Judgment 1. These three appeals are being disposed of by the common Judgment as they arose out of the common Judgment in O.S.Nos.14, 15 and 16 of 1986 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Bhimavaram. The learned Subordinate Judge by Judgment and Decree, dated 28-10-1991, dismissed the three suits and hence the plaintiffs therein have preferred the appeals. 2. O.S.No.14 of 1986 was filed by the appellants in A.S.No.1635 of 1993 for declaring that the plaintiffs are absolute owners and enjoyers of the suit schedule property and for permanent injunction. The suit schedule property in this suit comprises of an extent of Ac.2-97 cents of wet land situated in R.S.No.554/2, Srungavruksham village, West Godavari District. 3. The appellant in A.S.No.1731 of 1993 has filed O.S.No.15 of 1986 for the similar relief and it is in respect of an extent of Ac.2-68 cents in R.S.Nos.891/2 of Srungavruksham village, West Godavari District. 4. The appellant in A.S.No.440 of 1993 has filed O.S.No.16 of 1986 for the similar relief and it is in respect of an extent of Ac.2-27 cents in R.S.No.577/2 of Srungavruksham village, West Godavari District. The suit was originally filed by one Appala Naidu and on his death, the 2nd plaintiff has been impleaded vide orders in I.A.No.937 of 1988, dated 12-9-1989. 5. All the three suits were filed on 17-3-1986. Though the plaintiffs in the three suits were different, the defendants are common and the nature of claim and the question of fact and law involved in all the three suits are one and the same. On a memo filed by the plaintiffs on 17-9-1990, the trial Court has clubbed all the three suits and tried them. 6. Similar and identical issues were framed in all the three suits, viz., 1) whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration and consequential injunction as prayed for?; 2) whether the suit is barred by limitation?; and 3) to what relief? 7. During the course of trial, common evidence was recorded in O.S.No.14 of 1986 and on behalf of the plaintiffs, the 2nd plaintiff in O.S.No.14 of 1986 was examined as P.W.1, the plaintiff in O.S.No.15 of 1986 was examined as P.W.3 and P.Ws.2 and 4 were also examined on their behalf and they produced Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.9. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.12 were marked. 8. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.12 were marked. 8. Since the pleadings in all the three suits, both in the plaint and written statement, are identical, suffice it to refer to the pleadings in O.S.No.14 of 1986. 9. The contention of the plaintiffs is that they purchased the plaint schedule property from M/s. Mahaboob Iqbal, Hussain Baga, Mohammed Ali Akbar and Gouse Jeelani on 6-11-1974 under registered sale deed for valuable consideration. The sale deed was in pursuance to the agreement of sale, dated 11-5-1974. Ever since the date of purchase, the plaintiffs have been in lawful, continuous, uninterrupted and absolute possession of the plaint schedule lands. Prior to the purchase, the suit schedule lands were in possession of the lessees for over 90 years. The vendors of the plaintiffs derived their title by virtue of registered settlement deed, dated 20-9-1953, executed by Mahaboob Unnisa Begum, W/o.Mohammed Habibuddin Saheb in favour of (1) Mohammed Habibuddin, (2) Mahaboob Iqbal Saheb, (3) Vazirunnisa Begum, (4) Mohammada Begum, (5) Fiakunnisa Begum, (6) Md.Hussain Baba, (7) Mahammed Ali Akbar, (8) Ahmadi Begum, (9) Md. Ghouse Jeelani, and (10) Zuddu Tunnisa Begum. Mahaboob Unnisa Begum traced the title to the property through Emperor Aurangajeeb and contended that the property is not attached to mosque as wakf property. She desired that the income from the property be used for the religious purposes but did not make any obligation or condition precedent in the settlement deed. Therefore the property is free from any burdens. 10. The marriage of the daughters of Mahaboob Unnisa Begum were performed by her children. They acquired absolute title over the plaint schedule property. Subsequently they are transferred to the plaintiffs for valuable consideration. The vendors of the plaintiffs and thereafter the plaintiffs exercised absolute, independent, individual, unconditional and effective rights of ownership, possession and enjoyment in respect of the plaint schedule properties by paying taxes to the State Government. However, the 1st defendant – A.P. Wakf Board issued a notice on 29-1-1979 claiming the plaint schedule properties to be wakf properties. The 1st defendant proposed to hold an enquiry into the matter. The plaintiffs replied to the notice denying the claim of the 1st defendant. However, the 1st defendant – A.P. Wakf Board issued a notice on 29-1-1979 claiming the plaint schedule properties to be wakf properties. The 1st defendant proposed to hold an enquiry into the matter. The plaintiffs replied to the notice denying the claim of the 1st defendant. Without adhering to the mandatory provisions of the Wakf Act and without affording opportunity to the plaintiffs to participate in the enquiry, the 1st defendant – Wakf Board passed ex parte orders to the effect that the plaint schedule property is a wakf property. However, the said order is never communicated to the plaintiffs till the date of the suit. The plaintiffs, however, came to know about it through the notice, dated 24-9-1983, issued by the District Collector (2nd defendant). The 1st defendant never instituted any civil suit for the purpose of declaration in accordance with Section 6 of the Wakf Act. No Muthavalli or Wakf had at any time exercised any acts of administration in respect of the plaint schedule property nor was the schedule property at any time under the supervision of the Government or Islamic Religious Body. As the notice issued by the 1st defendant is invalid, the plaintiffs filed W.P.No.4142 of 1982 before this Court and by order dated 15-12-1982, this Court granted interim stay of the operation of the impugned proceedings and directed the plaintiffs to file a regular civil suit. The rights of the 1st defendant, if any, are lost by limitation and prescription and the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest, have acquired title by prescription and they have perfected their title over the plaint schedule property. Hence the suit to declare the plaintiffs as absolute owners and for consequential perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their peaceful possession. 