Rajiv Narain Raina, J. 1. Having heard the respective counsel and learned senior counsel for the parties this court has come around to the view that the present Company Petition deserves to be dismissed as one by barred by limitation and for the following reasons: the Petitioner has stated in para. No.8 of the petition that the parties agreed to enter into a "Fresh Agreement" dated 18th August 1997 and under which the respondent agreed to make a payment of Rs. 36,67,328/- in the manner indicated in the novated agreement and thereafter, the Respondent would stand absolved of the liability to pay Rs. 60,17,495/- to the opposing side. Furthermore, in the event the Respondent failed to make such payment the respondent's liability to make good a sum of Rs. 60,17,495/- alongwith interest @20% as liquidated damages would continue to enure vide document Annexure P-3. The Respondent Company became sick and made a reference to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) under Section 15(1) of the Sick Industries Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 ('the Act') to try to turn it out of the red. The BIFR on 10th June 1998 decided against survival and declared the Respondent Company Sick under Section 3(1)(o) of the Act and appointed IFCI as the operating agency under Section 17(3) of the Act for advising on measures for its rehabilitation. The Petitioner Company had earlier applied to BIFR for its leave and consent under Section 22 of the Act to permit it to either file a civil suit for recovery of its money or to bring a winding up petition against the respondent for its inability to pay its admitted debt within the period of limitation as it was expiring while the matter was pending before the BIFR. The BIFR vide its order dated 28th June 2005 (P-4), while observing that the net worth of the Company has become positive in terms of its current balance sheets since its accumulated losses were demonstrably wiped out and as such declared the Company as no longer sick within the meaning of Section 3(1)(o) of the Act and accordingly discharged the Respondent Company from the purview of the Act and set it free to carry on its business without the yoke of the Act. 2. In para. 2. In para. 10 (a) of the Company Petition, the Petitioner has asserted that on coming to know of the reference of the Respondent Company pending with BIFR, it also registered its claim against the Respondent with the Board of Industrial & Financial Reconstruction alongwith the other creditors, secured and unsecured. Thus, the Petitioner was in the know of the proceedings of the BIFR upto the stage of its termination vide annexure P-4 of which this court harbours no doubt on the strength of this admission of fact. In para. 5 of the order (P-4), it was directed that a copy of this order be sent to all concerned. Petitioner has attached with the replication (P-9), which is the order passed by the BIFR on 27th July 2000 wherein the request of the Petitioner for initiating recovery proceedings against the Respondent Company was rejected. The Petitioner further relies on a communication dated 12th August 2000 sent by the Petitioner to BIFR with a copy marked to IFCI, wherein it requested that their claim be also included in the scheme for rehabilitation. It is submitted that these documents were never attached with the main petition. Vide order passed by BIFR on 28th June 2005 (P- 4), it was held that the Respondent does not remain any longer a Sick Industrial Company in terms of Section 3(1)(o) of the Act. The petitioner has therefore, intentionally and wrongly stated that: "No information of the said order, much less the order itself, was sent to the Petitioner Company as is the mandatory requirement of law..." 3. In para. 12 of the Company Petition, the Petitioner has stated: "However, in September, 2009, the Petitioner through third party resources (without giving any details of the same) came to know that the proceedings from the BIFR had terminated and the said order had been passed therein." The Petitioner, however, in para. 10(c) of the Company Petition has taken a volte-face by pleading: "In May, 2010, the Petitioner received the information as to the said order (Annexure P-4) through third party resources. Immediately thereafter, the petitioner through its counsel, issued a legal notice dated 11.05.2010..." Thus, it is abundantly clear that the facts as stated both in para. 12 and para. 10(c) of the Company Petition as far from the truth. 4. The petitioner has further intentionally and wrongly stated in Para. Immediately thereafter, the petitioner through its counsel, issued a legal notice dated 11.05.2010..." Thus, it is abundantly clear that the facts as stated both in para. 12 and para. 10(c) of the Company Petition as far from the truth. 4. The petitioner has further intentionally and wrongly stated in Para. No. 12 of the Company Petition that "Owing to the non-supply of the said order (Annexure P-4) to the Petitioner Company, the Petitioner Company was under a bona-fide belief that the BIFR continued to be ceased ( sic. seized) of aforesaid proceedings and the same was still pending. 