Order This revision has been preferred against the order dated 09.04.2014 passed by the Addl. District Judge No.VII, Palamau in S.T. No.343 of 2009, whereby the petition filed by the petitioner under Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been rejected. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order and submitted that P.W-6, Daizy Khatun in her examination-in-chief has stated that “ I have prevented him but in spite of my prevention Rashid Khan has committed rape upon me and thereafter he took me to his mother and told her that this is your (bahu) daughter-in-law.” That in para-2, P.W-6 in examination-in-chief has stated that “two types of tablet were given to me and I was told to eat and when I refused to eat, by giving pressure they forced me to eat the medicine and also assured about marriage with Rashid Khan.” It is urged that P.W-3, Sanju Khan in para-1 of his cross-examination-in-chief has stated that “rape had been committed on my sister” and in para-5, he stated that “parents of the boy had given the tablets.” It is argued by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the said statements had not been made by P.W-6 in the First Information Report neither P.W-3 has made such statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C and the petition was filed to recall P.W-3 and P.W-6 to cross-examine them on the limited question, whether they had made such statement in the First Information Report or under Section 161 Cr.P.C; that the re-examination of PWs 3 and 6 is necessary as they have made improvement and embellishment in their statements during examination-in-chief. In support of his contention, he has relied on the decision rendered in case of “Natasha Singh Vs. C.B.I” reported in A.I.R 2013 SCW 3554. It is submitted that the accused is facing trial for a serious offence and fair opportunity should be given to ensure that no prejudice is caused to the defence but the court below without appreciating this aspect, has rejected the prayer for recall; that the impugned order is in contravention to the object and scope of the provisions of Section 311. 3. Mr. Pankaj Kumar, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State assisted by Mr. 3. Mr. Pankaj Kumar, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State assisted by Mr. Ajay Kumar Pathak, learned counsel appearing for the informant, has submitted that on perusal of the First Information Report and the depositions of P.W-3 and P.W-6, it is evident that the prosecutrix has narrated the occurrence as recited in the F.I.R. and use of word ‘rape’ is not an embellishment because in the F.I.R., she has stated that despite her protest the accused had physical relationship on the assurance that he would marry her and P.W-3 has used the word ‘rape’ but this in no way is an embellishment as it is the case of the prosecutrix that the petitioner had established sexual relationship with her despite her protest. That both the witnesses have been cross-examined at length; that the application has been filed after four years of examination of the witnesses only with an intent and purpose to delay and prolong the trial. It is contended that the trial court has considered and discussed the material facts and the provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C and there is no illegality in the impugned order. 4. Heard. From plain reading of the provisions of Section 311, it is manifest that it is the discretion of the Court to exercise the power under Section 311 of the Cr. P.C. and there is no limitation as far as the period is concerned. The provisioins of Section 311 Cr.P.C. can be invoked either by the prosecution or the defence or the power can be exercised by the Court suo-motu when it appears to the Court that the evidence is essential for the just decision of the case. In the case of “Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.” reported in JBCJ 2013(3) SC 295 the Hon’ble Supreme Court while discussing the object and scope in exercise of power under Sectioin 311 Cr.P.C. has also made reference to the decision rendered in the case of “Natasha Singh Vs. C.B.I.” (supra) relied by the petitioner. 5. Admittedly, P.W.-6 was examined on 15.02.2012 and P.W.-3 on 25.06.2010. C.B.I.” (supra) relied by the petitioner. 5. Admittedly, P.W.-6 was examined on 15.02.2012 and P.W.-3 on 25.06.2010. Both the witnesses have been cross-examined at length, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the prosecutrix has deposed that the accused committed rape on her but the word ‘rape’ has not been stated by her in the F.I.R. The said argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is rather misplaced because in F.I.R. prosecutrix has categorically stated that despite her objection and protest the accused had sexual intercourse with her and had assured to solemnize marriage with her. P.W-3 has stated that the accused had committed ‘rape’ on the prosecutrix and this statement is made on the basis of the statement of the prosecutrix. The use of word ‘rape’ and not physical relationship or sexual intercourse cannot be viewed as introduction of a new fact or embellishment or improvement in the statement. Keeping in view that the prosecutrix has catetorically stated in F.I.R. as noticed above, that despite her protest the accused had physical relationship with her. No doubt, Section 311 vests power in the Court to determine the truth by bringing on record the best available evidence, be it either of the prosecution or the defence so as to pass a judgment on conclusive evidence. It is true that the criminal trial should be conducted by giving a fair opportunity to the accused and even in case where there is a delay of a few years in filing an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. the power can be invoked by the court. But a corresponding duty is cast on the court to exercise the said power with caution in order to meet the ends of justice for strong and valid reasons. In the case of “Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the decision rendered in Court in “Hoffman Andreas Vs. But a corresponding duty is cast on the court to exercise the said power with caution in order to meet the ends of justice for strong and valid reasons. In the case of “Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the decision rendered in Court in “Hoffman Andreas Vs. Inspector of Customs, Amritsar” (2000) 10 SCC 430 wherein the application for recall of the witnesses was made after nearly four years of examination of the witness about an incident that was nearly seven years old and it was held that in such a case the delay takes a heavy toll on the human memory apart from breeding cynicism about the efficacy of the judicial system to decide cases within a reasonably forseeable time period. In the said case the Court preferred to err in favour of the appellant giving the accused an opportunity to recall and cross examine the witnesses keeping in view fairness of trial, so that the prejudice may not be caused to the defence stating that a possible prejudice to prosecutrix is not even a price, leave alone one that would justify denial of a fair opportunity to the accused to defend himself. The said decisions was rendered in the factual matrix of the particular case. In the instant case it is evident that the witnesses have been cross-examined at length and merely the use of word ‘rape’ in examination-in-chief by the witness in no way can be said to have caused any prejudice to the defence of the accused in the given facts of the case. 6. In view of the material facts of the case and the discussion made above there is no cogent reason warranting interference with the order passed by the trial court. 7. In the result, the Cr. Revision No.383 of 2014, is hereby dismissed. Revision dismissed.