ORAL JUDGMENT : 1. This Second appeal is filed by the appellant (original defendant) against the Judgment and Order, dated 8.5.2009 passed by Adhoc District Judge4, Nagpur in Regular Civil Appeal No.607 of 2008, which was allowed and whereby the decree was granted for specific performance. The said First Appeal arose from the Judgment and Order, dated 20.9.2008 passed by the 3rd Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Nagpur (trial Court) in Regular Civil Suit No. 34 of 2004. The suit was partly decreed for refund of earnest sum only with interest. 2. Brief facts are as under : An agreement to sell (Exh. 30) in respect of the suit land i.e. agricultural land bearing Survey No. 74, admeasuring 1 H. 62 R situated at village Khedi, District Nagpur was entered into on 20.12.2000 to sell the suit land for the consideration of Rs.1,89,000/-, out of which Rs. 50,000/- as earnest sum was paid on 20.12.2000. However, on 10.4.2001, Sale deed (Exh.48) was executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant nos.2 & 3. The plaintiff had sued for specific performance of the suit agreement. 3. The prayer in the suit was for specific performance of the agreement to sell the suit land pursuant to the agreement (Exh.30). Suit was defended on the ground that the plaintiff had advanced a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to defendant no.1 and that the said agreement to sell, dated 21.8.2000 was not duly stamped and was bogus. 4. The trial Court recorded findings in favour of the plaintiff that the agreement to sell, dated 21.8.2000 was proved and earnest sum of Rs 50,000/- was paid by cheque. The trial Court, however, curiously recorded finding that the sum was advanced as loan and in view of the subsequent sale deed of the suit land in favour of defendant nos.2 & 3 executed by defendant no.1, the trial Court refused to grant the decree for specific performance. 5. The first Appellate Court’s findings were challenged on the ground that the sale deed (Exh.48) executed was admissible document in evidence and it was not necessary to examine the attesting witnesses thereof. The appellant also challenged admissibility of the agreement to sell (Exh.30) in evidence. 5. The first Appellate Court’s findings were challenged on the ground that the sale deed (Exh.48) executed was admissible document in evidence and it was not necessary to examine the attesting witnesses thereof. The appellant also challenged admissibility of the agreement to sell (Exh.30) in evidence. On behalf of the respondent/plaintiff, it is contended that the document could not have been questioned as, in view of Section 34 of the Bombay Stamp Act, duty and penalty is payable for admissibility of the document and when the compliance is made, in view of the Section 35 of the Stamp Act, admissibility of the document cannot be questioned. 6. The present appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law : 1. Whether the first appellate Court was justified in holding that agreement dated 21.8.2000 (Exh.48) between defendant no 1 and defendant nos. 2 and 3 cannot be admitted in evidence as the same is not duly stamped when the respondent/plaintiff did not raise any objection when the said agreement dated 21.8.2000 was being exhibited in the evidence adduced by the appellant/defendant ? 2. Whether the first appellate Court was right in granting the decree for specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff in absence of plea that appellant nos. 2 & 3 had purchased the suit property with notice of agreement (Exh. 30), dated 20.12.2000 and that the sale by defendant no 1 in favour of defendant nos. 2 & 3 was sham and bogus and only an arrangement ? I must answer the questions raised in the affirmative for the following reasons : 7. On behalf of the appellants it is submitted that there was hand loan of Rs 50,000/- advanced from the plaintiff and the agreement to sell was not duly proved and therefore, the first Appellate Court ought not to have decreed the suit. 8. On behalf of the respondent, it is urged that there is no substantial question of law to entertain the Second Appeal. It is liable to be dismissed in view of Section 100 (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure. On merits, it is submitted that, in both the Courts below, the plea by the defendant of hand loan was proved false. It is liable to be dismissed in view of Section 100 (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure. On merits, it is submitted that, in both the Courts below, the plea by the defendant of hand loan was proved false. Furthermore, there was no any plea by defendant nos.2 & 3 in their Written Statement, dated 22.4.2004 (Exh.14) that there existed any agreement to sell the suit land in their favour nor the sale deed (Exh.31) contained any statement regarding the agreement to sell (Exh.30), dated 20.12.2000 earlier entered into by the plaintiff. It is, thus, contended that the first Appellate Court passed well reasoned judgment to grant the decree for specific performance of agreement. 