JUDGMENT S.C. DHARMADHIKARI, J. 1. These five Appeals at the instance of the Revenue challenge the order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai dated 27th April 2011. 2. In the first Appeal, we are concerned with the Assessment Year 1991-92. 3. Mr. Pinto, learned counsel appearing in support of this Appeal, submits that the Tribunal's order gives rise to three substantial questions of law. They read as under: (A) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law the Hon'ble ITAT is right in holding that the payments for the equipments and spare parts amounting to DM 7,15,000/is not a receipt of income accruing or arising to the Assessee by virtue of the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) of Income Tax Act 1961? (B) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law the Hon'ble ITAT is right in holding that the payments towards the supply of the equipments amounting to DM 13,30,000/- are not in the nature of royalty as defined in section 9 of the Income Tax Act 1961? (C) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law the Hon'ble ITAT is right in holding that when the entire income received by the nonresident Assessee was liable to deduction of tax at source, no advance was payable by the Assessee and there was no question of interest chargeable u/s 234B?” 4. At the outset and in all fairness Mr. Pinto submits that the question No.(C) is concluded against the Revenue and in favour of the Assessee by the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Director of Income Tax (International Taxation) v/s NGC Network Asia LLC, reported in (2009) 313 ITR 187 (Bom). 5. However, Mr. Pinto submits that the first two questions are substantial questions of law. They have impact not only on the present Assessee's case but several others as well. This is a case where the facts are undisputed. Mr. Pinto submits that the Assessee is a Company organised and existing under the law of Denmark. The assessment was completed under section 143(3) on 28th February 1994. The total income of Rs.8,67,82,300/- as against the returned income of Rs.6,05,90,310/by making additions on account of revenue received from Madras Fertilizer was made. Mr. Pinto submits that the Assessee is a Company organised and existing under the law of Denmark. The assessment was completed under section 143(3) on 28th February 1994. The total income of Rs.8,67,82,300/- as against the returned income of Rs.6,05,90,310/by making additions on account of revenue received from Madras Fertilizer was made. The Assessee claimed that certain receipts constituting Fees for Technical Services was not taxable as per Article III(3) of the Old Indo Danish Tax Treaty based on the argument that it does not have a permanent establishment in India. However, the Revenue had taxed these particular receipts either as royalty or something other than technical fees alongwith Royalty and Management charges @ 20 % of the gross amount. 6. Mr. Pinto therefore submits that the Assessing Officer was right in his conclusion reached in the order dated 28th February 1994. Mr. Pinto has invited our attention to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act 1961 together with the definition of the term 'royalty' for the purpose of clause (vi). Mr. Pinto submits that the definition is too wide and broad and includes the services which have been rendered by the Assessee to the Indian resident. The payment received from the Indian resident in Doish Marks is also for transfer of rights, imparting of any information concerning the working or the use or the process or marketing of the property. In other words, according to Mr. Pinto, this is not a case of mere supply of equipments by a foreign party to an Indian resident for which the price is received and in the contract, there is a reference to a manual or a guide for installation and use of the buyer. He submits that the product may be specialised or the equipment may not have something to do with the business of the Indian Company but it is not making payment only for acquisition of the equipment but the rights in the nature enumerated in Explanation 2 which is really an explanation to clause (vi) of subsection (1) of section 9 of the of Income Tax Act 1961. In these circumstances, even if the Tribunal has taken a particular view for the past Assessment Years, this being a question of law, according to Mr. Pinto, the finding of the Tribunal for earlier years does not bind the Revenue. Mr. Pinto therefore submits that the Appeal be admitted. 7. In these circumstances, even if the Tribunal has taken a particular view for the past Assessment Years, this being a question of law, according to Mr. Pinto, the finding of the Tribunal for earlier years does not bind the Revenue. Mr. Pinto therefore submits that the Appeal be admitted. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Pardiwalla, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, submits that the findings recorded by the Tribunal are pure findings of fact. They are based on the factual materials. The Tribunal has followed its order for the earlier Assessment Years in relation to identical transaction and identical contract. There is nothing by which this Court can take a different view on facts. Further, the widest possible of the meaning 'royalty' does not include the handing over of any written guide or manual or giving information for the purposes of installation and use of the equipment at the site of the Indian resident. Mr. Pardiwalla heavily relies upon the findings recorded by the Tribunal for the prior Assessment Years and submits that the Appeal does not raise any substantial question of law, it should be dismissed. 8. We have with the assistance of the learned counsel perused the order passed by the Tribunal. 9. The Tribunal in the case of the very Assessee, for prior assessment Years 1988-89 to 1990-91 decided an identical issue. 