Judgment M. Duraiswamy, J. 1. The above Appeals arise against the common judgment passed in A.S. No. 58 of 2010 and A.S. No. 1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Sub-Court, Tindivanam. 2. S.A. No. 1192 of 2012 arises against the Judgment and Decree passed in A.S. No. 58 of 2010 on the file of the Principal Sub-Court, Tindivanam, modifying the Judgment and Decree passed in O.S. No. 229 of 2004 on the file of the Additional District Munsif Court, Tindivanam. 3. S.A. No. 1193 of 2012 arises against the Judgment and Decree passed in A.S. No. 1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Sub-Court, Tindivanam modifying the Judgment and Decree passed in O.S. No. 229 of 2004 on the file of the Additional District Munsif Court, Tindivanam. 4. The Plaintiff is the Appellant and the Respondents were the Defendants 1, 3, 5 to 7 in the Suit. The Second Defendant died during the pendency of the Suit. The Plaintiff filed the Suit in O.S. No. 229 of 2004 for declaration, delivery of possession, mandatory injunction, past and future profits for illegal use and occupation and for other reliefs. 5. The brief case of the Plaintiff is as follows:- (i) According to the Plaintiff, the Suit property originally belonged to one Rajaram. ON 17.9.1986, the Plaintiff viz., Seetharaman purchased the Suit property from the said Rajaram. Since the date of his purchase, the Plaintiff alone is in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the Suit property. Except the Plaintiff, no one has got right, title or possession over the Suit property. The Plaintiff executed a registered Power of Attorney on 26.7.1995 in favour of the Power Agent viz. Narasimhan to administer the Suit property. After the execution of the Power of Attorney Deed, the Defendants illegally and unlawfully trespassed into the Suit property. The Defendants have no right to be in possession and enjoyment of the Suit property. (ii) On 11.6.1997, the Plaintiff issued a lawyer’s Notice calling upon them to deliver possession of the Suit property. On 7.8.1997, the First Defendant sent a reply. The Plaintiff came to know that the First Defendant had purchased the Suit property from the vendor of the Plaintiff viz. Rajaram subsequent to his purchase on 17.9.1986. (ii) On 11.6.1997, the Plaintiff issued a lawyer’s Notice calling upon them to deliver possession of the Suit property. On 7.8.1997, the First Defendant sent a reply. The Plaintiff came to know that the First Defendant had purchased the Suit property from the vendor of the Plaintiff viz. Rajaram subsequent to his purchase on 17.9.1986. According to the Plaintiff, the purchase made by the First Defendant subsequent to the Sale Deed dated 17.9.1986 will not confer any title on him. The Sale Deed in favour of the First Defendant can only be a sham and nominal document executed in collusion with Rajaram. The vendor Rajaram had died. The First Defendant put up illegal construction in the Suit property belonging to the Plaintiff. The First Defendant is in illegal possession of the Suit property since June 1997. The First Defendant is bound to remove the illegal construction and deliver possession of the Suit property to the Plaintiff. The First Defendant has no right to be in possession of the Suit property. The Defendants cannot claim any amount towards cost of the illegal construction put up by them. (iii) The Plaint is the absolute owner of the Suit property. Since the Defendants failed to simply with the demands of the Plaintiff mentioned in the Notice dated 11.6.1997, the Plaintiff has filed the Suit. The First Defendant is not a bona fide purchaser for the value. The First Defendant was aware of the sale of the Suit property by Rajaram in favour of the Plaintiff. Rajaram did not execute any Sale Deed in favour of the First Defendant. Since the Defendants are in illegal and unlawful possession of the Suit property, the Plaintiff also claimed past and future mesne profits. The Power Agent of the Plaintiff viz. Narasimhan issued a lawyer’s Notice on 18.12.1995. In these circumstances, the Plaintiff filed the Suit. 6. The brief case of the First Defendants as follows:- (i) According to the Defendant, the Suit property originally belonged to Rajaram. Prior to his purchase, he perused the Encumbrance Certificate in respect of the uit property and found ‘Nil’ entry in the Encumbrance Certificate. Thereafter, he obtained loan from his employer, Tamil Nadu Water Supply an Sewerage Board, for constructing a house in the Suit property. The Defendant constructed a house in the Suit Property and he is in possession and enjoyment of the same. Thereafter, he obtained loan from his employer, Tamil Nadu Water Supply an Sewerage Board, for constructing a house in the Suit property. The Defendant constructed a house in the Suit Property and he is in possession and enjoyment of the same. Neither the Plaintiff nor his Power Agent were in possession and enjoyment of the Suit property. Since the vendor of the First Defendant, Rajaram, is a proper and necessary party, the Plaintiff should have impleaded him as a party in the Suit. The non-joinder of necessary party is fatal to the case of the Plaintiff. For the Notice issued by the Plaintiff, the First Defendant sent a suitable reply. (ii) The Defendant obtained Encumbrance Certificate for the period from 1.1.1977 to 15.7.1990 and since there was not entry in the Encumbrance Certificate with regard to any encumbrance in respect of the Suit property, he purchased the Suit property from Rajaram. The Suit property bears Plot No. 24, Rajaram requested the First Defendant to purchase Plot Nos. 24 & 25. Rajaram also informed the First Defendant that there was no encumbrance in both the plots. The said G. Rajaram is a former Member of the Legislative Assembly and a Senior Advocate. The Defendant obtained the Encumbrance Certificate from 1.1.1977 to 6.5.1990 for both the Plots. On 7.5.1990, the First Defendant purchased the Plots along with the Suit Property from Rajaram. On 9.7.1990, the First Defendant obtained Planning Permission from the Commissioner of Marakanam Panchayat. Patta was obtained in the name of the First Defendant in respect