9. My attention is invited to the ruling in the case of Javer Chand & Others vs. Pukhraj Surana, AIR 1961 SC 1655 . It must be noted that under Section 36 of the Stamp Act, the crucial words are "where an instrument has been admitted in evidence." It is obvious that once the document has been admitted in evidence, the admission cannot be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. The words "admitted in evidence" were interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Javer Chand (supra). Sinha, C. J., delivering the Judgment of the Supreme Court has pointed out at page 1656 of the report after setting out the provisions of Section 36 of the Stamp Act" That Section is categorical in its terms that when a document has once been admitted in evidence such admission cannot be called in question at any stage of the suit or the proceeding on the ground that the instrument had not been duly stamped. The only exception recognised by the Section is the class of cases contemplated by Section 461, which is not material to the present controversy. Section 36 does not admit of other exceptions. Where a question as to the admissibility of a document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped, or has not been properly stamped, it has to be decided then and there when the document is tendered in evidence. Once the Court rightly or wrongly decides to admit the document in evidence, so far as the parties are concerned, the matter is closed. Once the Court rightly or wrongly decides to admit the document in evidence, so far as the parties are concerned, the matter is closed. Section 35 is in the nature of a penal provision and has farreaching effects. Parties to a litigation, where such a controversy is raised, have to be circumspect and the party challenging the admissibility of the document has to be alert to see that the document is not admitted in evidence by the Court The Court has to judicially determine the matter as soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is marked as an exhibit in the case." 10. The plaintiff had proved the agreement to sell in his favour for valuable consideration agreed by the first defendant The plaintiff had paid the earnest money by cheque in the sum of Rs 50,000/- and was ready and willing to purchase the land. Under these circumstances, when the agreement was entered into by the first defendant to sell the suit land, it was not open for the first defendant to execute the sale deed in favour of the third party without any prior consent of the plaintiff; particularly when the obligation in the nature of written contract was created in favour of the plaintiff to insist upon execution of the sale deed. The first defendant was not justified to hide this fact of written suit agreement from any third party. There could not have been any valid excuse for the first defendant to execute the sale deed in favour of the third party (second and third defendants in this case) on the pleaded ground that the suit agreement was not properly stamped and hence, it was bogus. This contention by the defendants was not proved in both the Courts below. Even otherwise, as held by the Gujarat High Court in the ruling in Laxmiben W/o. Chinubhai Bapalal Modi & Ors. 1982 (2) Guj L. R.Vol XXIII 426, the matter of requisite stamp duty payable is the question between the State and the person liable to pay it. Once judicial authority has decided to admit the document into evidence though unstamped, the third party has nothing much to do about it. 1982 (2) Guj L. R.Vol XXIII 426, the matter of requisite stamp duty payable is the question between the State and the person liable to pay it. Once judicial authority has decided to admit the document into evidence though unstamped, the third party has nothing much to do about it. Section 36 of the Stamp Act (2 of 1899) lay down a rule that once insufficiently stamped document is tendered in evidence and marked as exhibit in the case without any objection in the trial Court so as to invite judicial determination to decide its admissibility, the Court is prohibited from reopening the matter after the document gets admitted in evidence. In the case in hand, upon perusal of the evidence led by the parties on record, the first Appellate Court took cognizance of the legal position and was well within its discretion as final Court of facts to grant relief of decree for specific performance of the suit agreement. This was also in consonance with the legal position as explained in the case of Prakash Chandra vs. Angadlal and Others reported in AIR 1979 SC 1241 that ordinary rule is to grant specific performance of the agreement. When the vendee is ready & willing to get the sale deed executed from the vendor pursuant to the agreement to sell, relief can be granted particularly when the onus is squarely upon the subsequent purchaser to establish that he or they are innocent purchaser without notice of the suit agreement. This onus was not discharged by evidence in both the Courts below. Hence, I do not find any fault with the impugned Judgment and Order. 11. Observations, as stated in the ruling by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Boodireddy Chandraiah and Others vs. Arigela Laxmi and another, reported in AIR 2008 SC 380 , are required to be reproduced, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, considering the earlier decisions, has interpreted the phrase "substantial question of law", as under : "11. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. (See: Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. [ (2001) 3 SCC 179 ]. 12. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below as to the suit agreement to sell the suit property was entered into as claimed in the suit cannot be set aside in the Second Appeal in the absence of any perversity. The findings recorded by the first Appellate Court and the verdict was blemishless and was based on facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence. No perversity is found. My Conclusion, therefore, is that this Second Appeal has no merits. Hence, it is dismissed with costs.