11. Hence the suit to declare the plaintiffs as absolute owners and for consequential perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their peaceful possession. 11. The 1st defendant filed written statement, which is adopted by the 2nd defendant, contending that the suit is not maintainable, that the plaint schedule property was notified as mosque wakf property in Andhra Pradesh Gazette, Part-II, in the month of April, 1962, at para 434 as item No.306, that the aforesaid notification was issued on the basis of the enquiry report of the Wakf Commissioner, that the plaintiffs cannot question the same, that the sale deed, dated 6-11-1974 in pursuance to the agreement of sale, dated 11-5-1974, do not confer any title either upon the plaintiffs being the purchasers, that the alleged settlement deed, dated 20-9-1953, said to have been executed by Mahaboob Unnisa Begum in favour of her husband and children is not true, valid and binding upon the defendants, that even if the original mosque become extinct, the character of the plaint schedule property continues to be wakf property and it can never become the personal property, that the predecessors-in-title of the plaintiffs never enjoyed the plaint schedule properties, that the notice issued by the 1st defendant on 29-1-1979 is valid and binding and it cannot be questioned by the plaintiffs, that the suit is barred by limitation since notice under Section 6 of the Wakf Act was issued two decades back, that the 1st defendant is the owner of the plaint schedule property and is entitled to recover the same after ejecting the plaintiffs together with past and future profits. Therefore, the 1st defendant is setting up counter claim for eviction of the plaintiffs from plaint schedule property by dismissing the suit. 12. By the impugned Judgment and Decree, the learned trial Judge dismissed all the three suits holding the schedule properties are the wakf properties and therefore the plaintiffs are not entitled to be declared as owners thereof. It is further held that even though the 1st defendant claimed the relief of recovery of possession by way of counter claim but since no Court fee thereon was paid, the 1st defendant is not entitled to recover the possession. The learned trial Judge further held that the suits and also the counter claims are barred by limitation in view of sub-Section (1) of Section 6 of the Wakf Act. 13. The learned trial Judge further held that the suits and also the counter claims are barred by limitation in view of sub-Section (1) of Section 6 of the Wakf Act. 13. Aggrieved by the said Judgment and Decree, the plaintiffs have preferred the appeals contending as under:- The trial Court ought to have seen that the schedule properties are the private properties of the predecessors-in-title, that Mahaboob Unnisa Begum acquired title to the said properties from her father and she passed on the same through a settlement deed in the year 1953 in favour of her husband, four sons and five daughters, that the trial Court has misinterpreted the authorities cited, that the existence of any place of worship or any mosque will itself not prove any wakf in favour of such institution, that ever since the acquisition of title by the plaintiffs, they had been in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof, that the plaintiffs proved the case by adverse possession, that the documentary evidence produced was not properly appreciated, that the rights, interest, if any, of the Wakf Board stood extinguished by the lapse of time and its claims for possession or title are time barred, that the settler Mahaboob Unnisa Begum has acquired title by adverse possession, that the Court below has erroneously placed reliance upon Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.4, Ex.B.8 and Ex.B.9 for holding that the suit properties are wakf properties. It is further contended that since the notice under Section 56 of the Wakf Act was not issued, the proceedings of the Wakf Board are not binding on the plaintiffs. The Court below ought not to have relied upon Ex.B.6 and Ex.B.7, which are the Xerox copies of the alleged reports of the Commissioner of the A.P. Wakf Board, which are self-serving reports, that the oral and documentary evidence on record do not show that the suit schedule properties are wakf properties, that the whole approach of the trial Court is vitiated for lack of appreciation of the legal position, that under Muslim Law, the properties can be bequeathed in favour of individuals absolutely and mere wish of the settler who granted the same that they may do certain services to any religious institute will not itself indicate that they are not so given to the grantee or settlee to be absolutely enjoyed by such person. It is further contended that the trial Court having rightly rejected the relief of recovery of possession by the 1st defendant, has erred in dismissing the suits and hence the appeals. 14. Arguments of the learned Counsel of the appellants-plaintiffs and the respondents-defendants are heard. 15. The points that arise for consideration in these appeals are:- 1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to be declared as the absolute owners and possessors of the suit schedule lands? 