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2014 DIGILAW 1263 (PNJ)

Tarlok Singh v. State of Punjab

2014-09-05

DAYA CHAUDHARY

body2014
JUDGMENT Daya Chaudhary, J. - The accused-appellant Tarlok Singh has filed the present appeal to challenge the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Special Judge, Jalandhar, whereby, he has been convicted for offence under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 1-1/2 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- with default clause vide judgment dated 25.05.2004. 2. Briefly, the facts of the prosecution version are that one Jit Singh went to Office of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Bureau, Jalandhar and made a statement stating therein that Dilbagh Singh was to execute his General Power of Attorney regarding Mini Bus which was to be got attested from Paramjit Singh Sahota, Naib Tehsildar, Jalandhar. Jit Singh handed over the document to appellant-accused Tarlok Singh, who was posted as Patwari in the Office of Special Land Acquisition Collector, Jalandhar. Said Jit Singh, Dilbagh Singh and Vishwa Mitter appeared before Naib Tehsildar and the document was handed over to the appellant. The appellant mentioned receipt number on the Power of Attorney and kept the same with him and asked the complainant to take it after one or two days. Complainant-Jit Singh contacted the appellant=accused on several occasions but the document was not handed over to him. Thereafter, complainant-Jit Singh along with Baldev Singh met the appellant on 16.03.2000 in his office and demanded the document. The accused demanded Rs.1,000/- as illegal gratification for attestation of power of attorney. The complainant promised to bring the money. Complainant-Jit Singh got two currency notes of the denomination of Rs.500/- each which were smeared with phenolphthalein powder by the Deputy Superintendent of Police Gurmit Singh and it was asked to be hand over to the accused-appellant. Baldev Singh was made a shadow witness with the direction to hear the talk between Jit Singh-complainant and accused-Tarlok Singh and to give signal to police party. The hands of the complainant were got washed with a soap. Balwinder Singh, AEE and Ashwani Kumar from Municipal Corporation, Jalandhar were joined in the police party and the FIR was registered. The police party went in the Office of the accused and Jit Singh as well as Baldev Singh went to the seat of the accused. On asking, the money was paid to him. Balwinder Singh, AEE and Ashwani Kumar from Municipal Corporation, Jalandhar were joined in the police party and the FIR was registered. The police party went in the Office of the accused and Jit Singh as well as Baldev Singh went to the seat of the accused. On asking, the money was paid to him. Shadow witness-Baldev Singh gave a signal to the police party and they reached at the spot along with other witnesses. The currency notes were thrown on the floor by the accused. His hands were got washed in a water solution which changed its colour to pink. The coloured water was transferred to a nip and sealed with seal `GS' which was taken into possession by the police vide memo Exhibit `PF'. The currency notes were compared with its numbers with already prepared memo and were taken into possession along with power of attorney recovered from the table of the accused. Rough site plan was prepared and the statements of the witnesses were recorded. 3. On completion of investigation and after obtaining necessary sanction, the accused was challaned. Thereafter, the charge was framed under Section 13(2) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act vide order dated 11.09.2000 to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Thereafter, the charge was amended and reframed separately under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act to which also, he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution, in his support, examined as many as ten witnesses. 5. Thereafter, on closure of prosecution evidence, the statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Code. The accused examined two defence witnesses in his defence. 6. On appraisal of evidence of the prosecution as well as defence and after hearing learned counsel for the accused and public prosecutor, the accused was held guilty for offence as mentioned above and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 1-1/2 years and fine of Rs.1,000/- with default clause vide judgment dated 25.05.2004. 7. The judgment of the trial Court has been challenged by raising various grounds. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has falsely been implicated in the case and there are serious discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses. The statement of the complainant has not been corroborated by the statement of other prosecution witnesses. 7. The judgment of the trial Court has been challenged by raising various grounds. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has falsely been implicated in the case and there are serious discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses. The statement of the complainant has not been corroborated by the statement of other prosecution witnesses. Learned counsel also submits that the accused-appellant was working as Patwari in the Office of Special Land Acquisition Collector, Jalandhar and he had no concern with the registration of any document. It has been admitted by PW-3 Kuldip Singh that it was not the duty of the appellant but his duty was to put up the papers. The papers were put up before Naib Tehsildar-Paramjit Singh but he declined to attest the same. Learned counsel also submits that the statement of the complainant has been falsified by the statement of DW-1 Raghbir Singh Dhillon, who is the attesting witness of Power of Attorney. Raghbir Singh Dhillon-DW-1 has stated that he went to Paramjit Singh Sahota, Naib Tehsildar along with the General Power of Attorney for attestation and it was entered