JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner-defendants are aggrieved by the order dated 3.5.2014 passed by the Addl. District Judge No.2, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur, whereby the learned Judge has dismissed an application filed under Order 12, Rule 6 CPC by the petitioners. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent-plaintiff, Chandra Prakash Agarwal, filed a suit for specific performance, injunction and possession against the petitioner-defendants with regard to an agricultural land situated in village Neendad, Tehsil Amer, District Jaipur. According to him, the petitioners had agreed to sell the suit property for a total of Rs. 6,70,00,000/-. Thus, both the parties had entered into an agreement to sell on 22.3.2013. According to the agreement, an amount of Rs. 1,85,00,000/- was paid through four cheques by the plaintiff to the petitioners. It was further agreed that the remaining amount shall be paid on 31.5.2013, and the sale-deed be registered in the plaintiff's favour. However, subsequently the petitioners refused to get the sale-deed registered, despite the offer by the respondent-plaintiff with regard to the remaining amount. 3. The petitioners filed their written statement. During the proceedings, initially, the respondent-plaintiff filed an application under Order 12, Rule 6 read with Section 151 CPC wherein the respondent-plaintiff prayed that since in the written statement the petitioners have admitted the fact that an agreement to sell was entered between the parties, and have also admitted the fact that a notice was sent to them for performance of the contract, therefore, the judgment should be pronounced on the basis of such admission. However, by order dated 15.2.2014 the learned Judge dismissed the application filed by the respondent-plaintiff. 4. Subsequently, the petitioners filed an application under Order 12, Rule 6 read with Section 151 CPC, and pleaded that once the application filed by the respondent-plaintiff has been dismissed, and since no prayer was made by the respondent-plaintiff for producing his evidence, therefore, the plaintiff is now pre-empted from producing any evidence. Therefore, the Court should not permit the respondent-plaintiff from examining his witness. However, vide order dated 3.5.2014 the learned Judge has dismissed the said application. Hence, this petition before this Court. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Therefore, the Court should not permit the respondent-plaintiff from examining his witness. However, vide order dated 3.5.2014 the learned Judge has dismissed the said application. Hence, this petition before this Court. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Rajendra Prasad, has pleaded that under the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff has two options before him: firstly, to prove his case on the basis of cogent evidence submitted by him; secondly, to rely upon certain admissions made by the defendants and to file an application under Order 12, Rule 6 CPC, and to request the trial court to pass its judgment and decree on the basis of admissions made by the defendants in the written statement. Moreover, in case an alternate prayer is not made by the plaintiff that if the application were to be dismissed by the learned trial court, he should still be permitted to submit his evidence in order to establish his case, then in such a situation he cannot be permitted to lead evidence. In order to buttress this submission, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Shri Shankar Parmeshwar Mistri v. Shri Jagdish Makwana & Anr. [(2013) 5 ABR 52]. Therefore, according to the learned counsel the learned Judge has committed an illegality in dismissing the application filed by the petitioners, and in permitting the respondent-plaintiff to produce his evidence to establish his case. 6. On the other hand, Mr. P.C. Shah, the learned counsel for the respondents, has contended that there is no bar contained in Order 12, Rule 6 CPC which preempts the plaintiff from submitting his evidence in case an application filed by him has been rejected by the learned trial court. Therefore, a bar cannot be read into Rule 6 Order 12 CPC. Secondly, the the case of Shri Shankar Parmeshwar Mistri (supra) is distinguishable on the facts itself. Lastly, that the burden of proof is always on the plaintiff to establish his case. Therefore, the plaintiff would have the right to prove his case through cogent evidence and to establish his case by preponderance of evidence. Merely because an application filed by him has been rejected, would not preempt the plaintiff from proceeding further and in producing his evidence during the course of trial. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order as well as considered the case law submitted at the Bar. Merely because an application filed by him has been rejected, would not preempt the plaintiff from proceeding further and in producing his evidence during the course of trial. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order as well as considered the case law submitted at the Bar. 8. Order 12, Rule 6 CPC is as under:- Judgment on admissions.- (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1), a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced. 9. A bare perusal of Order 12, Rule 6 CPC clearly reveals that there is no bar contained in Rule 6 which preempts the plaintiff from pursuing the case further in case an application filed by him has been dismissed by the learned trial court. 