I. A. ANSARI, J.:–This appeal has put to challenge the judgment, dated 28.02.2012, passed, in Sessions Case No. 237 of 2010, by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Banka, whereby the accused-appellants, Akhleshwar Prasad Singh @ Akhileshwar Singh and Poonam Devi, stand convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Following their conviction, as mentioned herein before, they have been sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 2. The case of the prosecution may, in brief, be discussed thus:– (i) Deceased Renu Devi was wife of the informant Gopal Prasad Singh (PW 4), PW 4 being son of PW 3 (Jagdish Prasad Singh). On 30.06.2009, at about 7 PM, Renu Devi, having served meals to her husband (PW 4), her father-in-law (PW 3) and her brother-in-law, Rishi Kumar (PW 2), went outside her matrimonial house to answer the call of the nature. Having answered nature’s call, when she was returning, her neighbours, accused Poonam Devi and her husband, accused Akhleshwar Prasad Singh, came out of their house together. While accused Poonam Devi was having, in her hand, a lota (pot) containing petrol, accused Akhleshwar Prasad Singh had a match box in his hand. (ii) When Renu Devi was passing by the side of accused Poonam Devi’s house, accused Poonam Devi threw petrol from the lota on Renu Devi and accused Akhleshwar Prasad Singh threw a burning match stick on her and set her ablaze. Hearing the screams of Renu Devi, her husband, her father-in-law and her brother-in-law came out of their house and so did some of their neighbours, such as, PW 1 (Shyam Singh). While Renu Devi’s husband, her father-in-law and brother-in-law saw accused Poonam Devi throwing petrol on Renu Devi from the lota and her husband, accused Akhleshwar Prasad Singh, throwing a burning match stick towards Renu Devi and setting her on fire, their neighbour, Shyam Singh (P.W.1), saw Renu Devi burning. Having put out the fire, Renu Devi’s matrimonial family and her neighbours took Renu Devi to Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College and Hospital, Bhagalpur, at about 10:15 PM; but Renu Devi, while remaining under treatment, succumbed to her burn injuries on the very night of the occurrence. Having put out the fire, Renu Devi’s matrimonial family and her neighbours took Renu Devi to Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College and Hospital, Bhagalpur, at about 10:15 PM; but Renu Devi, while remaining under treatment, succumbed to her burn injuries on the very night of the occurrence. (iii) On the very day of the occurrence, Renu Devi had lodged a case against accused, Akhleshwar Prasad Singh, Bishnu Singh and Poonam Devi, for having allegedly assaulted her and committed theft. (iv) Following the death of his wife, Renu Devi, a fardbayan, which came to be treated as First Information Report (in short, FIR), was lodged by her husband, Gopal Prasad Singh (PW 4), on 01.07.2009 at 11:30 AM. Based on the FIR, Rajoun P.S. Case No. 98 of 2009 was registered under Sections 326/302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. (v) During investigation, inquest was held over the dead body of Renu Devi and inquest report was prepared. Renu Devi’s dead body was also subjected to post mortem examination, which revealed that she had sustained approximately 80 per cent burn injuries on epidermal part of her body and that she had died, because of the said ante mortem burn injuries. (vi) On completion of investigation, a charge sheet was laid, under Sections 326/302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, against both the accused aforementioned. 3. At the trial, when charges, under Sections 302 and 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, were framed against the two accused persons, both of them pleaded not guilty thereto. 4. In order to substantiate their case, prosecution examined altogether 8 witnesses. Both the accused were, then, examined under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in their examinations aforementioned, they denied that they had committed the offences, which were alleged to have been committed by them, their case being that Renu Devi had been set ablaze by her husband, Gopal Prasad Singh (P.W.4), because of strained relation, which Renu Devi had with her husband and her husband’s relatives, and, in fact, a case had been lodged, in the year 2007, by Renu Devi against her husband for subjecting her to cruelty and though the said case was subsequently withdrawn, the relation between Renu Devi, her husband and her husband’s relatives remained disturbed. 5. In support of their case, the defence, too, adduced evidence by examining two witnesses including accused Poonam Devi. 5. In support of their case, the defence, too, adduced evidence by examining two witnesses including accused Poonam Devi. 6. Having, however, concluded that the charges stood proved against both the accused beyond reasonable doubt, learned trial Court convicted them accordingly and passed sentence against them as have been mentioned above. Aggrieved by their conviction and the sentence passed against them, the two accused persons, as convicted persons, have preferred this appeal. 