JUDGMENT : INDERJIT SINGH, J. 1. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa-petitioner/plaintiff has filed this civil revision petition against Jasdev Singh-respondent/defendant No. 1 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 151 C.P.C. with a prayer for setting aside the impugned joint order dated 3.10.2011 (Annexure-P. 1) passed in Civil Suit No. 3/27-1-2009/6.1.2010 titled as "Harbhajan Singh Bajwa v. Jasdev Singh and others" by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), S.A.S. Nagar (Mohali) being void ab initio with a direction to the said Court to take final decision on the application filed under Order 7 Rule 6 C.P.C. and the order dated 3.10.2011 passed in another application dated 29.9.2011 filed under Order 8 Rules 1, 9 and 10 C.P.C. Notice of motion in this case was issued. Mr. A.K. Jain, Advocate appeared on behalf of the respondent and contested this civil revision petition. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. At the time of arguments, learned senior counsel for the petitioner firstly argued that the petitioner/plaintiff was not present when this order was passed, therefore, the matter be remanded back to the trial Court for deciding the application after giving hearing to the parties. He stated that the earlier order shows that on 3.10.2011 the case was adjourned to 4.10.2011, but later on the impugned order was passed on the same day. Similarly, in the order, it is written that opportunity was given for replication, but the issues were framed on the same day. Learned senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioner further argued that the application under Order 7 Rule 6 C.P.C. was not decided on merit and was kept pending with the observation that it shall be decided after concluding evidence by both the parties with regard to the said facts. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further argued that the written statement has not been filed within the prescribed period of 30 days, which can be extended upto 90 days. It was filed much later after the filing of the application under Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. by the present petitioner-plaintiff. No written request was made and no reasonable ground has been given in the application, therefore, this order should be set aside and defence of the defendant be struck off. 4. It was filed much later after the filing of the application under Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. by the present petitioner-plaintiff. No written request was made and no reasonable ground has been given in the application, therefore, this order should be set aside and defence of the defendant be struck off. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/defendant No. 1 argued that the order is as per law. No illegality has been committed by the Court below while passing the impugned order and there is no merit in the revision petition and the same should be dismissed. Learned counsel for the respondent further argued that the plaintiff filed so many applications in the case and he himself has delayed the proceedings and due to filing of those applications the written statement could not be filed in time and there are reasonable grounds for filing the written statement late and the provisions are not mandatory in nature and the Court in the facts and circumstances has rightly passed this order. 5. From the record, I find that Harbhajan Singh Bajwa plaintiff/petitioner filed a suit against Jasdev Singh posted as DSP at 13th Battalion P.A.P., State of Punjab and D.G.P. for damages for malicious prosecution for grant of decree of damages in the sum of Rs. 15 Crores for implicating the plaintiff in a false and fabricated criminal case F.I.R. No. 151 dated 10.12.1998, which was registered at Police Station Kharar and injuries were also caused on the body of the plaintiff on 11.12.1998 by defendant No. 1 himself. 6. The trial Court heard the arguments on application dated 21.9.2010 filed by the plaintiff under Order 7 Rule 6 read with Section 151 C.P.C. As per the impugned order, the case of the plaintiff is that the suit of the plaintiff has been filed within a period of three years from the cause of action accrued to him, whereas on the other hand, the case of defendant No. 1 is that suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation. The Court held that the controversy between the parties regarding limitation cannot be decided without evidence with regard to some documents relied upon by the plaintiff because the questions of facts are also involved to decide the said application. The Court held that the controversy between the parties regarding limitation cannot be decided without evidence with regard to some documents relied upon by the plaintiff because the questions of facts are also involved to decide the said application. Therefore, in these circumstances, the Court kept the application pending and ordered that it shall be decided after concluding evidence of both the parties with regard to the said facts. 7. It is settled law that any issue or legal point which requires evidence could not be decided as preliminary issue and it should be decided with the main case after taking the evidence. As the Court feels that this fact regarding limitation can only be decided on the basis of evidence, therefore, this order by keeping the application pending under Order 7 Rule 6 C.P.C. till the parties led the evidence, in no way, can be held as illegal. Therefore, no illegality has been committed by the learned lower Court. 