Anil s/o Tulshiram Sonkusle v. State of Maharashtra, through its Secretary, Tribal Development Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai -32
2014-06-11
B.R.GAVAI, S.B.SHUKRE
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
ORAL JUDGMENT : (per B.R. Gavai, J. ) 1. Heard. 2. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. 3. The petitioner has approached this Court praying for quashing and setting aside the reversion order dated 02.06.2014 issued by respondent no.3. 4. The facts in brief giving rise to the present petition are as under:- The petitioner was appointed as a Junior Clerk against the vacancy reserved for the Scheduled Tribe on the basis of his claim that he belongs to Halba which is recognised as Scheduled Tribe in the State of Maharashtra. The petitioner came to be promoted on 20.05.1992 as Senior Clerk and was again promoted as Head Clerk on 24.08.2000. The case of the petitioner came to be referred to the Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee-respondent no.2 herein. Vide order dated 25.02.2008, the claim of the petitioner came to be invalidated on the basis of the Police Vigilance Cell report. The said order of invalidation was challenged by the petitioner before this Court by way of Writ Petition No. 4690/2010. The Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 19.11.2010 remitted the matter back to the Scrutiny Committee for reconsideration and directed the parties to maintain status-quo till the caste claim of the petitioner is decided. By the impugned order dated 02.06.2014, the petitioner has been reverted to the post of Senior Clerk on the ground of non-submission of the validity certificate. Being aggrieved thereby, the present writ petition is preferred. 5. Mr. Narnaware, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra .vs. Milind, 2001(1)Mh.L.J.(SC) 1 and other judgments of the Apex Court including in the case of Kavita Solunke .vs. State of Maharashtra and others – 2012(5) Mh.L.J. 921 and in the case of Shalini .vs. New English High School Association and ors. and in the case of R. Unnikrishnan and another .vs. V.K. Mahanudevan and ors. - 2014(1) SCALE 305 and the various Division Bench judgments of this Court including the one in Writ Petition No.4229/2013 (Pravin B. Bais .vs. The Principal, Shrikrishnadas Jajoo Grameen Sewa Mahavidyalaya, Pipri and ors) and the one in the case of A.P. Ramtekkar and ors. .vs. Union of India and ors.
- 2014(1) SCALE 305 and the various Division Bench judgments of this Court including the one in Writ Petition No.4229/2013 (Pravin B. Bais .vs. The Principal, Shrikrishnadas Jajoo Grameen Sewa Mahavidyalaya, Pipri and ors) and the one in the case of A.P. Ramtekkar and ors. .vs. Union of India and ors. - 2013(2) Mh.L.J. 419 (to which one of us i.e. Shri Gavai, J. is party), the petitioner’s promotions being prior to 28.11.2000 i.e. the date on which the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Milind and others (supra) came to be rendered, the petitioner is entitled to protection of his promotional benefits also. 6. The question regarding whether the Halba Koshtis are entitled to be treated as Scheduled Tribe or not was pending before the Apex Court for a long period. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Abhay Parate vs. State of Maharashtra – 1984 Mh.L.J.289 had taken a view that Halba Koshtis are part of the Scheduled Tribe (Halba) and as such were entitled to the status of the Scheduled Tribe. However, for the first time the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra .vs. Milind and others (supra) took a view that no addition or alterations to the Presidential Order were permitted and as such Halba Koshtis were not entitled to be treated as Scheduled Tribe. However, taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court observed in para no.36 thus:- “Respondent no. 1 joined the medical course for the year 1985- 86. Almost 15 years have passed by now. We are told he has already completed the course and may be he is practicing as doctor. In this view and at this length of time it is for nobody's benefit to annul his Admission. Huge amount is spent on each candidate for completion of medical course. No doubt, one Scheduled Tribe candidate was deprived of joining medical course by the admission given to respondent no. 1. If any action is taken against respondent no. 1, it may lead depriving the service of a doctor to the society on whom public money has already been spent. In these circumstances, this judgment shall not affect the degree obtained by him and his practicing as a doctor.