10. The Tribunal perused the contract between the parties, the payment made thereunder and concluded with the same would not fall within the definition of the term 'royalty'. In reaching such a conclusion, the Tribunal held as under: “25. Thus a plain reading of all clauses of contract that designs, flow charts and information supplied by the assessee are relating to supply of S200 Converters and their successful installation at the premises of buyer i.e. Indian Company, such information are integrated to the equipment and their installation at the premises of the buyer. It is not the case of A.O. That assessee had supplied copy right design or other information which can enable the buyer i.e. Indian Company to manufacture S200 Converters in its rights. The alleged information is as how to use S200 Converters. It is not the case of A.O. That assessee had supplied copy right design or other information which can enable the buyer i.e. Indian Company to manufacture S200 Converters in its rights. The alleged information is as how to use S200 Converters. If we look the clauses of the contract as well as the payment received by the assessee in the light of authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Courts discussed supra particularly keeping in mind the decision of Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court, 262 ITR 110 wherein supplementary contracts for remittance made to the supervising staff deputed by the foreign company in India as well as paid towards other information were considered by the Hon'ble High Court as payments forming part of the main contract for setting up of the machinery and held that the supplementary contracts cannot be read in isolation and such payments cannot be treated within the ambit of expression 'Royalty'. It was also brought to our notice at the time of hearing that scope of royalty as provided in section 9(1)(vi) is much wider than the DTAT executed between India and Denmark. We find that the alleged payments for S200 Converters made to the assessee are even not covered within the expression 'royalty' provided u/s 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act which is much wider than the one provided in DTAT. Otherwise as per the settled proposition we are required to examine these payment within the limited scope of royalty provided within the DTAT but when such payments does not come in the ambit of wider scope of royalty then we do not deem it necessary to discuss the scope of expression royalty provided in DTAT. Therefore, we allow the ground raised by the assessee in the cross objection and reject the ground of appeal raised by the revenue. In other words, even 10 % of these receipts treated by the learned CIT(A) as taxable would not be sustainable. The A.O. Is directed not to tax the receipts received by the assessee on supply of S200 Converters in all the these years.” 11. The Tribunal followed this very reasoning for the present Assessment Year. Mr. Pinto submits that the Revenue has challenged this finding and for earlier Assessment Years by filing an Appeal but he has no instructions with regard to the outcome thereof. Mr. Pardiwalla submits that the Appeals have been dismissed on technical grounds. The Tribunal followed this very reasoning for the present Assessment Year. Mr. Pinto submits that the Revenue has challenged this finding and for earlier Assessment Years by filing an Appeal but he has no instructions with regard to the outcome thereof. Mr. Pardiwalla submits that the Appeals have been dismissed on technical grounds. Apart therefrom, we are not in agreement with Mr. Pinto that the widest possible meaning of the term 'royalty' and as found in the definition of the term in the explanation (2) would include the transaction under which payment has been made for supply of Converters. The agreement has been referred to by the Tribunal in detail. The Tribunal found that the agreement postulates the payment for the said equipment. The technical information that is provided is related to data plant specification flow sheet which are issued in the installation of the plant. The Tribunal found that there is no transfer of rights in the nature contemplated by clauses (i) to (v) of the Explanation 2 so as to be termed as 'royalty'. Thus, the equipment was supplied to the Indian party and for which the Indian party made payment. The contract in relation to such a contract included stipulations for giving all information so as to guide the Indian party to install the equipment at site and thereafter to use it. It is in these circumstances, we are of the opinion that this is a mixed question and a finding of fact has been rendered considering the peculiar facts and circumstances. The Assessee's case and the contract of the Assessee with the Indian party – Madras Fertilizers Ltd. has been considered in arriving at the finding. The view taken for the present year is thus consistent with the nature of the transaction and the stipulations thereof. Such a finding of fact therefore is a possible one. There is no perversity or error of law apparent on the face of the record which would enable us to entertain the Appeal on Question No.1. 12. As far as Question No.2 is concerned, that is also referred to extensively by the Tribunal. The impugned payment of Doish Marks 13,30,000/was found to be made towards the supply of equipments and that too on 'principal to principal' basis. 12. As far as Question No.2 is concerned, that is also referred to extensively by the Tribunal. The impugned payment of Doish Marks 13,30,000/was found to be made towards the supply of equipments and that too on 'principal to principal' basis. It is in these circumstances the finding recorded by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) in favour of the Assessee and based on the judgment of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v/s Gulf Oil (Great Britain) Ltd., reported in 108 ITR 874 is not vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record and/or suffering from any perversity enabling us to entertain the Appeal. Even on Question no.2, we are in agreement with the Tribunal that the finding recorded in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Tribunal's order would show that the payment even in relation to the Question No.2 cannot be said to be falling within the provision of section 9(i) of the Income Tax Act 1961. 