JUDGMENT Sanjay Karol, J. Assailing the judgment dated 14.09.2007, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Solan, H.P. Camp at Nalagarh, in Case No.7-NL/7 of 2007/2006, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ramu, State has filed the present appeal under the provisions of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. It is the case of prosecution that prosecutrix was residing with her parents, namely, mother Kamla (PW.2) and father Ram Ji Mal (PW.4) at Nalagarh. Sometime, in the month of March 2006 (exact date not mentioned), prosecutrix was subjected to repeated forcible intercourse by the accused, resulting into her conception. On 02.08.2006, to this effect, FIR No.199/2006 (Ex. PW.1/A) was lodged against the accused, at Police Station, Nalagarh, under the provisions of Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. Allegedly at the time of commission of crime, prosecutrix had not crossed the age of discretion and was a minor (below 16 years). The matter was investigated by Sher Singh (PW.13), who got the prosecutrix medically examined from Dr.Brind Kapil (PW.6), who issued MLC (Ex.PW.6/B). For determining the radiological age, skiagram test was conducted by Dr.M.R. Verma (PW.7), who issued report/medical record (Ex.PW.7/A, Ex.PW.7/B, Ex.PW.7/C to Ex.PW.7/E and Ex.PW.7/F). Further necessary investigation was carried out by the Investigating Officer. Investigation revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, hence Challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, in all, prosecution examined as many as thirteen witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took up plea of innocence and false implication. No evidence in defence has been led. 5. Trial Court after appreciating the testimony of the prosecution witnesses acquitted the accused. Hence the present appeal. 6. We have heard Mr. B. S. Parmar, learned Addl. Advocate General, on behalf of the State as also Mr. Ashok Tyagi, Advocate, on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. Advocate General, on behalf of the State as also Mr. Ashok Tyagi, Advocate, on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients so as to constitute the charged offence. 8. In Prandas v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 36 , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under: "(6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under Section 417, Criminal P.c., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in - 'Sheo Swarup v. Emperor', AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) at pp.229, 230 (A), in these words: "Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice." " 9. It is urged that prosecutrix, as on the date of commission of crime was 14 years of age. Significantly, there is no documentary evidence on record to this effect. On the other hand, MLC (Ex.PW.6/B) records age of the prosecutrix to be 16 years. Radiological age, so proved on record through testimony of Dr. M.R. Verma (PW.7) and Dr.Brind Kapil (PW.6) and medical record is between 15 to 17 years. Significantly, prosecutrix herself admits that at the time of her medical examination, her parents had disclosed her age to be 16 years. Not only that Ram Ji Mal (PW.4), father of the prosecutrix, who though initially deposed the age of the prosecutrix to be 14 years, later clarified that "the eldest children of mine is aged about 26 years and thereafter second child was born after about 4-5 years and thereafter the prosecutrix was born after 2/3 years." Thus, in our considered view, age of prosecutrix cannot be said to have been proved to be 14 years. On the contrary, there is evidence on record to the effect that she had crossed the age of discretion and was above 16 years of age. 10. It is a settled principle of law that testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient enough to convict the accused if it inspires confidence. On the contrary, there is evidence on record to the effect that she had crossed the age of discretion and was above 16 years of age. 10. It is a settled principle of law that testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient enough to convict the accused if it inspires confidence. (See: Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 3 SCC 791 and State of Rajasthan v. Babu Meena, (2013) 4 SCC 206 ). 11. The Court is duty bound to appreciate the evidence in totality of the background of the entire case. It is also settled proposition of law that in case evidence read in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, her version is liable to be rejected. The apex Court in Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 7 SCC 171 , has held that:- "20. It is a settled legal proposition that once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the court as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. 21. A prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. Her testimony has to be appreciated on the principle of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of probability having been shown to exist in view of the subject matter being a criminal charge. However, if the court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or substantial, which may lend assurance to her testimony. (Vide: Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P. & Anr., (2003) 3 SCC 175 ; and Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 . 22. However, if the court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or substantial, which may lend assurance to her testimony. (Vide: Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P. & Anr., (2003) 3 SCC 175 ; and Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 . 22. Where evidence of the prosecutrix is found suffering from serious infirmities and inconsistencies with other material, prosecutrix making deliberate improvements on material point with a view to rule out consent on her part and there being no injury on her person even though her version may be otherwise, no reliance can be placed upon her evidence. (Vide: Suresh N. Bhusare & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 1 SCC 220 . 23. In Jai Krishna Mandal & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 14 SCC 534 , this Court while dealing with the issue held: "4.the only evidence of rape was the statement of the prosecutrix herself and when this evidence was read in its totality, the story projected by the prosecutrix was so improbable that it could not be believed." 24. In Rajoo & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 15 SCC 133 , this Court held: (SCC p. 141, para 10) "10. that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on par with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary." The court however, further observed: "11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication. there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration." 25. In Tameezuddin @ Tammu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 15 SCC 566 , this Court held has under: "9. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication. there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration." 25. In Tameezuddin @ Tammu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 15 SCC 566 , this Court held has under: "9. It is true that in a case of rape the evidence of the prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, but to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if the story is improbable and belies logic, would be doing violence to the very principles which govern the appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter." 26. Even in cases where there is some material to show that the victim was habituated to sexual intercourse, no inference of the victim being a woman of "easy virtues" or a women of "loose moral character" can be drawn. Such a woman has a right to protect her dignity and cannot be subjected to rape only for that reason. She has a right to refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone and everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone. Merely because a woman is of easy virtue, her evidence cannot be discarded on that ground alone rather it is to be cautiously appreciated. (Vide: State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, (1991) 1 SCC 57 ; State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors., (1996) 2 SCC 384 ; and State of U.P. v. Pappu @ Yunus & Anr., (2005) 3 SCC 594 . 