2) Whether the proceedings of the respondents-defendants without complying with the requirements of Section 56 of the Wakf Act are not tenable? And 3) Whether the suits of the plaintiffs are barred by limitation in view of Section 6 (1) of the Wakf Act? 16. Point No.1:- The plaintiffs in all three suits are substantially basing their claim on the registered sale deeds, dated 6-11-1974, which are marked as Ex.A.1, Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7. Under these sale deeds, the plaintiffs have purchased the plaint schedule properties from the four sons of Mahaboob Unnisa Begum, W/o. Mohammed Habibuddin. The vendors of the plaintiffs are tracing their title over the property by virtue of a settlement deed said to have been executed by their mother Mahaboob Unnisa Begum on 20-9-1953. Mahaboob Unnisa Begum, in turn, is said to have got the plaint schedule properties from her father. While the plaintiffs claim that the suit schedule properties are the private properties of the individuals, except filing the sale deeds – Ex.A.1, Ex.A.6, and Ex.A.7 in their favour said to have been executed by the four sons of Mahaboob Unnisa Begum, the plaintiffs have not produced any oral or documentary evidence to show that their predecessors-in-title had valid title so as to transfer the same to the plaintiffs. Even according to the settlement deed, which has not been filed, the settler Mahaboob Unnisa Begum is said to have settled the schedule properties in favour of her husband, 5 daughters and 4 sons. Only the sons of Mahaboob Unnisa Begum have executed the registered sale deeds – Ex.A.1, Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7 in favour of the plaintiffs in the three suits. The oral evidence that is produced on behalf of the plaintiffs consists of the plaintiffs as P.Ws.1 and 3 and in their support, P.Ws.2 and 4 are examined. P.W.2 claims to be a professional document writer for about 30 to 35 years (prior to his deposition given on 16-11-1990). The oral evidence that is produced on behalf of the plaintiffs consists of the plaintiffs as P.Ws.1 and 3 and in their support, P.Ws.2 and 4 are examined. P.W.2 claims to be a professional document writer for about 30 to 35 years (prior to his deposition given on 16-11-1990). He deposed that he scribed the originals of Ex.A.1, Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7. He further deposed that the land was purchased by the plaintiffs from muslims, that the land purchased does not belong to mosque, that prior to the purchase, the lands were in cultivation of Rongala Chinna Appanna and the sale deeds were attested by Rongala Tata Rao and Rongala Veeranna and that the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the lands. In the cross-examination, the Professional Document Writer – P.W.2 admits that when a sale deed is executed, they generally insist for encumbrance certificate to clear the doubts of any encumbrances and also to trace the origin of the title. He fairly admits that in the sale deeds – Ex.A.1, Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7 the names of the ancestors or predecessors-in-title were not mentioned as it was represented that the land belongs to the ancestors of the vendors. The witness wants it to believe that on the basis of the self-serving statement of the vendor, he scribed the documents without perusing any other record nor did he mention in the sale deeds that the vendors have claimed the schedule property to be the ancestral property. 17. P.W.4 is one of the attestors of Ex.A.1, Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7 and he also claims to be the adjacent land owner. He deposed that prior to the sale, the lands were under cultivation of Rongala Chinna Appanna under lease from some muslims. P.W.4 asserted that the land belongs to muslims but not to Wakf Board. 18. That is all the independent evidence that is produced by the plaintiffs upon whom rests the responsibility of establishing that they are the absolute title holders of the suit schedule lands. 19. P.W.4, who claims to be the neighbouring land holder, could not even name the original owners of the properties, who are said to have leased the lands to Rongala Chinna Appanna prior to sale in favour of the plaintiffs. The Professional Document Writer – P.W.2 has also scribed the three registered instruments without verifying any document. 19. P.W.4, who claims to be the neighbouring land holder, could not even name the original owners of the properties, who are said to have leased the lands to Rongala Chinna Appanna prior to sale in favour of the plaintiffs. The Professional Document Writer – P.W.2 has also scribed the three registered instruments without verifying any document. When the lands are private lands as claimed by the plaintiffs, they ought to have produced the material to show that it belongs to them before a registered instrument is executed. Merely by saying that the properties belong to their ancestors, they cannot execute the sale deeds transferring title of such property to third parties. As already stated, at no point of time, the plaintiffs have produced the original settlement deed said to have been executed by Mahaboob Unnisa Begum in favour of her husband, 5 daughters and 4 sons. Even if that settlement deed is presumed to be true, only 4 out of 6 settlees cannot validly transfer the properties settled on them in favour of third parties without offering any tangible and valid reason. 