5. The legal notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 in the present case was sent on 11th May 2010 calling upon the Respondent Company to pay the debt as per agreement dated 18th August, 1997. It is objected that this claim of the Petitioner Company was belatedly made after 13 years from the date when the amount became due. Furthermore, in case the date when the cause of action arose is taken to be when the Company came out of BIFR i.e. on 28th June 2005 (P-4), then also the Petition filed in the year 2010 is delayed by 5 years, which is beyond the period of limitation prescribed to bring a suit for recovery, in case one was brought. The period for filing a suit or a winding up petition is 3 years as per Article137, the residuary clause in the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963. 6. In the reply sent to the statutory legal notice on 24th May 2010 (P-6) it had been specifically objected that the claim is grossly time barred and the petitioner has not been diligently pursuing its remedy to recover the amount and is himself to blame for the debt to have turned time barred and for filing the present petition for winding up. There has been no communication or demand for return of the amount after the application was filed with the BIFR on 14th June 2000 (P-8) and the communication was received from the BIFR on 27th July 2000 (P-9) and the letter sent by the Petitioner to the BIFR dated 12th August 2000 (P- 10). Even after the Respondent Company came out of the purview of BIFR on 28th June 2005 (P-4) no claim was ever made by the Petitioner to recover its debt. Even after the Respondent Company came out of the purview of BIFR on 28th June 2005 (P-4) no claim was ever made by the Petitioner to recover its debt. The legal notice was sent for the first time on 11th May 2010 after about 5 years of the day when the Company had come out from BIFR. The Company Petition even from this angle is barred by limitation. The claim of the Petitioner in order to bring the present petition within limitation on the submission that no intimation was received from the BIFR cannot be believed or sustained as the Petitioner should have been diligent enough to recover its debt in time. The said plea cannot be sustained in September 2009, when it had knowledge of the Company coming out of its sickness and from the purview of BIFR. The statutory legal notice was also sent much later on 11th May 2010. According to the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, Reprint 1999, bonafides means good faith. 'Good faith' has been defined in section 2(h) of the Limitation Act, 1963 to mean: "2. (h) 'good faith' -- nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention;" 7. The aforesaid definition means that an act done with due care and attention satisfies the test of "good faith". "Due care" means that sufficient care was taken so far as the circumstances demanded and there was absence of negligence. In other words, the plaintiff has taken sufficient care which a reasonable man is expected to take in order to avoid any injury." [ref. Para. 10 in Ghasi Ram and Others v. Chait Ram Saini and Others; : (1998) 6 SCC 200 ]. In the absence of any material details of bonafide belief or good faith in the Company Petition, filed on 7th June 2010, it can not be said that the Petitioner Company either acted in bonafide belief or in good faith when it said that it did not receive the order of the BIFR (P-4), or that the Petitioner acted in a diligent manner. 8. The Company Petition is thus found barred by thirteen years of somnolence from 18th August 1997 to 7th July 2010. from this period the period between 10th June 1998 to 28th June 2005 has to be excluded. 8. The Company Petition is thus found barred by thirteen years of somnolence from 18th August 1997 to 7th July 2010. from this period the period between 10th June 1998 to 28th June 2005 has to be excluded. Even if it is, even then the Company Petition is barred by limitation by more than five years. Even equity can then no longer come in aid of a slumbering party sitting idle waiting for a miracle to happen or manna to fall from heaven. The petitioner failed to prosecute its civil and company law rights with due care and diligence. It can now have no equitable bonanza or a lucky draw from the arena of litigation. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in Raghunath Rai Bareja and Another Vs. Punjab National Bank and Others; : [2007] 135 Company Cases 163 (SC) that:- "...it is well settled that when there is a conflict between law and equity, it is the law which has to prevail.." 9. In the present case, the claim is patently time-barred and for coming to such a pass the Petitioner can only blame itself. As reasoned above, the petitioner did not sue after the cause of action had arisen in its favour in the remote past but it allowed time to slip by making the claim stale. The right may exist but the remedy is taken away by bar of limitation, though the debt may remain a pious obligation but which the court may not be able to enforce. 10. The petition accordingly would stand dismissed.