JUDGMENT : M. Satyanarayana Murthy, J. 1. The unsuccessful plaintiffs in O.S. No. 43 of 1985 on the file of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Markapur (for short, 'the trial Court'), preferred this appeal against the decree and judgment dated 29-04-1994, whereby and whereunder the suit filed by the plaintiffs to set aside the sale deed dated 24-02-1984 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant in respect of suit schedule land, for delivery of possession of plaint schedule property to the 1st defendant after ejecting the 2nd defendant etc., was dismissed. 2. The appellants were the plaintiffs and the respondents were the defendants before the trial Court and, for convenience of reference, the ranks given to the parties before the trial Court will be adopted throughout this judgment. 3. The plaintiffs filed this suit, for the reliefs mentioned above, alleging that schedule property belonged to late Kakunuti Rami Reddy and his sons Kakunuti Ramachandra Reddy, the 2nd plaintiff, and Kakunuti Ramakrishna Reddy and they were in possession and enjoyment of the property. The 2nd plaintiff got some landed property through his wife at Yelluru Village of Allagadda Taluk in Kurnool District and, for managing the same, the 2nd plaintiff was residing at Yalluru Village. In the first week of September, 1984, the plaintiffs came to know that, in the month of June, 1984, there was a beat of tom-tom in Papinenipalli Village about delivery of possession of schedule property to the 2nd defendant through process of the Court. Immediately, the 2nd plaintiff, on enquiry, came to know that one Bollavaram Narapa Reddy of Papinenipalli Village obtained sale deed from Kakunuti Rami Reddy by playing fraud. When the 2nd plaintiff enquired, he came to know that some of the creditors of late Kakunuti Rami Reddy filed creditor petition in I.P. No. 4 of 1959 on the file of the Court of Sub Judge, Kurnool, and that late Kakunuti Rami Reddy and his younger son Ramakrishna Reddy were impleaded as respondents and adjudged as insolvents after due enquiry. Bollavaram Narapa Reddy exhausted all his remedies open to him under law and played all dilatory tactics to retain possession of schedule land for himself but he was not successful. He prevented sale of schedule land by the 1st defendant for a long time. Bollavaram Narapa Reddy exhausted all his remedies open to him under law and played all dilatory tactics to retain possession of schedule land for himself but he was not successful. He prevented sale of schedule land by the 1st defendant for a long time. The plaintiffs came to know that the property was brought to sale at 12 noon on 05-05-1982 in the office of the 1st defendant and the said sale is false, vitiated by fraud and there are material irregularities and illegalities. No proclamation of sale of schedule property by beat of tom-tom or by affixing any notice at public place was done and that public had no notice about the auction. Bollavaram Narapa Reddy, in collusion with the village officers, manipulated all papers as if there was proclamation of auction by beat of tomtom though sale did not take place but the sale was knocked down in favour of kith and kin of Bollavaram Narapa Reddy including the 2nd defendant and their confederates. Except the 2nd defendant and Bollavaram Narapa Reddy, none others have knowledge about the proposed auction and that the persons, who participated in the auction dated 05-05-1982, were only the close associates and relatives of Bollavaram Narapa Reddy. K. Tirupathi Reddy is son-in-law of Bollavaram Narapa Reddy and Ch. Khasimpeera is Upa-Sarpanch of Ardhaveedu Gramapanchayat. Sk. S. Mahaboob Saheb and M. Samuel are the close associates of Bollavaram Narapa Reddy, who are manual labourers, having no capacity to purchase the bid property. Thus, the sale is stage managed and, in the said sale, the bid was knocked down in favour of the 2nd defendant for Rs. 8,200/-. Both the insolvents in I.P. No. 4 of 1959 died. Though the 2nd plaintiff, son of Kakunuti Rami Reddy, got 1/3rd undivided share in the family property, was not impleaded as legal-heir of Rami Reddy, the insolvent. No notice to the legal-heirs was issued before auction of the property. On this ground alone, the sale is liable to be set aside as it is vitiated by illegalities and irregularities. The 2nd plaintiff further contended that value of schedule property was not less than Rs. 60,000/- and each acre costs Rs. 15,000/- as on the date of auction. The schedule land is a garden land, with well, fit for cultivation of wet crops which is adjacent to residential locality in the village. The 2nd plaintiff further contended that value of schedule property was not less than Rs. 60,000/- and each acre costs Rs. 15,000/- as on the date of auction. The schedule land is a garden land, with well, fit for cultivation of wet crops which is adjacent to residential locality in the village. Therefore, the bid amount is grossly inadequate and nominal. Hence, the sale is vitiated by fraud and liable to be set aside. It is further contended that though the auction was conducted long back, possession of the property was not obtained for two years from the date of auction keeping the auction as secret with an oblique motive. On account of the sale deed executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant dated 21-02-1984 in pursuance of the auction, the plaintiffs are put to irreparable loss and they are prepared to deposit the amount and interest thereon if time is fixed. Thus, the sale is not binding on the plaintiffs as it is vitiated by fraud and finally prayed to set aside the sale deed dated 21-02-1984 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant and deliver vacant possession of schedule property granting future mesne profits. 