JUDGMENT SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. 1. Aggrieved by order dated 17.04.2009 in L.C. Application No. 16 of 1996 passed under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the petitioner-General Manager, Kustore Area No. VIII of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, six workmen including four, who have been made respondents in the present proceeding, were working at Ghanoodih Colliery under M/s. BCCL. They were dismissed from service in the year, 1976. An industrial dispute was thus raised and six separate references were made. All the references were heard by the learned Labour Court together and vide award dated 16.11.1994, dismissal of the workmen was found not justified and accordingly, reinstatement in service was ordered. In the meantime, two workmen namely, Ram Rup Chamar and Sita Ram Chamar died and the remaining four workmen moved application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act on 04.10.1996. A writ petition being, CWJC No. 772 of 1996(R) was also preferred by the workmen and the said writ petition was allowed vide order dated 01.03.2004 whereby, grant of 50% back wages was also ordered by this Court. A review petition was filed by the petitioner General Manager, Kustore Area No. VIII of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited being, Civil Review No. 93 of 2004, which was allowed vide order dated 03.01.2011. In the meantime, the application dated 04.10.1996 under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was allowed vide order dated 17.04.2009. The writ petition being, CWJC No. 772 of 1996(R) was reheard and finally dismissed vide order dated 01.09.2011 whereby, the award dated 16.11.1994 of the Labour Tribunal, Dhanbad was affirmed. Aggrieved by order dated 17.04.2009, the present writ petition has been filed. 3. To a specific question by the Court why the petitioner cannot approach the Labour Court seeking modification of order dated 17.04.2009, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on decision in Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Others, AIR 1981 SC 606 and submits that 30 days after the award was published, the Labour Court became functus officio and therefore, it has no jurisdiction to modify or alter order passed under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 4. 4. A perusal of the documents brought on record indicates that the application dated 04.10.1996 under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was allowed vide order dated 17.04.2009 and at that time the order passed in the CWJC No. 772 of 1996(R) dated 01.03.2004 was in operation. The present writ petition was filed by the petitioner on 31.03.2011. It is the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that since the writ petition was finally dismissed vide order dated 01.09.2011, affirming the award dated 16.11.1994 of the Labour Court, the order dated 17.04.2009 is liable to be quashed. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is liable to be rejected. As noticed hereinabove, the date on which the application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was allowed vide order dated 17.04.2009, order dated 01.09.2011 whereby the writ petition was finally dismissed, was not in existence. Moreover, when the present writ petition was filed on 31.03.2011, on that day also, order dated 01.03.2004 passed in the writ petition was in operation. The challenge in the present writ petition filed by the petitioner is addressed to order dated 17.04.2009 only and such a challenge is not based on order dated 01.09.2011 whereby the writ petition was finally dismissed. Though, the petitioner has filed a supplementary affidavit bringing on record order dated 01.09.2011 whereby CWJC No. 772 of 1996(R) was finally dismissed and an application being, I.A. No. 6046 of 2014 seeking stay of further proceeding in Certificate Case No. 11 (WC) of 1011, no application seeking permission to raise additional ground has been preferred by the petitioner. Insofar as, order dated 17.04.2009 is concerned, it is a well reasoned order. No substantial challenge has been thrown by the petitioner to the impugned order. There is no infirmity in the impugned order dated 17.04.2009. I do not find any substance in the writ petition and accordingly, it is liable to be dismissed. 5. Referring to the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that, 30 days after the award is published, the Labour Court became functus officio and therefore, the petitioner has no other alternative but to approach this Court by filing the present writ petition, I am of the opinion that this contention is also liable to be rejected. 5. Referring to the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that, 30 days after the award is published, the Labour Court became functus officio and therefore, the petitioner has no other alternative but to approach this Court by filing the present writ petition, I am of the opinion that this contention is also liable to be rejected. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra), the case on which the counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied on, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide a matter on merits. Referring to an exparte award, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that there is no finality attached to an exparte award because it is always subject to its being set aside on sufficient cause being shown. The Tribunal has the power to deal with an application properly made before it for setting aside the exparte award and to pass suitable orders. It is thus clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act would be applicable while deciding an application seeking setting aside an exparte order. For this reason also, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is liable to be rejected. Moreover, the order dated 01.09.2011 whereby CWJC No. 772 of 1996(R) was finally dismissed was not before the learned Labour Court when application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was allowed by the Labour Court. It is well settled that on the basis of material, which was not before the court below, the order impugned cannot be challenged. 6. In view of the aforesaid, I find no merit in this case and accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. I.A. No. 6046 of 2014 is also dismissed.