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2014 DIGILAW 1306 (PNJ)

Puran Singh v. Surjit Singh

2014-09-17

MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR

body2014
JUDGMENT Mr. Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.(Oral) - The matrix of the facts & material, which needs a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the sole controversy, involved in the instant revision petition and emanating from the record is that, initially, in the wake of statement of complainant-Surjit Singh son of Mohinder Singh, respondent No.1(for brevity “the complainant”), a criminal case was registered against Binder Singh and others, accused (therein), vide FIR No.62 dated 18.05.2013, on accusation of having committed the offences punishable under Sections 302, 364, 324, 323, 342, 148 and 149 IPC, by the police of Police Station Sadar, Jalalabad, District Fazilka. Consequently, the investigation of that case was handed over to the petitioner. 2. Subsequently, the complainant claimed that petitioner-ASI Puran Singh(I.O.) did not conduct the fair investigation, acted in a biased manner and on the contrary, he started harassing the complainant-party, in order to illegally help and save the accused, after taking hefty amount of bribe from them. Even, he(petitioner) has threatened them (complainant-party), to implicate in some other false cases. 3. Levelling a variety of allegations and narrating the sequence of events, in detail in the complaint, in all, according to the complainant that, the petitioner being a public servant, prepared false record to be produced in the judicial proceedings, intentionally disobeyed the direction of law with intent to cause injury to the complainant and to save the accused from punishment in the pointed murder case, after accepting a huge amount of illegal gratification from the accused-party. In the background of these allegations, the complainant filed the complaint against the petitioner and his other co-accused, in the manner depicted here-in-above. 4. Having completed all the codal formalities, the trial Judge framed the charges against the accused, for the commission of offences punishable under Section 13 of The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereafter to be referred as “the P.C.Act”) and Sections 218, 219, 221 and 166 IPC, by virtue of impugned order dated 10.06.2014. 5. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has preferred the present revision petition, to challenge the impugned order, invoking the provisions of Section 401 Cr.P.C. That is how, I am seized of the matter. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, going through the record with his valuable help and considering the entire matter deeply, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant revision petition in this context. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, going through the record with his valuable help and considering the entire matter deeply, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant revision petition in this context. 7. Ex facie, the solitary celebrated argument of the learned counsel that, since the petitioner was working as an ASI in the Punjab Police(public servant), so, he could not be prosecuted without any proper sanction under Sections 19 of the P.C.Act and 197 Cr.P.C, is neither tenable nor the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases S.K. Zutshi and another Versus Bimal Debnath and another, 2004(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 813, Ashok Mehta and another Versus Ram Ashray Singh and others, 2006(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 330 and of this Court in cases Janardhan Dass Versus Prem Chand, 1994(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 55 and Dr. Jaswant Singh Versus State of Punjab and another, [2006(4) Law Herald (P&H) 3147] : 2006(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 525, are at all applicable to the facts of the present case, wherein, it was observed that where an act or omission was committed by a public servant, prima facie, in discharge of official duty, the Court cannot entertain or take cognizance of any offence, without obtaining requisite sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. from the competent authority. Possibly, no one can dispute with regard to the aforesaid observations, but to me, the same would not come to the rescue of the petitioner in the instant controversy, for the reasons mentioned here-in-below. 8. As is evident from the record that, very serious and direct allegations are assigned that the petitioner, being the investigating officer (public servant), has prepared false record to be produced in the judicial proceedings, intentionally disobeyed the direction of law with intent to cause injury to the complainant and to save the accused from punishment in the indicated murder case, after accepting a huge amount of bribe from the accused-party. It cannot possibly be disputed here is that the commission of such offences and taking illegal gratification cannot and indeed should not be termed to be a part of discharge of any official duty of a public servant. 9. It cannot possibly be disputed here is that the commission of such offences and taking illegal gratification cannot and indeed should not be termed to be a part of discharge of any official duty of a public servant. 