4. The 2nd defendant filed written statement denying material allegations of the plaint inter alia contending that late Kakunuti Rami Reddy was blessed with two sons and three daughters. The 2nd plaintiff married at Yelluru of Allagadda Taluk of Kurnool District and living there as illatom son-in-law but visiting the village occasionally and he is not aware of the family affairs. The father of the 1st plaintiff and his younger brother Ramakrishna Reddy, who were in village, indebted heavily. To discharge the pressing debts, Kakunuti Rami Reddy, being the manager of the joint family, sold the land in question to Bollavaram Narapa Reddy for valuable consideration through registered sale deed and delivered possession in the year 1957. In or about 1957, Kakunuti Rami Reddy gifted one acre of land to his second wife Venkata Subbamma. After two years, differences arose. Kakunuti Rami Reddy instigated some of his creditors to file I.P. No. 4 of 1959 with an ill-motive of creating debts to impeach the alienation in favour of Bollavaram Narapa Reddy and to harass him. In or about 1957, Kakunuti Rami Reddy gifted one acre of land to his second wife Venkata Subbamma. After two years, differences arose. Kakunuti Rami Reddy instigated some of his creditors to file I.P. No. 4 of 1959 with an ill-motive of creating debts to impeach the alienation in favour of Bollavaram Narapa Reddy and to harass him. The respondents in the said I.P. were adjudged as insolvents and as, expected, the alienation was successfully impeached, false claims were made before the 1st defendant by bogus creditors. When Bollavaram Narapa Reddy offered to discharge the debt due to genuine creditors to annul I.P. proceedings, an appeal was filed. During pendency of the appeal, one of the creditors filed affidavit stating that the debts were bogus and he was deleted from the list of creditors. The insolvents also approached this Court seeking a direction against the 1st defendant for preparation of list of schedule creditors. Then, Bollavaram Narapa Reddy was not inclined to pay the debts to get the insolvency proceedings annulled as interest accumulated on the debts is heavy due to passage of time. Thereupon, the property was brought to sale. Then, after issuing notice to all the creditors and after due publication of auction by beat of tom-tom, sale was held on 05-05-1982 by the 1st defendant. Several bidders participated in the auction and the bid was knocked down in favour of the 2nd defendant. Thus, the sale was within the knowledge of each and every creditor and they did not file any objection. The 2nd defendant deposited the bid amount, as per rules, within the time, and expenses for registration to obtain registered sale deed. Thereafter, the 2nd plaintiff filed I.A. No. 1313 of 1984 in I.P. No. 4 of 1959 to set aside the alienation on the same grounds urged in the suit. After completion of enquiry, the petition was withdrawn at the stage of argument having come to know that there were no irregularities in the auction. 5. The 1st defendant filed a memo adopting the written statement of the 2nd defendant. 6. After completion of enquiry, the petition was withdrawn at the stage of argument having come to know that there were no irregularities in the auction. 5. The 1st defendant filed a memo adopting the written statement of the 2nd defendant. 6. The 2nd defendant filed additional written statement on 25-09-1991 raising a specific plea that the Court fee is to be paid under Section 24(a) on the 3/4th of market value as the plaintiffs sought for recovery of possession and it is not a suit for mere declaration and, on this ground also, the suit is liable to be dismissed and prayed to dismiss the suit. 7. The 1st defendant again filed a memo adopting the additional written statement filed by the 2nd defendant. 8. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues and additional issue: Issues: 1. Whether the sale is illegal on the ground of fraud or callousness as contended by plaintiff? 2. Whether the suit is prematurely filed without exhausting reliefs under insolvency act? If so the suit is liable to be dismissed? 3. To what relief plaintiffs are entitled to? Additional Issue: 1. Whether the plaintiff is not liable to pay any court fee on the plaint after amendment? 9. During the course of trial, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws. 1 to 7 were examined and got marked Exs. A1 to A9. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and got marked Exs. B1 to B8 and Exs. C1 to C8. 10. Upon hearing argument of both the counsel, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 11. Aggrieved by the decree and judgment under challenge, the plaintiffs, being unsuccessful, preferred the present appeal challenging the decree and judgment on various grounds. The main contentions raised among various contentions are as follows: (a) Schedule property is joint family property of the plaintiffs and the deceased Kakunuti Rami Reddy, who are entitled to equal share, but, when the property was brought to sale after the death of insolvents by the 1st defendant, no notice was issued to the legal-heirs. Thereby, the sale is vitiated on the ground of irregularity but this was not considered by the trial Court; (b) The 1st defendant, did not follow the necessary procedure for sale of the property, more particularly when the auction was proposed to be held on 20-06-1977 as per Ex. Thereby, the sale is vitiated on the ground of irregularity but this was not considered by the trial Court; (b) The 1st defendant, did not follow the necessary procedure for sale of the property, more particularly when the auction was proposed to be held on 20-06-1977 as per Ex. C2 but the sale could not be held as per Ex. C2 in view of the Court proceedings, had no personal knowledge about the actual proclamation that took place in the village etc. Hence, oral evidence of the 1st defendant is suffice to conclude that the sale is vitiated by irregularities; (c) Since the 2nd defendant is in unlawful possession in