1. If any action is taken against respondent no. 1, it may lead depriving the service of a doctor to the society on whom public money has already been spent. In these circumstances, this judgment shall not affect the degree obtained by him and his practicing as a doctor. But we make it clear that he cannot claim to belong to the Scheduled Tribe covered by the Scheduled Tribes Order. In other words, he cannot take advantage of the Scheduled Tribes Order any further or for any other constitutional purpose. Having regard to the passage of time, in the given circumstances, including interim orders passed by this Court in SLP (C) No. 16372/85 and other related affairs, we make it clear that the admissions and appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this judgment. It could be thus seen that what the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court protected was the admissions and appointments that had become final. However, it could be seen from para 36 itself that while protecting the medical education undertaken by the respondent no.1 i.e. Milind, the Apex Court had specifically observed that he cannot claim to belong to the Scheduled Tribe covered by the Scheduled Tribes Order. It could thus be seen that in the peculiar facts and circumstances and particularly taking into consideration the question that the issue as to whether Halba Koshtis were Scheduled Tribe or not was pending for a considerable long time, the admissions and appointments which had become final prior to the said date were protected by the Apex Court. 7. The perusal of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kavita Solunke (supra) which is subsequently followed by various Division Benches (to which one of us i.e. Shri Gavai, J. is party) again deals with only protection insofar as the appointment is concerned. The petitioner therein i.e. Kavita Solunke was appointed as an Assistant Teacher against the post reserved for Scheduled Tribe candidate though her claim of belonging to Halba Scheduled Tribe came to be rejected and she was held to be belonging to Koshti.
The petitioner therein i.e. Kavita Solunke was appointed as an Assistant Teacher against the post reserved for Scheduled Tribe candidate though her claim of belonging to Halba Scheduled Tribe came to be rejected and she was held to be belonging to Koshti. The Apex Court finding that her appointment was on 01.08.1995 i.e. much prior to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Milind Katware (supra) observed thus :- “There is, therefore, no reason why the benefit of protection against ouster should not be extended to her subject to the usual condition that the appellant shall not be ousted from service and shall be reinstated if already ousted, but she would not be entitled to any further benefit on the basis of the certificate which she has obtained and which was 10 years after its issue cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee.” 8. It could thus be clearly seen that the protection granted by the Apex Court was only against the ouster of Kavita Solunke from her employment. The Apex Court further observed that she would not be entitled to any further benefits on the basis of the certificate which she had obtained and which was cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee 10 years after its issuance. Not only that the Apex Court further observed that for the period during which Kavita Solunke was out of employment, she would not be entitled to claim any salary/back-wages. She was, however, held to be entitled to continuity of service for all other intents and purposes. 9. Even insofar as the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shalini .vs. New English High School Association and ors. (supra) is concerned, it could be seen that she was appointed as Assistant Teacher with effect from 01.01.1984. She had also been promoted as Assistant Head Mistress and Head Mistress. However, while allowing special leave petition filed by her, the Apex Court directed her reinstatement as an Assistant Teacher. The Apex Court found that with the passage of time it is possible that there may be another incumbent as Head Mistress of the respondent no.1- School and it would not be equitable to remove such person. However, even in her case the Apex Court declined the benefits of back-wages.
The Apex Court found that with the passage of time it is possible that there may be another incumbent as Head Mistress of the respondent no.1- School and it would not be equitable to remove such person. However, even in her case the Apex Court declined the benefits of back-wages. The Apex Court further found that if this post falls vacant before the appellant reaches the age of retirement or superannuation, she shall be re-appointed to that post but with no further promotion as a Scheduled Tribe candidate unless she is otherwise entitled as a special backward class candidate. 10. Insofar as the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of R. Unnikrishnan and another (supra) is concerned, two issues arose before the Apex Court. The first issue was as to whether once an issue regarding the claim of the respondent therein was concluded by the judgment of the High Court, can it be reopened? The another issue that arose for consideration was whether by passage of time and on account of concluding state of affairs if a person is held to be belonging to Scheduled Tribe/Scheduled Caste for considerable time, he would not be entitled for protection or not. It was found that the High Court had clearly held the respondent no. 1 therein to be belonging to Scheduled Caste and as such the said issue could not be reopened. Insofar as the second issue is concerned relying on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Milind (supra), the Apex Court found that his services were entitled to be protected. It could thus be seen that in all the cases before the Apex Court and which basically flow from the judgment in the case of Milind, what has been specifically protected is only admissions and appointments which have become final. However, merely because somebody’s appointment which has become final prior to 28.11.2000, cannot be considered a ground even to protect the promotional benefits which were obtained by such a person on the basis of his claim of belonging to Scheduled Tribe. 11. The grounds for protecting somebody’s appointment and the admission are plenty.
