Tripura Khadi & Village Industries Board, The Chairman, Tripura Khadi & Village Industries Board and The Executive Officer v. Kajal Bhadra
2014-01-13
DEEPAK GUPTA, S.TALAPATRA
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DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta, C.J.:- This appeal by the Tripura Khadi & Village Industries Board & Ors., hereafter referred to as the 'Board' is directed against the judgment dated 06.12.2006 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Agartala Bench of the Gauhati High Court. Briefly stated the facts are that the respondent hereinafter referred to as the 'writ petitioner' was employed with the Board. The case of the Board is that the writ petitioner remained illegally absent from duties from 03.09.1993 to 22.03.1994 in different spells. Inquiry proceedings were initiated against the writ petitioner but on 12.03.1997, a report was submitted by the Inquiry Officer that the charges against the writ petitioner had not been proved and the Inquiry Officer directed that the proceedings against the writ petitioner be dropped. 2. The Disciplinary Authority considered the finding of the Inquiry Officer and vide order dated 12.03.1997 came to the conclusion that the Inquiry Officer had acted beyond his jurisdiction and competence. Therefore, on 26.06.1997 the Disciplinary Authority ordered that de novo inquiry be conducted against the petitioner in respect of the charges levelled against him. 3. The petitioner represented against conducting such de novo inquiry. Thereafter, surprisingly, on 3rd May, 1999 the Disciplinary Authority without giving any reasons decided to repeal the earlier order whereby de novo inquiry had been ordered. On the same date, i.e. 03.05.1999 the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to consider the material available against the writ petitioner and disagreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. He passed a detailed order stating the reasons given by him to disagree against the report of the Inquiry Officer and this order runs into 3(three) closely typed pages. At this stage, it would be pertinent to mention that in addition to the charges which had been inquired against the writ petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority while disagreeing with the report of the Inquiry Officer raised certain other issues which were not the subject matter of the inquiry. He was of the view that the petitioner had absented himself from duty with a view to avoid his arrest in a criminal case. This charge had never been levelled against the petitioner. 4. Be that as it may, the petitioner also filed a detailed reply raising a number of objections and this reply (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) runs into 12(twelve) pages.
This charge had never been levelled against the petitioner. 4. Be that as it may, the petitioner also filed a detailed reply raising a number of objections and this reply (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) runs into 12(twelve) pages. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: Sri Bhadra, submitted his reply vide his letter dated 14.05.99. After careful consideration of all relevant aspects & application of mind the undersigned came to the conclusion that, the proposed punishment should stand. 5. The appeal filed by the writ petitioner against this order was rejected by a non-reasoned order. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner on the ground that the order of termination of the services of the petitioner had been passed by the Disciplinary Authority not on the basis of any adverse finding given in the inquiry but on the basis of independent evaluation of material by the Disciplinary Authority. The learned Single Judge also held that the Disciplinary Authority introduced a 3rd charge that the petitioner was avoiding police action and no such charge has been levelled against the petitioner. The Learned Single Judge also came to the conclusion that the Disciplinary Authority had not followed a fair procedure. 6. Mr. B. Datta, learned State counsel appearing for the Board submits that there was only a procedural defect inasmuch as one witness had not been examined. In our view, non-examination of witness is not a procedural defect. If a material witness is not examined, then obviously the prosecution must suffer. In any event, once the Disciplinary Authority had taken a decision to order de novo inquiry it had the opportunity to examine this witness again but after having withdrawn the de novo inquiry, the Board cannot now pray before us, at this belated stage, that it should be permitted to examine the said witness. 7. There are many lacunae in the prosecution version. The first is that after having exercised power vested in it and ordering de novo inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority could not have reassessed the inquiry report on merits. This should have been either done at the initial stage but could not have been done after taking a decision to set aside the inquiry and order de novo inquiry.
The first is that after having exercised power vested in it and ordering de novo inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority could not have reassessed the inquiry report on merits. This should have been either done at the initial stage but could not have been done after taking a decision to set aside the inquiry and order de novo inquiry. Once the earlier inquiry report had been set aside and de novo inquiry ordered, no inquiry report existed in the eyes of law and therefore, the materials in the said inquiry report could not be used by the Disciplinary Authority. No doubt the copy of the inquiry report as well as the prima-facie findings of the Disciplinary Authority were sent to the delinquent official. He also submitted a detailed reply to the same. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the relevant portion which has been quoted by us hereinabove is a short and cryptic order which gives no reasons. The delinquent official had raised many objections in his response to the notice issued by the Disciplinary Authority. Each of these points should have been dealt with by the Disciplinary Authority in his order. We are constrained to observe that the order is totally non-speaking and without any reasons whatsoever. The appellate order suffers from the same vice and is a totally non-speaking order. In view of the above discussion, we find no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.