JUDGMENT Mr. Hemant Gupta, J.: - The challenge in the present writ petition is to an order dated 31.10.1990 whereby Industrial Plots No.9 and 10 situated in Industrial Area, Rewari were resumed and also to the order passed in appeal on 22.06.1991 affirming the said order of resumption. 2. The petitioner applied for allotment of two adjacent plots of two kanals each on 15.06.1981. On 12.03.1982, a provisional letter of allotment was issued and on deposit of requisite amount, allotment letter dated 12.10.1987 was issued allotting plot Nos.9 and 10, Industrial Area, Rewari measuring 4620 square yards at the tentative price of Rs.1,29,360/- at the rate of Rs.28/- per square yard. The petitioner had paid only an amount of Rs.65,670/- in installments towards the price of the plots as per the averments in the writ petition. 3. In terms of the conditions of letter of appointment which contemplated raising of construction within two years of the date of offer of possession after getting the plan of the proposed building approved, the petitioner submitted building plans which was sanctioned on 16.12.1987. However, the construction was not raised. The plea of the petitioner in the writ petition is that there was no water supply and it is also asserted that electric supply is still not available in the Industrial Estate, Rewari i.e. at the time of filing of the writ petition in the year 1991. 4. On 02.06.1990, the petitioner was served with a show cause notice as to why the plot should not be resumed for non-construction of the building. The petitioner submitted a reply on 08.10.1990 that allottee is out of station and some other date be given for his appearance. Another notice dated 16.10.1990 was served upon the petitioner to appear on 24.10.1990. The petitioner claims that he gave assurance in writing (Annexure P-8) that he would start construction. It is further stated that the petitioner started boring operations for the erection of a hand pump to ensure water supply but on 31.10.1990 the Estate Officer passed an order of resumption. 5. In appeal, for the first time, the petitioner asserted that delay in construction of the building was due to non-availability of water and other facilities and that the petitioner has now made water available and started construction of the boundary wall. 5. In appeal, for the first time, the petitioner asserted that delay in construction of the building was due to non-availability of water and other facilities and that the petitioner has now made water available and started construction of the boundary wall. The petitioner also asserted that Government has taken a policy decision to grant extension of time for construction of building but instead of informing the petitioner of the Government policy, the order of resumption was passed by the Estate Officer. Even the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal of the petitioner on 22.01.1991. 6. Before this Court, learned counsel for the petitioner refers to an order of Government of Haryana relating to grant of extension for completing the building as on 31.03.1990. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon an order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in CWP No.3365 of 1991 titled as M/s Achal Metal Industries, Rewari v. Haryana Urban Development Authority and others, decided on 02.08.2013 and the order dated 19.03.2014 in Review Application No.327 of 2013 filed to seek review of the order passed. The relevant clause noticed by Division Bench of this Court reads as under:- “II. Grant of extension where extension period had expired on 31.3.90 and the plots are required to be resumed as per the existing Allotment/Transfer Policy but no action for resumption has been taken. General extension upto 31.12.91 can be granted it the allottee deposits extension fee @ Rs.40/- per sq. mt. of the plot area. This extension should only be granted after obtaining an undertaking that the allottee will not sell his/her plot during the period of extension and will complete at least 25% construction of the permissible covered area within the extended period and will start the industrial activities on or before 31.12.91. In addition to the above, such allottee should also give Bank Guarantee equivalent to the 10% of the present cost of the plot. This guarantee shall be invoked in favour of the HSIDC/HUDA/Directorate of Industries as the case may be if the allottee fails to complete construction and start industrial activity in the extended period.” 7. In the alternative, it is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is ready and willing to pay current market price. This guarantee shall be invoked in favour of the HSIDC/HUDA/Directorate of Industries as the case may be if the allottee fails to complete construction and start industrial activity in the extended period.” 7. In the alternative, it is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is ready and willing to pay current market price. It is pointed out that an industrial plot measuring 2 Kanals situated in Urban Estate, Rewari was restored by the Financial Commissioner in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of the State Government in the case of M/s Amba Chemicals Company. A Division Bench of this Court dismissed the writ petition bearing CWP No.15223 of 2012 titled as ‘Haryana Urban Development Authority Vs. M/s Amba Chemicals Company and others’, on 09.08.2012 upholding the equitable order passed by the Financial Commissioner. It is also pointed out that the current market price as circulated on 09.07.2014 by Haryana Urban Development Authority (for short ‘HUDA’) in respect of plots in Industrial Area, Rewari is Rs.3000/- per square meter. 8. Mr. D.V. Sharma, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the respondents, opposed the argument of restoration of the industrial plot on payment of current market price for the reason that there is no provision which provides for restoration of a resumed plot on payment of current market price. 9. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the policy of extension was available before the order of resumption was passed by the Estate Officer on 31.10.1990, therefore, the petitioner should have been apprised of such policy so as to permit the petitioner to seek extension in raising construction. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relies upon an order passed by Single Bench of this Court in RSA No.537 of 2000 titled as Haryana Urban Development Authority v. The Estate Officer, HUDA and others, on 07.02.2000, whereby the second appeal filed by Haryana Urban Development Authority (for short ‘HUDA’) challenging the order of resumption, wherein the order of resumption was found to be illegal, remained unsuccessful. The second appeal has been dismissed for the reason that development work was still in progress, therefore, it was difficult for the Court to believe that the plaintiff could raise construction on the plot in dispute. 10. The second appeal has been dismissed for the reason that development work was still in progress, therefore, it was difficult for the Court to believe that the plaintiff could raise construction on the plot in dispute. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, pointed out that the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid CWP No.3365 of 1991 has been challenged in the Special Leave Petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and notice has been issued. Therefore, the said order has not attained finality. A perusal of the order passed by Division Bench of this Court in CWP No.3365 of 1991 shows that the said writ petition also pertains to two adjoining Industrial Plots No.3 and 4 in the same Industrial Area as in the present case. The said writ petition was allowed for the reason that the counsel for the HUDA did not dispute the contents of the policy as well as the entitlement of the petitioner to be considered under the said policy. 