JUDGMENT 1. - The learned Single Judge having negated the appellants' challenge to the judgment and order dated 19.07.2011 passed by the learned Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan in Appeal No.65/2010 vide the impugned decision dated 04.04.2013. The instant appeal has thus been presented seeking redress. 2. We have heard Mr. Ashok Sharma, the learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Amit Gupta, the learned counsel for the respondent No.3. 3. For the order proposed to be passed, it is not considered essential to issue formal notice to the respondent Nos.1 and 2. 4. The respondent No.3 had instituted a suit in the Court of learned Rent Control Tribunal, Jaipur under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (for short, hereafter referred to as 'the Act 2001') praying for a decree for eviction of the appellants from the suit premises, as described therein and also for an amount of Rs. 64,000/- as arrears of rent for the period from 01.01.2002 to 31.08.2004, for which they (appellants) were allegedly in default. The plaint, inter alia, disclosed that a suit under Section 6 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short, hereafter referred to as 'the Act 1950'), had meanwhile been instituted by the respondent No.3 and registered as Case No.41/2002 in the Court of Additional District & Sessions Judge No.6, Jaipur City, Jaipur for fixation of standard rent, wherein by order dated 04.07.2003 provisional monthly rent of Rs. 2,000/- had been fixed by that Court under the said enactment. According to the respondent No.3, in spite of such determination of provisional rent, the appellants, without any lawful justification, defaulted in making payment thereof for the period from 01.01.2002 to 31.08.2004, for which apart from seeking their eviction from the suit premises, a decree for recovery of an amount of Rs. 64,000/- had been prayed. That before institution of the suit, an Advocate's notice dated 15.06.2004 claiming the aforementioned outstanding amount, had been given and that the appellants did neither make any payment nor offer any response thereto, was also mentioned. 5. The appellants in their written statement referred to the pendency of three proceedings between the parties involving the same suit premises including the one instituted by the respondent No.3 for fixation of standard rent. 5. The appellants in their written statement referred to the pendency of three proceedings between the parties involving the same suit premises including the one instituted by the respondent No.3 for fixation of standard rent. They insisted that the pending proceedings included a suit for their eviction from the suit premises on the ground of default as well. According to them, the suit on the ground of default in making the payment of the provisional rent fixed by the order dated 04.07.2003 under the Act 2001, was not maintainable in law. This was more so, they contended, as while assailing the fixation of provisional rent, they had meanwhile preferred an appeal before this Court, which was pending. They pleaded as well that since there was a dispute with regard to the rent payable in terms of Section 4 of the Act 2001, they could, by no means, be construed to be defaulters and thus, were not liable to be evicted under Section 9 thereof. 6. The learned Rent Control Tribunal, Jaipur by its judgment and order dated 26.02.2010, rendered in the above referred suit i.e. Suit No.1342/2004 instituted by the respondent No.3 for eviction of the appellants and recovery of arrears of rent of Rs. 64,000/-, adjudged the same (suit) to be not maintainable in law. In concluding thus, the learned Tribunal noticed, inter alia, that in Case No.41/2002, the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.6, Jaipur City, Jaipur, subsequent to its order dated 04.07.2003, had, on 09.05.2007 finally determined the standard rent to be Rs. 5,000/- per month. Referring to Section 32 of the Act 2001, the learned Tribunal returned a finding that the respondent No.3's suit for eviction under Section 9 thereof on the ground of default in making the payment of provisional rent of Rs. 2,000/-, was not maintainable. 7. Being aggrieved, the respondent No.3 preferred Appeal No.65/2010 in the Court of the learned Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan and the learned Appellate Tribunal, after hearing the parties, by its determination dated 19.07.2011, interfered with the adjudication of the learned Rent Control Tribunal, Jaipur. It set aside the judgment and order dated 26.02.2010 and remanded the matter to the learned Tribunal for fresh disposal on merits. It set aside the judgment and order dated 26.02.2010 and remanded the matter to the learned Tribunal for fresh disposal on merits. The learned Appellate Tribunal, in essence, held that in the face of Section 32(2) of the Act 2001, the respondent No.3's suit for eviction under Section 9 of the Act 2001 on the ground of default of the appellants in making the payment of the provisional rent fixed under Section 7 of the Act 1950, was maintainable. 