in the register by Kuldip Singh but it was not registered by the Magistrate stating that he was not competent to attest the same. The power of attorney was left with the accused to get it attested later on. Said power of attorney remained with him till 16.03.2000. This fact is contrary to the prosecution version. As per version of prosecution, the power of attorney was numbered on 23.12.1999 and it was left with the accused for collecting after a day or two. Finally on 16.03.2000, it was stated by the accused that the power of attorney could not be attested free. Learned counsel also submits that the statements of defence witnesses have not been considered. As per statement of Bhupinder Singh, Naib Sadar Kanungo, Jalandhar, the complainant and others came to his office only once and it was told by Kuldip Singh that it was not to be attested by the Executive Magistrate. Learned counsel also submits that the accused was asked by the Vigilance Officials to lift those currency notes from the ground and was asked to be handed over to them. Learned counsel further submits that it cannot be said that the recovery was from the accused-appellant and the link evidence is also missing. 9. Learned counsel also submits that the accused was asked by the Vigilance Officials to lift those currency notes from the ground and was asked to be handed over to them. Learned counsel further submits that it cannot be said that the recovery was from the accused-appellant and the link evidence is also missing. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court in case Subash Parbat Sonvane v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2003 Supreme Court 2169, judgments of this Court in cases Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana 1991(1) RCR (Criminal) 351, Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana 2011(2) RCR (Criminal) 791, Parbodh Kumar v. State of Punjab passed in Criminal Appeal No.1408-SB of 2009, decided on 12.05.2010, Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab passed in Criminal Appeal No.251-SB of 1994, decided on 30.07.2008, Sultan Singh v. State of Haryana passed in Criminal Appeal No.395-SB of 2005, decided on 17.08.2010 as well as the judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court in case P.R. Rajpal v. State of Himachal Pradesh 2014(3) RCR (Criminal) 46, in support of his contentions. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the judgment of the trial Court is well reasoned based on proper appreciation of evidence. Hence, no interference is required. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent-State has relied upon the judgments of Hon'ble the Apex Court in cases Ramesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1996(1) RCR (Criminal) 94, M. Narsinga Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2001(1) RCR (Criminal) 95, State of West Bengal v. Kailash Chandra Pandey 2004(4) RCR (Criminal) 743 as well as Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra 2000(4) RCR (Criminal) 705, in support of his arguments. 12. Heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the documents on the file as well as record of the trial Court. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is facing the agony of trial since registration of FIR i.e 16.03.2000 and in case, his sentence is reduced to the period already undergone, he would not contest the conviction. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is facing the agony of trial since registration of FIR i.e 16.03.2000 and in case, his sentence is reduced to the period already undergone, he would not contest the conviction. Hon'ble the Apex Court in cases Balaram Swain v. State of Orissa AIR 1991 Supreme Court 279 and M.O. Shamsuddin v. State of Kerala 1995(2) RCR (Criminal) 315 had reduced the sentence to the period already undergone by the public servants by considering the long duration of the pendency of criminal proceedings against the convicted persons. Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is reproduced as under :- "Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine : Provided that the court may, for any special reasons recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year." 14. Under Section 13(2) of the Act, there is no proviso as in Section 5(2) of the earlier Act and no power whatsoever has been given to the Court to impose a sentence less than the minimum, even if there are special reasons for doing so. The Parliament fixed the minimum sentence of imprisonment of one year by making an amendment to it in 1958. The proviso is in the form of a rare exception by giving power to the Court for reducing the imprisonment period below one year only when there are "special reasons" and those "special reasons" are required to be recorded in writing by the Court. 15. Hon'ble the Apex Court in Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi's case (supra) has held that mere pendency of litigation for long period cannot be considered as "special reasons" as it is a general feature in almost all cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The observation made by Hon'ble the Apex is as under :- "18. In the present case, how could the mere fact that this case was pending for such a long time be considered as a "special reasons"? That is a general feature in almost all convictions under the PC Act and it is not a specialty of this particular case. The observation made by Hon'ble the Apex is as under :- "18. In the present case, how could the mere fact that this case was pending for such a long time be considered as a "special reasons"? That is a general feature in almost all convictions under the PC Act and it is not a specialty of this particular case. It is the defect of the system that longevity of the cases tried under the PC Act is too lengthy. If that is to be regarded as sufficient for reducing the minimum sentence mandated by the Parliament the legislative exercise would stand defeated." 