20. The plaintiffs who claim to have parted with valuable consideration for the suit schedule lands have not conducted themselves in a manner in which a prudent and bona fide purchaser will do. They did not make any enquiry before obtaining sale deeds in their favour. It is not as though that the plaintiffs are strangers to the locality or to the villages where the properties are situated. Even though the plaintiffs claim possession for about several decades prior to the sale deeds since suit schedule lands have been under cultivation of tenants who obtained the same on lease from the original owners who are said to be muslim people. Even with regard to the possession of the suit schedule properties, absolutely no evidence was produced to substantiate the same even though they claim that the suit lands had been under cultivation on the basis of lease for several decades. The only evidence that is produced on this aspect by the plaintiffs is Ex.A.9, which is said to be a bunch of 19 tax receipts in respect of the plaint schedule properties. The only evidence that is produced on this aspect by the plaintiffs is Ex.A.9, which is said to be a bunch of 19 tax receipts in respect of the plaint schedule properties. These tax receipts do not, in any way, show that the cist for the suit schedule land has been paid either by the settler Mahaboob Unnisa Begum, her ancestors, or the settlees, who are the vendors of the plaintiffs at any point of time, prior to the suit. 21. For any cause to survive, the averments of the plaint are the foundation on which the entire case has to be developed. The specific case of the plaintiffs in the 3 suits is that their vendors have derived their title through a settlement deed, dated 20-9-1953, said to have been executed by Mahaboob Unnisa Begum, W/o.Mohammed Habibuddin. As already stated, the said settlement deed has not been produced even though it is said to be a registered instrument. In order to settle a property in favour of another, basically the settler should have an element of right so as to settle the same in favour of another. Even though, the registered settlement deed has not been produced, the same has been extracted in the plaint, the veracity or otherwise of which has not been proved. Even according to the said settlement deed, Smt. Mahaboob Unnisa Begum claimed that their ancestors settled at Veeravasaram village and her ancestors had a mosque which later fell into ruins. There were family tombs on the outskirts of Srungavruksham village near Viravasaram. The settlement deed is also said to have recited that some Sunni muslims used to visit the place, that Mahaboob Unnisa Begum and her husband Habibuddin constructed a mosque again with an intention to help muslim devotees to offer their prayers. It is also recited that Mahaboob Unnisa Begum and her husband out of their own funds constructed a family mosque and the Muthavali rights were reserved in their own family. It is also recited therein that part of the suit schedule lands were acquired by way of ancient grant on the ancestors of the settlers by the orthodox Mohammadan Ruler H.M. Aurangajeeb for rendering their services as accepted and the settlees desired to perform such services according to the Quoran Sharief and enjoyed the suit schedule lands. It is also recited therein that part of the suit schedule lands were acquired by way of ancient grant on the ancestors of the settlers by the orthodox Mohammadan Ruler H.M. Aurangajeeb for rendering their services as accepted and the settlees desired to perform such services according to the Quoran Sharief and enjoyed the suit schedule lands. It is also recited that the suit schedule lands were leased out in favour of Mr. Rongala Appanna under registered document, dated 13-4-1952 and the said original lease deed was handed over to the settlers. 22. A perusal of the above, unsubstantiated averments in the plaint leaves no room for doubt that the suit schedule lands have been put to religious use and there existed mosque, tombs and the villagers visit the said places for offering their prayers. The settler Mahaboob Unnisa Begum has no authority to settle such property in favour of Habibuddin, her husband, who was the Muthawalli and his/their children. 23. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in MENAKURU DASARATHARAMI REDDI AND ANOTHER v. DUDDUKUDRU SUBBU RAO AND OTHERS (AIR 1957 S.C., 797) in support of his contention that the dedication to charity need not necessarily be by instrument or grant and that it can be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of the parties and user of the property which show extinction of the private secular character of the property and its complete dedication to charity. 24. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in P.V. BHEEMSENA RAO V. SIRIGIRI PEDDA YELLA REDDI AND OTHERS (AIR 1961 S.C., 1350) wherein it is laid down that the distinction between a grant for an office to be remunerated by the use of land and a grant of land burdened with service is well known. It is also held that the former is a case of a service grant and is resumable when the service is not performed and the latter is not a service grant as such but a grant in favour of a person though burdened with service and its resumption will depend upon whether the circumstances in which the grant was made establish a condition that it was resumable if the service was not performed. These authorities are not applicable to the facts of the case in hand. 25. These authorities are not applicable to the facts of the case in hand. 25. The specific contention of the 1st defendant is that the suit schedule lands are the wakf properties and therefore the alleged sale deeds in favour of the plaintiffs are invalid. As long back as in April, 1962, as mandated, the suit schedule lands have been notified in Official Gazette as wakf properties for which no objections whatsoever were raised till about 1982. As per the records, the husband of Mahaboob Unnisa Begum by name Habibuddin was the Muthavalli of the properties, which were earmarked for Moharrum festival. A mosque did exists there, which appears to have been now extinct. According to the 1st defendant that does not however denude the suit schedule properties from the characteristics of a wakf property. In support of their contentions, reliance is placed upon the documentary evidence, which are Ex.B.1, Ex.B.2, Ex.B.3, Ex.B.4, Ex.B.6, Ex.B7, Ex.B.8 and Ex.B.9. 