11. As a result of the above discussion, the Appeal does not raise any substantial question of law. It accordingly fails and is dismissed. No costs. INCOME TAX APPEAL NO.15 OF 2012 12. We do not find that this case is different than the facts referred in Income Tax Appeal No.51 of 2012. As to the is Question No.1 i.e. in relation to procurement of fees, there is concurrent finding of fact. After recording the admitted facts including the stipulation of double taxation avoidance agreement, the Tribunal has recorded that the payment received cannot be termed as 'royalty'. We do not find that it is vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record or perversity. Appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. INCOME TAX APPEAL NO.21 OF 2012 13. The facts and circumstances involved in this Appeal are identical to the facts and circumstances in Income Tax Appeal No.23 of 2012. For the reasons that have been indicated by us in the order passed in that Appeal, which is dismissed, we are of the view that the present Appeal also does not raise any substantial question of law. It is dismissed with no order as to costs. 14. We are in agreement with Mr. For the reasons that have been indicated by us in the order passed in that Appeal, which is dismissed, we are of the view that the present Appeal also does not raise any substantial question of law. It is dismissed with no order as to costs. 14. We are in agreement with Mr. Pinto that in this case, the Assessee did not provide something more than required as information to guide the Indian resident and hence the payment does not fall within the definition of the term 'royalty'. The clause which Mr. Pinto relies upon and rather all the clauses of Explanation 2 would denote that mere imparting of any information concerning technical, commercial, industrial or scientific knowledge, expertise of skill by itself has not been brought into the definition. If the transferring of all or any rights in respect of a patent, invention, model, design, secret formula or process or trade mark of the property including granting of licence is admittedly not an act performed in the present case, similarly the imparting of any information concerning the working of or use of the patent, invention, model, design, secret formula or process or trade mark or similar property is not what is found out in the Assessee's case, then, we do not see how the basic information to guide the Indian resident with regard to the installation and use of the equipment at site and any sum paid therefor would fall within this definition. In such circumstances, the finding of fact does not suffer from any perversity or error of law apparent on the face of the record. INCOME TAX APPEAL NO.41 OF 2012 15. Heard Mr. Pinto, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue and Mr. Pardiwalla, learned counsel for the Respondent. The distinguishing feature in this Appeal according to Mr. Pinto is that the payment of Doish Marks 1,34,046 received by the Respondent – Assessee is not only on account of supply of the equipment but transfer of all rights including granting of a licence. In such circumstances, explanation 2(i) of clause (VI) of subsection (1) of section 9 of the said Act wholly applies and this Appeal therefore raises substantial question of law. 16. Mr. Pinto invites our attention to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the order passed by the CIT (Appeals) stated to be in favour of the Assessee. In such circumstances, explanation 2(i) of clause (VI) of subsection (1) of section 9 of the said Act wholly applies and this Appeal therefore raises substantial question of law. 16. Mr. Pinto invites our attention to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the order passed by the CIT (Appeals) stated to be in favour of the Assessee. He also invites our attention to the Tribunal's order impugned in this Appeal and upholding the view of the CIT (Appeals). Mr. Pinto submits that both the Commissioner and the Tribunal have ignored the definition of the term 'royalty' and admitted facts and rendered a finding which is totally perverse. 17. Upon reading the two order and concurrent finding therein, we are unable to agree with Mr. Pinto. It is true that the payment of Doish Marks 1,34,046 converted at the relevant time in the Indian Rs.25,77,801 received by the Assessee includes the licence and engineering fees but the Commissioner noted that the Indian resident M/s Madras Fertilizers Ltd. offered the payment of Doish Marks 27,000 to tax in India. Further, the Commissioner as also the Tribunal noted that similar payments were not taxable in India and they do not fall in the definition of the term 'royalty' or fees for technical services given in Article 30 of the Indo Danish Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. The Commissioner may have referred to the definition of the term 'royalty' in the above referred explanation of the Income Tax Act 1961 but found that consistently a view has been taken and with reference to the Indo Danish Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement that the payment in this case cannot be said to be royalty. We are of the opinion that any larger or wider question need not be considered or gone into. Suffice it to hold that the Tribunal and the Commissioner took a possible view of the matter and by relying on the stipulations of Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. The Commissioner and Tribunal have therefore not rendered any finding which can be termed as perverse or vitiated by error of law apparent on the face of the record. The finding recorded and concurrently is in consonance with the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case. For these reasons, even this Appeal does not raise any substantial question of law. It is dismissed with no order as to costs. INCOME TAX APPEAL NO.51 OF 2012 18. The finding recorded and concurrently is in consonance with the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case. For these reasons, even this Appeal does not raise any substantial question of law. It is dismissed with no order as to costs. INCOME TAX APPEAL NO.51 OF 2012 18. We have heard Mr. Pinto and perused the order under challenge. We do not find that this case is different from the other cases which we have dealt with. For the reasons we have recorded in the companion Appeals, this Appeal does not raise any substantial question of law, it fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.