7. We have heard Mr. Braj Nandan Prasad, learned Counsel for the accused-appellants, and Mr. A. K. Sinha, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 8. While considering the present appeal, it may be noted that there is no doubt that Renu Devi died as a result of burn injuries sustained by her. The questions were as to whether the accused-appellant, Poonam Devi, had thrown petrol on Renu Devi and whether her husband, Akhleshwar Prasad Singh, was the one, who had set Renu Devi ablaze by throwing burning match stick on her body after his wife, Poonam Devi, had thrown petrol on Renu Devi’s body. 9. While considering the present appeal, it needs to be noted that the learned trial Court has taken into account the evidence of PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4, whose evidence, in substance, is that they had heard Renu Devi screaming and, on coming out of their house, they saw accused-appellant, Poonam Devi, throwing petrol from a lota on Renu Devi and her husband, Akhileshwar Prasad Singh, throwing a burning match stick on Renu Devi’s body setting her on fire. 10. Thus, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 claimed, at the trial, that they had seen the occurrence of setting Renu Devi on fire from the beginning. The learned Trial Court has not, however, made any effort to determine as to how these witnesses could have seen the occurrence of setting Renu Devi on fire from the beginning, when they had themselves claimed that they had come running to the place of occurrence after they had already heard Renu Devi screaming. 11. Situated, as we are, it is not only difficult, but well-neigh impossible to believe the evidence of PW2, PW 3 and PW 4 and hold that they had seen the occurrence of Renu Devi being set on fire. 12. 11. Situated, as we are, it is not only difficult, but well-neigh impossible to believe the evidence of PW2, PW 3 and PW 4 and hold that they had seen the occurrence of Renu Devi being set on fire. 12. Coupled with the above, the learned Trial Court has also taken into account the evidence of PW 1, a neighbour, that on hearing halla, when he went to the place of occurrence, he saw Renu Devi burning and screaming that Akhleshwar Singh and Poonam Devi had set her on fire after pouring petrol. The learned Trial Court has, however, not taken into account the fact that neither the husband of Renu Devi nor her father-in-law and brother-in-law claimed that while Renu Devi was burning, she was screaming or crying by saying that she had been set on fire by Akhleshwar Prasad Singh and Poonam Devi. In the absence of any corroboration having been received by PW 1 to his evidence, his evidence could not have been relied upon. 13. Moreover, the learned trial Court, has not, while examining the accused-appellants, under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, put the various incriminating circumstances, which it has relied upon in order to come to the conclusion that the two accused-appellants stood proved guilty of the charge brought against them. If an accused is not properly examined under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and his response to a given incriminating piece of evidence is not elicited by the trial Court, then, such an incriminating piece of evidence cannot be relied upon by this Court. 14. Placing of reliance on an incriminating piece of evidence, which has not been put to an accused, would cause prejudice to the accused inasmuch as the accused, in such a case, must be treated to have been denied the opportunity to offer his explanation, if any, to the incriminating piece of evidence, which has come on record and relied upon by Court. 15. It is, now, settled beyond dispute by a catena of judicial pronouncements that every circumstance, on which a trial Court relies upon to hold an accused guilty, must be put to the accused person and his answer sought thereto. Conversely, if an incriminating circumstance has not been put to an accused, such a circumstance cannot be taken into account for the purpose of determining his guilt. Conversely, if an incriminating circumstance has not been put to an accused, such a circumstance cannot be taken into account for the purpose of determining his guilt. The very purpose of Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure will stand defeated if a trial Court, without asking for explanation of an accused on the circumstances, which appear to it to be incriminating, bases its conviction on such circumstances. It is in this view of the matter that the examination of an accused person, under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, is considered a solemn act of a trial Court and it cannot, and must not, be treated as an empty formality. [see Sharad Birdhi Chand Vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 1662) and State of Maharashtra Vs. Sukhdeo Singh and Another (MANU/SC/0416/1992 : AIR 1992 SC 2100 ). 16. In the case at hand, the incriminating circumstances, spoken to by each prosecution witness, on which the learned trial Court has relied upon, ought to have been put to the accused-appellants, when they were being examined under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same having not been done, learned trial Court ought not to have based its findings on such incriminating pieces of evidence. 