However, merely because somebody’s appointment which has become final prior to 28.11.2000, cannot be considered a ground even to protect the promotional benefits which were obtained by such a person on the basis of his claim of belonging to Scheduled Tribe. 11. The grounds for protecting somebody’s appointment and the admission are plenty. If a person is admitted and he undertakes the entire course and after completion of the course obtains a degree, cancellation of the admission would serve no purpose inasmuch as the seat on which such a candidate was admitted and had undertaken the education, cannot be given to any other candidate belonging to Scheduled Tribe. Not only that if such a candidate has taken education in specilized field like medicine, engineering, architecture, result of such a cancellation would be depriving the services of such a candidate to the society on whom public money has already been spent. The factors while protecting the appointment would be more humane than legal or technical. The person who has rendered 25 years or 30 years service and who is aged about 50 years or above, cannot be expected to be thrown away on the street at such a fag end of his career. If he is terminated at such a fag end, there may be disastrous results. A person’s son or daughter may be taking education either in engineering or medicine or any other specialized course. If he is thrown on street, it will not be possible for such a person to pursue the educational career of his children. So also it will be difficult for him to find out another job and he and his family will be left with no other alternative but to lead life of starvation. 12. However, the grounds which weigh while protecting a person’s appointment even after he being held to be not belonging to Scheduled Tribe, would not necessarily follow for protecting the promotional benefits which he has obtained on the basis of his claim of he belonging to Scheduled Tribe, though he has been held to be not belonging to Scheduled Tribe. In our view if the promotional benefits are protected, it would lead to giving a premium to a person who has been held to be not belonging to Scheduled Tribe.
In our view if the promotional benefits are protected, it would lead to giving a premium to a person who has been held to be not belonging to Scheduled Tribe. If such a course is adopted, it will deprive genuine Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste candidate from availing the promotional benefits which otherwise he would have been entitled to. 13. Insofar as the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of A.P. Ramtekkar (supra) is concerned (to which one of us i.e. Shri Gavai, J. is a party), what specifically fell for consideration before this Court is that the petitioners therein had put in more than 25 years of service and as such the Division Bench was inclined to protect their services. However, the moot question is as to whether the candidate who was appointed on the basis of his claim of belonging to Scheduled Tribe and whose claim was found to be invalidated, would also be entitled to further promotional benefits, did not fall for consideration in the said case. In that view of the matter, the said judgment in our view would not be applicable in the present writ petition. 14. As a matter of fact the said question directly arose for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court to which one of us is a party (Shri Gavai, J.) in the case of Prabhakar s/o Rushi Nandanwar .vs. Joint Commissioner and Vice-Chairman- 2013(1) Mh.L.J. 156 . The Division Bench observed thus:- 13. However, at the same, we may add that what has been protected by the Apex Court is only the appointments of the candidates belonging to Halba Koshti which had become final. We are of the considered view that the word “appointment” cannot be stretched to include “promotion” also. Permitting an employment of a person who has served for long period is on a different pedestal than permitting him even to enjoy the promotional benefits on the basis of his claim of belonging to Scheduled Tribe which is found to be invalidated. Not protecting the employment/appointment of such a person would result in great hardship at an advanced age as it would not be possible for such persons to get another employment at this age. It would, therefore, be not appropriate to drive such persons on road.
Not protecting the employment/appointment of such a person would result in great hardship at an advanced age as it would not be possible for such persons to get another employment at this age. It would, therefore, be not appropriate to drive such persons on road. Particularly so when on account of a confusion that was prevailing as to whether the Halba Koshtis are included Halba/Halbi or not, we find that the appointment of such person deserves protection. However, such a consideration cannot be made applicable to the promotions inasmuch as if the same is accepted, it will be giving premium to a person whose claim has been invalidated and at the same time, it would deprive a legitimate Scheduled Tribe candidate of the promotion to which he is entitled to on the basis of him belonging to Scheduled Tribe. At the cost of repetition, we may reiterate that what has been protected in the case of Milind (supra) is only admissions and appointments which had become final. 15. In that view of the matter, we do not find that any case is made out for interference with the impugned order. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed. We clarify that the petitioner would be entitled only for protection of his initial appointment and not any further benefits which have been availed by him on the basis of his claim of belonging to Scheduled Tribe. Needless to state that the petitioner has also obtained the validity certificate of belonging to Special Backward Class. In that event, if the petitioner is entitled to any promotional benefits on the basis of his claim of Special Backward Class, he would be entitled for the same but in no case on the basis of his claim of belonging to Scheduled Tribe. 16. Rule discharged. No costs.