JUDGMENT Sudhir Agarwal,J. 1. Heard Sri Manoj Kumar, Advocate for petitioners and Sri C.B. Gupta, Advocate for respondent no. 3. 2. This is a tenants' writ petition, who have lost in both the courts below. Landlord's release Application No. 01 of 1998, filed under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1972"), in respect of accommodation in question, was allowed by Prescribed Authority vide order dated 06.02.2006 and thereagainst petitioners-tenants' Rent Appeal No. 10 of 2006 was dismissed by 10th Additional District Judge, Budaun vide judgment dated 25.03.2014. 3. It is contended that petitioners brought certain subsequent events before Lower Appellate Court which have been noticed in its judgment but no finding has been recorded. My attention is drawn to impugned judgment dated 25.03.2014, internal page 36-37, which reads as under: "On a perusal of file it is found that the applicant's son Tanmay Rastogi is carrying on his own dental clinic in a portion of his uncle Dr. Praval Rastogi with his permission and is residing in the residential building of his grand father Shree Harishchandra Rastogi with his permission for the time being. Shree Tejendra Asthana has filed affidavit paper no. 104C in the appellate court in which he has deposed that Shree Harishchandra Rastogi and Smt. Premlata Rastogi and, Praval Rastogi has died and the wife of Praval Rastogi who was living in the residential accommodation of his grandfather and grand mother with their permission has become the owner of the half portion of the residential building of his grandfather late Shree Harishchandra Rastogi. Thus the permission has come to an end and the need of the disputed building has come to an end and the need of the disputed building has also come to and end. In rebuttal of the affidavit 104c, affidavit of Tanmay Rastogi paper no. 117c/2 to 117c/5 and affidavit of Shree Rajeev Rastogi paper no. 117c/6 to 117c/9 has been filed. In both the affidavits it has been stated that on the death of Shree Harishchandra Rastogi and Smt. Prem Lata Rastogi, Dr. Tanmay Rastogi or Rajeev Rastogi has not become the sole owner of the property of late Shree Harishchandra Rastogi and Smt. Premlata Rastogi but there are others co-sharers too. 117c/6 to 117c/9 has been filed. In both the affidavits it has been stated that on the death of Shree Harishchandra Rastogi and Smt. Prem Lata Rastogi, Dr. Tanmay Rastogi or Rajeev Rastogi has not become the sole owner of the property of late Shree Harishchandra Rastogi and Smt. Premlata Rastogi but there are others co-sharers too. Wife of Shree Praval Rastogi, Praval Rastogi's son and daughter, Rajeev Rastogi and brother Vaibhav Rastogi all inherited the property of Shree Harishchandra Rastogi and Smt. Premlata Rastogi jointly so permission given by them to Dr. Tanmay Rastogi has not come to an end. There is no force in the contention of counsel for the appellants that consultation chamber comes with in the category of professional use and the building in dispute is residential building so it cannot be released for the purpose of operation a consultation chamber as per the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13/72, because as per the evidence on record the building is needed for residence of Tanmay Rastogi in which Tanmay Rastogi will reside and in one room of the disputed building he will open a consultation chamber. Opening of consultation chamber in a residential building does change the nature of residential building. It has been held by the Mysore High Court, in Mrs. Colaco Versus Urban D' Silva 1970 Rent Control Reporter, 733: AIR 1970 Mys 297, 299 that "Even though a house is taken for residential purpose, it does not prevent the person from carrying on his profession in the said premises during his spare time as has been pointed out by Madras High Court. Simply because a lawyer meets his clients in his house and transacts some some legal work, or doctor sees some patients in his house, a residential house is not converted into a non residential one." 4. Sri Manoj Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that no finding in respect of above subsequent events have been recorded by Lower Appellate Court. He placed reliance on this Court's decision in M/s Kanhaiya Mal Kasturi Lal and another Vs. Hari Prasad, 2013(1) ADJ 66 ; Saroj Kumar and others Vs. Suresh Chandra and another, 2013(3) ADJ 124 ; and, Sat Rarup Chetan Vs. Badruzzama Ansari and others, 2013(3) ADJ 415 . 5. He placed reliance on this Court's decision in M/s Kanhaiya Mal Kasturi Lal and another Vs. Hari Prasad, 2013(1) ADJ 66 ; Saroj Kumar and others Vs. Suresh Chandra and another, 2013(3) ADJ 124 ; and, Sat Rarup Chetan Vs. Badruzzama Ansari and others, 2013(3) ADJ 415 . 