11. Firstly, we find that the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid Regular Second Appeal that in the absence of development work no construction could be undertaken is no longer sustainable in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported as UT Chandigarh Administration and Anr. v. Amarjeet Singh and Ors., [2009(2) Law Herald (P&H) 1058 (SC)] : (2009) 4 SCC 660 , wherein the Court has examined somewhat similar issue regarding right of Chandigarh Administration to claim interest on delayed payment for the reason that amenities were not provided. The Court held to the following effect:- “19. In Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243 , it was held that where a developer carries on the activity of development of land and invites applications for allotment of sites in a developed layout, it will amount to `service’, that when possession of the allotted site is not delivered within the stipulated period, the delay may amount to a deficiency or denial of service, and that any claim in regard to such delay is not in regard to the immovable property but in regard to the deficiency in rendering service of a particular standard, quality or grade. The activity of a developer, that is development of land into layout of sites, inviting applications for allotment by assuring formation of a lay out with amenities and delivery of the allotted sites within a stipulated time at a particular price, is completely different from the auction of existing sites either on sale or lease. In a scheme for development and allotment, the allottee has no choice of the site allotted. He has no choice in regard to the price to be paid. The development authority decides which site should be allotted to him. The development authority fixes the uniform price with reference to the size of plots. In most development schemes, the applications are invited and allotments are made long before the actual development of the lay out or formation of sites. Further the development scheme casts an obligation on the development authority to provide specified amenities. Alternatively the developer represents that he would provide certain amenities, in the Brochure or advertisement. In a public auction of sites, the position is completely different. A person interested can inspect the sites offered and choose the site which he wants to acquire and participate in the auction only in regard to such site. Before bidding in the auction, he knows or is in a position to ascertain, the condition and situation of the site. He knows about the existence or lack of amenities. The auction is on `as is where is basis’. With such knowledge, he participates in the auction and offers a particular bid. There is no compulsion that he should offer a particular price. 20. Where there is a public auction without assuring any specific or particular amenities, and the prospective purchaser/lessee participates in the auction after having an opportunity of examining the site, the bid in the auction is made keeping in view the existing situation, position and condition of the site. If all amenities are available, he would offer a higher amount. If there are no amenities, or if the site suffers from any disadvantages, he would offer a lesser amount, or may not participate in the auction. If all amenities are available, he would offer a higher amount. If there are no amenities, or if the site suffers from any disadvantages, he would offer a lesser amount, or may not participate in the auction. Once with open eyes, a person participates in an auction, he cannot thereafter be heard to say that he would not pay the balance of the price/premium or the stipulated interest on the delayed payment, or the ground rent, on the ground that the site suffers from certain disadvantages or on the ground that amenities are not provided.” 12. In view of the said judgment, the argument that the petitioner could not raise construction is not sustainable. The said judgment was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench while deciding the review application on 19.03.2014 wherein, the order passed by learned Single Bench in the aforesaid Regular Second Appeal was heavily relied upon to dismiss the review application. 13. We find that the benefit of extension policy is not automatic. An allottee has to seek extension on fulfillment of the conditions specified. Since none of the conditions have been satisfied by the petitioner, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of extension of the period of construction. 14. However, in respect of the argument that petitioner is ready and willing to pay current market price, we again do not find any merit. The two industrial plots were allotted in the year 1987 when regular letter of allotment was issued. The plots were resumed on 31.10.1990. The petitioner has neither used the plots for the purpose it was allotted to him nor permitted the respondents to use the plots by allotting it to another suitable entrepreneur. The petitioner has failed to comply with the terms of the letter of allotment and, at this stage, we do not find that the petitioner can be permitted to pay current market price. This Division Bench has taken a view in CWP No.1534 of 1991 titled as M/s Orient Resins Limited v. The State of Haryana and others, decided on 12.08.2014, in respect of another plot situated in Rewari that plots are liable to be resumed if an allottee fails to set up industry. This Division Bench has taken a view in CWP No.1534 of 1991 titled as M/s Orient Resins Limited v. The State of Haryana and others, decided on 12.08.2014, in respect of another plot situated in Rewari that plots are liable to be resumed if an allottee fails to set up industry. It was held to the following effect:- “In the reply to the show cause notice, the petitioner nowhere stated that he is now ready to raise construction of the industry, for which the plot was allotted. Rather the stand of the petitioner in the writ petition is that due to change of circumstances, it has become difficult and that there is no purpose in going back to the project of chemical industry. Rather in the writ petition, the plea was taken that the petitioner had approached respondent No.1 for permission to shift from the original project to commercial agricultural activity. Therefore, it comes out that the petitioner does not intend to establish the industry. The petitioner, in fact, wanted to carry out the agricultural activity by growing trees and dairy farming. The plot was allotted purely for industrial purpose. Therefore, the impugned order of resumption of plot and the order passed by the Appellate Authority are in accordance with law.” 15. The reliance of learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in CWP No.15223 of 2012 titled as Haryana Urban Development Authority v. M/s Amba Chemicals Company and others, decided on 09.08.2012 is not tenable. It was a case where the HUDA challenged an order passed by the State Government in the writ jurisdiction. This Court in exercise of power of judicial review has not interfered with the orders passed by the State Government in revision. It does not lay down any ratio decidendi that an allottee is entitled to plot at the current market price. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to seek fresh allotment at the current market price having failed to raise construction at this stage. 16. Consequently, we do not find any merit in the present writ petition. The same is dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------ —————————