Judgment : V. Ramasubramanian, J. 1. Both these Habeas Corpus Petitions are filed challenging the orders of detention passed under the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. 2. While the first Habeas Corpus Petition is filed by the wife of the detenu by name Murugan @ Periyavan, the second Habeas Corpus Petition is filed by the mother of another detenu, by name Manimaran. Since both the detenues are involved in the same ground case and also since the orders of detention are dated the same and carry almost identical reasons, both the Habeas Corpus Petitions are taken up for disposal together. 3. We have heard Mr.R.Thamariselvan, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr.A.Ramar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 4. Both these petitioners came up earlier with HCP.Nos.1257 and 1264 of 2013, challenging the very same orders of detention. But, a Division Bench of this Court, by an order, dated 10.02.2014, dismissed both the Habeas Corpus Petitions. Now, the petitioners have come up with these petitions purportedly raising a new ground. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners assails the orders of detention on four grounds. They are:- i. that the detaining authority took into account the bail secured by some other persons in an unrelated case and that therefore, the order of detention is vitiated. ii. The copies were served on the detenues, after the expiry of five days, in violation of Section 8 of the Act. iii. The second representation made by the petitioners were not at all considered and iv. The booklet containing the materials run about 127 pages, but all of which are claimed to have been read over and explained to the detenues on a single day, which is humanly impossible. 6. We have carefully considered the above submissions. 7. The orders of detention in both the cases are dated 31.10.2013. The orders of detention were served on the detenues on 01.11.2013. Paragraph No.4 of the grounds of detention discloses that both these detenues were involved in Crime No.496 of 2013 on the file of the Kumbakonam Taluk Police Station. Both of them jointly filed application for bail. The bail application was dismissed on 22.10.2013 by the Judicial Magistrate Court, Kumbakonam in Crl.O.P. (MD).No.16000 of 2013. Similarly, another bail application jointly filed by the detenues in Crl.O.P.(MD).No.4384 of 2013 was also dismissed by the Sessions Court, Tanjore, on 29.10.2013. Both of them jointly filed application for bail. The bail application was dismissed on 22.10.2013 by the Judicial Magistrate Court, Kumbakonam in Crl.O.P. (MD).No.16000 of 2013. Similarly, another bail application jointly filed by the detenues in Crl.O.P.(MD).No.4384 of 2013 was also dismissed by the Sessions Court, Tanjore, on 29.10.2013. Thereafter, both the detenues filed a Crl.O.P.(MD).No.19506 of 2013 on the file of this Court on 30.10.2013, which is pending. But the detaining authority took into account the bail granted in favour of some other accused in Crime No.166 of 2009 on the file of Pateeswaran Police for alleged offences under Section 399 IPC read with Section 26(ii) of the Arms Act. The bail had been granted in favour of those accused by the Principal Sessions Court, Tanjore in Crime No.2624 of 2009 on 10.09.2009 itself. 8. The above facts disclosed in paragraph 4 of the orders of detention show that the detaining authority was influenced by the bail granted to some other accused in some other case, though the offences were the same. As a matter of fact, the offences in the case where bail was granted to some other accused were under Section 399 IPC and Section 26(ii) of the Arms Act. But the offences in respect of the which the first information report was registered against the detenues in this case are under Section 399 IPC read with Section 25(1)(B)(b) of the Arms Act, 1956. 9. More over, the grant of bail to some other accused in Crime No.166 of 2009 by the Principal Sessions Court, Tanjore was wayback on 10.09.2009. Despite this, the detenues in these two cases could not secure bail from the very same Sessions Court, Tanjore, where their bail applications were dismissed, on 29.10.2013. Yet, the detaining authority states that he apprehended that the detenues may be released on bail on the basis of the release of the accused in some other crime number. The apprehension on the part of the detaining authority that the detenues in both these cases will also be released is obviously faulty for two reasons. First is that the very same Sessions Court which granted bail to some other accused in Crime No.166 of 2009 refused to grant bail to the detenues herein in October 2013. The second is that such a ground is impermissible in law as held by the Supreme Court in Rekha Vs. First is that the very same Sessions Court which granted bail to some other accused in Crime No.166 of 2009 refused to grant bail to the detenues herein in October 2013. The second is that such a ground is impermissible in law as held by the Supreme Court in Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244 , wherein, the Supreme Court pointed out in paragraph No.27 that there is a real possibility of release of a person on bail who is already in custody provided