of both the Plots. The First Defendant also obtained Electricity connection. The Plaintiff did not object the First Defendant for constructing a house in the Suit property and residing in the said house. The Power of Attorney Deed executed in favour of the Power Agent is not true. Even the Power Agent did not object the first Defendant for constructing the house and residing in the house. After the purchase on 7.5.1990, he stated construction in June, 1990 and completed the construction in 1991 and has been residing in the said house since them. The case of the Plaintiff that the First Defendant trespassed into the Suit property on 3.6.1997 cannot be true. The Sale Deed dated 17.9.1986 in favour of the Plaintiff is not true and genuine. It is a sham and nominal document. The case of the Plaintiff that the First Defendant trespassed into the Suit property on 3.6.1997 cannot be true. The Sale Deed dated 17.9.1986 in favour of the Plaintiff is not true and genuine. It is a sham and nominal document. (iii) The Plaintiff did not pay the sale consideration to Rajaram. The document was no acted upon. The Plaintiff has filed the Suit after 12 years from the date of his Sale Deed. The Suit was filed only on 24.7.2000, therefore, the Suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. Patta was not issued in favour of the Plaintiff. The First Defendant is in lawful possession of the Suit property, therefore, he is not liable to pay past and future mesne profits. The Defendants 3 to 5 are the Legal Heirs of the deceased Rajaram. In these circumstances, the First Defendant prayed for dismissal of the Suit. 7. Before the Trial Court, on the side of the Plaintiff, four Witnesses were examined and 13 Documents, Exs.A1 to A13 were marked and on the side of the Defendants, three Witnesses were examined and 21 Documents, Exs.B1 to B21 were marked. 8. The Trial Court, after taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidences of both sides, passed a Decree directing the Plaintiff to initiate appropriate legal proceedings against the First Defendant for claiming damages based on the value of the Suit property on the date of filing of the Suit together with 6% interest. In respect of the other reliefs sought for by the Plaintiff, the Trial Court dismissed the Suit. Aggrieved over the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court, the Plaintiff preferred an Appeal in A.S. No. 58 of 2010 challenging the dismissal of the Suit in respect of the reliefs sought for in the Suit and the First Defendant preferred an Appeal in A.S. No. 1 of 2011 challenging the Decree passed by the Trial Court. The Lower Appellate Court took up both the Appeals together and by a common judgment, modified the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court by confirming the dismissal of the Suit in respect of the prayer for declaration and recovery of possession and set aside the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court in other aspects. Aggrieved over the Judgment and Decrees of the Courts below, the Plaintiff has filed the above Second Appeals. 9. Heard Mrs. Aggrieved over the Judgment and Decrees of the Courts below, the Plaintiff has filed the above Second Appeals. 9. Heard Mrs. Chithra Sampath, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant and Mr. N. Suresh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the First Respondent. 10. The Appellant raised the following substantial questions of law in the Second Appeals:- (i) Whether the Courts below are right in subscribing its own opinion instead of placing reliance on Section 48 of the T.P. Act to hold that in the event of successive transfers of the same property, the later transfer is subject to the prior transfer? (ii) Whether the finding of the Courts below that the Suit filed in the year 2000 seeking declaration and recovery of possession is belated is not contrary to the provisions of Article 65 of the Limitation Act? (iii) Whether the Courts below did not commit a mistake in holding that the First Respondent has purchased the Suit property on 7.5.1990 only after ascertaining about Nil encumbrances in the Suit property by obtaining the Encumbrance Certificate on 16.7.1990? 11. Mrs. Chithra Sampath, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant submitted that the Plaintiff’s title over the Suit property could not get extinguished, unless, the First Defendant had prescribed title by adverse possession. Further, the learned Senior Counsel contended that under Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, in the event of successive transfers of the same property, the latter transfer is subject to the prior transfer; that the Suit is not barred by limitation in view of the provisions of the Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The leaned Senior Counsel also submitted that the First Defendant purchased the property on 7.5.1990 stating that he ascertained about the ‘Nil’ encumbrances in the Suit property by obtaining an Encumbrance Certificate on 16.7.1990 (i.e.) subsequent to the purchase made by him, therefore, the Courts below should not have relied upon the Encumbrance Certificate produced by the First Defendant. 12. In support of her contentions, the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant relied upon the following judgments: (i) Deva (Dead) thr. L.Rs. vs. Sajjan Kumar (Dead) by L.Rs. 12. In support of her contentions, the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant relied upon the following judgments: (i) Deva (Dead) thr. L.Rs. vs. Sajjan Kumar (Dead) by L.Rs. 2004 (3) LW24, wherein the Apex Court held that when a Suit is based on the title of the Plaintiff and not merely based on his prior possession and subsequent dispossession, the limitation for such Suit is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act and the Plaintiff’s title over the encroached land could not get extinguished unless the Defendant had prescribed title by adverse possession. (ii) Saroop Singh vs. Banto & others, 2006 (3) LW 6, in this judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where the Plaintiff had proved his title and thus, it could be for the First