8. Being dissatisfied with this adjudication, the appellants instituted the above referred S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.10389/2011 under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking defeasance thereof. The learned Single Judge, however, vide judgment and order dated 04.04.2013, declined to intervene. 9. Mr. Sharma has persuasively argued that in the teeth of Section 32 (2)(b) of the Act 2001, the appellants' right under Section 13 of the Act 1950 being secured and protected, the respondent No.3's suit under the Act 2001, seeking to divest them thereof, is not maintainable in law and thus, the learned Rent Appellate Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge having grossly erred in law and on facts, the impugned judgments and orders are liable to be interfered with. Contending that Section 32 of the Act 2001, in form and substance, being akin to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it was incumbent on the respondent No.3 seeking eviction of the appellants from the suit premises on the ground of default in making the payment of rent to institute a suit under the Act 1950 providing protection from such eviction on payment of rent as mandated by Section 13. As no provision pari materia with Section 13 of the Act 1950 is available in Act 2001, the suit under the latter legislation had the potential of denying the appellants of their protection from eviction on payment of rent as guaranteed by Section 13 of the Act 1950, he urged. 10. Mr. Sharma, to buttress his arguments, placed reliance on the decisions, amongst others, of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P. v. M/s. Shah Sadiq and Sons, AIR 1987 SC 1212 and Gammon India Ltd. v. Special Chief Secretary And Others, (2006) 3 SCC 354 . 11. As against this, Mr. 10. Mr. Sharma, to buttress his arguments, placed reliance on the decisions, amongst others, of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P. v. M/s. Shah Sadiq and Sons, AIR 1987 SC 1212 and Gammon India Ltd. v. Special Chief Secretary And Others, (2006) 3 SCC 354 . 11. As against this, Mr. Gupta has argued that as the impugned judgment and order rendered by the learned Single Judge had been in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the instant appeal is patently unsustainable in law and ought to be dismissed in limine. He has asserted that a landlord's right to evict a tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent having been guaranteed by Section 32(2) of the Act 2001, the suit under the said enactment is clearly maintainable and the plea, to the contrary, is wholly misconceived. According to Mr.Gupta, a tenant liable to be evicted under the Act 1950 could legally be sued therefor under the Act 2001 and thus, neither the learned Appellate Tribunal nor the learned Single Judge did commit any error in entering a finding to the effect. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Ashok K. Jha And Others v. Garden Silk Mills Limited And Another, (2009) 10 SCC 584 . 12. We have analyzed the pleaded facts and the documents to the extent necessary at this stage. We have applied ourselves to the rival arguments as well. 13. Noticeably, by judgment and order dated 19.07.2011, the learned Rent Appellate Tribunal had, while interfering with the decision rendered by the learned Tribunal, remitted the proceedings to it (learned Tribunal) for adjudication on merits. As a logical corollary, the rival contentions on merits, await scrutiny of the learned Tribunal. For obvious reasons, therefore, the present exercise would be confined only to the aspect of maintainability of the suit instituted under the Act 2001. 14. Section 6 of the Act 1950 provides for fixation of standard rent in the eventualities, as contemplated therein. As a logical corollary, the rival contentions on merits, await scrutiny of the learned Tribunal. For obvious reasons, therefore, the present exercise would be confined only to the aspect of maintainability of the suit instituted under the Act 2001. 14. Section 6 of the Act 1950 provides for fixation of standard rent in the eventualities, as contemplated therein. Section 7 predicates that in case of institution of a suit under Section 6 for fixation of standard rent, the Court concerned would forthwith make an order fixing in a summary manner a provisional rent for the premises in question, which would be binding on all parties concerned and would remain in force till a decree of determination of standard rent is finally made. In terms of Section 7(3), a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent to which the provisional rent, so fixed, is applicable would be stayed by the Court upon payment by the tenant in Court of the total amount due to the landlord on the basis of such provisional rent. As per Section 7(4), any failure to pay the provisional rent for any month by the fifteenth day of the next following month would render the tenant liable to eviction under clause(a) of sub-section 13 and all sums due from the tenant as such would be recoverable as if the order fixing the provisional rent was a decree of the Court in a suit for periodical payments. 