10. According to Section 101 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proof is always upon the party which makes a statement of fact to prove the existence of the said fact. Thus, it is the right of the party to establish his case through cogent evidence, and to prove his case through preponderance of evidence. Merely because the plaintiff has submitted an application under Order 12, Rule 6 CPC which has been dismissed, would not deprive him of his right to establish his case through preponderance of evidence. In case the Legislature in its wisdom wanted to prevent the plaintiff from producing his evidence, it would have clearly placed an embargo on the right of the plaintiff to proceed further. However, as Rule 6 does not contain any such bar, a bar cannot be read into the said Rule. If a bar were to be read while interpreting the scope and ambit of Rule 6, the Court would be amending the Rule - a power not enjoined upon a court of law. However, as Rule 6 does not contain any such bar, a bar cannot be read into the said Rule. If a bar were to be read while interpreting the scope and ambit of Rule 6, the Court would be amending the Rule - a power not enjoined upon a court of law. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel that once an application filed by the plaintiff has been dismissed, and in case he did not make the alternate prayer that he may be permitted to produce his evidence, then he is prevented from producing his evidence, is not substantiated by the tenor of the law. Hence, the said contention is clearly unacceptable. 11. In catena of cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a judgment passed by a Court should not be read as a provision of law. Before the ratio of a case can be applied, the Court should scrutinise the similarity of facts, the issues involved, and only then should the ratio be applied. A bare perusal of the facts of Shri Shankar Parmeshwar Mistri (supra) clearly reveals that the facts are different from the facts of the present case. In that case, relying upon the admission made by the defendants in the written statement, the plaintiff had filed an application under Order 12, Rule 6 CPC. The said application was accepted by the learned trial court. However, instead of decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff, the learned trial court dismissed his suit. Therefore, two issues were raised before the Hon'ble Bombay High Court: firstly, was the learned trial court right in dismissing suit when defendants' admission relied on by the plaintiff was not sufficient to treat that the claim in suit as admitted claims? Secondly, whether the learned trial court was bound to relegate the plaintiff to prove his claim, though plaintiff had not prayed for chance to prove the claim, and had prayed for judgment only on admission? Secondly, whether the learned trial court was bound to relegate the plaintiff to prove his claim, though plaintiff had not prayed for chance to prove the claim, and had prayed for judgment only on admission? It is in light of the peculiar facts of the said case that His Lordship of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court has held that once the plaintiff was so sure that he could win his suit on the basis of the admission made by the defendants, and once he had not made an alternate prayer that he may be permitted to produce evidence in case his application were to be dismissed, then the plaintiff would be debarred from producing his evidence. 12. However, in the present case, the plaintiff's application in fact has been dismissed by the learned trial court. Meaning thereby that the learned trial court has concluded that the facts narrated in the written statement do not amount to an admission on part of the defendant. Once the plaintiff's application was dismissed by the learned trial court, the plaintiff is relegated to the original position of having to prove his case through cogent evidence. Therefore, the learned Judge was justified in permitting the respondent-plaintiff to produce his evidence, and to establish his case. Hence, the case of Shri Shankar Parmeshwar Mistri (supra) does not rush to the rescue of the petitioners. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners informs this Court that today the case is listed before the learned trial court for cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness. The petitioners have been permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness after imposition of cost upon them. Therefore, the petitioners have a bona fide apprehension that in case they were not to deposit the cost today, their right to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness may be closed by the learned trial court. The apprehension seems to be a reasonable one. Therefore, this Court directs the learned trial court not to close the right of cross-examination of the petitioners today, but to give them another opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness in the near future. 14. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order. This petition being devoid of any merit is, hereby, dismissed. Consequently, the stay application also stands dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******