Defendant to prove acquisition of title by adverse possession and when the First Defendant did not raise any plea of adverse possession, the Suit is not barred. Further, the Apex Court held that the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the Plaintiff, but commences from the date when the Defendant’s possession becomes adverse under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. (iii) Smt. Gitarani Paul vs. Dibyendra Kundu alias Dibyendra Kumar Kundu, AIR 1991 SC 395 , wherein the Apex Court held that if in the face of the finding of the Courts below that the Appellant/Plaintiff had proved her title, it was not necessary for the High Court to go into the question of ascertaining the date of dispossession. (iv) State of Maharashtra vs. Pravin Jethalal Kundur (Dead) by L.Rs. 2000 (3) SCC 460 , whereas the Apex Court held as follows: “When possession has been taken by the Appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the Suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a Suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the Suit it could be contended that these documents are a nullity. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a Suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the Suit it could be contended that these documents are a nullity. In Ajudh Raj vs. Moti, 1991 (3) SCC 136 , this Court said that if the Order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as a nullity, that is, non-existent in the eye of the law and it is not necessary to set it aside; and such a Suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The contention that the Suit was time barred, has no merit. The Suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.” (v) C. Natarajan vs. Ashim Bai and another, 2007 (14) SCC 183 , wherein the Supreme Court held as follows: “16. The law of limitation relating to the Suit for possession has undergone a drastic change. In terms of Articles 142 & 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it was obligatory on the part of the Plaintiff to aver and plead that he not only has title over the property but also has been in possession of the same for a period of more than 12 years. However, if the Plaintiff has filed the Suit claiming title over the Suit property in terms of Articles 64 & 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, burden would be on the Defendant to prove that he has acquired title by adverse possession.” (vi) Khagendra Lall Dutta and another vs. Jacob Sole Jacob, 1995 (5) SCC 446 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “6. In the absence of any specific plea in the Written Statement qua the Appellant that a subtenancy was created between the Appellant and the Respondent by acquiescence of the Appellant, no amount of evidence can be looked into in that behalf. It is a well-settled principle of law and needs no elaborate consideration, Shri Ganguli fairly conceded that there is no such specific plea. He, however, pointed out that in Para 2 of the Written Statement plea of Limitation, estoppels, etc, had been raised, which would show that the Respondent had pleaded acquiescence in the sub-tenancy as well. It is a well-settled principle of law and needs no elaborate consideration, Shri Ganguli fairly conceded that there is no such specific plea. He, however, pointed out that in Para 2 of the Written Statement plea of Limitation, estoppels, etc, had been raised, which would show that the Respondent had pleaded acquiescence in the sub-tenancy as well. We cannot agree, as the pleas advanced in Para 2 are too general and akin to those pleas which are regularly taken virtually in all Written Statements.” (vii) M. Ramalingam vs. N. Thangavelu, 1997 (2) LW 35 , wherein this Court held that mere silence will amount to representation unless a duty is cast on the Plaintiff to speak about the limits, and if so, the Plaintiff must be made aware of the limits of the property. (viii) R.S. Maddanappa (deceased) after him by his Legal Representatives vs. Chandramma and another, AIR 1965 SC 1812 , wherein the Apex Court held that no man, who knowing fully well that he has no title to the property, spends money on improving it, can be permitted to deprive the original owner of his right to possession of the property except upon the payment for the improvements, which were not effected with the consent of the person. (ix) Bodi Reddy vs. Appu Goundan, 1970 (2) MLJ 577 , in this judgment, this Court held that when the owner of the land filed a Suit for recovery of possession of his land from a trespasser, who had build upon the land, with incidental prayer for mandatory injunction directing the Defendant to demolish the building put by him, the Plaintiff (owner) is entitled to succeed once he has established his title and the fact that he has been in possession of the property within 12 years from the date of the Suit and he is not prevented by the Principle of Equitable Estoppel from asserting his title to the Suit property. Simply because the Plaintiff has prayed for a Mandatory Injunction as incidental to the relief of recovery of possession, there is no discretion vested in the Court to deny delivery of possession to the Plaintiff and instead to award compensation to him. Once the Suit is within time, the Doctrine of Laches or Acquiescence has no place to defeat the right of the Plaintiff to obtain the relief in the Suit. Once the Suit is within time, the Doctrine of Laches or Acquiescence has no place to defeat the right of the Plaintiff to obtain the relief in the Suit. Unless acquiescence amounting to equitable estoppels is established, the Plaintiff cannot be denied the relief of possession. (x) Chhaganlal Keshavlal Mehta vs. Patel Narandas Haribhai, AIR 1982 SC 121 , wherein the Apex Court held that to bring the case within the scope of estoppels as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Act; (1) there must be a representation by a person or his Authorized Agent to another in any form, a declaration, act or omission; (2) the representation must have been of the existence of a fact and not to promises de future or intention which might or might not be enforceable