pursuance of the invalid sale, he is liable to re-deliver vacant possession of the property and render true and correct account of future mesne profits but the trial Court did not consider the specific contentions; (d) The trial Court, on erroneous appreciation of law, came to a wrong conclusion that civil Court has no jurisdiction as I.A. No. 1313 of 1984 in I.P. No. 4 of 1959 was withdrawn and, that too, the present suit is for comprehensive relief. Thereby, civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit; (e) The trial Court did not consider various aspects about value of the property, proclamation of sale and stage managed sale etc., in proper perspective and committed an error in dismissing the suit and finally prayed to allow the appeal setting aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court and pass a decree in favour of the plaintiffs setting aside the sale deed dated 24-02-1984 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant, direct the 2nd defendant to deliver vacant possession of schedule property and to render true and correct account of mesne profits from the date of suit till delivery of property. 12. During the course of argument, Sri Srinivas Emani, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, would contend that when no permission was granted for withdrawal of the application in I.A. No. 1313 of 1984 in I.P. No. 4 of 1959, the jurisdiction of civil Court cannot be ousted and apart from that, the relief claimed in the present suit to set aside the sale deed is a comprehensive relief and civil Court has got jurisdiction and placed reliance on Ravula Gopal Reddy Vs. Ravula Narasi Reddy and others 2014 (4) ALT 234 , Arora Enterprises Limited and others Vs. Indubhushan Obhan and others (1997) 5 SCC 366 , Padmavathamma and others Vs. Battepati Parthasarathi (Plaintiff) and others 1996 (4) ALT 272 and Hans Raj Vs. Rattan Chand and others AIR 1967 SC 1780 . Learned counsel further drawn attention of this Court to the irregularities in conducting sale as mentioned in the plaint and spoken to by the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiffs and, in view of the same, the sale deed is liable to be set aside or cancelled. 13. Whereas, Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the defendants, would contend that when a specific remedy is provided under Section 68 read with Section 4 of Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (for brevity, 'the Act of 1920'), the plaintiffs filed I.A. No. 1313 of 1984 in I.P. No. 4 of 1959 so as to exhaust the statutory remedy available to him but, strangely, withdrawn the same at the stage of argument, that itself is sufficient to dismiss the suit. When a specific statutory remedy is provided under Section 68 of the Act of 1920, without exhausting the statutory remedy, the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim the relief in the present suit as civil Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to decide those issues and placed reliance on Hans Raj Vs. Rattan Chand and others (supra) and Dhulabhai etc., Vs. State of M.P. and another AIR 1969 SC 78 (1) in support of his contentions. It is further contended that the suit is filed for cancellation of sale deed executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant in pursuance of the auction held by the 1st defendant and the relief claimed by the plaintiffs is nothing but questioning the act of the 1st defendant and, in such a case, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file a petition under Section 68 read with Section 4 of the Act of 1920 but not by a separate suit in a civil Court. Assuming for a moment that the relief claimed by the plaintiffs is not directly questioning the act of the 1st defendant, they are not entitled to claim the relief of cancellation or annulment of the sale deed and the remedy available to them is only under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Act of 1963'). Therefore, the suit for annulment or setting aside the sale deed dated 24-02-1984 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant is not maintainable in civil Court; on this ground alone, the suit is liable to be dismissed; supported the findings recorded by the trial Court in all respects and finally prayed to dismiss the appeal confirming the decree and judgment under challenge. 14. Considering rival contentions, perusing oral and documentary evidence and decree and judgment, the points that arise for consideration are as follows: (1) Whether the insolvency Court is competent to grant the relief claimed in the suit in civil Court, if so, is the jurisdiction of civil Court ousted either by express bar or by necessary implication? (2) Whether the suit is filed questioning the act of the 1st defendant, if so, is the suit for cancellation or annulment of sale deed dated 24-02-1984 in civil Court maintainable? (3) Whether the sale deed dated 24-02-1984 is vitiated by fraud and irregularities, if so, is it liable to be set aside or annulled? (4) Whether possession of the 2nd defendant is wrongful or unlawful, if so, is he liable to render true and correct account of mesne profits from the date of suit till date of delivery? (5) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the property from the 2nd defendant? 