5. In my view whatever has been said to be the alleged subsequent event do not constitute a fact which may have any substantial consequence in the matter. What actually is being said is that during pendency of matter the son of landlord has started his own dental clinic in a portion of his uncle's house with his permission. This kind of engagement or arrangement by landlord's son by himself during long pendency of release application cannot be equated with the fact that landlord's need has extinguished or disappeared since he has got an alternative accommodation and is already engaged himself therewith which was his basic reason for filing release application. Firstly, the residential accommodation cannot be treated to be converted in commercial accommodation and secondly, if a temporary permission is granted by a relative, that does not mean that landlord has get suitable accommodation for all times to come to continue his vocation therein. Assumption on the part of petitioners itself is wholly misconceived and, therefore, in my view it did not satisfy the ingredients of subsequent events which ought to have been taken note by courts below since they have the effect of changing the circumstances so much so that release application would have render infructuous. The Lower Appellate Court, therefore, has rightly ignored these facts having no consequence in the matter and I do not find any justification to interfere for this reason alone when otherwise judgment of courts below, recording concurrent findings in favour of landlord, are neither shown to be illegal nor bad in law or facts, justified interference of this Court. 6. Law in respect to the question, when and in what circumstances, subsequent activities/events can be looked into is now well established. 6. Law in respect to the question, when and in what circumstances, subsequent activities/events can be looked into is now well established. A three-Judge Bench of Apex Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. Motor and General Traders 1975 (1) SCC 770 permitted cognizance of subsequent events, though very cautiously, and said: "We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed." 7. Again in Hasmat Rai Vs. Raghunath Prasad 1981 (3) SCC 103 , cognizance of subsequent events was held permissible provided it wholly satisfy requirement of landlord who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal requirement. The Court said: "Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlords requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the court to take into consideration subsequent events." 8. In Ramesh Kumar Vs. Kesho Ram 1992 Suppl. (2) SCC 623 a two-Judge Bench of Apex Court said, normal rule is that rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they were when the lis commenced. The only exception is that the Court is not precluded from moulding reliefs appropriately in consideration of subsequent events provided such events had an impact on those rights and obligations. Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachalia, J (as his Lordship then was) observed: "The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachalia, J (as his Lordship then was) observed: "The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief." 9. In Gaya Prasad Vs. Pradeep Srivastava 2001 (1) ARC 352 (SC), the Court said that for the malady of judicial system of delayed justice, a landlord should not suffer. Every day may result in some kind of development and, therefore, every subsequent development would not deny claim of landlord on the pretext of a subsequent development since no one can be expected to stay idle for all times to come till a litigation is going on. It may happen that the lifetime of litigation may be more than that of litigant-landlord himself. Therefore, the judicial tardiness should not cause an irreparable loss to a landlord. It would be unjust to shut the door of justice to a landlord at the end of litigation after passing through various levels of litigation, to deny him justice and relief sought, only on the ground, of certain developments occurred pendentelite because the tenant has been successful in prolonging litigation for an unduly extended long period. However, if the cause of action is submerged in such subsequent events, in other words, if the subsequent events are such as to satisfy the very requirement of landlord in its entirety, the same can be seen and there is no allergy in considering and taking note of subsequent events of importance which may justify remoulding of relief not on account of mere pendency of litigation but on account of the position and status of landlord and other relevant factors. 10. This matter was further examined in detail in Kedar Nath Agrawal and another Vs. 10. This matter was further examined in detail in Kedar Nath Agrawal and another Vs. Dhanraji Devi and another 2004 (4) AWC 3709 (SC) and having considered a number of authorities on the subject, the Apex Court, in para 14 of judgment, crystallized three aspects when subsequent events can be taken note of, by a Court of law, namely: (i) The relief claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate; or (ii) It is necessary to take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten litigation; or (iii) It is necessary to do so in order to do complete justice between the parties. 11. In these facts and circumstances, in my view, question of bona fide requirement of landlord as also hardship in the light of the subsequent events/changed circumstances has rightly been considered by Lower Appellate Court and it has recorded clear findings of fact which could not be shown perverse or contrary to record. It is not the case of petitioners that any relevant evidence was ignored or any impermissible or irrelevant evidence was taken into account or there is any other perversity, legal or otherwise, in the judgments impugned in this petition. I, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere. 12. Dismissed.