26. Ex.B.8 and Ex.B.9 are the extracts of Andhra Pradesh Gazette Part II, dated 19-4-1962. The suit schedule lands are shown therein as the wakf lands and that Habibuddin was the Muthavalli. It is recorded therein that the wakf is for the benefit of the public. Ex.B.6 and Ex.B.7 are the Xerox copies of the reports submitted by the Commissioner of the 1st defendant which show that the suit schedule properties to be wakf properties and in the relevant column Janab Habibuddin Saheb is shown as Muthavalli. Ex.B.6 and Ex.B.7 are the reports of the Commissioner and they were prepared on 15-12-1955. On the basis of the said report of the year 1955, the suit schedule lands have been notified in the A.P. Gazette, dated 19-04-1962, and in the Gazette it is specifically mentioned that the Muthavalli is Habibuddin, the nature of the wakf is religious, and the object of the wakf is to maintain the mosque. 27. Ex.B.1 and Ex.B.2 are the Re-Settlement Registers and even in these two Registers, the suit schedule lands have been specifically shown as “masjid moharrum peerla panduga”. What is evident there from is that the suit schedule lands are being used for masjid and for moharrum festival. Similarly, Ex.B.3 is the Adangal for the Fasli 1399. In the column of pattedar, it is specifically mentioned that the suit schedule lands are for moharrum festival. 28. What is evident there from is that the suit schedule lands are being used for masjid and for moharrum festival. Similarly, Ex.B.3 is the Adangal for the Fasli 1399. In the column of pattedar, it is specifically mentioned that the suit schedule lands are for moharrum festival. 28. In none of the revenue records, the suit schedule lands are shown to be the private properties of any individual. It may be recalled that the plaintiffs having purchased the suit schedule lands under registered sale deeds – Exs.A.1, A.6 and A.7 in November, 1974, their vendors claim that the suit schedule lands have been settled on them by their mother under registered instrument of the year 1953 and the settler is none other than the wife of Habibuddin, who has been shown in the records long prior to the purchase by the plaintiffs, as Muthavalli in respect of the suit schedule properties. 29. The contention of the plaintiffs is that before the survey of the land by the Commissioner in the year 1955, which resulted in the publication of the Gazette notification in 1962, no notice thereof has been served on the plaintiffs. There is absolutely no substance in this contention of the plaintiffs for the simple reason that so far as the suit schedule lands are concerned, when the survey was conducted in the year 1955 or Gazette notification was published in 1962, the plaintiffs were strangers to the suit schedule properties. They have come into picture only in November, 1974 in pursuance of the agreement of sale. The only persons competent to say as to whether any notice was served or not before the survey is Habibuddin, the original Muthavalli, or his wife – Mahaboob Unnisa Begum or the settlees of Mahaboob Unnisa Begum, who have executed the registered sale deeds – Exs.A.1, A.6 and A.7 in favour of the plaintiffs. Neither any oral evidence nor any document is produced by the plaintiffs in support of their contention. The entries in the revenue records, even prior to the purchase by the plaintiffs, were clearly evidencing the fact that the suit schedule lands are earmarked for ‘Moharrum festival’ and this should have put the plaintiffs on sufficient notice before purchasing the suit schedule lands. 30. In B. Gowra Reddy & Others v. Govt. The entries in the revenue records, even prior to the purchase by the plaintiffs, were clearly evidencing the fact that the suit schedule lands are earmarked for ‘Moharrum festival’ and this should have put the plaintiffs on sufficient notice before purchasing the suit schedule lands. 30. In B. Gowra Reddy & Others v. Govt. of A.P. & Others ( AIR 2002 A.P. 313 ) the High Court of A.P. held that where before notifying the property as Wakf property no notice was issued to petitioners who were occupants of property and recorded as such in revenue register, nor any enquiry was conducted by Survey Commissioner as required by Sec.4 of Wakf Act, as to whether the property in question was Wakf property or not, writ petition challenging the notification notifying the property in question was Wakf property was maintainable. This authority is not relevant since in the case in hand, neither the name of the plaintiffs, their vendors nor the settlee Mahaboob Unnisa Begum were recorded in any revenue records as occupants of the suit lands. 31. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs submits that they have perfected the title by adverse possession. The concept of adverse possession is well-settled and fundamentally it contemplates a hostile possession by which there is denial of title of true owner. Mere possession or user or permissive possession does not remotely come near the spectrum of adverse possession.Possession to be adverse has to be actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous over the requisite frame of time as provided in law so that the possessor perfects his title by adverse possession. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs cited several authorities on this aspect. What is required to be seen is as to whether the facts of the case in hand are such so as to hold that the plaintiffs have perfected their title over the suit schedule lands by adverse possession. It may be recalled that the plaintiffs are the purchasers of the suit schedule properties under three registered instruments, which are Exs.A.1, A.6 and A.7, dated 6-11-1974. It is also not disputed that prior thereto, the agnates of the plaintiffs were cultivating the land as lessees, having obtained the same from Mahaboob Unnisa Begum. According to the plaintiffs, Mahaboob Unnisa Begum has settled the suit schedule properties in favour of her husband and children, some of whom are the vendors of the plaintiffs. It is also not disputed that prior thereto, the agnates of the plaintiffs were cultivating the land as lessees, having obtained the same from Mahaboob Unnisa Begum. According to the plaintiffs, Mahaboob Unnisa Begum has settled the suit schedule properties in favour of her husband and children, some of whom are the vendors of the plaintiffs. Within five years of the purchase of the suit schedule properties by the plaintiffs, the 1st defendant got issued legal notice in January, 1979 – Ex.B.10 and three years thereafter, the plaintiffs filed writ petition before this Court. The possession of the suit schedule properties by the plaintiffs or for that matter their predecessors-in-title is not in dispute. However, according to the 1st defendant the suit schedule properties are the wakf properties and the husband of Mahaboob Unnisa Begum was the Muthavalli and neither of them has got any right to settle the properties in favour of any third person and such a person will not derive any valid title, so as to transfer the same in favour of the plaintiffs or anybody. The plaintiffs having purchased the suit schedule properties on 6-11-1974 cannot contend that by 1979 when the defendant issued notice calling upon them to deliver possession, the principle of adverse possession enure to them. The possession of the plaintiffs or for that matter that of their predecessors-in-title cannot be said to be hostile and it did not start with a wrongful dispossession of rightful owner. The time for acquiring title by adverse possession has been arrested or remained in a state of suspension till entire proceedings arising on and from 29-1-1979 when the defendants issued notice are terminated. In view of the above, it is held that the plaintiffs cannot claim to have perfected the title over the plaint schedule properties by adverse possession. 32. The 1st defendant has successfully established by producing the documents, which are maintained by the authorities in discharge of their duties long prior to the plaintiffs purchasing the suit schedule lands that the suit schedule lands are the wakf properties and they were being earmarked for celebrating ‘Peerla Panduga’, which is known as ‘Moharrum festival’. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, miserably failed to show that the suit schedule lands were the properties of private individuals and their vendors were competent to alienate the same in their favour. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, miserably failed to show that the suit schedule lands were the properties of private individuals and their vendors were competent to alienate the same in their favour. As already stated, the main source of title of the vendors of the plaintiffs is said to be registered settlement deed, dated 20-9-1953, which is said to have been executed by Mahaboob Unnisa Begum, who is none other than the wife of Muthavalli, who was very much alive by then. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to be declared as owners of the suit schedule lands. 33. Point No.2:- The other submission of the learned Counsel for the defendants is that notice as contemplated under Section 56 of the Wakf Act has not been issued, and hence the suit is not maintainable. The contention of the plaintiff is that before instituting the suit, they have filed W.P.No.4142 of 1982 questioning the notice of the 1st defendant and the said Writ Petition has been disposed of by this Court on 19-12-1985 giving liberty to the plaintiffs to initiate any legal action including filing of a suit against the defendants. The writ petition was contested by the defendants and the order came to be passed after hearing both sides. Therefore, the statutory notice contemplated under Section 56 of the Wakf Act is not necessary, since the defendants had very much notice of the action to be initiated by the plaintiffs. 34. There is no dispute with the requirement of issuance of notice under Section 56 of the Wakf Act before any suit is instituted against the Wakf Board in respect of any act purporting to be done by it. It is also not in dispute that no such notice was given by the plaintiffs. However, the peculiar facts of the case are such that the suits cannot be said to be hit by the provisions of Section 56 of the Wakf Act for the reason that the suits came to be filed in pursuance to the liberty given by the High Court in W.P.No.4142 of 1982, which was filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants. The contentions of the writ petitioners are in para materia and once again the statutory notice is not required. The contentions of the writ petitioners are in para materia and once again the statutory notice is not required. The object underlying the requirement of issuance of notice prior to filing of a suit with a clear two months time to the Board is intended to address the grievances of the plaintiffs so as to obviate legal proceedings being initiated. By filing writ petition, which was duly contested, the defendants had notice of the intention of the plaintiffs to initiate legal proceedings for ventilating their grievance and in the peculiar facts of the case, there was no need for the plaintiffs to issue fresh notice after the writ petition has been disposed of, in which there was also direction to both the parties to maintain status quo and the defendants were specifically restrained from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule lands for a period of three months. When the writ petition was disposed of on 19-12-1985, the suits came to be filed on 17-3-1986, which is within the stipulated time. The point is accordingly answered. 