15. In Re. Point No. 1: The first and foremost contention of the defendants is that when a specific remedy under Section 68 read with Section 4 of the Act of 1920 is available to the plaintiffs questioning the act or decision of the 1st defendant, they may apply to the Court and the Court may confirm, reverse or modify the act or decision complained of and make such order as the insolvency Court thinks fit. Section 4 of the Act of 1920 is wider than Section 68 of the Act of 1920 which conferred power on insolvency Court to decide all questions whether of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case. Subject to the provisions of this Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every such decision shall be final and binding for all purposes as between, on the one hand, the debtor and the debtor's estate and, on the other hand, all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them. If a petition is filed under Section 68 read with Section 4 of the Act of 1920, all questions arising out of insolvency proceedings can be decided by insolvency Court. The present dispute is regarding vitiation of sale conducted by the 1st defendant-official receiver knocking down in favour of the 2nd defendant and execution of registered sale deed dated 24-02-1984 in pursuance of the auction. Thus, the plaintiffs directly questioned the action of the 1st defendant which falls within the ambit of Section 68 of the Act of 1920. Section 4 conferred plenary power on Courts and to decide all such questions if it thinks necessary or expedient in the interest of justice. In view of Section 4 of the Act of 1920, any dispute between the insolvent and his sons regarding joint family property shall also be decided. At the same time, insolvency Court is competent to decide title since power is vested on insolvency Court as held in Official Receiver Vs. Sankara Linga Mudaliyar AIR 1921 Madras 904. In the present case, the plaintiffs filed an interlocutory application in I.A. No. 1313 of 1984 in I.P. No. 4 of 1959 to set aside the sale as the sale is vitiated by fraud and irregularities. Thus, the relief claimed in I.A. No. 1313 of 1984 is directly questioning the act or decision of the 1st defendant i.e. auction conducted by him. Thus, the relief claimed in I.A. No. 1313 of 1984 is directly questioning the act or decision of the 1st defendant i.e. auction conducted by him. The earlier petition filed by the plaintiffs falls within the ambit of Section 68 of the Act of 1920. Even assuming for a moment that the claim of the plaintiffs would not fall within the ambit of Section 68 of the Act of 1920, still all the questions arising in insolvency proceedings can be determined by exercising power conferred under Section 4 of the Act of 1920 by insolvency Court but question of limitation will arise when an application is filed under Section 68 of the Act of 1920 and the limitation is only 21 days from the date of act or decision of the 1st defendant complained of whereas for filing an application under Section 4 of the Act of 1920, there is no limitation. 16. On overall consideration of power of insolvency Court under Sections 68 and 4 of the Act of 1920, insolvency Court can decide all the questions including legality of the action of the official receiver as it is a question arising during insolvency proceedings. Therefore, the special machinery provided under the Act of 1920 to decide the controversies between parties to the insolvency proceedings or third parties to proceedings is sufficient and grant any relief which a civil Court can grant by exercising power under Section 68 read with Section 4 of the Act of 1920. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that though a specific remedy is provided under the Act of 1920, civil Court's jurisdiction is not ousted either by express bar or by necessary implication. Thereby, the plaintiffs may approach the Court constituted under the ordinary law of the land and placed reliance on Hans Raj Vs. Rattan Chand and others (supra), wherein the Apex Court held that "A person complaining of the act of the receiver may either apply under Section 68 or proceed under the ordinary law of the land. Section 4 does not prescribe any application for any relief under that section. This section does not lay down what procedure or what steps should be taken by any person who is aggrieved by any order of the insolvency Court or of any act of omission or commission of the receiver. Section 4 does not prescribe any application for any relief under that section. This section does not lay down what procedure or what steps should be taken by any person who is aggrieved by any order of the insolvency Court or of any act of omission or commission of the receiver. Its object is to define the limits of jurisdiction of the Courts exercising powers in insolvency. It is not correct to say that a person aggrieved by an act of the receiver has the choice of making an application under Section 4 or under Section 68. Section 4 comes into operation whenever any question of the nature mentioned therein is sought to be canvassed before a Court exercising insolvency jurisdiction. Such questions may arise because of acts or decisions of the receiver complained. A question as to whether an insolvent has any interest in the property attached by the receiver would fall within the purview of Section 4, but the application for the adjudication of such a question when the receiver acts otherwise than under the order of a Court would be covered by Section 68 and as such the period of limitation of twenty-one days would be attracted to any such application. Moreover, sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 4 both start with the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Act" and even if it was possible to construe that Section 4 envisaged the making of an application for relief, such application would be subject to Section 68 of the Act." Taking advantage of the principle laid down in the above judgment, more particularly the observation that the person complaining of the act of the receiver may either apply under Section 68 or proceed under the ordinary law of the land, it is contended that civil Court's jurisdiction is not ousted either by necessary implication or by express bar. 17. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the defendants, would submit that the judgment of the Apex Court in Hans Raj Vs. Rattan Chand and others (supra) is posterior to the judgment in Dhulabhai etc., Vs. State of M.P. and another (supra) and Kamala Mills Limited Vs. State of Bombay 1965 AIR 1942. 17. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the defendants, would submit that the judgment of the Apex Court in Hans Raj Vs. Rattan Chand and others (supra) is posterior to the judgment in Dhulabhai etc., Vs. State of M.P. and another (supra) and Kamala Mills Limited Vs. State of Bombay 1965 AIR 1942. Thereby, the principle laid down therein cannot be applied for the reason that the guidelines laid down in the earlier larger bench decision were not referred as special machinery is provided for redressal of the grievance questioning the act or action of the official receiver under Section 68 read with Section 4 of the Act of 1920 and it is competent to confirm the decision or set aside the decision of the official receiver by exercising power conferred on it under Section 68 of the Act of 1920. In the present case, the relief claimed by the plaintiffs is to set aside the sale deed executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant on the ground that the sale is vitiated by fraud and irregularities. Even if the sale is vitiated by fraud or irregularities, it is nothing but a decision taken by the 1st defendant and the same can be questioned and, accordingly, the plaintiffs filed I.A. No. 1313 of 1984 in I.P. No. 4 of 1959 questioning the act of the 1st defendant. Obviously for different reasons, the plaintiffs had withdrawn the petition seeking liberty to file a civil suit. However, the Court did not grant liberty but permitted to withdraw the application in I.A. No. 1313 of 1984 in I.P. No. 4 of 1959. Thus, initially, the plaintiffs exhausted the statutory remedy under Section 68 of the Act of 1920 but filed the present suit after withdrawing I.A. No. 1313 of 1984 for the reliefs mentioned above. Therefore, when a specific machinery is provided in the statute, jurisdiction of civil Court is ousted by necessary implication. 18. Thus, initially, the plaintiffs exhausted the statutory remedy under Section 68 of the Act of 1920 but filed the present suit after withdrawing I.A. No. 1313 of 1984 for the reliefs mentioned above. Therefore, when a specific machinery is provided in the statute, jurisdiction of civil Court is ousted by necessary implication. 18. In view of the specific contentions, it is appropriate to advert to Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for brevity, 'C.P.C.') which reads as follows: "The Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred." In view of the language used under Section 9 of C.P.C., if there is an express or implied bar on jurisdiction of civil Court, civil Court cannot take cognizance of the suit. In the absence of implied or express bar, civil Court can try all suits of civil nature. At this stage, I feel that it is appropriate to refer to Section 68 of the Act of 1920 which reads as follows: "If the insolvent or any of the creditors or any other person is aggrieved by any act or decision of the receiver, he may apply to the Court, and the Court may confirm, reverse or modify the act or decision complained of, and make such order as it thinks just: provided that no application under this section shall be entertained after the expiration of twenty-one days from the date of the act or decision complained of." In the present case, the property of Kakunuti Rami Reddy was brought to sale by the 1st defendant for distribution of the same to the general body of creditors after making necessary enquiry. The plaintiffs produced Ex. A2 certified copy of bid list in I.P. No. 4 of 1959 on the file of the Court of Sub Judge, Kurnool, and, at best, it shows participation of few bidders in the auction and the bid was knocked down in favour of the 2nd defendant who is the highest bidder in the auction. Later, Ex. B3 registered sale deed was executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant dated 24-02-1984, delivered possession of the property under the original of Ex. B4 and obtained delivery receipt under the original of Ex. B5. Later, Ex. B3 registered sale deed was executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant dated 24-02-1984, delivered possession of the property under the original of Ex. B4 and obtained delivery receipt under the original of Ex. B5. The said proceedings were challenged in the present suit before the insolvency Court by filing original of Ex. B1 and, later, withdrew the same. Thus, the plaintiffs are aware about the statutory remedy available to them but filed the present suit in civil Court. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that civil Courts have to assume jurisdiction in any matter of civil nature unless jurisdiction of civil Court is barred by necessary implication or by express bar in any Act. No doubt the contention of the plaintiffs' counsel holds substance for the reason that Section9 of C.P.C. says that Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. In the present case, there is no express bar under Section 68 of the Act of 1920 to take cognizance of the present suit. When the plaintiffs are challenging the action of the official receiver, the remedy available to the aggrieved persons i.e. the plaintiffs is only to prefer an appeal against the official receiver under Section 68 of the Act of 1920 before the insolvency Court. Therefore, when an effective and efficacious remedy is provided under the special statute i.e. the Act of 1920, jurisdiction of civil Court is ousted by necessary implication and civil Court cannot assume jurisdiction of insolvency Court. Time and again, the Apex Court laid down the principles as to when jurisdiction can be exercised by civil Court when a statutory remedy is provided. A larger bench of the Apex Court consisting of seven judges in Kamala Mills Limited Vs. State of Bombay (supra) rules as follows: "Exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Court expressly or impliedly, words of statutory provision on which plea of bar