16. In subsequent judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court in Ramesh Kumar Gupta's case (supra), the sentence of the appellant was reduced to the period already undergone and his conviction was upheld. 17. As per case of the prosecution, complainant made a complaint to Vigilance Bureau stating that the appellant-Tarlok Singh, who was working as Patwari in the Office of Special Land Acquisition Collector, Jalandhar demanded Rs.1,000/- as illegal gratification for attestation of Power of Attorney. Deputy Superintendent of Police Gurmit Singh constituted raiding party. Baldev Singh was made as a shadow witness and was directed to give signal to him after hearing the talk between complainant-Jit Singh and accused. Two currency notes of the denomination of Rs.500/- each was given by the complainant but the accused threw the currency notes on the floor by seeing the police party. His hands were washed in the water solution prepared by the raiding party. On perusal of statement of PW-3 Kuldip Singh, it is clear that he has admitted that his duty was to put up the papers for registration of Power of Attorney and the same was put up before Naib Tehsildar Paramjit Singh but he declined the attestation of the same. It has been proved from the statement of Kuldip Singh-PW3 that the appellant was not involved in the process of registration of Power of Attorney. The statement of the complainant has also been falsified by the statement of Raghbir Singh DW- 1, who was attesting witness of Power of Attorney. DW-1 has stated in his statement that he went to Paramjit Singh Sahota, Naib Tehsildar along with General Power of Attorney for attestation and it was entered in the register maintained by Kuldip Singh PW-3. The statement of the complainant has also been falsified by the statement of Raghbir Singh DW- 1, who was attesting witness of Power of Attorney. DW-1 has stated in his statement that he went to Paramjit Singh Sahota, Naib Tehsildar along with General Power of Attorney for attestation and it was entered in the register maintained by Kuldip Singh PW-3. Said Power of Attorney was not registered by the Magistrate stating that he was not competent to attest the same. On refusal, Power of Attorney was left with the accused to get it attested later on and it remained with him up to 16.03.2000. As per stand of the prosecution, the Power of Attorney was numbered on 23.12.1999 and it was left with the accused to collect after one or two days. On 16.03.2000, it was stated by the accused that Power of Attorney could be attested on payment of amount. As per statement of Bhupinder Singh-Naib Sadar Kanungo, Jalandhar, the complainant came to his Office only once and it was told by Kuldip Singh that it was not to be attested by the Executive Magistrate. Said witness-Kuldip Singh has also stated that the vigilance officials asked him to lift the currency notes from the ground and hand over to them. Kuldip Singh PW-3 has also stated that the complainant-Jit Singh came to him with a paper at about 1.15/1.20 p.m and documents of Power of Attorney and affidavit were shown to him. Complainant had told him that the documents had already been presented but attestation was refused. The complainant asked about location of room of PW-2 Paramjit Singh Sahota. He has also stated that in his presence, no recovery was effected from possession of the accused. Complainant, while appearing as PW-7, has stated in cross-examination that the accused was not known to him. He has also stated that he did not know whether Mr. Sahota was Sub Registrar or not. He has also admitted in cross examination that he had not given any application before the higher officers that money was demanded from him. It has been stated by Baldev Singh that no conversation between the accused and complainant took place in his presence. It has also been stated that it was brought to his notice by complainant-Jit Singh that he wanted to get accused arrested on account of some Power of Attorney. It has been stated by Baldev Singh that no conversation between the accused and complainant took place in his presence. It has also been stated that it was brought to his notice by complainant-Jit Singh that he wanted to get accused arrested on account of some Power of Attorney. He has denied that any Power of Attorney was scribed in his presence. 18. The accused has specifically stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C that he had no authority to enter any Power of Attorney in the register or to get it attested from Mr. Sahota. Complainant-Jit Singh approached Kuldip Singh for attestation of General Power of Attorney but he told that the Power of Attorney could not be attested by him but still the complainant insisted to allow him to meet Mr. Sahota. It has also been stated in the statement that the door of the Office was opened and the complainant tried to thrust the papers in his hand and to get it attested. However, during this process, the papers fell down on the floor and currency notes kept in the papers also fell down on the ground. The currency notes were picked up by the police from the floor and the accused was taken to Vigilance Staff in the presence of other staff members. He has specifically stated in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C that he was having no authority to get power of attorney attested and there was no question of demanding money for that. 19. From the perusal of statements of witnesses, it has not been proved that the money was demanded by the accused appellant or the same was accepted by him. Neither the demand nor the receipt has been proved. It has also not been proved that the money was recovered from the accused appellant and that the accused appellant was the concerned official to get the power of attorney attested and moreover, there was no occasion to demand money for the work, which was not assigned to him. 20. The factum of mere recovery of tainted amount is not sufficient to prove the offence as has been held in the case of Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana 2009 (4) RCR (Criminal) 608. 