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2014 DIGILAW 1258 (PNJ)

JATINDER SOOD v. RENU

2014-09-04

MUTTACI JEYAPAUL, NAVITA SINGH

body2014
JUDGMENT : NAVITA SINGH, J. 1. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard. The present appeal is preferred by appellant Jatinder Sood feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned Additional District Judge, Ludhiana, on 06.08.2002, whereby his petition, for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act - for short), was dismissed. 2. The case of the appellant in his petition, filed for divorce, was that the parties tied the nuptial knot on 11.05.1982 at Ludhiana according to Hindu rites and ceremonies and they were blessed with a female child on 29.05.1983. Since inception of marriage, the behavior of the respondent towards the appellant was not good and she pressurized him for arranging a separate residence. On refusal by the appellant, she started insulting him in the presence of friends and relatives. She did not perform the household chores and made wild and reckless allegations against the character of the appellant. She left his company without any reason on 06.08.1994 and took all the ornaments and other valuables with her. The appellant made efforts to bring her back, but all in vain. 3. The respondent contested the allegations on the ground that the appellant and his family members were greedy persons, who were not satisfied with the dowry brought by her. She was taunted and tortured for that and the appellant used to say that he had made a big mistake by marrying her as she was not qualified enough. She had a diploma in Art and Craft. 4. After the birth of the female child, the respondent could not conceive which disturbed the mother of the appellant who started calling the respondent 'barren' and said that if she did not bear a male child, the family tree would be destroyed. The respondent told her mother-in-law that she was ready to get herself treated, but the mother-in-law told her that they had no money to spend on her treatment and her parents should spend on the same. The mother of the appellant even told that she would marry her son, i.e. the appellant, for the second time. The respondent told her mother-in-law that she was ready to get herself treated, but the mother-in-law told her that they had no money to spend on her treatment and her parents should spend on the same. The mother of the appellant even told that she would marry her son, i.e. the appellant, for the second time. The brother of the appellant was blessed with two sons and the respondent suggested that the younger son of the brother of the appellant could be taken in adoption by the parties, but the suggestion was found preposterous by the appellant and his family. 5. The mother of the appellant wanted the respondent to get money out of the retiral benefits of her mother, but she refused. In the second week of August, 1994, the respondent was turned out of the matrimonial home along with her daughter and since then she was living with her parents. Her parents convened panchayats for rehabilitating their daughter in the matrimonial home, but the efforts proved fruitless. 6. Rejoinder was filed by the appellant controverting the allegations made in the reply to the petition. 7. The following issues were framed by the trial Court:- 1. Whether the respondent treated the petitioner with cruelty? OPP 2. Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of more than two years before filing of the petition? OPR 3. Relief. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the trial Court had erred in dismissing the petition because the appellant was able to prove his case, whereas the allegations of the respondent were proved to be false. He stated that one of the allegations of the respondent was that the appellant and his family had asked her to bring a car from her parents. That allegation was apparently false because it came in evidence that the brother of the appellant was already owning a car since 1986. The family of the appellant already had a car and as such there was no question of demanding another one. These arguments are without any substance because even if there was a car in the family, it is absolutely believable that the appellant and his mother had wanted a new car to be brought by the respondent from her parents. Even otherwise, it came in evidence that the brother of the appellant had sold the car in 1992. These arguments are without any substance because even if there was a car in the family, it is absolutely believable that the appellant and his mother had wanted a new car to be brought by the respondent from her parents. Even otherwise, it came in evidence that the brother of the appellant had sold the car in 1992. Also, the brother of the appellant started living separate after his marriage and, therefore, his car could not be used by the entire family. This reason was enough to believe the averment of the respondent that she had been asked to bring a car from her parents. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant thereafter contended that the suggestion floated by the respondent that the parties should adopt one of the male children of the brother of the appellant was rightly found to be obnoxious by her in-laws because the respondent had no right to compel the appellant to ask his brother to part with the child. This argument is again not convincing. It is admitted case of the parties that after the birth of the female child in 1983 till many years later when the parties separated, the respondent had not conceived a child. If the respondent was being harassed in the matrimonial home for not bearing a male child, her suggestion that some male child from outside or the child of the brother of the appellant may be adopted was not that bad, though it may not have found favour with the appellant and his family. 10. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that efforts were made to bring the respondent back to the matrimonial home for which the appellant produced witnesses, namely, Padma Sood (PW 2), his mother; Vishnu Datt (PW 3) his mother's sister's husband and Meena Sood (PW 4), wife of the appellant's brother. It was argued that all the witnesses, including the appellant himself who appeared as PW 1, stated that efforts were made to bring the respondent back. Also, they stated that there was no demand of dowry and no harassment for not producing a male child. It was also argued that from the evidence it was clear that Usha Rani, Mrs. It was argued that all the witnesses, including the appellant himself who appeared as PW 1, stated that efforts were made to bring the respondent back. Also, they stated that there was no demand of dowry and no harassment for not producing a male child. It was also argued that from the evidence it was clear that Usha Rani, Mrs. Sarin, Seema Sood (wife of Vishnu Datt PW 3), Shashi Bhushan Sharma, Kewala Rani, Raj Rani and Major Sandhu were the persons in whose presence different meetings took place for reconciliation and for bringing the respondent back. All these arguments are absolutely without merit because the appellant very conveniently avoided to name any of the persons, who were the members of the alleged panchayats, in the petition and just stated passingly that several panchayats were convened to bring the respondent back, but she remained adamant. No month or year of holding of any meeting was given, nor any of the persons was named. At the time of evidence, certain persons were named for the first time and no one out of those persons, who could be said to be holding independent opinion, was examined. The appellant examined his mother, his uncle and his sister-in-law (Bhabhi), who were all interested witnesses. Even otherwise, all the names being introduced later and that part of the evidence being out of pleadings cannot be read. The casual way in which mention about holding of panchayats was made in para 4 of the petition and the manner in which the evidence was led, would make it clear that it was a cock and bull story. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant then argued that Meena Sood (PW 4) was the other daughter-in-law of the family, who was happy and she stated that there had never been any demand of dowry from her. She also stated that the respondent had never complained to her that she was being harassed on account of dowry. This argument will also meet the same fate, as above, because it is not necessary that both the daughters-in-law' would be harassed for dowry. It is possible that Meena Sood had brought sufficient dowry and that is why there was no demand of dowry from her. This argument will also meet the same fate, as above, because it is not necessary that both the daughters-in-law' would be harassed for dowry. It is possible that Meena Sood had brought sufficient dowry and that is why there was no demand of dowry from her. It is also quite possible, rather probable, that she would not depose against the family of her husband as she would not want to disturb her matrimonial life. Another factor would be that she was living separately with her husband and, therefore, there was not much occasion for her mother-in-law to extend any cruelty to her. Yet another factor that Meena Sood was happy in the matrimonial home and commanded respect would be that she had borne two male children. All the factors cumulatively show that the statement of Meena Sood (PW 4) from that point of view would not be of no avail to the appellant. 12. It was also argued on behalf of the appellant that reckless and wild allegations were made by the respondent against the character of the appellant and such character assassination was also cruelty. The appellant appearing as PW 1 stated that respondent used to torture him in the presence of friends and relatives to the effect that he was having illicit relations with many women. This part of the evidence was also out of the pleadings because it was written in the petition that the respondent used to make wild and reckless allegations against the character of the appellant. Nothing was mentioned that she said so in the presence of any friend or relative. No such friend or relative was ever named. Also, no name was given about which the respondent may have doubted the character of her husband. It can rather be said that reckless allegations were made by the appellant himself against the respondent that she used to say this or that and used to do this or that. None of the allegations was proved. 13. Lastly, it was argued on behalf of the appellant that in spite of serious allegations against the appellant and his family that they tortured the respondent for dowry and for not begetting a male child, no complaint was made either by her or by her family before any Forum so as to bring the appellant and his family to book. Lastly, it was argued on behalf of the appellant that in spite of serious allegations against the appellant and his family that they tortured the respondent for dowry and for not begetting a male child, no complaint was made either by her or by her family before any Forum so as to bring the appellant and his family to book. This argument is also not convincing because if criminal complaint and other litigation was launched by the respondent, the argument of the husband would have been that dragging him into such a litigation was cruelty, especially if they had been acquitted. Filing of complaints or not filing the same cannot both be used as weapon against the wife. 14. The authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, i.e. Vishwanath Agrawal Vs. Sau. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 ; Smt. Swedit Kaur v. Sh. Mohan Singh, 2004 (2) RCR (Civil) 15 (P & H) and Nagubai Ammal and Others Vs. B. Shama Rao and Others, AIR 1956 SC 593 , are entirely different on facts and even otherwise do not help the appellant even on law points. 15. Even from the culture and the society in which we live, it is understandable that the respondent was subjected to cruelty for not bearing a male child. Since the other daughter-in-law of the family had two sons, whereas the elder son of the family had only a female child, it is highly likely that the desire for a male child led the appellant and his family to extend torture to the respondent. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that since the respondent could not conceive for almost eleven years after the birth of her daughter, the relations between the parties worsened from day-to-day and life of the respondent was made a living hell. Ultimately, she was turned out of the matrimonial home. He also referred to the cross-examination of the appellant where he stated that he was not prepared to keep the respondent with him and to rehabilitate her in the matrimonial home at any cost. He also showed ignorance as to whether the respondent was willing to live with him or whether she has ever refused to live with him. The intention of the appellant thus was to get rid of his wife at every cost and he had never intended to bring her back. 17. He also showed ignorance as to whether the respondent was willing to live with him or whether she has ever refused to live with him. The intention of the appellant thus was to get rid of his wife at every cost and he had never intended to bring her back. 17. It is clear from the discussion made above that the appellant miserably failed to prove his case and the trial Court rightly dismissed the petition. The appeal is dismissed.