is rested, the scheme of relevant provision, their object and purpose to be seen. Court will consider whether remedy in special statute is sufficient or adequate. Such determination is relevant but not decisive in case of expressed bar. In case of plea of implied bar, such determination may be decisive. Special right and liability created by special statue determinable by special tribunal. Court will consider whether remedy in special statute is sufficient or adequate. Such determination is relevant but not decisive in case of expressed bar. In case of plea of implied bar, such determination may be decisive. Special right and liability created by special statue determinable by special tribunal. Even then, Court will enquire whether remedies normally available in civil Court are prescribed by such statute." In another judgment between M/s. K.S. Venkataraman & Company (P) Limited Vs. State of Madras AIR 1966 SC 1089 , the Apex Court held as follows: "If a statute imposes a liability and creates an effective machinery for deciding questions of law or fact by necessary implication, civil court's jurisdiction is barred." 19. In view of the principles laid down by Apex Court that, when a special remedy is provided under the Act of 1920, civil Court cannot entertain any suit and decide cause of the party who approached the civil Court instead of approaching the forum provided under the Act of 1920. In the present case, Section 68 read with Section 4 of the Act of 1920 provides an appeal questioning the act or decision taken by the official receiver to the insolvency Court, the plaintiffs approached the insolvency Court by filing I.A. No. 1313 of 1984 in I.P. No. 4 of 1959, withdrawn the same and approached civil Court seeking the relief of setting aside the sale deed executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant. Thus, by necessary implication, jurisdiction of civil Court is ousted as machinery provided under special statute is competent to grant the relief which the plaintiffs claimed in the present suit by exercising power under Sections 68 read with Section 4 of the Act of 1920. 20. In Dhulabai Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), a Larger Bench of Apex Court laid down the following seven guidelines either to assume jurisdiction of any subject matter of civil nature or to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court: "(1) Whether the statute gives finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is net decision to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and scheme of particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and he result of the inquiry may he decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determinate of the right or liability and further lays down that all the questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act is ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constitutes under that Act Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies. (6) Questions of the correctness or the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the order of the authorities is declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case, the scheme of the particular Act must be examined, because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." In Ramesh Gobindram Vs. In either case, the scheme of the particular Act must be examined, because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." In Ramesh Gobindram Vs. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf AIR 2010 SC 2897 , the Apex Court laid down a specific test as follows: "The real test is to see whether a tribunal has power to gran, the relief which normally granted by a Civil Court only." This principle is almost similar to the principle in Kamala Mills Limited (supra). The principle laid down in the above judgments is only that when the authority under the special statute is provided for redressal of grievance by applying the test referred in M/s. Kamala Mills Limited (supra) whether such authority is competent to grant relief which the Civil Court normally grants. In the instant case on hand, the relief sought by the plaintiffs is to set aside or annul the sale deed dated 24-02-1984 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant directly questioning the decision taken by the 1st defendant and the insolvency Court is competent to grant such relief under Section 68 read with Section 4 of the Act of 1920. In view of guideline No. 2 in Dhulabai's case (supra), when adequate machinery is provided under the special statute, which can exercise power of Civil Court, the Civil Court's jurisdiction is barred by necessary implication. A co-joint reading of Sections 68and 4 of the Act of 1920, it is abundantly clear that a specific machinery which is competent to exercise the power of Civil Court is provided under the statute for redressal of grievance of the plaintiffs herein and the jurisdiction is ousted by necessary implication. 21. As a special machinery is provided under Section 68 read with Section 4 of the Act of 1920 to set aside or confirm the act or decision taken by the 1st defendant, by the insolvency Court, the jurisdiction of civil Court is ousted by necessary implication. The principle laid down in Hans Raj Vs. Rattan Chand and others (supra) to the extent that the aggrieved person may proceed under the ordinary law of the land appears to be contrary to the judgment in Kamala Mills Limited (supra). The decision in Ravula Gopal Reddy Vs. The principle laid down in Hans Raj Vs. Rattan Chand and others (supra) to the extent that the aggrieved person may proceed under the ordinary law of the land appears to be contrary to the judgment in Kamala Mills Limited (supra). The decision in Ravula Gopal Reddy Vs. Ravula Narasi Reddy and others (supra). Arora Enterprises Limited and others Vs. Indubhushan Obhan and others (supra) and Padmavathamma and others Vs. Battepati Parthasarathi (Plaintiff) and others (supra) needs no consideration as failure to grant liberty to file suit is not questioned. 