21. 20. The factum of mere recovery of tainted amount is not sufficient to prove the offence as has been held in the case of Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana 2009 (4) RCR (Criminal) 608. 21. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI Cochin, High Court of Kerala, 2009 (2) RCR (Criminal) 134, has observed as under:- "16. In Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.) reported in (1979) 4 SCC 725 , this court took the view that mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. 17. The learned counsel for the CBI submitted that the onus of proof was upon the appellant to explain as to how he came into possession of the amount recovered from him during the trap. The argument of the learned counsel is obviously based on Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which reads as under: "20. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration.- (1) Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 7 of Section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, or any gratification (other than legal remuneration) any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (2) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 12 or under clause (b) of section 14, it is proved that any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given or attempted to be given by an accused person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he gave or offered to give or attempted to give that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7, or as the case may be without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections (1) (2), the court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said subsections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no interference of corruption may fairly be drawn." 18. A three-Judge Bench in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691 while dealing with the contention that it is not enough that some currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make it acceptance of gratification and prosecution has a further duty to prove that what was paid amounted to gratification, observed: "……………………we think it is not necessary to deal with the matter in detail because in a recent decision rendered by us the said aspect has been dealt with at length. (Vide Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra.) The following statement made by us in the said decision would be the answer to the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel (SCC p.577, para 12) The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted `as motive or reward' for doing or forbearing to do any official act. So the word `gratification' need not be stretched to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like `gratification or any valuable thing'. So the word `gratification' need not be stretched to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like `gratification or any valuable thing'. If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word `gratification' must be treated in the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it." 19. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 20. It is equally well settled that the burden of proof placed upon the accused person against whom the presumption is made under Section 20 of the Act is not akin to that of burden placed on the prosecution to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. "It is well established that where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence of proof his case beyond a reasonable doubt. That is, of course, the test prescribed in deciding whether the prosecution has discharged its onus to prove the guilt of the accused; but the same test cannot be applied to an accused person who seeks to discharge the burden placed upon him under Section 4 under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is sufficient if the accused person succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability in favour of his case. It is not necessary for the accused person to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt or in default to incur verdict of guilt. The onus of proof lying upon the accused person is to prove his case by a preponderance of probability. As soon as he succeeds in doing so, the burden shifts to prosecution which still has to discharge its original onus that never shifts, i.e.; that of establishing on the whole case the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt." (See Jhangan v. State 1966 (3) SCR 736 ). (Emphasis supplied) 22. As soon as he succeeds in doing so, the burden shifts to prosecution which still has to discharge its original onus that never shifts, i.e.; that of establishing on the whole case the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt." (See Jhangan v. State 1966 (3) SCR 736 ). (Emphasis supplied) 22. Similarly, Hon'ble the Apex Court in Meena (Smt.) wife of Balwant Hemke v. State of Maharashtra 2000 (2) RCR (Criminal) 661 held that mere recovery of currency notes and positive result of the phenolphthalein test is not enough to establish the guilty of the appellant in the nature of perfunctory nature of materials and prevaricating type of evidence. 23. In Anand Parkash v. State of Haryana 2008 (2) RCR (Criminal) 33, tainted money was recovered from the almirah and not from the personal search of the accused. The prosecution version was not corroborated by independent witness. It was held by me that neither the demand, nor acceptance of currency notes Ex. P1 to P-26 by accused from Sube Singh complainant is established. 24. In Ganapathi Sanya Naik v. State of Karnataka, 2007 (4) Recent Criminal Reports (Criminal) 184, the prosecution case was that the accused had demanded money from the complainant for effecting entry of mutation in the revenue record. A trap was laid. The currency notes were recovered from table of the accused beneath office files. The defence version that no demand was made and currency notes had been surreptitiously put on the table, while the appellant was otherwise engaged in some activity was held plausible by the Apex Court. To my mind, the factual situation in the case at hand is somewhat identical with Anand Parkash's case (supra). 