35. Point No.3:- The contention of the defendant is that the suits are barred by limitation. It is their contention that as per the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 6, no suit shall lie against the wakf property one year after expiry of the Gazette notification, which in this case was in April, 1962. The Act further provides that once the lands have been notified, till they are modified the Gazette notification shall be final and conclusive. 36. In B. Govinda Rao v. A.P. State Wakf Board ( 2008(2) ALT 429 (DB) a Division Bench of our High Court held that as per Sec.6 (4) of the Act, the list of wakfs shall unless it is modified pursuant to a decision of Tribunal to be final and conclusive and that once such list published the lands are under the character of wakf property. 37. In the instant case, when the Gazette notification was made in 1962, the suits came to be filed on 17-3-1986. Before that, however, the plaintiffs have filed W.P.No.4142 of 1982 before this Court, which was disposed of on 15-12-1982, directing the plaintiffs to approach the Civil Court for redressal of their grievances. 37. In the instant case, when the Gazette notification was made in 1962, the suits came to be filed on 17-3-1986. Before that, however, the plaintiffs have filed W.P.No.4142 of 1982 before this Court, which was disposed of on 15-12-1982, directing the plaintiffs to approach the Civil Court for redressal of their grievances. Admittedly, the 1st defendant has issued notice to the plaintiffs on 21-9-1979 calling upon the plaintiffs to deliver possession of the suit schedule properties since the properties are the wakf properties. The plaintiffs admit having received the originals of Ex.B.10, Ex.B.11 and Ex.B.12. Even after receiving such notices in January, 1979, for more than three years, no proceedings, whatsoever, are initiated by the plaintiffs. Only in the year 1982, they filed a writ petition and after its disposal, filed the suits in the year 1986. It is manifest from the above that at least on or after service of legal notices, dated 29-1-1979, the plaintiffs had clear notice that the suit schedule properties are wakf properties and if at all they wanted to question the same, they ought to have taken appropriate steps within one year but need not wait for more than three years and thereafter approach the High Court questioning the notices issued by the Wakf Board. In view of the above, the suits filed by the plaintiffs in March, 1986, are clearly barred by limitation, in view of the provisions of Section 6 (1) of the Wakf Act, which mandates that the entries in the Gazette shall be questioned within one year, failing which they will become final and conclusive. 38. In Dr. T.S.A. Guptha v. Joint Collector-II, Ranga Reddy District ( 2008(4) ALT 189 ) the High Court of A.P. followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Sayyed Ali v. Andhra Pradesh Wakf Board (1998 ALT (Rev.)188(SC). In the said decision the Supreme Court laid down as under: “It is open for any person to raise a dispute within one year from the date of publication of the list of Wakf under sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act. Under Section 6(4) of the Act the list of wakfs published under sub-section (2) of Section 5, unless it is modified pursuant to the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and conclusive. Under Section 6(4) of the Act the list of wakfs published under sub-section (2) of Section 5, unless it is modified pursuant to the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and conclusive. Any occupancy rights under the Inams Abolition Act in respect of the wakf properties is of no avail as the Tahsildar under the Inams Act is not competent to enquire into or give any decision in respect of the character of the wakf property. It is held that wakf is a permanent dedication of the property for the purpose recognized by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and the property having been found as Wakf would always retain its character as a Wakf. Once a Wakf always a Wakf and the grant of patta in favour of Mokshadar under the INams Act does not, in any manner, nullify the earlier dedication made of the propery constituting the same as Wakf. After a wakf has been created, it continues to be so far all time to come and further continues to be governed by the provisions of the Wakf Act and a grant of patta does not affect the original character of the Wakf property”. 39. In PUNJAB WAKF BOARD, AMBALA CANTT., v. CAPT, MOHAR SINGH AND OTHERS (AIR 1975 S.C., 1891, it is laid down that a property cannot become Wakf property by the mere use of the word “Idgah” in “Rent Demand and Collecltion Register”. 40. In THE BOARD OF MUSLIM WAKFS, RAJASTHAN v. RADHA KISHAN AND OTHERS (AIR 1979 S.C., 289), it is laid down in paragraphs No.33, 36 and 39 as under:- “33. The answer to these questions must turn on the true meaning and construction of the word ‘therein’ in the expression ‘any person interested therein’ appearing in sub-s.