in contract; (3) the representation must have been meant to be relied upon; (4) there must have been belief on the part of the other party in its truth; (5) there must have been action on the faith of that declaration, act or omission, that is to say, the declaration, act or omission, must have actually caused another to act on the faith of it, and to alter his former position to his prejudice or detriment; (6) the misrepresentation or conduct or omission must have been the proximate cause of leading the other party to act to his prejudice; (7) the person claiming the benefit of an estoppels must show that he was not aware of the true state of things. If he was aware of the real state of affairs or had means of knowledge, there can be no estoppels; (8) only the person to whom representation was made or for whom it was designed can avail himself of it. A person is entitled to plead estoppels in his own individual character and not as a representative of his assignee. (xi) K.S. Chindambaram vs. Gomathi Ammal and others, 1996 (2) MLJ 59 , wherein this Court held that acquiescence imports not only full knowledge of facts, which will enable the parties to the factual and actual action, but also willful shutting of his eyes and the positive inaction tantamounting to an implied consent. (xi) K.S. Chindambaram vs. Gomathi Ammal and others, 1996 (2) MLJ 59 , wherein this Court held that acquiescence imports not only full knowledge of facts, which will enable the parties to the factual and actual action, but also willful shutting of his eyes and the positive inaction tantamounting to an implied consent. It would not be that laches alone, even if proved to exist could be raised to the level of acquiescence, inasmuch as the acquiescence imports active assent in contract to laches which can be passive or indifference. Acquiescence is other construed and held to be an instance of law of estoppels by words or conduct. (xii) An unreported judgment of this Court in the matter of Mohan Breweries & Distelleries vs. Palavesakonar and 13 other, 2002 (4) CTC 265, dated 5.7.2002 held as follows: “From the facts, it is further clear that the Respondents, knowing fully well that they have no right, title or possession, had entered into the land under the guise of Sale Deed coupled with the corrected Adangal entry and tried to defeat the interest of the Plaintiffs. Hence, it cannot be stated that the Plaintiffs had acquiesced to the rights of the Defendants.” (xiii) Kamakshi Builders vs. Ambedkar Education Society and others, 2007 (12) SCC 27 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “23. Acquiescence on the part of Respondent 3, as has been noticed by the High Court, did not confer any title on Respondent 1. Conduct may be a relevant fact, so as to apply the procedural law like estoppels, waiver of acquiescence, but thereby no title can be conferred. 24. It is now well settled that time creates title. 25. Acquisition of a title is an inference of law arising out of certain set of facts. If in law, a person does not acquire title, the same cannot be vested only by reason of acquiescence or estoppels on the part of other.” (xiv) Ramesh Kumar and another vs. Furu Ram and another, 2011 (8) SCC 613 , in this judgment the Apex Court held that no amount of evidence contrary to the leading can be relied on or accepted. If there is variance and divergence between pleading and documentary evidence, pleading and oral evidence and between the oral and documentary evidence, the entire case of the part is liable to be rejected. If there is variance and divergence between pleading and documentary evidence, pleading and oral evidence and between the oral and documentary evidence, the entire case of the part is liable to be rejected. Further, the Apex Court held that the different versions clearly demonstrate fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the Respondents. 13. Countering the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. N. Suresh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first Respondent submitted that the Lower Appellate Court has rightly dismissed the Suit and the Judgment and Decree of the Lower Appellate Court needs no interference. The learned Counsel for the First Respondent further submitted that the Suit is barred by limitation and the prayer for recovery of possession cannot be ordered in view of the deliberate acquiescence on the part of the Plaintiff. The leaned Counsel also submitted that under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Suit is liable to be rejected, which was rightly dismissed by the Lower Appellate Court. That apart, the learned Counsel also submitted that the Courts below concurrently found that there was acquiescence on the part of the Plaintiff, therefore, unless there is perversity, the concurrent findings on fact cannot be interfered in these Second Appeals. 14. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel for the First Respondent relied upon the following judgments: (i) Dwarampudi Nagaratnamba vs. Kunuku Ramayya and another, AIR 1963 AP 177 , wherein a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the principle underlying Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act is based on the Doctrine of Equity and therefore, the maxim “he who seeks equity must do equity” would apply. The key note of Section 51 is good faith and the transferee would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 51 unless he proves that he made the improvements on the property in the honest belief that he was absolutely entitled to it. (ii) Khatri Hotels Private Limited and another vs. Union of India and another, 2011 (9) SCC 126 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “30. While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word “first” has been used between the words “sue” and “accrued”. While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word “first” has been used between the words “sue” and “accrued”. This would mean that if a Suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the Suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued. 31. In the light of the above, it is to be