17. Since incriminating pieces of evidence, which appeared against the accused-appellants, were not put to the accused-appellants and their response was not sought thereto, while being examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we would have, ordinarily, interfered with the conviction of the accused-appellants and sent the case, on remand, to the learned trial Court for appropriate examination of the accused-appellants in terms of the requirement of law under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, considering the fact that we are satisfied, on close scrutiny of the evidence on record, that none of the prosecution witnesses can be treated to be reliable, the accused-appellants could not have been convicted on the basis of such evidence. 18. In the absence of any other evidence, supporting the description of the occurrence given by the eye-witnesses, one has no option, but to hold, and we do hold, that none of these witnesses, who have claimed themselves to be eye-witnesses, can be treated or held to be reliable. 18. In the absence of any other evidence, supporting the description of the occurrence given by the eye-witnesses, one has no option, but to hold, and we do hold, that none of these witnesses, who have claimed themselves to be eye-witnesses, can be treated or held to be reliable. Even if their evidence is not rejected by the Court as wholly unreliable, their evidence would fall, at best, in the category of those witnesses, who are neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 19. It is trite that the witnesses, ordinarily, fall into three distinct categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. If the witness is wholly reliable, his evidence can be implicitly relied upon and such a witness’s testimony can be made basis for conviction of an accused. Similarly, when a witness is found to be wholly unreliable, no reliance can at all be placed on his evidence and his evidence has to be rejected outright. When, however, a witness is found to be neither wholly reliable, nor wholly unreliable, his evidence cannot be accepted as true unless his evidence is found to have been corroborated by some credible independent evidence, direct or circumstantial. 20. The evidence of the eye-witnesses, which the prosecution has adduced in the present case, cannot be safely relied upon unless the same is found to have been corroborated by some credible independent evidence, direct or circumstantial. 21. It is also an undisputed position of law that one infirm witness cannot be treated to have corroborated the evidence of another infirm witness meaning thereby that witnesses of same brand cannot be taken to have corroborated each other. Thus, when a witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, his evidence cannot be taken to have been corroborated by a witness of the same brand, namely, a witness, who is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, for, evidence is not to be counted, but weighed. It is not the number of the witnesses, which determines the outcome of a trial; rather, it is the inherent falsity or truth of the evidence given by the witness, which decides the outcome of trial. If each one of a large number of witnesses is found to be wholly unreliable, their evidence cannot become acceptable as true merely because a large number of similar brand of witnesses has corroborated each other. 22. If each one of a large number of witnesses is found to be wholly unreliable, their evidence cannot become acceptable as true merely because a large number of similar brand of witnesses has corroborated each other. 22. A reference, with regard to the above position of law, may be made to the case of Muluwa, S/o Binda and others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 989, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows :– “It is elementary that the evidence of an infirm witness does not become reliable merely because it has been corroborated by a number of witnesses of the same brand; for, evidence is to be weighed not counted. Since the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 6 suffered from the same infirmities as that of Smt. Jugatia, it cannot be said that the trial Judge had no basis, whatsoever, for stigmatising it as unreliable.” (Emphasis is added) 23. Situated thus, it is clear that merely because some persons, claiming themselves to be eye-witnesses, have given evidence describing the occurrence in tune with each other, their evidence cannot be made basis for holding them truthful witnesses, when their evidence is found to be intrinsically unreliable and does not inspire confidence and, similarly, when their neighbour’s evidence also is not such which can be implicitly relied upon by the Court. 24. In the backdrop of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we are firmly of the view that the prosecution had failed, in the present appeal, to bring home the charge against the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused-appellants were entitled to be accorded benefit of doubt. 25. In the result, and for the reasons discussed above, the appeal stands allowed. The impugned conviction of the accused-appellants and the sentence passed against them by the judgment and order, under appeal, shall accordingly stand set aside. Both the accused-appellants are held not guilty of the offences, which they were charged with, and they are acquitted of the same under benefit of doubt. 26. As the accused-appellants are in jail custody, they are directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless they are required to be detained in connection with any other case. 27. Send back the Lower Court Records with a copy of this judgment and order. V.N. SINHA, J.:–I agree.