(1) of S.6. In order to understand the meaning of the word ‘therein’ in our view, it is necessary to refer to the preceding words ‘the Board or the mutawalli of the wakf. The word ‘therein’ must necessarily refer to the ‘wakf’ which immediately precedes it. It cannot refer to the ‘wakf property’. Sub-sec. (1) of S.6 enumerates the persons who can file suits and also the questions in respect of which such suits can be filed. The word ‘therein’ must necessarily refer to the ‘wakf’ which immediately precedes it. It cannot refer to the ‘wakf property’. Sub-sec. (1) of S.6 enumerates the persons who can file suits and also the questions in respect of which such suits can be filed. In enumerating the persons who are empowered to file suits under this provision, only the Board, the mutawalli of the wakf, and ‘any person interested therein’, thereby necessarily meaning any person interested in the wakf, are listed. It should be borne in mind that the Act deals with wakfs, its institutions and its properties. It would, therefore, be logical and reasonable to infer that its provisions empower only those who are interested in the wakf, to institute suits. 36. The two provisions are practically similar in content except that the language of the main enacting part has been altered in sub-s. (1) of S.6 of the present Act and put in a proper form. In redrafting the section, the sequence of the difference clauses has been changed, therefore, for the expression “any person interested in a wakf” the legislature had to use the expression “any person interested therein.” The word ‘therein’ appearing in sub-s. (1) of S.6 must, therefore, mean ‘any person interested in a wakf’ as defined in S.3 (h). The objection of sub-s. (1) of S.6 is to narrow down the dispute between the Board of Wakfs, the mutawalli and the person interested in the wakf, as defined in S.3(h). 39. It follows that where a stranger who is non-Muslim and is in possession of a certain property his right, title and interest therein cannot be put in jeopardy merely because the property is included in the list. Such a person is not required to file a suit for a declaration of his title within a period of one year. The special rule of limitation laid down in proviso to sub-s.(1) of Sec.6 is not applicable to him. In order words, the list published by the Board of Wakfs under sub-s. (2) of S.5 can be challenged by him by filing a suit for declaration of title even after the expiry of the period of one year, if the necessity of filing such suit arises.” 41. Upon carefully perusing the authorities, it is evident that they are not relevant insofar as the facts of the case in hand are concerned. Upon carefully perusing the authorities, it is evident that they are not relevant insofar as the facts of the case in hand are concerned. The suits are neither initiated by the Muthavalli, Wakf Board nor the persons interested therein. The plaintiffs are purchasers of the suit schedule lands and have no concern with the Wakf. 42. From the above discussion, it is manifest that the suits of the plaintiffs having been filed in March, 1986, were clearly barred by limitation. The plaintiffs, who have been served with notices by the Wakf Board on 21-9-1979, ought to have initiated proper steps within a period of one year, which, however, they have not taken till they filed writ petition in the year 1982. Since, admittedly, the plaintiffs are non-muslims and are claiming to be in possession of property which has been on the records for several decades to be the wakf property, though may not be required to challenge the declaration issued by the Wakf Board in the Gazette in 1962 within one year, they are certainly required to challenge at least within a period of one year after they are specifically served with notices by the Wakf Board on 21-9-1979. Even at the cost of the repetition, it may be stated that when the suit schedule lands are notified as wakf in the Gazette in the month of April, 1962, the muthawalli Habibuddin was alive so also his wife Mahaboob Unnisa Begum, who has settled the suit schedule properties in favour of her husband and children in 1953 and none of them have challenged the list published by the Wakf Board under sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act. Long thereafter only in 1974, some of the settlees claiming title under the settlement deed said to have been executed by Mahaboob Unnisa Begum have sold the suit schedule land to the plaintiffs under registered instruments – Ex.A.1, Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7. Such purchasers, even after having been served with notices on 21-9-1979, have not filed the suits for declaration of title within a period of one year as contemplated under Section 6(1) of the Act. Such purchasers, even after having been served with notices on 21-9-1979, have not filed the suits for declaration of title within a period of one year as contemplated under Section 6(1) of the Act. In the said legal notices, the office copy of which is marked as Ex.B.10, receipt of which is not denied by the plaintiffs, it is specifically mentioned by the Wakf Board that the suit schedule lands are registered as Wakf, that they have wakf property, that previously one Habibuddin was the muthawalli, who was a mere Manager of the Wakf property which do not vest in him, that the ownership of the suit schedule property is vested in God and the Muthawalli cannot transfer the property, that the alleged sale deeds in favour of the plaintiffs, dated 6-11-1974, were sold away by the said Muthawalli fraudulently, that the suit schedule lands are gazetted as wakf property, as classified by the Government of A,.P. in the Gazette, dated 19-4-1962 and that the alienations made by the Muthawalli in their favour is void under law and has no legal effect. The point is accordingly answered against the plaintiffs. 43. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is held that the appellants-plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief and accordingly the appeals are dismissed with costs confirming the Judgments and Decrees in O.S.Nos.14, 15 and 16 of 1986 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Bhimavaram, dated 28-10-1991. The miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand disposed of.