25. Hon'ble the Apex Court in V. Venkata Subbarao v. State represented by Inspector of Police, A.P., has held that in absence of proof of demand, the question of raising the presumption would not arise as Section 20 of the Act provides for raising of a presumption only if a demand is proved. 26. In M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani v. State of Kerala and Another, (2006) 6 SCC 39 : AIR 2006 SC 3366 , Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under: "Moreover, the onus on an accused is not as heavy as that of the prosecution. 26. In M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani v. State of Kerala and Another, (2006) 6 SCC 39 : AIR 2006 SC 3366 , Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under: "Moreover, the onus on an accused is not as heavy as that of the prosecution. It may be compared with a defendant in a civil proceeding." In Union of India v. Purnandu Biswas, (2005) 12 SCC 576, it was opined: "In this case demand of illegal gratification by the respondent has not been proved. Furthermore, Section 20 of the Act is not attracted as the respondent had been charged for commission of an offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act." 27. A three-Judge Bench in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691 : AIR 2001 SC 318 while dealing with the contention that it is not enough that some currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make it acceptance of gratification and prosecution has a further duty to prove that what was paid amounted to gratification, observed: "24............... we think it is not necessary to deal with the matter in detail because in a recent decision rendered by us the said aspect has been dealt with at length. (Vide Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 571 : AIR 2001 SC 147 The following statement made by us in the said decision would be the answer to the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel (SCC p. 577 (P.p. 150-151 of AIR), (para 12) "12. The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted 'as motive or reward' for doing or forbearing to do any official act. So the word 'gratification' need not be stretched to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like 'gratification or any valuable thing'. So the word 'gratification' need not be stretched to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like 'gratification or any valuable thing'. If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word 'gratification' must be treated in the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it." 28. It is well settled that the presumption to be drawn under Section 20 is not an inviolable one. The accused charged with the offence could rebut it either through the cross-examination of the witnesses cited against him or by adducing reliable evidence. If the accused fails to disprove the presumption the same would stick and then it can be held by the Court that the prosecution has proved that the accused received the amount towards gratification. 29. It is equally well settled that the burden of proof placed upon the accused person against whom the presumption is made under Section 20 of the Act is not akin to that of burden placed on the prosecution to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. "4..........It is well established that where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence of proof his case beyond a reasonable doubt. That is, of course, the test prescribed in deciding whether the prosecution has discharged its onus to prove the guilt of the accused; but the same test cannot be applied to an accused person who seeks to discharge the burden placed upon him under Section 4 under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is sufficient if the accused person succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability in favour of his case. It is not necessary for the accused person to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt or in default to incur verdict of guilt. The onus of proof lying upon the accused person is to prove his case by a preponderance of probability. It is not necessary for the accused person to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt or in default to incur verdict of guilt. The onus of proof lying upon the accused person is to prove his case by a preponderance of probability. As soon as he succeeds in doing so, the burden shifts to prosecution which still has to discharge its original onus that never shifts, i.e.; that of establishing on the whole case the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis supplied) (See V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1762 at p. 1764, para 4)." (pp. 784-786). 30. From the perusal of facts and law position, it appears that the prosecution has failed to prove three necessary ingredients i.e demand of bribe money (ii) acceptance of amount and; (iii) recovery. 31. On perusal of statements of witnesses, it appears that neither any demand of money has been proved nor acceptance of amount and nor any recovery from the accused has been proved. It has been admitted by the prosecution witnesses that the amount was recovered which was lying on the floor. Admittedly, the amount was lifted from the floor by the vigilance officials and it was found to be kept in the documents which were in possession of the complainant. As such, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, which goes in favour of the appellant. 32. The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.05.2004 passed by Special Judge, Jalandhar is set aside. The appellant is already on bail and is discharged from the bail/surety bonds furnished by him.