum of Rs. 48,000/- in lump-sum without any interest." 32. Though no law is laid down, the facts of the above decision are similar, hence, conclusion of the Apex Court in the decision cited supra, is directly applicable to the present facts of the case. Learned counsel for the defendant, in support of his contention, placed reliance on judgment of this Court in M. Ali Baig and Others vs. Kottala Sanjeeva Reddy and Others, 2014 (3) ALD 449 , wherein this Court held as follows: "68. I have already held that Ex. Learned counsel for the defendant, in support of his contention, placed reliance on judgment of this Court in M. Ali Baig and Others vs. Kottala Sanjeeva Reddy and Others, 2014 (3) ALD 449 , wherein this Court held as follows: "68. I have already held that Ex. A. 1 is not an agreement of sale, but is an agreement dated 01.09.1992 recording payment of Rs. 1,30,000/- by plaintiff to defendant Nos. 1 to 4, as a loan repayable without interest by 25.02.1993, and in default of such payment, entitling the plaintiff to get the land by a registered sale deed. I have also held that Rs. 1,10,000/- was paid by the defendant Nos. 1 to 4 to the plaintiff on 22.02.1993. Only Rs. 20,000/- remained to be paid. In my opinion, for a mere non-payment of Rs. 20,000/- it would be unconscionable to direct the transfer of the suit land to plaintiff by decreeing the suit for specific performance. In fact, in my view, it would be equally unconscionable to direct the transfer of the suit land worth Rs. 2,25,000/- to plaintiff by decreeing the suit for specific performance, even if Rs. 1,10,000/- was not paid." 33. In the facts of the decision cited supra, an agreement of sale was entered on 01.09.1992 recording payment of Rs. 1,30,000/- by plaintiff to the defendants 1 to 4 as loan payable without interest by 25.02.1993 and in default of such payment entitling the plaintiff to get the land by a registered sale deed. It was also held that Rs. 1,10,000/- was paid by the defendants 1 to 4 to the plaintiff on 22.02.1993, only Rs. 20,000/- remained unpaid. The facts of the present case are almost similar to the facts of the above case, except agreement to pay interest at the rate of 18% p.a. in the present case. If the above conclusion is applied to the present facts of the case, the transaction covered by the original of Ex. A-1 is a loan transaction but not an agreement to convey the property to the plaintiff. As the relief of specific performance is purely discretionary under Section 20 of Specific Relief Act, the Court cannot grant a decree, merely because it is lawful to do so and such discretion can be exercised judiciously. A-1 is a loan transaction but not an agreement to convey the property to the plaintiff. As the relief of specific performance is purely discretionary under Section 20 of Specific Relief Act, the Court cannot grant a decree, merely because it is lawful to do so and such discretion can be exercised judiciously. In Puvvada Chiranjeeva Rao vs. Busi Koteswara Rao, 2011 (6) ALT 261 : AIR 2012 AP 17 , while dealing with similar circumstances, this Court held as follows: "By its very nature, an equitable relief requires the person claiming it to be fair, reasonable and trustworthy. A plaintiff would disentitle himself from claiming such relief, if he has flouted the terms of the very agreement, which he seeks to enforce, with impunity. A person cannot be permitted to reap the benefits of a transaction partly through his unilateral acts, and to approach a Court of law for the balance of it. A plaintiff in a suit of such nature must prove his bona fide, before he seeks the assistance of the Court to compel the other person to perform his part of the obligation. It is not without reason that relief of specific performance is treated as equitable. In the ordinary course of things, if a party to a contract commits breach of terms thereof, the aggrieved party can certainly institute proceedings for damages. Further, the concerned party may choose to pay damages than to abide by the terms of the contract, may be for variety of reasons. Grant of relief of specific performance would curtail the freedom of a party to the agreement to rescind from it. Such a course can be adopted only when the persons who seek the relief convince the Court about their bona fides and prove that the entire blame for not taking the contract to its logical and, is with the other party." 34. Such a course can be adopted only when the persons who seek the relief convince the Court about their bona fides and prove that the entire blame for not taking the contract to its logical and, is with the other party." 34. The principle laid down by this Court in the decision cited supra, is directly applicable to the present facts of the case for the reason that if the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into contract and other circumstances are taken into consideration, it is clear that the plaintiff taking advantage of the financial crisis of the defendant obtained the said agreement entering an unconscionable term, which will give an unfair advantage over the defendant to the plaintiff and that too no ordinary prudent person will agree to sell the property worth of lakhs, more particularly, a newly constructed building in an extent of 270 square yards in a commercial town like Vijayawada. If all these circumstances are taken into consideration, it is difficult to grant the relief of specific performance in favour of the plaintiff by exercising discretion under Section 20 of Specific Relief Act. 35. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contended that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the advance amount paid under Ex. A-1 together with interest at 18% p.a. from the date of execution of Ex. A-1 till the date of payment, but the trial Court negated the relief of refund of advance amount on the ground no alternative relief for refund of advance amount with interest was claimed. Undoubtedly, according to Section 22 of Specific Relief Act, any person suing for the specific performance of a contract for transfer of immovable property may, in an appropriate case, ask for possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property, in addition to such performance; or any other relief to which he may be entitled, including refund of any earnest money or deposit paid or (made by) him, in case his claim for specific performance is refused. Thus, Section 22 permits the plaintiff to claim refund of earnest money or advance amount paid, but sub-section (2) of Section 22 creates an interdict that no relief under clause (a) or (b) shall be granted by the Court unless it has been specifically claimed. Thus, Section 22 permits the plaintiff to claim refund of earnest money or advance amount paid, but sub-section (2) of Section 22 creates an interdict that no relief under clause (a) or (b) shall be granted by the Court unless it has been specifically claimed. In view of the bar under sub-section 2 of Section 22 of Specific Relief Act, it is the duty of the plaintiff to claim relief of refund of advance amount and in the absence of such claim, the Court shall not accord such relief of refund of advance amount. The proviso under sub-section 2 of Section 22 permits the plaintiff who claimed relief of specific performance to amend the plaint, at any stage, and the Court may allow such amendment on such terms as may be just in inclusion of such claims contemplated under sub-section 1 clause (a) and (b) of Section 22. Despite availability of the benefit under sub-section 2, proviso to Section 22, the plaintiff did not get the plaint amended seeking the alternative relief of refund of advance amount, in such case, this Court cannot exercise its power to grant he relief of refund of advance amount, in view of the specific bar contained under sub-section 2 of Section 22 of Specific Relief Act. Hence, the trial Court rightly exercised its discretion in not granting the relief of specific performance and rightly exercised its jurisdiction in denying the relief of refund of advance amount and this finding does not call for interference of this Court. 36. In Ali Baig 2014 (3) ALD 449 (supra), this Court further held as follows: "Under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. Where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant, the Court may not decree specific performance. In (2010) 7 SCC 717 ) the Supreme Court considered the principles relating to exercise of discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In (2010) 7 SCC 717 ) the Supreme Court considered the principles relating to exercise of discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Applying the said principles to the facts of this case, upholding the decree of specific performance granted by the Court below, in the light of findings recorded supra, would not be proper and would result in giving an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendants. The conduct of the plaintiff and the pleas raised by him having been proved to be false, also disentitle him to the discretionary relief of specific performance." (Emphasis supplied) 37. The plaintiff also claimed damages of Rs. 30,000/- for breach of contract, but the trial Court did not specifically record any finding. However, this Court being Court of first Appeal is under an obligation to decide the same. The plaintiff claimed the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale, marked as Ex. A-1, in addition to that claimed damages of Rs. 30,000/- for breach of contract. If, Ex. A-1 is really an agreement of sale, he is entitled to claim damages, if he sustained any loss on account of such breach, but here according to my finding Ex. A-1 is only a transaction of loan and not an agreement of sale, but taking advantage of the financial crisis of the defendant, the plaintiff obtained Ex. A-1 incorporating an unconscionable condition to execute registered sale deed. Hence, Ex. A-1 is not an agreement of sale and failure to repay the amount under Ex. A-1 does not amount to breach of contract. At best the plaintiff is entitled only to recover the amount by filing a Suit basing on loan transaction. Hence, I hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any damages since Ex. A-1 is not an agreement or contract of sale. A-1 does not amount to breach of contract. At best the plaintiff is entitled only to recover the amount by filing a Suit basing on loan transaction. Hence, I hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any damages since Ex. A-1 is not an agreement or contract of sale. From a perusal of the entire judgment of the trial Court coupled with the evidence on record, there are no grounds calling for interference of this Court in the judgment and decree under challenge and in the absence of any legal infirmity in the finding recorded by the trial Court, it is difficult for this Court to interfere with the impugned decree and judgment and to set-aside the same and as such on discerning the entire material available on record, I find that the grounds urged by the plaintiff-appellant are without any legal basis and thereby I find that the Appeal is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed. In the result, the Appeal Suit is dismissed confirming the impugned decree and judgment dated 30.04.1994 passed in Original Suit No. 25 of 1989 by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada, Krishna District. In consequence, the Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this Appeal shall stand dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.