he has moved a bail application which is pending. The Supreme Court has held that as a corollary if no bail application is pending, then there is no likelihood of a person in custody being released on bail. Carving out an exception to this rule, the Supreme Court has pointed out in the same paragraph in Rekha's case that where a co-accused whose case stands on the same footing have been granted bail, the detaining authority can reasonably conclude that there is a likelihood of the detenue also being released on bail, even though no bail application is pending. The law so pronounced by the Supreme Court in the case of Rekha was further amplified in its subsequent decision in Huidrom Konungjao Singh Vs. State of Manipur, reported in 2012 (3) MLJ (Crl) 794 (SC). In that case, after extracting the relevant portion of the decision in Rekha, the Supreme Court has held that merely because somebody else in similar cases had been granted bail, there could be no presumption that in the instant case, bail would have been granted to the detenue, had he applied for the same. Paragraph 14 of the decision in Huidrom Konungjao Singh's reads as follows:- “14. In the instant case, admittedly, the said bail orders do not related to the co-accused in the same case. The accused released in those cases on bail had no concern with the present case. Merely because somebody else in similar cases had been granted bail, there could be no presumption that in the instant case had the detenu applied for bail could have been released on bail. Thus, as the detenu in the instant case has not oved the bail application and no other co-accused, if any, had been enlarged on bail, resorting to the provision of Act was not permissible. Thus, as the detenu in the instant case has not oved the bail application and no other co-accused, if any, had been enlarged on bail, resorting to the provision of Act was not permissible. Therefore, the impugned order of detention is based on mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.” 10. The interesting development that Huidrom Konungjao Singh's casemade to the law pronounced in Rekha's case is that in Rekha's case the Supreme Court dealt with a case, where no bail application was filed and pending in Huidrom Konungjao Singh's case. The law went to the next stage to hold that even if there is a bail application, the release of some other persons on bail in an unrelated case cannot influence the mind of the detaining authority. Therefore, we are of the view that the detaining authority was in error in being carried away by the bail granted by the Sessions Court to some other persons in a similar case way back in 2009, when the very same Court had rejected the bail applications of the detenues in the year 2013. In such circumstances, the first ground on which the order of detention is assailed has to be upheld. 11. Though we need not actually go into the other grounds raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, we consider it necessary atleast to deal with one more ground. We do not wish to deal with the third and the fourth grounds of attack. But, the second ground of attack appears to be interesting. Therefore, we would deal with same. The order of detention is dated 31.10.2013. It was served on the detenues, on 01.11.2013. The paper booklet was served, on 06.11.2013. Section 8 of the Act reads as follows:- 8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order:-(1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government.” 12. A perusal of the section would show that the time limit of five days for serving the grounds of detention commences 'from the date of detention' and not 'from the date of order of detention'. If the statute had used the language 'from the date of order of detention' the interpretation to be given would stand on a different footing. If the statute uses the language 'from the date of detention', the detention actually comes into effect only from the time of service of order of detention. Therefore, in this case, the date of detention of the detenues was only on 01.11.2013 and though the order is dated 31.10.2013. The period of five days has to be calculated only from 01.11.2013. If so calculated, the service of the grounds on 06.11.2013 and that too, 8'o clock cannot said to be in violation of Section 8 of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. 13. In fine, we upheld the first ground of attack to the impugned orders of detention. Accordingly, the Habeas Corpus Petitions are liable to allowed. 14. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that no new grounds are raised in these Habeas Corpus Petitions, so as to enable this Court to entertain the second Habeas Corpus Petition. But, we do not agree. The Habeas Corpus Petition deals with the rights of persons kept under preventive detention. The rules of procedure which normally applies to Civil Courts such as res judicatta cannot be applied to these cases. Hence, these Habeas Corpus Petitions are allowed and the detention orders, dated 31.10.2013, passed by the second respondent are quashed. The detenus are directed to be set at liberty, forthwith, unless their detention is required to be continued lawfully in connection with any other case.