seen as to when the right to sue first accrued to the Appellants. They have not controverted the fact that in the Written Statement filed on behalf of DDA in Suit No.2576 of 1990, Lal Chand vs. MCD, it was clearly averred that the Suit land belonged to the Gaon Sabha and with the urbanization of the rural areas of Village Kishangarh vide Notification dated 28.5.1966 issued under Section 507 of the DMC Act, the same automatically vested in the Central Government and that vide Notification dated 20.8.1974 issued under Section 22(1) of the DD Act, the Central Government transferred the Suit land to DDA for development and maintaining as green. This shows that the right, if any, of the Appellants over the Suit land stood violated with the issue of Notification under Section 507 of the DMC Act and, in any case, with the issue of Notification under Section 22(1) of the DD Act. Even if the Appellants were to plead ignorance about the two Notifications, it is impossible to believe that they did not know about the violation of their so-called right over the Suit land despite the receipt of copy of the Written Statement filed on behalf of DDA in December 1990. Therefore, the cause of action will be deemed to have accrued to the Appellants in December 1990 and the Suit filed on 14.2.2000 was clearly barred by time.” (iii) Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla vs. Hargovind Jasraj and another, 2013 (3) SCC 182 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “25. Therefore, the cause of action will be deemed to have accrued to the Appellants in December 1990 and the Suit filed on 14.2.2000 was clearly barred by time.” (iii) Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla vs. Hargovind Jasraj and another, 2013 (3) SCC 182 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “25. The right to sue in the present case first accrued to the lessees on 13.12.1978, when in terms of Order dated 8.8.1977, the lease in favour of the lessee was terminated. A Suit for Declaration that the termination of the lease was invalid hence, ineffective for any reason including the reason that the person on whose orders the same was terminated, had no authority to do so, could have been instituted by the lessee on 14.12.1978. For any such Suit it was not necessary that the lessess was dispossessed from the leased property as dispossession was different from termination of the lease. But even assuming that the right to sue did not fully accrue till the date the lessees was dispossessed of the plot in question, such a dispossession having taken place on 14.12.1978, the lessees ought to have filed the Suit within three years of 15.12.1978 so as to be within the time stipulated under Article 58 extracted above. The Suit in the instant case was, however, instituted in the year 1996, i.e. after nearly eighteen years later and was, therefore, clearly barred by limitation. The Courts below fell in error in holding that the Suit was within time and decreeing the same in whole or in part.” (iv) Thulasi Ammal and others vs. A. Sivakumar and others, 2012 (2) MWN (Civil) 235, wherein this Court held as follows: “15. Suits relating to declarations are enumerated under Part-III of the Act. Part-III contains Articles 56, 57 & 58. Article 58 squarely applied to this Suit. Suits relating to declare the forgery of an instrument issued or registered comes under Article 56. Suits to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, or never, in fact, took place comes under Article 57. Suits to obtain any other declaration comes under Article 58. Therefore, Article 58 has been construed to be residuary article relating to declaratory Suits and now it will govern all Suits for declaration which are not covered by any other article.” (v) Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. Suits to obtain any other declaration comes under Article 58. Therefore, Article 58 has been construed to be residuary article relating to declaratory Suits and now it will govern all Suits for declaration which are not covered by any other article.” (v) Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. And others, 2008 (6) CTC 237 (SC) : 2008 (4) SCC 594 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “21(a) Where a cloud is raised over the Plaintiff’s title and he does not have possession, a Suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the Plaintiff’s title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with the Plaintiff’s lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter.” (vi) Venkataswami Naidu and another vs. Munappa Mudaliar and others, AIR (37) 1950 Mad. 53, wherein this Court held that where a person in bona fide belief that a certain property belongs to him spends money upon it and the true owner stands by and allows him to spend money and make improvements upon his land, the true owner is stopped from asserting his title to the land as against the person making improvements in such bona fide belief. (vii) The Associated Cement Companies Ltd. by the Manager, Sri J.P. Munsiff vs. L.S. Ramakrishna Gowder, 1964 (77) LW 629 , wherein a Division Bench of this Court held that where a person bona fide thinking himself to be the owner of the land, spent money upon it while the true owner was standing and allowed him to spend money for the improvements upon his land, the latter would be stopped from asserting his title to the land as against the person bona fide believing the property to be his and was making improvements. Further the Division bench held that once it is held that the Appellants are personally stopped from recovering possession of the property from the Respondent, it must follow that they would not be entitled to recovery of any damages for the portion of the land occupied by the Respondent. Further the Division bench held that once it is held that the Appellants are personally stopped from recovering possession of the property from the Respondent, it must follow that they would not be entitled to recovery of any damages for the portion of the land occupied by the Respondent. Further, the Division bench held that the estoppels by which the Appellant is precluded from recovering possession of the property from the Respondent is purely a personal one and it will not affect the Government, when they ultimately resume possession of the property on the termination of the lease in favour of the Appellant nor will it enure in favour of the Appellant after the superstructure is removed. (viii) S. Palanivelu vs. K. Veradammal, AIR 1977 Mad. 342 , wherein this Court held as follows: “14. In the present case also, as already stated, the Respondent has not done anything when the Appellant was putting up a portion of his main building on a portion of the trespassed property and sinking a major portion of the well and doing other acts on the trespassed property. The Appellant could not have done these things in a hurry. They must have taken several months for the Appellant to complete the things which he had done on the property. The Respondent had not disclosed these things in the Plaint and has not prayed for a mandatory injunction for the removal of the structures put up by the Appellant on the trespassed portion of the Suit property. The Court would, therefore, be justified in inferring acquiescence on the part of the Respondent I consider that this is not a case for directing delivery of possession of the trespassed portion to the Respondent. But this is a case where the Respondent has to be compensated in money for the value of the trespassed portion.” (ix) Krothapalli Satyanarayana vs. Koganti Ramaiah and others, AIR 1983 SC 452 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “In this case both the Appellate Court and the High Court have concurrently held that the Plaintiff was guilty of acquiescence in that even though the wall was constructed to his knowledge in 1956, he approached the Court in 1965 and even in that year he did not seek the prayer for removal of wall which prayer was for the first time introduced in 1969. In this background, we are not inclined to entertain the submission on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant that Defendants 2 & 3 should be directed to remove the wall WW-1 and clear the passage of encroachment. But at any rate, Defendants 2 & 3 are not entitled to dumping of Tandu adjacent and to the west of the wall in the name of a support to the wall and thereby further reduce the width of the passage. Therefore, having heard learned Counsel on both sides, we are satisfied that original Defendants 2 & 3 should remove Tandu or any dumping of earth just adjacent and to the west of the wall WW-1 and keep the passage of the width between G-1 and W up to W-1 open unencroached and of the same level for passing and repassing including the passing of the cart, animals and vehicles.” (x) M/s. M. Ramnarain Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. The State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. AIR 1983 SC 786 , wherein the Supreme Court held as follows: “The term, is, however, properly used where a person having a right, and seeing another person about to commit it in the course of committing an act infringing upon the right, stands by in such a manner as really to induce the person committing the act, and who might otherwise have abstained from it, to believe that he assents to its being committed, a person so standing by cannot after wards be heard to complain of the act. In that sense the Doctrine of Acquiescence may be defined as quiescence under such circumstances that assent may be reasonably inferred from it, and is no more than an instance of Law of Estoppel by words or conduct, the Principle of Estoppel by representation applying both at law and in equity, although its application to acquiescence is equitable. The estoppels rests upon the circumstance that the person standing by in effect makes a misrepresentation as to a fact, namely, his own title; a mere statement that he intends to do something, for example, to abandon his right, is not enough. Furthermore, equitable estoppels is not applied in favour of a volunteer. The Doctrine of Acquiescence operating as an estoppels was founded on fraud, and for the reason is no less applicable when the person standing by is a minor. Furthermore, equitable estoppels is not applied in favour of a volunteer. The Doctrine of Acquiescence operating as an estoppels was founded on fraud, and for the reason is no less applicable when the person standing by is a minor. As the estoppels is raised immediately by the conduct giving rise to it lapse of time is of no importance, and for the reason the effect of acquiescence is expressly preserved by statute.” (xi) Arulmighu Kothandaramasamy Koil, Thrupuvanum, rep, by its Managing Trustee, Jayaprakash v. Vairam and others, 2012 (1) CTC 708 , wherein this Court held that if the Plaint does not contain proper description of the Suit property as contemplated under Order 7, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil procedure, even if a Decree of Mandatory Injunction is granted in favour of the Plaintiff, the same cannot be executed nor enforced as contemplated under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act. (xii) V. Ranga Durai and others v. S. Jayalakshmi and another, 2007 (4) CTC 227 : 2007 (5) MLJ 1228 , wherein this Court held that in a Suit for Mandatory Injunction, alleging encroachment by the Defendants, the specific extent of encroachment must be distinctly stated in the Plaint, otherwise, if the Suit is decreed, the execution of the Decree itself would become impossible. 