9. Exhibiting the deep concern with regard to the corruption in public life, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case Billa Nagul Sharief v. State of A.P. [2010(4) Law Herald (SC) 2628] : 2010(11) SCC 575 , has noticed the feeling of a common man that “when the work is enshrined to different persons bribe is demanded by one of them, when all are invariably in collusion, cannot be lost sight of. If Senior Officers ensure that the works of the citizens are done without payment of bribe, Junior Officers and employee may abandon the demand and this country would not have prominently figured as one of the most corrupt nations of the World, as it is widely accepted that the corruption flows from the top.” The enactments of the P.C.Act and The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 are the appropriate steps in the right direction to eradicate the corrupt practice by certain categories of public servants and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. India is passing through a very crucial phase of corruption. Perhaps, time has now come to take effective steps to control it, but, the Vigilance Department of State of Punjab, prima facie, does not appear to be very serious in this relevant connection. 10. Above being the legal position and material on record, now the core controversy, that invites an immediate deep attention of this Court and arises for determination in this case is, as to whether any sanction under Section 19 of the P.C.Act or under Section 197 Cr.P.C., is legally required before taking cognizance in the case of such public servant(ASI) under the present set of circumstances or not? 11. Having regard to the legal position, material on record and the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, to me, the answer must obviously be in the negative in this regard. 12. At the very outset, it will not be out of place to mention here that the Hon’ble Apex Court in a line of judgments has held that the very object of sanction is to protect the honest & eligible public servant from malicious and vexatious prosecution. 12. At the very outset, it will not be out of place to mention here that the Hon’ble Apex Court in a line of judgments has held that the very object of sanction is to protect the honest & eligible public servant from malicious and vexatious prosecution. The intention is not to put a wall around public servants, who are dishonest and act mala fidely. At the same time, the policy is not to set an official above the common law and if he commits a common offence, then, he cannot avail peculiar privilege of the pointed sanction. 13. Sequelly, Section 19 of the P.C.Act postulates that “no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction; (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government and residuary clause(c), in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. 14. Therefore, a combined and meaningful reading of these provisions would reveal that(in the instant case), the sanction is only required in a case of a person, who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and (+) is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government and not otherwise. The words “ is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government”, occurring in Section 19, are very important, carry a significant intent & meaning and are most essential ingredients to invoke the protection, as envisaged under Section 19 of the P.C.Act(emphasis supplied). The entire provision has to be conjunctively (not disjunctively) construed as such and cannot be read in isolation. The intention of the legislature is very clear and intended not to protect all the categories of Govt. The entire provision has to be conjunctively (not disjunctively) construed as such and cannot be read in isolation. The intention of the legislature is very clear and intended not to protect all the categories of Govt. employees, but only to protect those public servants, who are removable from their office by the State Government and not otherwise. To my mind, in this manner, Section 19 (1)(a) deals with the employees of Central Government, clause (b) regulates the public servants, who are removable by the State Government, whereas clause (c) is residuary and is only applicable to other persons (public servants), employed with the affairs of variety of other Govt. financial institutions, banks, statutory corporations & boards etc. (not the public servants of Central or State Governments), as the case may be. 15. What cannot possibly be disputed here is that, the petitioner was working as an ASI in Punjab Police, at the time of occurrence. It is not a matter of dispute that as per relevant notification, the punishing authority of ASI is the Superintendent of Police and not the State Government. Therefore, no indicated sanction under Section 19 of the P.C.Act is required to prosecute the petitioner. This matter is no more res integra and is now well settled. 16. An identical question came to be decided by this Court in case Amarjit Singh(Patwari) Versus State of Punjab, [2012(2) Law Herald (P&H) 1789] : 2012(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 79. Having interpreted the relevant provision of Section 19 of the P.C. Act, it was ruled as under:- “Sequelly, to my mind, the strict and natural interpretation would reveal that Section 19(1)(a) of the P.C.Act regulates the public servants, who are removable by the Central Government and clause (b) deals with the public servants, who are removable by the State Government, whereas clause (c) is only applicable to other persons (public servants), employed with the affairs of variety of other financial institutions, banks, corporations & boards etc. (not the public servants of Central or State Governments). That means, the pointed particular category of employees of Central Government can claim protection under clause (a), whereas the eligible employees of the State Government can avail the benefit of sanction in clause (b) and the employees of other financial institutions, banks, corporations & boards etc. are covered under clause (c) of Section 19(1) of the P.C.Act. That means, the pointed particular category of employees of Central Government can claim protection under clause (a), whereas the eligible employees of the State Government can avail the benefit of sanction in clause (b) and the employees of other financial institutions, banks, corporations & boards etc. are covered under clause (c) of Section 19(1) of the P.C.Act. Faced with this grave situation, the submission of learned counsel that the case of the petitioner falls within the domain of clause (c) of Section 19 (1) of the P.C.Act, sans merit as well. Had the intention of the legislature was to extend the protection of sanction under this section to all categories of public servants employed in relation to the affairs of the Central or State Governments’ department, as the case may be, in that eventuality, it would and ought to have so mentioned that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act, except the prior sanction in case of and all public servants are entitled to the protection of sanction and only this one line would have (suffice) served the purpose. Hence, there was no occasion for the Legislature to create different categories of such employees in clauses (a) & (b), who are removable by the Government. Likewise, there was no necessity to create 3rd category of other employees (not the employees of Central or State Governments) as mentioned in clause (c) as well. This demonstrates the clear intent of the Legislature to grant protection of sanction to a particular category of employees removable by the respective Governments in this behalf. If the argument of learned counsel that the case of petitioner falls within the ambit of clause (c) is accepted as such, then, to me, it will amount to nullifying and re-writing the relevant provisions of the P.C.Act by this Court, which is not legally permissible.” 17. Therefore, it is held and reiterated that the indicated sanction under Section 19 of the P.C.Act is only required in case of a person, who is employed in connection with the affairs of the State Government(+) is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government and not otherwise. Therefore, it is held and reiterated that the indicated sanction under Section 19 of the P.C.Act is only required in case of a person, who is employed in connection with the affairs of the State Government(+) is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government and not otherwise. The ratio of law laid down in Amarjit Singh’s case (supra), “mutatis-mutandis” is applicable to the facts of the present case as well and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. Hence, the contrary arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner “stricto sensu” deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances. 18. There is yet another aspect of the matter, which can be viewed entirely from a different angle. As indicated here-in-above, the Special Judge has acknowledged that, prima facie, there is sufficient material/evidence on record and framed the charges against the petitioner by way of impugned order. Section 19(3)(a) of the P.C.Act further enumerates that “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure; (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section(1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. That means, even otherwise, the impugned order cannot legally be assailed on the ground of absence and omission of the sanction, as contemplated under clause (3)(a) of Section 19 of the P.C.Act. In the instant case, it remained an unfolded & undisclosed mystery and it has not remotely been projected by learned counsel that how, when, where and in what manner, the absence of sanction has occasioned or resulted in the failure, or miscarriage of justice and prejudiced the case of petitioner, in any manner. Thus, seen from any angle, to my mind, no ground, much less cogent, to set aside the impugned order is made out, in view of the ratio of law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in case Surat Ram Sharma v. State of Punjab and another, 2010(4) RCR (Criminal) 500. 19. Thus, seen from any angle, to my mind, no ground, much less cogent, to set aside the impugned order is made out, in view of the ratio of law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in case Surat Ram Sharma v. State of Punjab and another, 2010(4) RCR (Criminal) 500. 19. Meaning thereby, the trial Court has examined the matter in the right perspective and correctly negated the plea of sanction raised by the petitioner, by virtue of impugned order. Such order, containing valid reasons, cannot legally be set aside, in exercise of limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court, as contemplated under Section 401 Cr.P.C. and Section 19(3) of the P.C.Act, unless & until, the same is perverse and without jurisdiction. Since, no such patent illegality or legal infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, so, the impugned order deserves to be and is hereby maintained in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 20. No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the counsel for the petitioner. 21. In the light of aforesaid reasons, taking into consideration the totality of facts & circumstances, oozing out from the record, as discussed here-in-above and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial, as there is no merit, therefore, the instant revision petition is hereby dismissed as such. Needless to mention that nothing observed, here-in-above, would reflect, in any manner, on merits of the main case, as the same has been so recorded for a limited purpose of deciding the present revision petition. ---------0.B.S.0------------ —————————