JUDGMENT N. Kotiswar Singh, J. 1. Heard Mr. M. Hemchandra, learned counsel for the applicants and Mr. Ng. Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The present application has been filed by the newly constituted School Management Committee of Khergao Junior High School (Aided), Khergao represented by Md. Motim Shah, as its Secretary for being impleaded as a respondent in writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012. The said W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 was filed by Md. Abdul Manan Khan and others praying inter-alia, for quashing the order dated 02.05.2012 by which the School Managing Committee of Khergao Junior High School (Aided) of which the petitioners were members, was dissolved with immediate effect in public interest. 3. This Court while issuing notice of motion in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 on 10.7.2012 made returnable on 14.08.2012 had directed that till the returnable date, the said impugned order dated 02.5.2012 shall not be given effect to. The said interim order passed on 10.7.2012 was directed to be continued until further orders vide order dated 25.7.2012 by this Court. However, subsequently, the competent authority issued an order dated 14.7.2014 stating that the earlier term of the School Managing Committee had expired and accordingly, on expiry, the said School Managing Committee was dissolved and in its place, a new School Managing Committee consisting of 8 (eight) members were re-constituted for a period of 3 (three) years with effect from the date of its first meeting which the present applicant represents. The said order dated 14.7.2014 has been challenged in another writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 537 of 2014 by the same writ petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012. In the second writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 537 of 2014, this Court by an order dated 01.8.2014 had passed an interim order suspending the said order dated 14.7.2014 and the said interim order was directed to be continued until further orders vide order dated 6.08.2014. 4. The present Misc. application has been filed by the said newly constituted School Management Committee represented by Md. 4. The present Misc. application has been filed by the said newly constituted School Management Committee represented by Md. Motim Shah, as its Secretary, vide order dated 14.7.2014 and seeking for impleadment as a respondent in the first writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012, contending that in the event, the said W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 is disposed of without hearing the applicant, it will seriously affect their rights. This application filed for impleadment of the applicant as respondent in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 has, however, been strongly opposed by the writ petitioners contending that the applicant is neither a necessary party nor a proper party in the present writ petition. It has been also contended that the applicant was not even born at the time of passing of the impugned order or at the time of filing of the writ petition and the relief claimed in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 is against the State respondents for their illegal dissolution on 02.5.2012 of a validly constituted School Managing Committee of which the writ petitioners are the members and of which the present applicant has nothing to do as they are mere strangers. Mr. Ng. Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently opposed this application contending that the validity of this dissolution order dated 02.5.2012 has to be justified by the State respondents who have taken this decision and the applicant, who was yet to come into existence at the relevant time, had nothing to do with the process of dissolution which has been challenged in the said writ petition. It has been also stated that in the said writ petition, no relief has been claimed against the applicant and as such, they are neither necessary party nor proper party and as such, the prayer made by the applicant for impleading as respondent in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 is liable to be rejected. In support of his contention, Mr. Ng. Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others reported in : (1992) 2 SCC 524 . Relying on the said decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Mr. In support of his contention, Mr. Ng. Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others reported in : (1992) 2 SCC 524 . Relying on the said decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Mr. Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that unless a party can show that he is directly or legally interested in the action, he has no right to be impleaded as a party. In the said case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal (supra), the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay had issued a notice to the appellant for demolition of two chattels on the terrace on the ground that these were unauthorised constructions and the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. was the lessee of the land on which a service station was erected of which the appellant was in possession. In the suit instituted by the appellant challenging the validity of the notice issued by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. sought to be impleaded as an additional defendant on the ground that they had materials to show that the constructions were unauthorised and they were necessary parties to the litigation, which was allowed by the trial Court and upheld by the High Court of Bombay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court on consideration, set aside the order for impleadment on the ground that the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. had no direct interest in the subject matter of litigation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. had no interest in those chattels which were sought to be demolished by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and the demolition of the same in pursuance to the notice was not a matter which affected the legal rights of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. It has been accordingly contended by the petitioners that since the applicant has no direct interest in the issue of illegal dissolution of the Managing Committee passed by the State respondents, the applicant cannot be impleaded in the writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012. On the other hand, Mr. On the other hand, Mr. Hemchandra, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the applicant, i.e. the newly constituted School Management Committee has a vital say in the writ petition contending that if the said writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 is dismissed without hearing the applicant, the right of the newly constituted School Management Committee would be adversely affected without affording any opportunity of being heard. It has been contended that the applicant is vitally interested in the first writ petition for the fact that if the impugned dissolution order dated 02.5.2012 is set aside, the existence of the newly constituted School Management Committee cannot be sustained. In this connection, Mr. Hemchandra has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Aliji Momonji & Co. Vs. Lalji Mavji & ors. reported in : (1996) 5 SCC 379 . 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. It is true that when W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 was filed by the petitioners challenging the dissolution order dated 02.5.2012, the newly constituted School Management Committee represented by the applicant had not yet come into existence. In fact, the said newly constituted School Management Committee came into existence only on 14.7.2014. The writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 was filed on 16.6.2012 challenging the dissolution order issued by the State respondents. The said decision to dissolve the School Management Committee vide order dated 02.5.2012 was taken by the State respondents, the validity of which has been called in question in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012. Apparently, the newly constituted School Management Committee, the applicant had not come into existence and accordingly, it's formation was not challenged in the said W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012, thus no relief has been claimed against the new Managing Committee. Neither the newly constituted School Management Committee, which was not yet in existence could have any say in the decision taken by the school authorities in dissolving the earlier School Managing Committee of which the writ petitioners were members. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the present applicant is not directly concerned with the issue involved in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 and hence not a necessary party in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the present applicant is not directly concerned with the issue involved in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 and hence not a necessary party in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012. However, it is also a fact that upon dissolution of the School Managing Committee of which the writ petitioners were the members, the newly constituted School Management Committee had been subsequently constituted represented by the present applicant. The constitution of the new School Management Committee represented by the applicant is the subject matter in W.P. (C) No. 537 of 2014 which has been challenged by the writ petitioners on various grounds. When the W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 was taken up on 16.9.2014, the pendency of the other writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 537 of 2014 was mentioned and it was also mentioned that it would be in the fitness of things that the said writ petition is also heard along with this writ petition. It was also submitted on behalf of the State respondents that since the State respondents had already filed affidavit-in-opposition in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012, they would rely on the same for the purpose of the other writ petition. Accordingly, the said writ petition was directed to be listed on the next date along with W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012. 6. When these two writ petitions i.e. W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 and W.P. (C) No. 537 of 2014 were put up together on 23.9.2014, it was pointed out that present Misc. Case has been filed and it was directed to be listed along with these writ petitions on 14.10.2014. Accordingly, this Misc. Case has been taken up, which has been opposed by the writ petitioners as mentioned above. 7. It is to be noted that even though at the time of filing of W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 the newly constituted School Management Committee represented by the applicant had not come into existence, nevertheless, an order was passed subsequently on 14.7.2014 constituting the new School Management Committee represented by the applicant, the validity of which is under challenge in W.P. (C) No. 537 of 2014 and the said writ petition is proposed to be heard along with W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012. Therefore, even if the present applicant is not a necessary party in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 as the said writ petition can be disposed of in absence of newly constituted School Management Committee, the very survival of W.P. (C) No. 537 of 2014 would hinge on the result of the W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 for if the said W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 is allowed, the earlier School Management Committee, which was dissolved could be revived in which event, the newly constituted School Management Committee cannot continue. Thus, the fate of the said writ petition, i.e. W.P. (C) No. 537 of 2014 as well as that of the newly constituted School Management Committee is directly linked to the outcome of the decision of W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012. This Court is of the view that since the said two writ petitions are proposed to be heard together and since the applicant had also, in the meantime, came into existence whose validity is questioned in the other writ petition, it will be appropriate that the applicant be also heard at the time of hearing of W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012, not as a necessary party but as a proper party. This Court is of the view that hearing of the applicant may be necessary to enable this Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the issues involved in these two writ petitions, which are proposed to be heard together and accordingly, the present Misc. Case is allowed and the applicant be impleaded as a respondent No. 4 in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012. 8. It may be observed that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal (supra) had been referred to and discussed in the later case of Aliji Momonji & Co. Case is allowed and the applicant be impleaded as a respondent No. 4 in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012. 8. It may be observed that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal (supra) had been referred to and discussed in the later case of Aliji Momonji & Co. (supra) in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court took the view that the question whether a party is necessary or proper party under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and also pointed out to the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal (supra) that notice issued by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay did not relate to the structures but only to the two chattels which were unauthorisedly constructed because of which the Hon'ble Supreme Court took the view that the lessee therein i.e. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. had no direct interest in the suit pending before the Court filed by the appellant challenging the notice issued by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. In the case of Aliji Momonji & Co. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in the suit filed by the appellant lessee for perpetual injunction for restraining the Municipal Corporation from demolishing a portion of the building on the ground of unauthorised construction, the landlord was a necessary party in as much as the landlord had direct and substantial interest in the demised building, portion of which was sought to be demolished by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aliji Momonji & Co. (supra) also observed that the only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action and question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. (supra) also observed that the only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action and question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. In the present case, it may be stated that though the applicant has no direct interest as regards the issue raised in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012, but only by way of implication, it cannot be denied that the applicant would be bound by the decision to be arrived at in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 for if the writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 is allowed, the very existence of the applicant would become untenable as it would have no basis for its existence. Further, it may be also observed that as this Court has already proposed to hear all the writ petitions together, the issues raised in the writ petitions cannot be effectually and completely settled unless the applicant is heard. Hence, this Court considers that the applicant will be a proper party in W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012. 9. Since the members of the newly constituted School Management Committee, the applicant have been already impleaded as party respondents in W.P. (C) No. 537 of 2014, the applicant will be allowed to rely on their affidavit-in-opposition, if filed, in the said writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 537 of 2014 at the time of hearing of this writ petition i.e. W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 and would also be allowed to address this Court on the legal points as to the validity or otherwise of the impugned order dated 02.5.2012 regarding which the State respondents have already field their affidavit-in-opposition. 10. With the above observation and direction, the Misc. application stands allowed. Registry is directed to make the necessary entry in the cause title of W.P. (C) No. 349 of 2012 by showing the applicant as Respondent No. 4.