15. Section 13 of the Act 1950, which stipulates eviction of tenants, in clause (1)(a), as a ground therefor envisages failure of the tenant to pay or tender the amount of rent due from him for a period of six months. Section 13(3) makes it incumbent on the Court concerned to provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in Court or paid to the landlord by the tenant in a suit for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent. Section 13(4) makes is obligatory for the tenant in such an eventuality to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord the amount, so determined, within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the Court. Section 13(4) makes is obligatory for the tenant in such an eventuality to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord the amount, so determined, within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the Court. The tenant is also obligated to continue to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord month by month, the monthly rent, subsequent to the period up to which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the Court at the monthly rate at which the rent was provisionally determined by the Court. Whereas Section 13(5) ordains that on failure of a tenant to deposit or pay amount, as above, on the date or within the time specified therein, the Court would order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the suit, Section 13(6) mandates that if a tenant makes such deposit or payment, as required, no decree for eviction on the ground of default, as contemplated in Section 13(1)(a), would be passed by the Court. 16. Section 9 of the Act 2001, though similarly postulates default in payment of rent by a tenant for a period of four months to be a ground for his eviction thereunder, it does not contain provisions similar to Section 13(3) to 13(6) of the Act 1950. Section 9 of the Act 2001 however makes it incumbent for a landlord to give a notice to the tenant by registered post, acknowledgement due, demanding arrears of rent and also disclosure of his bank account number and name to the tenant. Section 32 of the Act 2001 occupying the centre stage of the debate, is extracted herein below:- "32. Repeal and savings.- (1) The Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,1950 (Act No. 17 of 1950) shall stand repealed with effect from the date notified under sub-section (3) of section 11 of this Act. (2) The repeal under sub-section (1) shall not affect,- (a) anything duly done or suffered under the enactment so repealed; or (b) any right, title, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or incurred under the enactment so repealed; or (c) any fine, penalty or punishment incurred or suffered under the provisions of the enactment so repealed. (2) The repeal under sub-section (1) shall not affect,- (a) anything duly done or suffered under the enactment so repealed; or (b) any right, title, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or incurred under the enactment so repealed; or (c) any fine, penalty or punishment incurred or suffered under the provisions of the enactment so repealed. (3) Notwithstanding the repeal under sub-section (1)- (a) all applications, suits or other proceedings under the repealed Act pending on the date of commencement of this Act before any court shall be continued and disposed of, in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Act, as if the repealed Act had continued in force and this Act had not been enacted. However, the plaintiff within a period of one hundred and eighty days of coming into force of this Act shall be entitled to withdraw any suit or appeal or any other proceeding pending under the repealed Act with liberty to file fresh petition in respect of the subject matter of such suit or appeal or any other proceeding under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and for the purpose limitation such petition shall, if it is filed within a period of two hundred and seventy days from the commencement of this Act, be deemed to have been filed on the date of filing of the suit which was so withdrawn and in case of withdrawal of appeal or other proceeding, on the date on which the suit, out of which such appeal or proceeding originated, was filed; (b) the provision for appeal under the repealed Act shall continue in force in respect of applications, suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder; (c) all suits and proceedings instituted under the provisions of the repealed Act shall be effective and disposed of in accordance with such repealed law; (d) any rule or notification made or issued under the repealed Act and in force on the date of commencement of this Act shall continue to govern the pending cases." 