Judgment : 1. The appeal is filed against judgment and decree of Regular Civil Appeal No. 488/1993, which was pending in the Court of Additional District Judge, Biloli, District Nanded. The Trial Court has given the decree of redemption of mortgage in favour of present respondents and the said decision is confirmed by the First Appellate Court. Both the sides are heard. 2. The suit was filed for redemption of mortgage of agricultural land bearing Survey No. 2, admeasuring 18 Acres 19 Gunta situated at Lakhmapur, Tahsil Mukhed [to the extent of 8 Acres and given separate number as survey No. 2/B]. It is the case of plaintiffs that father of plaintiff No. 1 namely Dnyanoba was real brother of Vithoba and they lived in joint family. It is contended that in the year 1971, Vithoba gave the suit property by way of mortgage for the consideration of Rs. 4,000/- and for the period of five years to defendant and possession was taken by defendant as mortgagee. It is contended that Vithoba died in the year 1972. It is contended that Vithoba was issuless and his widow also died subsequently. It is contended that it was joint family property and further, plaintiff No. 1 is the only heir, who can succeed to the property of Vithoba and so, he is entitled to file the suit for redemption. 3. It is the case of plaintiffs that they had requested the defendant to accept the amount of Rs. 4,000/- and return back the possession but the defendant refused to do so. It is contended that lastly the demand was made by plaintiffs in the month of November 1981 and when defendant refused to deliver back the possession, the plaintiffs were constrained to file the suit. 4. In written statement, defendant contended that there was no mortgage transaction between him and Vithoba and the document executed in his favour is document of out and out sale. The defendant also contended that he had filed Regular Civil Suit No. 57/1976 against plaintiffs and in that suit, plaintiffs had given consent written statement to admit the nature of transaction. 5. Issues were framed on the basis of aforesaid pleadings. Both the sides gave evidence. The Trial Court held that it was mortgage transaction and gave the decree of redemption. This decision is confirmed by the First Appellate Court. 5. Issues were framed on the basis of aforesaid pleadings. Both the sides gave evidence. The Trial Court held that it was mortgage transaction and gave the decree of redemption. This decision is confirmed by the First Appellate Court. This Court made order on 19.8.1994 and decided to formulate the substantial questions of law on the basis of ground No. VII (A) (B) (C) of appeal memo. The substantial questions of law are as under :- (i) Whether both the Court below have committed error in interpreting the disputed document and whether the document is out and out sale ? (ii) Whether plaintiffs are estopped from challenging the nature of transaction in view of the written statement filed by them in previously instituted suit ? (iii) Whether the suit ought to have been dismissed by holding that it is time barred ? 6. When there is dispute over the nature of transaction, in view of the provision of section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act ('T.P. Act' for short), the intention of the parties must be gathered, in the first place, from the document itself. If the words are express and clear, the effect must be given to the words and in that case, any extraneous inquiry in to what was though or intended is ruled out. Only if there is ambiguity in the language used, it is permissible to look to surrounding circumstances to determine what was intended. 'Mortgage' is defined in section 58 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act and there is interpretation of section 58 (c) and section 8 in the case reported as AIR 1954 SC 345 (Chunchun Jha Vs. Ebadat Ali). 7. In the case cited supra itself, the Apex Court has observed that in view of section 58 (c) of the T.P. Act, if the sale and agreement to repurchase are embodied in separate document, then the transaction cannot be called as 'mortgage' whether the documents are contemporaneously executed or not. However, the Apex Court has observed that but, the converse does not hold good, that is to say, the mere fact that there is only one document does not necessarily mean that it must be a mortgage and cannot be a sale. 8. At para No. 8 of the case cited supra following observations are made by the Apex Court in respect of such document. "8. ............ 8. At para No. 8 of the case cited supra following observations are made by the Apex Court in respect of such document. "8. ............ The legislature has made a clear cut classification and excluded transactions embodied in more than one document from the category of mortgages, therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that persons who, after the amendment, choose not to use two documents, do not intend the transaction to be a sale, unless they displace that presumption by clear and express words; and if the conditions of Section 58 (c) are fulfilled, then we are of opinion that the deed should be constructed as a mortgage." 