27. In view of the provisions of Sections 53 and 54 of the Evidence Act, 1872, unless the character of the prosecutrix itself is in issue, her character is not a relevant factor to be taken into consideration at all. 28. The courts while trying an accused on the charge of rape, must deal with the case with utmost sensitivity, examining the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses which are not of a substantial character. 29. However, even in a case of rape, the onus is always on the prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. 29. However, even in a case of rape, the onus is always on the prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. It is no part of the duty of the defence to explain as to how and why in a rape case the victim and other witness have falsely implicated the accused. Prosecution case has to stand on its own legs and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. However great the suspicion against the accused and however strong the moral belief and conviction of the court, unless the offence of the accused is established beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of legal evidence and material on the record, he cannot be convicted for an offence. There is an initial presumption of innocence of the accused and the prosecution has to bring home the offence against the accused by reliable evidence. The accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt. (Vide: Tukaram & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 SCC 143 ; and Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 . 30. The prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. There must be proper legal evidence and material on record to record the conviction of the accused. Conviction can be based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it lends assurance of her testimony. However, in case the court has reason not to accept the version of prosecutrix on its face value, it may look for corroboration. In case the evidence is read in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, the prosecutrix case becomes liable to be rejected. 31. The court must act with sensitivity and appreciate the evidence in totality of the background of the entire case and not in the isolation. Even if the prosecutrix is of easy virtue/unchaste woman that itself cannot be a determinative factor and the court is required to adjudicate whether the accused committed rape on the victim on the occasion complained of." 12. In the backdrop of aforesaid principles of law we shall discuss the evidence on record. 13. Even if the prosecutrix is of easy virtue/unchaste woman that itself cannot be a determinative factor and the court is required to adjudicate whether the accused committed rape on the victim on the occasion complained of." 12. In the backdrop of aforesaid principles of law we shall discuss the evidence on record. 13. We find that there is inordinate delay which remains unexplained on the part of the prosecution in not reporting the matter to the authorities/police within time. Prosecutrix states that on the first occasion, when she went to the jungle to answer the call of nature, accused followed and threatened to kill her with a knife. But she does not state the cause thereof. Be that as it may, she states that on another occasion when she went to the jungle, accused followed her and asked her to accompany him, which request she turned down. Significantly she does not state that on these occasions she was subjected to rape in the jungle or elsewhere. On the charged offence, all that she states is that she was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse on four occasions, twice inside the hut and twice in the Khud. Except for bald assertion her testimony about the time, date and place is conspicuously silent. She states that thereafter she went to Patiala along with her parents and returned to Nalagarh. After two days she narrated the incident to her mother. Now significantly, if the incident stood reported to the mother immediately after the occurrence of crime, then why is it that no prompt action was taken against the accused. 14. Birwati (PW.3) neighbour of the prosecutrix, has not supported her cause and the prosecution case in Court. She was declared hostile and nothing fruitful could be elicited from her testimony. 15. Prosecutrix was pregnant by five months, certainly her parents would have noticed physiological changes in her body, yet they did not either pursue the matter any further with the accused or report the matter to the authorities. Delay in the instant case, cannot be said to have been explained, thus rendering the prosecution version to be doubtful. 16. Version of the prosecutrix that she was subjected to rape inside the hut and in the Khud, to our mind, does not inspire confidence. She admits that she was residing in a cluster of Jhuggis, which were fully occupied and people were residing there. 16. Version of the prosecutrix that she was subjected to rape inside the hut and in the Khud, to our mind, does not inspire confidence. She admits that she was residing in a cluster of Jhuggis, which were fully occupied and people were residing there. Yet it has not come on record that she resisted the acts of the accused. On any one of the occasions, she could have easily reported the matter to the neighbours. She admits that after she was subjected to rape, she went with her parents to Patiala, which is a far of place from Nalagarh. Assuming that she was living under fear of threat from the accused, she could have conveniently disclosed such fact to her parents/relatives at Patiala, which for reasons best known to her, she did not do so. Also she admits to have stayed with her brother-in-law for quite some time, yet she did not disclose such fact to him or to her sister. Her version of the accused having threatened her and sexually assaulted her in the Khud and Jhuggi is only an improvement for it does not find mention in her previous statement (Ex.PW.1/A) with which she was confronted. Thus, we do not find the testimony of the prosecutrix to be worthy of credence, inspiring in confidence or even partly believable. Prosecutrix through her version cannot be able to establish the case set up against the accused. Testimony of the parents of prosecutrix also does not advance the case of prosecution any further. 14. Hence, it cannot be said that prosecution has been able to prove its case, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence so as to prove that the accused forcibly committed rape upon prosecutrix against her will or criminally intimidated her by threatening to do away with her life. 17. The Court below, in our considered view, has correctly and completely appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. It cannot be said that judgment of trial Court is perverse, illegal, erroneous or based on incorrect and incomplete appreciation of material on record resulting into miscarriage of justice. 17. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. It cannot be said that judgment of trial Court is perverse, illegal, erroneous or based on incorrect and incomplete appreciation of material on record resulting into miscarriage of justice. 17. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (2010) 1 SCC 94 , since it cannot be said that trial Court has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice, no interference is warranted in the instant case. For all the aforesaid reasons, present appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. Bail bonds furnished by the accused are discharged. Record of the trial Court be immediately sent back. Appeal dismissed.