17. As would be evident from the above extract, this statutory provision is one of repeal and savings, whereby the Act 1950 has been repealed with effect from the date notified under sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act 2001. Significantly, the Act 2001 was brought into force with effect from 01.04.2003. As would be evident from the above extract, this statutory provision is one of repeal and savings, whereby the Act 1950 has been repealed with effect from the date notified under sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act 2001. Significantly, the Act 2001 was brought into force with effect from 01.04.2003. Section 32(2) provides that the repeal of Act 1950, amongst others, would not affect any right, title, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or incurred under the Act 1950. Section 32(3) provides that notwithstanding such repeal, all applications, suits or other proceedings under the Act 1950 pending on the date of commencement of the Act 2001 before any Court would be continued and disposed of, in accordance with the provisions of the repealed enactment, as if the same had continued in force and that the Act 2001 had not been enacted. Thereby, the plaintiff, however, within a period of 180 days of coming into force of the Act 2001, was entitled to withdraw a suit or appeal or any other proceeding pending under the Act 1950 and file fresh petition in respect of the subject matter of such suit or appeal or any other proceeding under and in accordance with the provisions of the Act 2001. 18. It is worthwhile to extract, at this juncture, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 in the following terms:- "6. 18. It is worthwhile to extract, at this juncture, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 in the following terms:- "6. Effect of repeal.- Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." 19. Avoiding the details, suffice it to mention that clause (c) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, is substantially in pari materia with Section 32(2)(b) of the Act 2001. 20. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Gammon India Ltd.(supra), while dilating on the scope and purport of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, essentially enunciated that whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down thereby would follow unless a different intention appears. Their Lordships' held that when repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject, the provisions of the new enactment would have to be looked into, but only for the purposes of determining whether they indicate a different intention. It was held that unless a different intention appears in the repealing Act, any legal proceeding can be instituted and continued in respect of any matter pending thereunder, as if the same was in force at the time of repeal. If the repeal is followed by a fresh legislation, it was reiterated that scrutiny to follow, ought to be to ascertain as to whether latter enactment manifests an intention to destroy the old rights and liability. If the repeal is followed by a fresh legislation, it was reiterated that scrutiny to follow, ought to be to ascertain as to whether latter enactment manifests an intention to destroy the old rights and liability. That Section 6 would be applicable in such cases unless the new legislation manifests intention inconsistent with or contrary to the application of the Section was underlined. It was observed as well that the object of repeal and re-enactment is to obliterate the repealed Act and to get rid of such obsolete matters. 21. That rights not expressly saved by the 'savings' provision would not necessarily get extinguished or stand ipso facto terminated by the mere fact that a new statute repealing the old statute is enacted, was propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P.(supra). 22. The enunciation's, as above, do not admit of any doubt. By way of analogy thereof, in terms of Section 32(2)(b), the repeal of Act 1950 would not affect any right, title, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or incurred thereunder. This statutorily conferred benefit when viewed in the backdrop of scheme of the Act 1950, would however be axiomatically available to both the landlord and the tenant. No contrary inference in the face of Section 32(2)(b) of Act 2001 and the scheme thereof according to us is deductible. 23. In that view of the matter, having regard to the pleaded facts and the cognate provisions of the two enactments, we are left unpersuaded to sustain the plea against maintainability of the respondent No.3's suit for eviction of the appellants and recovery of the arrears of rent of Rs. 64,000/-, instituted under the Act 2001. Assailant of the judgment and order dated 19.07.2011 of the learned Rent Appellate Tribunal, on this count, thus, cannot be sustained. The impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge in the face of the above determination, also does not merit interference. 24. The present appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. 25. We make it clear that the present adjudication, to reiterate, has been confined only to the impugnment pertaining to the maintainability of the respondent No.3's suit under the Act 2001 and would have no bearing on the rival contentions of the parties on merit, to be assayed by the learned Tribunal, both in legal and factual perspectives. 25. We make it clear that the present adjudication, to reiterate, has been confined only to the impugnment pertaining to the maintainability of the respondent No.3's suit under the Act 2001 and would have no bearing on the rival contentions of the parties on merit, to be assayed by the learned Tribunal, both in legal and factual perspectives. As ordered by the learned Rent Appellate Tribunal, the learned Tribunal would decide the suit on merits, in accordance with law.Appeal Dismissed. *******