9. On this point one case reported as AIR 1965 SUPREME COURT 225 [Murli Vs. Devkaran] was cited by the learned counsel for the respondent. In that case, the discussion is made by the Apex Court about clog on equity of redemption mentioned in section 60 of T.P. Act. In the present case, the interpretation of the document is necessary and if the Court come to the conclusion that it was mortgage document, it would not be necessary to find out as to whether the other conditions amount to clog on equity of redemption. So, the observations made by the Apex Court in this case need not be used in the present case. 10. The execution of document is not disputed and so, the contents can be considered without reference to the evidence of witnesses. The relevant portion of the document is as under :- " vkt fnukad 4-2-1971 bZ- iklwu fnukad 3-2-1976 i;Zar rqEgkl ,danj ¼4000½ : pkj gtkj :i;s ;kl eqn~nr ikp o"ksZ ikosrks eqnr [kjsnh fnyks vkgs- lnjh 'ksr izR;s{k rqeps rkC;kr fnyks vkgs- ojhy jDde eqnr laiY;koj rqEgkl nsowu vkeps 'ksr eh vkiY;k rkC;kr ?ksm=u tj eqnr laiysoj jDde u fnY;kl gsp dk;e [kq"k [kjsnh [kr letwu lnjh tfeuhph ofgokV rqEgh rqeps oa'k ijaijsus fujaru djkoh " The aforesaid contents show that term of five year was fixed. Possession was given and only after completion of term of five years, the amount was to be returned by the mortgagor. Even if the possibility of mistake is considered in respect of the time of payment, it can be said that the possession was to be returned immediately after returning of the mortgage money and parties did not intend to execute the reconveyance document. Even if the possibility of mistake is considered in respect of the time of payment, it can be said that the possession was to be returned immediately after returning of the mortgage money and parties did not intend to execute the reconveyance document. Mentioning of specific dates in aforesaid portion shows that during this period, the defendant was to enjoy the property and after that, the amount was to be given by mortgagor for taking back the possession. In this area, mortgage documents are created this way. In view of the observations made by the Apex Court in the case cited supra and the provision of section 58 (c) of T.P. Act, from the aforesaid contents only one inference is possible that it was a mortgage document. 11. The evidence of defendant in cross examination shows that in the year 1976, plaintiffs had sent persons to him and they had requested the defendant to return the possession. There is specific admission in this regard that in January 1976, plaintiffs had come to him and had requested to accept Rs. 4,000/- and redeem the suit land, but he refused to do so. Thus, immediately after expiry of period, plaintiffs had approached the defendant and this circumstance is important and needs to be considered for ascertaining the intention of the parties. Though the construction of document is a question of law, in the second appeal, this Court is not expected to interfere in the findings given after appreciation of oral evidence. 12. The circumstance like filing of written statement by the plaintiff in a suit filed by defendant in the past is considered by both the Courts below. The original document was available for perusal of the Trial Court and it is observed that signatures of plaintiffs were obtained on separate paper and that paper was used for preparing written statement. Their signatures were not present on other pages of written statement. The documents show that the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court. There is no record to show that the Trial Court had made inquiry with the present plaintiffs in the said suit to ascertain as to whether they were admitting the claim of the present defendant. Present defendant had contended that he is the owner of the suit property. The documents show that the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court. There is no record to show that the Trial Court had made inquiry with the present plaintiffs in the said suit to ascertain as to whether they were admitting the claim of the present defendant. Present defendant had contended that he is the owner of the suit property. In any case, when the suit was dismissed, not much can be made out due to the aforesaid circumstance in the present matter. The suit was filed in the year 1976, written statement was shown to be given on 14.9.1976 and the suit came to be disposed of on 29.9.1984. In view of the aforesaid admission of the defendant that in 1976 plaintiffs had approached him and had requested to redeem the property, this Court holds that no interference is possible on the finding given by both the Courts below on this point. 13. The suit is filed for redemption of mortgage and it came to be filed within six years from the date of expiry of period of mortgage and so, there was no question of considering the point of limitation. The issue of limitation was not framed by the Courts below as there was no such pleadings. 14. In the result, all the points are answered against the appellants and the appeal is dismissed. 15. The learned counsel for appellant seeks stay to the execution for the period of four weeks. Other side is heard. Time of four weeks is given.