15. On a careful consideration of the materials available on record, the submissions made by the learned Counsel on either side and also taking into consideration the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel on either side, it could be seen that there is no dispute that the Plaintiff purchased the Suit property under Ex.A2-Sale Deed dated 17.09.1986 from one Rajaram and the First Defendant purchased the Suit property along with the adjacent Plot No.25 from the same vendor under a registered Sale Deed dated 07.05.1990 which were marked as Exs.A3 & B1. There is also no dispute that after the purchase made by the First Defendant, he put up construction in the land purchased by him. Therefore, it is clear that Rajaram had sold the Suit property to two persons viz., the Plaintiff and the First Defendant under two different Sale Deeds. Since Rajaram had died, his Legal Representative viz., the Defendants 3 to 5 were made as parties in the Suit. Therefore, it is clear that Rajaram had sold the Suit property to two persons viz., the Plaintiff and the First Defendant under two different Sale Deeds. Since Rajaram had died, his Legal Representative viz., the Defendants 3 to 5 were made as parties in the Suit. The Plaintiff also appointed one Narasimman as his Power of Attorney and executed a registered Power of Attorney Deed dated 26.07.1995, which was marked as Ex.A1. The Power of Attorney issued Ex.A7-Notice to the First Defendant dated 18.12.1995 calling upon him to vacate and hand over possession of the Suit property. Under Ex.A11-Notice dated 11.06.1977, the Plaintiff called upon the First Defendant to hand over possession of the Suit property. The Suit was filed on 29.03.2000. The First Defendant contended that he purchased the Suit property along with the Plot No.25 under Ex.B1-Sale Deed dated 07.05.1990, after verifying the Encumbrance Certificate and after having satisfied himself that there were no encumbrances. 16. According to the First Defendant, he is the bona fide purchaser and after the purchase, he applied for a loan from his Office and also obtained Plan Sanction and thereafter, constructed the house and has been in possession and enjoyment of the Suit property since 1991. The Defendant also contended that neither the Plaintiff nor the Power of Attorney had objected the First Defendant from constructing the house and living in the house in the Suit property. 17. The Trial Court, after taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidences of both sides, held that the First Defendant had purchased the Suit property, on a bona fide impression, without knowing the sale made in favour of the Plaintiff and had raised constructions and that the Plaintiff had not objected to the raising of the construction by the Defendant and hence, he is not entitled to recovery of possession of the Suit property. Further, the Trial Court directed the Plaintiff to sue for compensation against the First Defendant and to recover the market value of the Suit property as on the date of Suit with 6% interest. Further, the Trial Court directed the Plaintiff to sue for compensation against the First Defendant and to recover the market value of the Suit property as on the date of Suit with 6% interest. On Appeal, the Lower Appellate Court held that since the First Defendant is bona fide purchaser and had raised the construction on a bona fide belief that the Suit property belonged to him, since the vendor of the Plaintiff, the First Defendant, was the root cause for the dispute between the parties, the Plaintiff is entitled to claim damages from the Legal Heirs of his vendor. The Lower Appellate Court also held that since the Plaintiff had not objected to the raising of the construction by the Defendant, he is not entitled to the relief of recovery of possession. 18. With regard to the plea of limitation raised by the First Defendant, it could be seen that under Ex.A2-Sale Deed dated 17.09.1986 the Plaintiff purchased the property from Rajaram. Under Ex.B1-Sale Deed dated 17.05.1990, the First Defendant purchased the property from the same vendor. In Ex.B3-Encumbrance Certificate dated 16.06.1990, obtained by the First Defendant, there is no entry in the Certificate with regard to Ex.A2-Sale Deed. Thereafter, under Ex.B4, proceedings of the Commissioner of Marakanam Panchayat Union dated 09.07.1990, the First Defendant obtained Planning Permission for the construction of the building. Under Ex.B6, proceedings of the First Defendant’s Employer dated 25.06.1991, Housing Loan was sanctioned to him. Under Ex.B7 dated 19.12.1994, a further loan was also sanctioned to the First Defendant. Under Exs.B8 to B11, Electricity Consumption Charges were paid by the First Defendant from the year 1992. On 18.12.1995, the Plaintiff issued Ex.A7-Legal Notice to the First Defendant. In the said Notice, the Plaintiff has stated that the First Defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the Plot No.24,. Thereafter, after a lapse of two years, the Plaintiff issued a similar Notice under Ex.A11 dated 11.06.1997. Thereafter, the Suit was filed on 29.03.2000. The Plaintiff had filed the Suit after a lapse of five years from the date of issuance of Ex.A7-Notice dated 18.12.1995. Thereafter, after a lapse of two years, the Plaintiff issued a similar Notice under Ex.A11 dated 11.06.1997. Thereafter, the Suit was filed on 29.03.2000. The Plaintiff had filed the Suit after a lapse of five years from the date of issuance of Ex.A7-Notice dated 18.12.1995. The contention of the learned Counsel for the First Respondent that as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act the Plaintiff should have filed the Duit within three years, therefore, the Suit filed by the Plaintiff is liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation, cannot stand for the reason that under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, if a Suit if filed for Declaration of Title and Recovery of Possession and for a further relief of mandatory injunction to remove the superstructure, since the Suit is not merely based on his prior possession or subsequent dispossession, but also on the basis of title, the limitation for such a Suit is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, Further, the Plaintiff’s title over the encroached land could not extinguish, unless, the Defendant had prescribed title by remaining in adverse possession for a continuous period of twelve years. The ratio laid down in the judgment reported in Deva (Dead) thr. L.Rs. vs. Sajjan Kumar (Dead) by L.Rs. 2004 (3) LW 24 and Saroop Singh vs. Banto & Others, 2006 (3) LW 6, squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, applying the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in those judgments. I am of the considered view that only Article 65 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Since the Suit was filed within twelve years, the Suit is in time and the same is not barred by limitation. 