8. Now coming to another application under Order 8 Rules 1, 9 and 10 C.P.C. filed by the plaintiff on 29.9.2011, the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), S.A.S. Nagar (Mohali) vide order dated 3.10.2011 held that defend ant No. 1 on receiving the summons appeared through counsel on 16.3.2009. Defendants No. 2 and 4 were proceeded against ex parte. The said application was posted for 23.4.2009, 21.5.2009 and 22.7.2009 for filing written statement on behalf of defendant No. 1 and for service of defendant No. 3, who was proceeded ex parte vide order dated 22.7.2009. The case then was posted for 12.10.2009 for filing written statement by defendant No. 1. At this stage, defendant No. 4 filed application for setting aside the ex parte order dated 22.7.2009. The case was sent to learned District Judge, Roop Nagar for 27.10.2009 by the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kharar for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. The said case was transferred to the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kharar for 9.11.2009 for filing written statement and also for filing reply to the application for setting aside the ex parte order dated 22.7.2009. The plaintiff then filed application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. on 5.4.2010 and reply to the application was filed on 26.5.2011. The said case was transferred to the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kharar for 9.11.2009 for filing written statement and also for filing reply to the application for setting aside the ex parte order dated 22.7.2009. The plaintiff then filed application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. on 5.4.2010 and reply to the application was filed on 26.5.2011. The case was adjourned for consideration on the application and again the plaintiff then moved an application under Section 151 C.P.C. read with Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. on 21.9.2010. The reply to the said application was also filed. It is stated that thereafter the case was fixed for arguments time and again on all the said applications filed by the plaintiff. All the applications except application under Section 151 read with Order 7 Rule 6 C.P.C. were decided vide order dated 9.9.2011. Defendant No. 1 thereafter on filing of application one and the other, was not given time to file the written statement. Defendant No. 1 while filing reply to the application in hand also filed written statement on record to contest the suit of the plaintiff. The Court held that the crux of ratio of law discussed in the referred cases goes to reveal that an opportunity should be given to defendant No. 1 to file the written statement to contest the civil suit in the interest of justice because the plaintiff could not establish on record as to how right of defendant No. 1 to file the written statement to contest the suit could be curtailed and the application under Order 8 Rules 1, 9 and 10 C.P.C. was dismissed. The Court also held that the written statement filed by defendant No. 1 is already on the record. 9. First of all, as regards the argument that the plaintiff was not present when this order was passed, I find that as per the order, the plaintiff in person was present there and he has been shown as present in person in the impugned order. Earlier order is dated 3.10.2011, in which it is stated that to come up for 4.10.2011 for remaining arguments with regard to both the applications and the arguments were heard partly. On the same day, this detailed order dated 3.10.2011 has been passed. Earlier order is dated 3.10.2011, in which it is stated that to come up for 4.10.2011 for remaining arguments with regard to both the applications and the arguments were heard partly. On the same day, this detailed order dated 3.10.2011 has been passed. A perusal of the impugned order shows that so may citations have been referred on behalf of the plaintiff in this order, which shows that, in no way, it can be held that the plaintiff was not present. It is specifically mentioned that the plaintiff has addressed arguments and it is clear that arguments were heard by the Court from the plaintiff side. Though, the plaintiff is stated to be present in person, but it has been brought to my notice that the plaintiff himself is an Advocate. Otherwise also, presumption is attached to the official work done by the public servant and the presence of the plaintiff has been marked in the order, which shows that the plaintiff was present and on this ground this case is not liable to be remanded back. 10. Secondly, it is clear from the impugned order that so many applications have been filed by the plaintiff and the case was transferred due to pecuniary jurisdiction and further some of the defendants were proceeded against ex parte and one of the defendants filed application for setting aside the ex parte proceedings. Then after taking reply, the ex parte proceedings were set aside etc. The Court itself held that due to filing of so many applications by the plaintiff, which were decided after taking the reply from the defendant etc., in no way, it can be held that the defendant with the intention to delay the proceedings has filed the written statement late. 11. It is now settled law that the provisions under Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. are not mandatory in nature but directory in nature. Time for filing written statement cannot be extended beyond 90 days unless the Court is satisfied that there are sufficient reasons. In the order, the Court itself feels that there are sufficient reasons for not filing the written statement due to filing of so many applications by the plaintiff regarding which replies etc. have been taken from the defendant. Therefore, in no way, it can be held that the defendant has filed the written statement intentionally or with mala fide intention late. 12. have been taken from the defendant. Therefore, in no way, it can be held that the defendant has filed the written statement intentionally or with mala fide intention late. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of Bombay High Court in Rukhana Associates v. E-Square Leisure Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (4) Civ. C.C. 508. In this case, it is held that dispensing with oral arguments, the Judge who had heard the oral arguments was transferred before pronouncing the judgment or for that matter writing the judgment. New Judge has had no option, but to hear the oral arguments afresh and only then pronounce the judgment. On this point, he also placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal v. Madan Gopal and others, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 655, in which it is held that oral arguments were not advanced due to strike of members of the bar and the appellate Court decided the case on the basis of written arguments only. In view of the issues involved in the case, it was held that efficacy of oral arguments could not be underestimated. These judgments having distinguished facts will not apply in the present case, as already held that the plaintiff had addressed the arguments. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.K. Palanisamy v. N. Arumugham and another, 2010 (1) R.C.R. (Cr.) 129 and of this Court in Hem Raj v. Harchet Singh and others, 1993 Civil Court Cases 48 (P & H). These judgments are regarding payment of Court-fee, therefore, will not apply in the present case. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Laxmanan v. Thekkayil Padmini and others, 2009 (1) R.C.R. (Cr.) 389 and of this Court in Harbans Singh v. Nahar Singh, 1978 Revenue Law Reporter 351 (P & H) and Mateshwar Dayal Vs. Amar Singh, AIR 1983 P&H 197 . I have gone through these judgments. These judgments are under Order 6 Rule 1 C.P.C. that replication when allowed is part of pleadings. These judgments having distinguished facts will not apply in the present case. 15. Amar Singh, AIR 1983 P&H 197 . I have gone through these judgments. These judgments are under Order 6 Rule 1 C.P.C. that replication when allowed is part of pleadings. These judgments having distinguished facts will not apply in the present case. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohammed Yusuf v. Faij Mohammad & others, 2009 (1) R.C.R. (Civil) 633, wherein it is held that the provision is directory in nature but filing of written statement beyond 90 days should be allowed to avoid extreme hardship and only in rare and exceptional cases. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash v. Nanhku & others, (2005-3) 141 PLR 558, in which it is held that in exceptional situations the Court may extend time for filing written statement though period of 30 and 90 days expired for reasons assigned by defendant and recorded in writing by Court to its satisfaction. The Court may put defendant on terms including imposition of costs, filing of affidavit, medical certificate or documentary evidence. It is also held in this judgment that in no case defendant shall get extension if Court is satisfied that it is case of laxity or gross negligence on his part. In this judgment, it is held that the provisions under Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. are directory in nature. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgments of the Karnataka High Court in A. Sathyapal & others v. Smt. Yasmin Banu Ansari, 2004 (2) Civil Court Cases 651; of Allahabad High Court in Dr. Nanda Agrawal v. Matri Mandir, Varanasi and another, 2005 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) 258; of Himachal Pradesh High Court in M/s. Shobit Constitution and another v. M/s. T.K. International Ltd., 2006 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 568 and of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manohar Lal (D) by L.Rs v. Ugrasen (D) by L.Rs. and others, 2010 (2) SLJ 1286 on the same point. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that no extension should be given by the Court beyond the period of 90 days except by giving reasoning and only on the satisfaction of the Court. 19. and others, 2010 (2) SLJ 1286 on the same point. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that no extension should be given by the Court beyond the period of 90 days except by giving reasoning and only on the satisfaction of the Court. 19. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the law laid down in Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar and others, (2006) 1 Supreme Court Cases 46, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "9. The text of Order VIII, Rule 1, as it stands now, reads as under:- "1. Written statement. - The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence: Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons." Order VIII, Rule 1 after the amendment casts an obligation on the defendant to file the written statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him and within the extended time falling within 90 days. The provision does not deal with the power of the court and also does not specifically take away the power of the court to take the written statement on record though filed beyond the time as provided for. Further, the nature of the provision contained in Order VIII, Rule 1 is procedural. It is not a part of the substantive law. Substituted Order VIII, Rule 1 intends to curb the mischief of unscrupulous defendants adopting dilatory tactics, delaying the disposal of cases causing inconvenience to the plaintiffs and petitioners approaching the court for quick relief and also to the serious inconvenience of the court faced with frequent prayers for adjournments. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle the same. While justice delayed may amount to justice denied, justice hurried may in some cases amount to justice buried. 10. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle the same. While justice delayed may amount to justice denied, justice hurried may in some cases amount to justice buried. 10. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the Statute, the provisions of the CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. 11. The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a Judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. 12. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. - Justice is the goal of jurisprudence - processual, as much as substantive. (See Sushil Kumar Sen Vs. State of Bihar, (1975) 1 SCC 774 . 13. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending, and if, by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. (See Blyth v. Blyth 1966 (1) All E.R. 524 (HL). A procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory, the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed. (See Shreenath and Another Vs. Rajesh and Others, (1998) 4 SCC 543 . 14. Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed. (See Shreenath and Another Vs. Rajesh and Others, (1998) 4 SCC 543 . 14. Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. 15. It is also to be noted that though the power of the Court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII is circumscribed by the words - "shall not be later than ninety days" but the consequences flowing from non-extension of time are not specifically provided though they may be read by necessary implication. Merely, because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. The courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form." 20. I have gone through the law laid down in this judgment, which fully applies in the present case. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent also placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu Vs. Union of India (UOI), (2005) 6 SCC 344 , in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "21. The use of the word 'shall' in Order VIII Rule 1 by itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. We have to ascertain the object which is required to be served by this provision and its design and context in which it is enacted. The use of the word 'shall' is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules or procedure are hand-maid of justice and not its mistress. The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules or procedure are hand-maid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice. 22. In construing this provision, support can also be had from Order VIII Rule 10 which provides that where any party from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9, fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. On failure to file written statement under this provision, the Court has been given the discretion either to pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such other order in relation to suit as it thinks fit. In the context of the provision, despite use of the word 'shall', the court has been given the discretion to pronounce or not to pronounce the judgment against the defendant even if written statement is not filed and instead pass such order as it may think fit in relation to the suit. In construing the provision of Order VIII Rule 1 and Rule 10, the doctrine of harmonious construction is required to be applied. The effect would be that under Rule 10 of Order VIII, the court in its discretion would have power to allow the defendant to file written statement even after expiry of period of 90 days provided in Order VIII Rule 1. There is no restriction in Order VIII Rule 10 that after expiry of ninety days, further time cannot be granted. The Court has wide power to 'make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit'. Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order VIII Rule 1 providing for upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is directory. Having said so, we wish to make it clear that the order extending time to file written statement cannot be made in routine. The time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases. While extending time, it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time limit of 90 days. Having said so, we wish to make it clear that the order extending time to file written statement cannot be made in routine. The time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases. While extending time, it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time limit of 90 days. The discretion of the Court to extend the time shall not be so frequently and routinely exercised so as to nullify the period fixed by Order VIII Rule 1." 22. I have gone through the law laid down in this judgment, which fully applies to the facts in the present case. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent further placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Mani Chhabra v. Aloka Chhabra, 2010 (1) R.C.R. (Civil) 257, in which it is held that if the written statement is not filed within 90 days, the Court is not bound to strike of defence of defendant. The Court has discretion to allow the defendant to file written statement even after expiry of 90 days in exceptionally hard cases as Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. is directory in nature. 24. From the perusal of the record, I find that, in no way, it can be held that the Court has extended the time in routine. The Court has held that this delay was due to filing of applications by the plaintiff and the application filed by the defendant for setting aside the ex parte proceedings etc. Otherwise also, this is a case filed by the plaintiff for compensation to the tune of Rs. 15 Crores. 25. Therefore, from the above, I find that no illegality has been committed by the Court below while passing the impugned order. However, from the perusal of the order, it is clear that earlier it was written that the case be fixed for replication and issues, but the issues were framed on the same day without asking for the replication. Therefore, it is observed that an opportunity to file replication should be given to the plaintiff and if on filing of the replication, the Court feels that any fresh issue arises, then the Court would be at liberty to frame any fresh issue. With these observations, finding no merit in the revision petition, the same is dismissed.