22. Considering the scheme of the Act of 1920 and remedies provided thereunder, more particularly machinery provided under the Act of 1920 for expeditious disposal of the case, the civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted by necessary implication. Hence, I am of the considered view that the civil Court has no jurisdiction and the contention of the plaintiffs holds no substance, as the civil Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to grant any relief questioning the act or decision taken by the official receiver under the Act of 1920, in view of the interdict contained under Section 68 of the Act of 1920. Accordingly, the point is held in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. 23. In Re. Point No. 2: The primary relief claimed by the plaintiffs in this suit is to set aside the sale deed dated 24-02-1984 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant conveying suit schedule property and for consequential delivery of possession of schedule property to the 1st defendant on the ground that the sale is vitiated by fraud and irregularities. Of course the plaintiffs pointed out several instances of irregularities in conducting sale but, however, they are not germane for deciding the present controversy. Admittedly, the sale deed was executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant as the 2nd defendant became the highest bidder in the auction conducted by the 1st defendant under the original of Ex. A2 dated 05-05-1982. Thus, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are alone parties to the document but the plaintiffs sought for annulment of the sale deed dated 24-02-1984. A2 dated 05-05-1982. Thus, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are alone parties to the document but the plaintiffs sought for annulment of the sale deed dated 24-02-1984. The relief claimed by the plaintiffs would fall within Section 31 of the Act of 1963 which confers power on Court to cancel a sale deed in a suit filed by any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the Court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. On a plain reading of Section 31 of the Act of 1963, it is clear that any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable is competent to seek the relief of cancellation of any written instrument. Whereas, it is the contention of the defendants that suit for cancellation under Section 31 of the Act of 1963 cannot be maintained by a person other than party to the written instrument and his remedy is only to seek the relief under Section 34 of the Act of 1963 to declare that such instrument is void against him and placed reliance on Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh Vs. Randhir Singh and others (2010) SAR (Civil) 402, wherein the Apex Court, while deciding Court fee payable under Sections 6 and 7 of Court Fee Act, 1870, incidentally held in para No. 6 as follows: "Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to 'A' and 'B' - two brothers. 'A' executes a sale deed in favour of 'C. Subsequently 'A' wants to avoid the sale. 'A' has to sue for cancellation of the deed. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to 'A' and 'B' - two brothers. 'A' executes a sale deed in favour of 'C. Subsequently 'A' wants to avoid the sale. 'A' has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if 'B', who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by 'A' is invalid/void and non-est/illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If 'A', the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad-valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If 'B', who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues of a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of Second Schedule of the Act. But if 'B', a non-executant, is not in possession and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided U/s. 7(iv)(c) of the Act. Sec. 7(vi)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The provision thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of section7." 24. However, the principle laid down by Apex Court in Suhrid Singh (supra) is only an obiter i.e. the incidental observation of Apex Court while dealing with Court fee payable on such plaint. However, the principle laid down by Apex Court in Suhrid Singh (supra) is only an obiter i.e. the incidental observation of Apex Court while dealing with Court fee payable on such plaint. No doubt the decision of Apex Court in Suhrid Singh (supra) is only an incidental finding of Apex Court but it cannot be totally ignored and still it is binding on High Courts and Subordinate Courts in view of the principle laid down by Apex Court in Municipal Committee Vs. Hazara Singh AIR 1975 SC 1087 , wherein it was held as follows: "Even obiter Dictum of the Supreme Court should be accepted as binding. But statements on matters other than law have no binding force. Since on facts no two cases are similar, Supreme Court's decisions which are essentially on questions of fact cannot be relied upon as precedents for decision of other cases." 