19. With regard to the plea of acquiescence, it could be seem that the Defendant had purchased the property under Ex.B1-Sale Deed dated 07.05.1990. He obtained Electricity connection in the year 1992 itself. According to the First Defendant, he has been residing in the house constructed in the Suit property since the year 1991. Thee is nothing on record to show that the Plaintiff objected the First Defendant from putting up any construction in the Suit property. The First Notice, Ex.A7, was issued in the year 1995. According to the First Defendant, he has been residing in the house constructed in the Suit property since the year 1991. Thee is nothing on record to show that the Plaintiff objected the First Defendant from putting up any construction in the Suit property. The First Notice, Ex.A7, was issued in the year 1995. Thereafter, Ex.A11-Notice was issued in the year 1997 and the Suit was filed in the year 2000. The First Defendant purchased the Suit property from Rajaram under the Bona fide impression that his vendor was selling the property only to him. This is also supported by the ‘Nil’ entries found in the Encumbrance Certificate obtained by the First Defendant. Though the vendor of the First Defendant had ulterior motive for selling the Suit property twice to two different persons, the same motive cannot be attributed to the First Defendant. Without knowing that the property was already sold to the Plaintiff in the year 1986, the First Defendant had purchased the property from his vendor. If any entry was found in the Encumbrance Certificate with regard to the purchase made by the Plaintiff, in that case, one can understand that in spite of the entry with regard to the purchase made by the Plaintiff, if the First Defendant had purchased the property, definitely, he cannot be construed as a bona fide purchaser. In the case on hand, he was completely misled and had no knowledge about the purchase made by the Plaintiff earlier. When the First Defendant had started the construction in the year 1990, the Plaintiff should have objected to the construction and should have taken appropriate proceedings to prevent the First Defendant form proceeding with construction, but the Plaintiff slept over for ten years for taking legal proceeding against the First Defendant. The First Defendant on a bona fide belief that the Suit property belongs to him, spent money upon it and the Plaintiff for the reasons best known to him stands by and allowed him to spend money and make improvements on his lands. It is also not the case of the Plaintiff that the First Defendant had constructed the house overnight. The First Defendant must have taken several months for completing the construction. But the Plaintiff did not raise any objection for the construction till the year 1995. It is also not the case of the Plaintiff that the First Defendant had constructed the house overnight. The First Defendant must have taken several months for completing the construction. But the Plaintiff did not raise any objection for the construction till the year 1995. The ratio laid down in the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the First Respondent reported in Venkataswami Naidu and another vs. Munnappa Mudaliar and others, AIR (37) 1950 Mad. 53 and The Associated Cement Companies Ltd. by the Manager, Sri J.P. Munsiff vs. L.S. Ramakrishna Gowder, 1964 (77) LW 629 , squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, I am of the considered view that this is not a case for directing delivery of possession of the Suit property to the Plaintiff. 20. In the case on hand, had the Plaintiff found out in time that the First Defendant was trying to put up construction upon his property and in spite of the same permitted him to complete the construction, it was evidenced that he was acquiescing in the act of the First Defendant and therefore, he is not entitled to delivery of possession. However, the vendor, of the Plaintiff and the First Defendant, being the wrong doer in selling the Suit property to both of them under two different Sale Deeds, is liable to compensate the Plaintiff. Since the vendor of the Plaintiff and the First Defendant had died, his Legal Representatives were made as parties viz. Defendants 3 to 5. Both the Courts below also concurrently found that there was acquiescence on the part of the Plaintiff. 21. The learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that under Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, in the event of successive transfers of the property, the latter transfer is subject to the prior transfer. There is no dispute with regard to the said proposition. But in the case on hand, as already stated, the First Defendant had purchased the Suit property on a bona fide impression, without knowing the previous purchase made by the Plaintiff. He was also allowed to put up construction by the Plaintiff in the Suit property long ago. The Plaintiff also failed to prevent the First Defendant from putting up construction for about ten years. The First Defendant is residing in the Suit property for nearly twenty five years now. He was also allowed to put up construction by the Plaintiff in the Suit property long ago. The Plaintiff also failed to prevent the First Defendant from putting up construction for about ten years. The First Defendant is residing in the Suit property for nearly twenty five years now. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Appellant cannot now contend that under Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act the purchase made by the First Defendant is subject to his purchase. Therefore, the said contention is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, the same is rejected. The Courts below, after taking into consideration all these aspects, concurrently dismissed the Suit. 22. In these circumstances, I find no ground much less any substantial question of law to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. The Second Appeals are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same are dismissed. No costs.