JUDGMENT L.K. Mohapatra, Actg. C.J. The petitioner in this writ application questions the legality of the order dated 4.6.2003 passed by the respondent no. 3 terminating his service. The National Co-operative Union of India (for short ’NCUI’) issued an advertisement for appointment of a Project Officer in the year 1999 and petitioner was one of the several applicants for appointment to such post. He was subjected to recruitment test and on the recommendation of the Selection Committee, he was appointed as a Project Officer in NCUI Co-operative Education Field Project, Bishnupur in the State of Manipur vide office order dated 19th July, 1999 and continued to hold such post till the order of termination was passed by the respondents on 4.6.2003. The impugned order of termination in Annexure-A/9 is quoted below: NATIONAL COOPERATIVE UNION OF INDIA (APEX ORGANISATION OF THE INDIAN COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT) Date: June 4, 2003 NCUI/AA/ESTT/Po/Bishnupur/03 OFFICE ORDER Inspite of many warning issued from time to time to Sh. L.G. Singh, Project Officer, NCUI Coop.Edn.Field Project, Bishnupur, he has not shown any improvement in his performance as Project Officer. It has been decided by the competent authority to terminate the services of Sh. L.G. Singh, Project Officer, NCUI Coop.Education Field Project, Bishnupur with immediate effect. Sd/- (D.P. Neb) Sr. Consultant 2. It is the case of the petitioner that since the order of termination is attached with a stigma, opportunity of hearing should have been given to him and admittedly no opportunity of hearing having been given to him before the impugned order was passed, the said order of termination is not sustainable in law. 3. A preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the respondents 2 to 4 with regards to the maintainability of the writ application. It is stated in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the above respondents that NCUI is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as such the writ is not maintainable against a private body. In answer to the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents, it was submitted by Mr. Kh. Tarunkumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the NCUI is discharging public duty and as such it is an "Authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the writ application is maintainable. 4. In answer to the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents, it was submitted by Mr. Kh. Tarunkumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the NCUI is discharging public duty and as such it is an "Authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the writ application is maintainable. 4. Before entering into the merits of the case, it is necessary to examine as to whether the NCUI is a "State" or "Authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In order to examine this question, it is not only necessary to look into the bye-laws of NCUI but also several decisions cited by the learned counsel appearing for both parties. 4.1. The law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Hasia & Ors. -vs- Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors., reported in (1981) 1 SCC 722 is that the test for determining as to whether an "Authority" falls within the definition of "State" in Article 12 is whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government. It is immaterial whether the corporation is created by a statute or under a statute. The concept of instrumentality or agency of the Government is not limited to a corporation created by a statute but is equally applicable to a company or society and in a given case it would have to be decided, on a consideration of the relevant factors, whether the company or society is an instrumentality or agency of the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression ’authority’ in Article 12. Applying the above principles, the Supreme Court in the said case held that even though the administration and management of the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar, is under the control of a society registered under the J & K Registration of Societies Act, it is an instrumentality or agency of the State and the Central Government and is an "Authority" within the meaning of Article 12. While coming to such conclusion, the Apex Court also found that from the Memorandum of Articles and rules of society, it appears that the composition of the society is dominated by the representatives appointed by the Central Government and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh with the approval of the Central Government. While coming to such conclusion, the Apex Court also found that from the Memorandum of Articles and rules of society, it appears that the composition of the society is dominated by the representatives appointed by the Central Government and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh with the approval of the Central Government. The money required for running the College was also provided entirely by the Central Government and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The rules made by the Society were also required to have the approval of the Central Government and the State Government and the accounts of the society have also to be submitted to both the Governments for their scrutiny and satisfaction. The society was also required to comply with all such directions as may be issued by the State Govt. with the approval of the Central Government in respect of any matter dealt with in the report of the Reviewing Committee. All these factors were taken into account by the Apex Court while holding that the society which controls administration and management of the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar, is an instrumentality of the State and accordingly an "Authority" under Article 12. This question again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas - Vs - Indian Institute of Chemical Biology & Ors, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 111 . The Apex Court held that tests to determine, as formulated in Ajay Hasia case (Supra), are not a rigid set of principles so that a body falling within any one of them must be considered to be ’State’. The question in each case would be whether on facts the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government and such control must be particular to that body and must be pervasive. 4.2. The above decision in the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) was again taken note by the Apex Court in the case of Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Ors. -Vs - Union of India & Ors. reported in (2005) 4 SCC 649 before a Constitution Bench. The Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether the BCCI is amenable writ jurisdiction or not. -Vs - Union of India & Ors. reported in (2005) 4 SCC 649 before a Constitution Bench. The Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether the BCCI is amenable writ jurisdiction or not. In para-35 of the judgment, the majority view was that there can be no two views about the fact that the constitution of this country is a living organism, and it is the duty of the court to interpret the same to fulfill the needs and aspiration of the people depending on the needs of the time. The term ’other authorities’ was introduced in Article 12 at the time of framing of Constitution with a limited objective of granting judicial review of actions of such authorities which are created under the statute and which discharge state functions. However, because of the need of the day in the case of Rajasthan SEV -Vrs- Mohan Lal, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1857 and the case of Sukhdev Singh -Vs- Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 421 , noticing the socio-economic policy of the country the court thought it fit to expand the definition of the term ’other authorities’ to include bodies other than statutory bodies. This development of law by judicial interpretation culminated in the judgment of the seven-Judge Bench in the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra). The court further observed that in the meantime the socio-economic policy of the Government of India has changed and State is today distancing itself from commercial activities and concentrating on governance rather than on business. Therefore, the situation prevailing at the time of Sukhdev Singh (supra) is not in existence at least for the time being, hence, there seems to be no need to further expand the scope of ’other authorities’ in Article 12 by judicial interpretation at least for the time being. It was also observed that in a democracy there is a dividing line between a State enterprise and a non-State enterprise, which is distinct and the judiciary should not be an instrument to erase the said dividing line unless, of course, the circumstances of the day require it to do so. With all the above observations, the majority view was that the Board of Cricket Control of India is not a State for the purpose of Article 12. 5. With all the above observations, the majority view was that the Board of Cricket Control of India is not a State for the purpose of Article 12. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placed reliance in another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. -Vrs - Partha Sarathi Sen Roy, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 345 . Referring to the above judgment, the learned counsel submitted that in the above reported case the petitioner was an employee of a Company and filed a writ application challenging his termination. On perusal of the judgment, we find that the Apex Court on detail examination all the factors like, formation of the Company, its objectives, functions, management and control, financial aid received by it, extent of domination by Government and control of Government, came to the conclusion that the said Company is an "authority" under Article 12 making it amenable the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. 6. In the light of the above decisions, we now to proceed to examine the bye-laws of NCUI to find out as to whether State Government or the Central Government has any control whatsoever in functioning of the said organization. The object of the union is to promote and develop the cooperative movement in India, to guide and assist the people for their effort to built up and expand the cooperative sector and serve for expanding of cooperative opinion in accordance with cooperative principles as enunciated in the first schedule to the Act. 6.1. The membership of the Union shall be open to the State Co-operative Union, National Cooperative Societies/Federations Cooperative Unions of Union Territories, etc.. The funds raised for NCUI are from different sources such as annual membership subscription and other grants from the Government and some other sources as mentioned in Clause-8 of the bye-laws. Nothing has been placed before the Court to indicate that the NCUI has received any financial grant from the Central Government or the State Government. On the other hand, learned counsel, Mr. Ch. Momon Singh, appearing on behalf of respondents 3 to 5 submitted that there is no financial grant either from the State Government or from the Central Government and the NCUI is only engaged for execution of certain projects of the State and Central Government. On the other hand, learned counsel, Mr. Ch. Momon Singh, appearing on behalf of respondents 3 to 5 submitted that there is no financial grant either from the State Government or from the Central Government and the NCUI is only engaged for execution of certain projects of the State and Central Government. On examination of the entire bye-laws, we find that there is no representative either from the State Govt. or from the Central Govt. and there is absolutely no participation either from the State Govt. or from the Central Govt. in functioning of the NCUI. There is nothing in bye-laws to show that either the State Govt. or the Central Govt. has any kind of control over the functioning of the NCUI. Therefore, if the present case is examined in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the above decisions, it can safely be held that the NCUI is neither an instrumentality nor an agency of the State and it is completely a private body and neither the State Govt. nor the Central Govt. has any control over its functioning nor it is financed either by the Central Govt. or the State Govt. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the NCUI is not an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and accordingly the said private body is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. It was strenuously contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since NCUI is discharging public duty, even if the Central or the State Government have no control over its functioning, it is amenable to writ jurisdiction. Even if we go to the extent of accepting these submissions, any dispute relating to discharge of public duty may be examined by the Court in a writ jurisdiction, but any internal dispute relating to the service conditions of an employee of the organization such as taking disciplinary action against one of the employees of NCUI is definitely not an action in discharge of public duty and therefore, the writ application filed by the petitioner challenging his termination from service cannot be examined by the Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Since we hold that NCUI is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, we have not examined the case on merit. The Writ application is not maintainable and accordingly stands dismissed.