25. Even if the judgment of Apex Court in Suhrid Singh (supra) is obiter, a Full Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with a similar issue in Yanala malleshwari and others Vs. Ananthula Sayamma and others 2006 (6) ALT 523 (FB), wherein it was held in para No. 26 as follows: "It is a misconception that in every situation, a person who suffers injury by reason of a document can file a suit for cancellation of such written statement. Two conditions must exist before one invokes Section 31 of Specific Relief Act. These are: the written instrument is void or voidable against such person; and such person must have reasonable apprehension that such instrument if left outstanding may cause him serious injury. Insofar as Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act is concerned, it is no doubt true that a person entitled to any right as to any property can seek declaration that he is so entitled to such right. Here again, the person who claims the right to property can institute a declaration suit only when the defendant denies or interested to deny the title of the plaintiff. The difference between the two situations is glaring. In one case, cancellation of deed can be sought in a Court only by a person who executed document and who perceives that such document is void or voidable. In the other case, even if a person is not a party to the document, he can maintain a suit for declaration." 26. The difference between the two situations is glaring. In one case, cancellation of deed can be sought in a Court only by a person who executed document and who perceives that such document is void or voidable. In the other case, even if a person is not a party to the document, he can maintain a suit for declaration." 26. In view of the principles laid down in the above judgments, it is clear that person, who, is not a party to written instrument, wanted to annul the written instrument, he has to file a suit seeking declaration under Section 34 of the Act of 1963 and not competent to seek relief under Section 31 of the Act of 1963 but, in the present case, the plaintiffs, who are not parties to the instrument, sought relief under Section 31 of the Act of 1963 instead of seeking relief under Section 34 of the Act of 1963. The relief claimed by the plaintiffs is totally contrary to the principles laid down by Apex Court and a Full Bench of this Court referred supra. On this ground also, the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim the relief of cancellation of the written instrument i.e. sale deed dated 24-02-1984 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant. Hence, the plaintiffs, who are not parties to the written instrument, are incompetent to claim the relief under Section 31 of the Act of 1963. Accordingly, the point is held in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. 27. In Re. Point No. 3: The plaintiffs contended that the sale is vitiated by fraud and irregularities and it is liable to be set aside and the sale deed dated 24-02-1984 is liable to be cancelled. The plaintiffs pointed out several irregularities and illegalities in conducting sale by the 1st defendant-official receiver and adduced oral evidence in support of those pleas. However, in view of my finding on point No. 1, civil Court has no jurisdiction to cancel or annul the sale deed dated 24-02-1984 on the ground of fraud or irregularity committed by the 1st defendant in conducting auction of schedule property as it was a decision taken by the official receiver and the same can be questioned under Section 68 read with Section 4 of the Act of 1920. When civil Court lacks inherent jurisdiction, this Court need not go into merits of the alleged fraud or irregularities committed by the 1st defendant while conducting auction of schedule property under the original of Ex. A1 Hence, no finding is recorded as civil Court lacks inherent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the point is held. 28. In Re-Point Nos. 4 & 5: The plaintiffs claimed consequential relief of delivery of vacant possession and for mesne profits contending that possession of the 2nd defendant is wrongful. Admittedly, the 2nd defendant participated in the auction, became the highest bidder, the bid was Knocked down in his favour, paid sale consideration as per rules and obtained registered sale deed. In such a case, his possession cannot be termed as unlawful or wrongful and, thereby, question of delivery of vacant possession to the plaintiffs does not arise. The plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the property under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 in case they are dispossessed and the relief of delivery of possession is only a consequential relief, which is incidental to the main relief of annulment of sale deed dated 24-02-1984, but this Court declined to grant the relief of cancellation while deciding point No. 2. Therefore, grant of consequential relief of delivery of vacant possession of schedule property does not arise. Hence, I find that the plaintiffs are not entitled to consequential relief of delivery of vacant possession of the property in view of my specific finding on point Nos. 1 and 2. 29. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that possession of the 2nd defendant is wrongful and, thereby, he is under obligation to render true and correct account of profits received by him from schedule property. Section 2(12) of C.P.C. defines the word mesne profits as follows: "Those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest profits, but shall not include Profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession." According to my discussion on the earlier points, possession of the 2nd defendant over schedule property is not wrongful or unlawful. Thereby, the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim mesne profits under Order 20 Rule order 20 rule 12 of C.P.C. Hence, I find that the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim consequential relief of delivery of vacant possession so also future mesne profits. Accordingly, the points are decided in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. 30. In view of my findings on point Nos. 1 to 5, I find that the appeal is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed. 31. In the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the decree and judgment in O.S. No. 43 of 1985 on the file of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Markapur. Pending miscellaneous petitions in this appeal, if any, shall stand dismissed in consequence. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed