Judgment L. Narasimha Reddy, J. The Court of Sessions Judge, Nizamabad, through its judgment dated 23.07.2009, convicted the appellant/A-1 in S.C.No.363 of 2007 for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. and imposed punishment of imprisonment for life. Fine of Rs.5,000/-was imposed and in default, he was required to suffer imprisonment for a period of three months. A-2, the mother of A-1, was acquitted. This appeal is filed by A-1. The relevant facts, in brief, are as under: A-1 married Nazia Sulthana, the daughter of PW.1, on 15.01.2006. It is stated that ever since the marriage, A-1 was not liking his wife, on the ground that she is black in complexion and within two months, she was sent back to the house of her parents. Panchayats were said to have been held and ultimately, Nazia Sulthana was living with A-1. In the afternoon of 27.06.2006, Nazia Sulthana was admitted in the Government Hospital, Nizamabad, with serious burn injuries. Her mother, PW.1, submitted a complaint before the Police Station Nizamabad, alleging that A-1, his mother and other family members were harassing Nazia Sulthana for additional dowry and by commenting that she is not good looking and panchayats were held on two occasions. She stated that she received a phone call from one of her relations to the effect that her daughter was admitted in Government Hospital and she immediately rushed to the scene. She alleged that her daughter was set at fire by A-1 and his family members. Cr.No.95 of 2006 was registered. Taking note of the condition of the victim, the Superintendent of Government Hospital gave a requisition to the jurisdictional Judicial First Class Magistrate (PW.12), who, in turn, recorded a Dying Declaration (DD) marked as Ex.P5. The victim stated that her husband, A-1 herein, poured kerosene and set her on fire. She alleged that A-1 has illicit relationship with another married woman. Four days thereafter i.e., on 01.07.2006 Nazia Sulthana died. Sections in the First Information Report were altered and offence under Section 302 I.P.C. was alleged against A-1 and his mother - A-2. The Investigating Officer caused the scene of offence panchanama, inquest and postmortem report to be prepared. After completing the investigation, a charge sheet was filed alleging the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. against A-1 and his mother - A-2. Before the trial Court, PWs.1 to 15 were examined and Exs.P1 to P10 were filed. The Investigating Officer caused the scene of offence panchanama, inquest and postmortem report to be prepared. After completing the investigation, a charge sheet was filed alleging the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. against A-1 and his mother - A-2. Before the trial Court, PWs.1 to 15 were examined and Exs.P1 to P10 were filed. Besides that, MOs.1 and 2 were taken on record. As observed earlier, the trial Court convicted A-1 and imposed sentence, but acquitted A-2. Learned counsel for A-1 submits that the conviction of his client is based entirely upon Ex.P5, though it was not at all corroborated by any other evidence. She submits that while PW.1 stated that A-1 and his family members, including mother and sisters, have set the deceased on fire, the deceased stated in Ex.P5 that A-1 alone has set her on fire. Learned counsel contends that in her cross examination, PW.1 categorically stated that Ex.P5 was recorded only after herself, her brother and sister have interacted with the victim and in that view of the matter, no credence can be given to Ex.P5. Learned counsel further submits that the victim is said to have spoken Urdu, whereas PW.12, who recorded the D.D., translated the same into Telugu. Placing reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Shaik Moin , learned counsel contends that such a D.D. cannot be taken into account at all. She further submits that the very fact that A-1 has sold his house for returning the articles, given at the time of marriage, discloses that he did not have any intention to demand dowry and that the conviction ordered against him cannot be sustained in law. Learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submits that Ex.P5 did not suffer from any infirmity and the conviction based upon it cannot be disturbed, simply by expressing doubts. She submits that there were disputes between A-1 and the deceased shortly after the marriage and the fact that within a span of six months, between the date of marriage and the date of death of the deceased, two panchayats were held, discloses the intention on the part of A-1 to do away with the deceased. He further submits that the trial Court has appreciated the evidence from the correct perspective and that the judgment rendered by it does not warrant interference. He further submits that the trial Court has appreciated the evidence from the correct perspective and that the judgment rendered by it does not warrant interference. Out of the two accused that were tried for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C., only one was convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. The point that arises for consideration is as to, “Whether the conviction and consequential sentence handed out by the trial Court against A-1 can be sustained in law?” It is not in dispute that A-1 was married to the deceased and the latter died on account of burn injuries. The prosecution alleged that the deceased was set at fire by A-1 by pouring kerosene. It is true that in matters of this nature, it is difficult to expect any eyewitness, particularly when the death of a woman has taken place in the house of her in-laws. The trial Court has virtually rested its findings upon Ex.P5, recorded by PW.12. A dying declaration, which reflects the version of a victim uninfluenced by any factors, can certainly be taken into account. Existence of corroborative material, no doubt, would help the Court to come to a more accurate conclusion. However, absence thereof cannot disable the Court from acting upon such declaration. In the instant case, the declaration was recorded on 27.06.2006 i.e., the same day on which the incident has occurred. The text thereof is as under: “Q. No.9. What happened and tell me about the incident? Ans: My name is Naziya Sulthana, Muskan, My husband is not liking me my husband poured Kerosene on my body and lit fire. Nobody co-operated with him. My Uncle Ameeruddin got admitted me in the hospital. My Mother in law also in the house. Nobody is in the house, when my husband poured kerosene oil on me, my mother in law not said anything. Q. No.10. Would you like to say anything more? Ans: Please help me my husband used to abuse me he is not liking me, and he beat me. My husband is having illicit intimacy with another woman, who is married person.” PW.12, who recorded the dying declaration, stated that the victim spoke in Urdu and she translated the same into Telugu. An attempt is made to find fault with the very procedure of recording the declaration, by placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shaik Moin (supra). An attempt is made to find fault with the very procedure of recording the declaration, by placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shaik Moin (supra). In that case, the witness spoke in Urdu and the Officer, who recorded the same, was not conversant with that language. It was prepared in Telugu language. The Supreme Court took a view that such a declaration cannot be treated as valid. In the instant case, PW.12 categorically stated that the victim was speaking Hindi and in view of the same, she too has put the questions in Hindi. Thereby, the conversation between the Officer and the victim, has taken place in the same language. It is a different matter that it was written in Telugu. No provision of law or decided case is cited to convince us that such a procedure is defective. One thing, which, however, makes us to hesitate to take the contents of Ex.P5 as the sole basis for convicting A-1, is that much has transpired between the occurrence of incident and the recording of the same. PW.2 is the maternal uncle of the deceased. It is he, who arranged the marriage between A-1 and the deceased. He gave the information about the incident to PW.1. In his cross examination, he stated as under: “The statement of the deceased was recorded by a Magistrate while she was in the hospital. Myself, my sister, my brother had a talk with the deceased in the hospital. Thereafter the magistrate recorded her statement.” It is important to note that the deceased was not in such a precarious condition as to not able to interact with others and to form opinion. She was alive till 01.07.2006 i.e., four days after the incident. It is not difficult to imagine the result of her interaction in the hospital with PWs.1 and 2, immediately preceding the recording of the statement. Here itself, we intend to add that, had there been any corroborative material to support Ex.P5, the mere fact that the deceased interacted with her parents and other relations would not have made much difference. When the conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstances must be taken into account in their entirety. The incident of burning has taken place in the house of A-1 himself. The whole controversy is as to who caused the burn injuries. When the conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstances must be taken into account in their entirety. The incident of burning has taken place in the house of A-1 himself. The whole controversy is as to who caused the burn injuries. The scene of offence panchanama marked as Ex.P3 indicates that the residence of A-1 comprised of a front room, abutted by a bathroom, on one side, a varanda, on the second side, and a small room, on the third side. It was mentioned that the kerosene smell was prevailing in the scene, and that match box was also present. However, no signs of burning or any item in the house catching fire were noticed. In case the victim was set at fire by A-1 or somebody else, she would have made an attempt to escape from scene and in Ex.P5, the deceased did not even mention that anybody has prevented her from escaping. If she is forced to remain in the house, the articles, such as clothing and bed, in such a small room would have naturally caught fire. It is not uncommon that if an attempt is made by an accused to prevent the victim of burning flames from escaping, he or she would also sustain burn injuries may be, of a lesser degree. No signs of burning were noticed in the house. It is difficult to arrive at a conclusion that A-1 has forcibly set the deceased on fire. Though we do not take judicial notice of the fact, it is generally observed that the burn injuries to the extent of 80 to 90% would either when the victim himself or herself or when the person who has set the victim on fire prevents the latter from dousing it. In such cases, the accused is bound to suffer burns. At the same time, we do not intend to generalize this. The victim herein was found to have sustained more than 90% injuries, by the time she was admitted into hospital. It is also essential to note that the incident is said to have taken place in the morning, where movement of people is vigorous and even a small cry in such a locality would attract the attention of many. The victim herein was found to have sustained more than 90% injuries, by the time she was admitted into hospital. It is also essential to note that the incident is said to have taken place in the morning, where movement of people is vigorous and even a small cry in such a locality would attract the attention of many. A pendulum of doubt lingers between two extremes of a voluntary act of burning, on the one hand, and the forcible setting of fire, on the other hand. The evidence on record does not enable this Court to stop the pendulum at any extreme, but all the same the benefit of doubt deserves to be given to the accused. The conduct of A-1 in selling the house and returning all the articles that were given to him at the time of marriage, would also give an indication that he was not the one for additional dowry. In the result, we allow the Criminal Appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC by the District and Sessions Judge, Nizamabad, in S.C.No.363 of 2007. In case the appellant is not required in any other case, he shall be released forthwith. Fine amount, if any, paid by the appellant shall be returned to him. The miscellaneous petition filed in this appeal shall also stand disposed of.