JUDGMENT : B. Chandra Kumar, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the decree and judgment dated 23.2.2004 passed in AS No. 39 of 2002 by the IE Additional District Judge, (FTC-II), Khammam, whereby and whereunder the appellate Judge has confirmed the judgment and decree dated 23.9.1998 passed in OS No. 60 of 1996 by the Senior Civil Judge, Kothagudem. The appeal is admitted on the following question of law. Whether the plaintiff can maintain a suit seeking for injunction against the real owner asserting the possession and seeking protection from the Court. 2. The learned Senior Counsel Sri B.V. Subbaiah on behalf of Sri G.S. Sanghi, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy on behalf of Sri V. Ramakrishna Reddy, learned Counsel for the respondents elaborate arguments and cited several decisions. 3. Before dealing with the substantial question of law raised in this appeal, it is necessary to refer to the basic facts. 4. The plaintiff filed the suit with following averments: The plaintiff is a firm in the name and style of M/s. Durga Kala Mandir, Kothagudem represented by its managing partner K. Krishna Murthy. The plaintiff is the owner and possessor of the suit schedule property. It has been carrying out the exhibition of films in the theatre under the name and style of Durga Kala Mandir. It has been in possession of the suit schedule property since 1976. The said property is covered by a compound wall and two gates are fixed to the said property. The plaintiff got erected three bore wells for the supply of the water and fixed a motor for drawing the water in the vacant site situated in the northern part of the said theatre. The plaintiff also constructed a cycle stand, septic tank and erected the water supply pipelines besides the water supply pipeline sanctioned by the Notified Area, Kothagudem. The entire place situated to the north of the theatre is under the enjoyment and possession of the plaintiff since 1976 and the plaintiff has been enjoying it openly to the knowledge of one and all and nobody has objected the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has been paying property tax to the Municipality since 1976. The entire place situated to the north of the theatre is under the enjoyment and possession of the plaintiff since 1976 and the plaintiff has been enjoying it openly to the knowledge of one and all and nobody has objected the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has been paying property tax to the Municipality since 1976. Originally one of the partners of the plaintiff, Chippa Muthilingam purchased the site of the theatre through a registered sale deed from its original owner Smt. Chitti Butchi Narsamma and had kept some place vacant to the north of the property purchased by the plaintiff and the plaintiff has been using the said vacant place as part and parcel of its property since 1976 by erecting pipelines, drain lines, water bore wells, cycle stand and power supply etc. Though the said fact was known to Muthilingam, he never raised any objection and as such the plaintiff acquired title to said property by being in possession and enjoyment of the said property for more than twenty years. The plaintiff's further case is that the defendant made the plaintiff to believe that he purchased a site at M.G. Road, Kothagudem and made the partners of the plaintiff firm to enter into a partnership firm in the name and style of Durga Enterprises for construction of theatre. Under the guise of it, the defendant intended to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit schedule property. The further case of the plaintiff is that the defendant is no way concerned to the suit schedule property, but he tried to dismantle the compound wall on 9.6.1996 with his hired unsocial elements and the partners of the plaintiff obstructed the action of the defendant. The defendant is economically sound and having political influence and may cause damage to the property of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff filed the suit for perpetual injunction. 5. The suit schedule property has been described as follows: "M/s. Sri Durga Kalamandir, Cinema Theatre bearing H. No. 6-13-82 (Old Numbers 69/6-13-68; 6-2-387) along with its other properties viz., Canteen, Pan Shop, Cool Drink Shop, 3 Bore Wells, Cycle Stand, Septic Tank, Power Supply Line, Water and Drainage Pipe Lines situated in a total area of 5519 square yards surrounded by a compound wall bounded by: East-M.G. Road, West-Residential Houses of Md. Khan and others, North-Residential Houses of Poshamallu and Md. Khan and others, North-Residential Houses of Poshamallu and Md. Siddiq and South-Balaji Restaurant and Lodge." 6. After filing of the suit the original defendant died on 12.7.1998 and defendant Nos. 2 to 6 have been brought on record as LRs. of the original defendant (1st respondent). 7. The original defendant filed written statement and made following averments. Sri K. Krishna Murthy who signed and verified the plaint did not produce the extract of Firm Registry to show that he is a partner of M/s. Durga Kalamandir, Kothagudem. He has no power to bring the suit of the alleged Firm. The plaintiff is not the owner of entire 5519 square yards of site and the defendant is the owner of 1994 square yards towards north of the plaint schedule property and the northern boundary shown by the plaintiff is not correct. The defendant admitted that the plaintiff constructed Durga Kala Mandir within its premises, however his specific case that premises does not extended up to the residential house of Poshamallu and Md. Siddiq on its northern side. The specific case of the defendant is that the plaint schedule property covers the vacant site of M/s. Durga Complex to an extent of 1994 square yards on northern side. The defendant is the Managing Partner of M/s. Durga Complex, Kothagudem. The northern boundary in the plaint schedule is not correct. The plaintiff did not include the site covered by Balaji Restaurant and Lodge, which is the part of the property purchased by it. The plaintiff is not in possession of 1994 square yards on northern side. It is the property of the defendant. It is false to say that Buchamma left vacant space to the northern side of the site purchased by the plaintiff. Question of paying property tax to the property of Durga Complex does not arise. It is specifically denied that the plaintiff has been in possession of disputed site since more than 20 years and the entire property became it's absolute property. It is specifically averred that the plaintiff purposefully omitted to state total extent area purchased by it and also the extent of the area if any left by Buchamma on northern side. It is also denied that the defendant under the guise of entering into a partnership firm in the name and style of M/s. Durga Enterprises tried to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff. It is also denied that the defendant under the guise of entering into a partnership firm in the name and style of M/s. Durga Enterprises tried to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff. The specific case of the defendant is that the property originally belongs to Chitti Butchi Narsamma. Chippa Muthilingam purchased 6840.27 square yards from Chitti Butchi Narsamma on 18.1.1961 with specific boundaries: "North-House of their backyards of Abdul Hameed and Mallarapu Venkaiah, East-PWD Road, South-Galli and West-Houses of Julugu Narsaiah and Meka Poshaiah." Chippa Muthilingam sold an extent of 1994 square yards to Komapalli Subbarao vide Document No. 121/1964 with specific boundaries: "North-Houses of Abdul Hameed and Mallarapu Venkaiah, West-Hut of Mekala Poshaiah, South-Remaining area purchased along with tiled house by executants Muthilingam and East-PWD Road." Subbarao in turn sold the same to Mummaneni Venkata Krishnaiah under a sale deed dated 21.3.1966. Muthilingam sold his remaining site to the plaintiff on 18.12.1973 with following boundaries: "East-PWD Road leading to Bhadrachalam extent is 220 ft., with compound wall, South-Lane 138 ft., with compound wall, West-Residential houses, extent 197 ft., of compound wall and North-Land sold to K. Subba Rao by the vendor, 231 ft." Thus, the specific case of the defendant is that no space was left by Chitti Butchi Narsamma on northern side of the suit schedule property as alleged in the plaint. The further case of the defendant is that Venkata Krishnaiah sold 1994 square yards to M/s. Durga Complex, represented by the defendant vide Document No. 220/1980 with the same boundaries and extents as purchased by him from his vendor Muthilingam and it was mutated in the name of Durga Complex in Municipal Records. 8. M/s. Durga Complex represented by the defendant applied for construction of M/s. Sri Durga Complex A/C to the Joint Collector, Khammam who sanctioned permission by proceedings dated 7.12.1989. However, the defendant could not carry-out the construction due to his ill-health. The time was extended upto 6.12.1994. Subsequently, the defendant applied for permission to construct Store Room, Office Room and compound wall. However, the defendant could not carry-out the construction due to his ill-health. The time was extended upto 6.12.1994. Subsequently, the defendant applied for permission to construct Store Room, Office Room and compound wall. K. Krishna Murthy who claims to be managing partner of the plaintiff filed an objection on 19.4.1996, wherein he admitted that the defendant purchased the site on behalf of Durga Complex and further wrongly and falsely pleaded that the ownership rights were transferred to M/s. Sri Durga Enterprises which is constituted with 8 partners of Sri Durga Kalamandir and 11 partners of Sri Durga Complex. However, the Municipality has accorded permission to the defendant after hearing objections. 9. Thus, the specific case of the defendant is that M/s. Sri Durga Complex represented by the defendant is the owner and possessor of 1994 square yards. His further case is that on behalf of Kodumuri Krishna Murthy, Managing Partner of M/s. Sri Durga Enterprises issued a legal notice dated 12.5.1996 alleging that M/s. Durga Enterprises was constituted on 12.11.1980, wherein it is admitted that M/s. Durga Complex purchased 1994 square yards and that the plaintiff has relinquished its right in the space 15 ft. x 125 ft. on its northern side. The defendant gave reply dated 16.5.1996 denying the constitution of M/s. Sri Durga Enterprises. His further case is that the plaintiff has suppressed all these material facts and filed the suit. 10. The trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to injunction as prayed for? (2) Whether the person who filed the suit has no power to file the suit as contended by the defendant? (3) To what relief? 11. On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs. 1 to 3 were examined and Exs. A1 to A50 were marked. On behalf of defendant, DW 1 was examined and Exs. B1 to B19 were marked Exs. C1 to C4 are the Commissioner's report, plan, objections and photographs. 12. On Issue No. 2, the learned Senior Civil Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff firm underwent changes and the names of the partners shown in Ex. A2 are not the present partners and the plaintiff has not filed the documents showing the actual change of the partners and therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable. On Issue No. 2, the learned Senior Civil Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff firm underwent changes and the names of the partners shown in Ex. A2 are not the present partners and the plaintiff has not filed the documents showing the actual change of the partners and therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable. On Issue No. 1, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to prove that it is in possession of the disputed area of 1994 square yards to the north of its theatre. It is also held that the report of the Commissioner is not satisfactory and it does not give clear picture and the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence with regard to actual location of structures. The appellate Court confirmed the findings of the trial Court. The appellate Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not in possession of the entire extent of the suit schedule property of 5519 square yards and the site purchased by the defendant is on the northern side of the plaintiff's site and it is a part and parcel of the suit schedule property and that the plaintiff also failed to prove its possession over the disputed site. Aggrieved by the judgment, this second appeal has been filed. 13. Sri B.V. Subbaiah, learned Senior Counsel arguing for the appellant, submits that the Courts below failed to consider the evidence on record and that their findings are perverse. He had relied on the judgments of the apex Court in case between Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Bajrang Lal, 2014 (4) ALD 43 (SC) : (2014) 4 SCC 693 and in case between M/s. Variety Emporium v. VRM Mohd. Ibrahim Naina, ATR 1985 SC 207 and also in case between Smt. Indira Kaur and others v. Shri Sheo Lal Kapoor, AIR 1988 SC 1074 , in support of his contention that where findings are perverse, the same can be interfered in second appeal. The learned Senior Counsel has referred to the plaint averments, written statement averments and also the evidence and submitted that the plaintiff specifically pleaded about the existence of cycle stand, bore wells, drain wells and motor fixed for drawing water in the disputed site. The learned Senior Counsel has referred to the plaint averments, written statement averments and also the evidence and submitted that the plaintiff specifically pleaded about the existence of cycle stand, bore wells, drain wells and motor fixed for drawing water in the disputed site. It is further argued that the Commissioner's Report support the case of the plaintiff and proves that disputed site is in the actual possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff. It is argued that when there is clear evidence to show that the plaintiff has been in possession of the property, the findings of the Courts below that the plaintiff failed to prove its possession are perverse. It is also his submission that the findings of the Courts below that the plaintiff admitted that the disputed site is not in possession of the plaintiff is perverse. According to learned Counsel, P.W. 1 simply stated in his evidence that he is not having the documents to prove his possession and that does not mean that P.W. 1 admitted he is not in possession of the property. 14. His next submission is that the theatre Durga Kala Mandir was constructed in the year 1973 and that the plaintiff has been in possession of the disputed site since 1976 without any objection or interruption and therefore it has to be held that the plaintiff has been in settled possession. It is also his submission that when a person has been in settled possession, he can protect his possession and he cannot be dispossessed without following the due process of law. In support of his contention, he has relied on a judgment of apex Court reported in Rame Gowda (Dead) by LRs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) by LRs. and another, 2004 (2) ALD 31 (SC) : (2004) 1 SCC 769 . It is also his submission that in a suit is for injunction simpliciter normally the issue of file will not be directly and substantially in issue. In support of his contention he has also relied on a judgment reported in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. and others, AIR 2008 SC 2033 . It is also his submission that even if it is held that the plaintiff is not the true owner, but when it is found that it has been in settled possession, it is entitled for injunction. and others, AIR 2008 SC 2033 . It is also his submission that even if it is held that the plaintiff is not the true owner, but when it is found that it has been in settled possession, it is entitled for injunction. His submission is that where a person is in possession as a agent of true owner or as care taker or servant no injunction can be granted against true owner. It is also his submission that it is not a dispute between a coparcener or a partner and as far as plaintiff and defendant are concerned they are strangers, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled for injunction. In support of his contention, he has relied on the judgment of the apex Court reported in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and others v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) through LRs., 2012 (4) ALD 1 (SC) : (2012) 5 SCC 370 , wherein it is observed that even a trespasser cannot be dispossessed without following the due course of law. 15. It is also submitted that the defendant himself filed an affidavit in High Court in CRP No. 2055 of 1997 which is marked as Ex. A49, wherein he admitted that the plaintiff's firm erected a cycle stand, bore well, septic tank etc., and that they are existing in the disputed site. Sri B.V. Subbaiah argued that the compound wall was constructed about 35 years back and existing of compound wall is an admitted fact and these circumstances go to show that the plaintiff has been in exclusive possession of the disputed site. 16. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Senior Counsel arguing for the respondents submitted that the defendant filed his title deeds to prove his title to the disputed site of 1994 square yards and the plaintiff has title to the extent of only 4211 square yards to the south of defendant's property. It is further argued that in Ex. B1 sale deed through which the plaintiff is claiming title, defendant's vendor's name is shown as the owner of the land towards north after fencing. His main submission is that that plaintiff cannot claim injunction against the real owner particularly when he has admitted the title of the defendant. It is further argued that in Ex. B1 sale deed through which the plaintiff is claiming title, defendant's vendor's name is shown as the owner of the land towards north after fencing. His main submission is that that plaintiff cannot claim injunction against the real owner particularly when he has admitted the title of the defendant. It is also argued that the defendant as owner of 1994 square yards filed an application for construction of theatre to the competent authorities and he was granted permission, but due to some difficulty he could not construct the theatre. It is further argued that the plaintiff has not filed his document of title only to suppress the particulars such as the total extent of land purchased by it and the name of the owner of the northern side vacant site of the plaintiff's site. He has also referred to the recitals of the sale deed under which the plaintiff purchased the property i.e., Ex. B2 plan attached to the Ex. B1 sale deed which show that northern boundary is mentioned as fencing and then the land of K. Subba Rao. It is further argued that the disputed site of 1994 square yards is separated from the land of the plaintiff by fencing according to the sale deed of the plaintiff itself. It is further argued that by the date of purchase of the land by the plaintiff, Muthilingam had no subsisting right or title in the disputed site, since it was already sold to K. Subba Rao and therefore giving consent by Muthilingam or Butchi Narsamma does not arise. His main submission is that the plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands and that he has suppressed material facts. It is also argued that the question of title can be gone into incidentally in a suit for perpetual injunction. Reliance is placed on judgments in case between P. Saraswathi v. Vallabhaneni Veerabhadra Rao, 1985 (2) An. WR 7 and also in case between N.R. Srinivas v. Madduri Malla Reddy and others 2005 (1) ALD 268 . His next submission is that relief of injunction cannot be granted against true owner. Reliance is placed on judgments in case between P. Saraswathi v. Vallabhaneni Veerabhadra Rao, 1985 (2) An. WR 7 and also in case between N.R. Srinivas v. Madduri Malla Reddy and others 2005 (1) ALD 268 . His next submission is that relief of injunction cannot be granted against true owner. Reliance is placed on judgments in case between Sadasivuni Manmadeswara Rao v. P. Lakshmana Rao and others, 2012 (1) ALD 511 , in case between Yamuna Nagar Improvement Trust v. Khartilal, (2005) 10 SCC 30 , in case between Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner and others, 2004 (2) ALD 115 (SC) : (2004) 3 SCC 137 , in case between Kantamma and others v. Gangulamma and others, 2004 (3) ALD 151, in case between K. Ankaiah and others v. Tirumala Tirupathi Devastanam, 2002 (4) ALD 223 : 2006 (6) ALT 170, in case between Premji Patansay Shah and others v. Union of India and others, (1994) 5 SCC 547 , in case between K.C. Reddy, in RC, 1991 (3) ALT 14 and also in case between K.V. Narayan v. S. Sharma Gowda and another, AIR 1986 Kar. 77 . Referring to the report of the Advocate Commissioner, it is submitted that when objections are filed and when the Commissioner is not examined, the report of the Advocate Commissioner cannot be relied upon. Reliance is placed on judgments in case between Selvi v. Dorathy Paul, 2013 (3) Laws 75 (Mad.), in case between Kirpa Shankar Mukundlal Sahu v. Tilak Raj Khushal Chandra Wadhawan, 2010 (7) Laws 105 (Bom.) and also in case between Bishwanath Rai v. Sachhidanand Singh, AIR 1971 SC 1949 . It is also submitted that no reliance can be placed on the Advocate Commissioner's report to decide the rights of the parties. Reliance is placed on judgments in case between M. Govinda Rajulu v. Smt. Bhushanamma, 2000 (4) ALD 444 : 2000 (2) ALT 71 , in case between T.K. Krishna Murthy v. Tamilnadu Water and Drainage Board rep. by its Sr. Engineer, 2006 (7) Laws 115 (Mad.) and also in case between Malaya Gounder v. Palanisamy, 1994 (11) Laws 57 (Mad.). Reliance is placed on judgments in case between M. Govinda Rajulu v. Smt. Bhushanamma, 2000 (4) ALD 444 : 2000 (2) ALT 71 , in case between T.K. Krishna Murthy v. Tamilnadu Water and Drainage Board rep. by its Sr. Engineer, 2006 (7) Laws 115 (Mad.) and also in case between Malaya Gounder v. Palanisamy, 1994 (11) Laws 57 (Mad.). It is further argued that when objections to the Advocate Commissioner's report were filed and the trial Court redirected the Commissioner to inspect the suit site and measure the suit site with respect to the sale deeds of the parties and with regard to existing structures, but subsequently since the Commissioner did not comply with the said direction, and therefore the said petition was dismissed. He has referred to the orders of the Court in this regard and in view of the same, it is submitted that the report of the Commissioner cannot be looked into. His main submission is that the Commissioner has not measured Sri Balaji Restaurant and Lodge which is a part of the land purchased by the plaintiff. It is further argued that the plaint is signed by K. Krishna Murthy, whereas another person is examined as P.W. 1. It is argued that P.W. 1 is not a partner of the plaintiff's firm and no particulars of existing partners have been furnished and the suit itself is not maintainable. It is further argued that eight partners of the plaintiff Durga Kalamandir and three partners of the defendant Durga Complex entered into a new firm by name Durga Enterprises and a mini theatre was proposed to be constructed. However, that could not be materialized. It is argued that formation of new firm has been suppressed by the plaintiff. It is also argued that when the defendant himself wanted to construct a theatre and obtained permission, objections have been raised by the plaintiff and these facts are suppressed by the plaintiff. It is further argued that when a person is claiming possession over the property of others, he must specifically plead as to when he came into possession of the property. It is argued that there is no evidence to show when fencing was removed and when the plaintiff encroached into the land of the defendant, the plaintiff cannot be said to be in settled possession. It is argued that there is no evidence to show when fencing was removed and when the plaintiff encroached into the land of the defendant, the plaintiff cannot be said to be in settled possession. Referring to the affidavit filed by the defendant in the High Court, it is submitted that such affidavit cannot be treated as evidence. Reliance is placed on judgments in case between Ayub Khan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2013) 4 SCC 465 , in case between M. Manoharan Chetti and others v. M/s. C. Coomaraswamy Naidu and Sons, Madras, AIR 1980 Mad. 212 (1), in case between M/s. Prem Ex-Serviceman Coop. Tenant Farming Society Limited v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1974 SC 1121 , in case between Jadho Nagu Bai and another v. Jadho Gangu Bai, AIR 1958 AP 19 and also in case between Rama Bai Shrinivas Nadgir v. Government of Bombay, AIR 1941 Bom. 144. Referring to the evidence of P.W. 1, it is submitted that power of attorney holder cannot depose in the place of principal. Reliance is placed on judgments in case between S. Kesari Hanuman Goud v. Anjum Jehan, 2013 (4) ALD 150 (SC) and also in case between K. Mallikharjuna Vara Prasad v. K. Poorna Chandra Rao (Died) and others, 2006 (6) ALD 333 . It is also argued that the Advocate Commissioner cannot be appointed to gather evidence. Reliance is placed on judgments in case between Arredla Ram Reddy and others v. Arredla Alivelamma, 2004 (5) ALD 388 , in case between Gangavarapu Hanumantha Rao @ Anjaneyulu v. Battigiri Ramulu and others, 2008 (1) ALD 466 , in case between Puttappa v. Ramappa, AIR 1996 Kar. 257 , in case between Chinnathambi v. Anjali, 2006 (9) Laws 93 (Mad.) and also in case between Makupalli Lakshmamma v. Guntur Kedari and another, 2004 (5) ALD (NOC) 326. It is also argued that perpetual injunction cannot be claimed as regards property not held by the plaintiff. Reliance is placed on judgments in case between Polasa Rajalaxmi v. M.A. Raheem, 2006 (5) ALD 7 and in case between G. Venkat Ratnam v. Kolli Para Jhansi Lakshmi and others, 2011 (2) ALD 468 . It is also argued that perpetual injunction cannot be claimed as regards property not held by the plaintiff. Reliance is placed on judgments in case between Polasa Rajalaxmi v. M.A. Raheem, 2006 (5) ALD 7 and in case between G. Venkat Ratnam v. Kolli Para Jhansi Lakshmi and others, 2011 (2) ALD 468 . It is further argued that even it is assumed that the plaintiff is in possession of the property, his possession is to be treated as unlawful possession and a person who has illegally occupied the land of another is not entitled for injunction. It is also argued that if the new partnership firm is admitted then all these persons would become co-owners and the injunction cannot be granted against a co-owner. Reliance is placed on judgments in case between Sunil Kumar and another v. Ram Prakash and others, (1988) 2 SCC 77 and in case between Ranukanta Mullaiah v. Sircilla Rajamma and another, 2006 (6) ALD 113. It is further argued that the plaintiff never explained when these constructions have been made and who made these constructions and he has admitted he has no document to show that he is in possession of the disputed site. The plaintiff has only 15 ft. x 120 ft. after Durga Kala Mandir theatre and he has no right on the remaining vacant site which belongs to the defendant. It is also argued that there is no evidence to show the exact location of these structures and whether they are within the site of the plaintiff or the defendant. 17. Sri B.V. Subbaiah in reply submits that the plaintiff has been in possession of the property since 1976 and when he is settled in possession he is entitled for protection and he cannot be dispossessed without following due process of law. 18. Before dealing with the other issues it is necessary to decide two preliminary issues: (1) Whether the Commissioner's report is admissible? (2) Whether the affidavit of P.W. 1 can be looked into? 19. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy submits the report of the Advocate Commissioner is not admissible. It is argued that in spite of requisition made by the defendant under work memo along with the sale deed, the Advocate Commissioner omitted to measure the land purchased by the plaintiff from Muthilingam and wrongly included the site of the Durga Complex. 19. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy submits the report of the Advocate Commissioner is not admissible. It is argued that in spite of requisition made by the defendant under work memo along with the sale deed, the Advocate Commissioner omitted to measure the land purchased by the plaintiff from Muthilingam and wrongly included the site of the Durga Complex. As seen from the entire record, it is clear that objections were filed questioning the report of the Advocate Commissioner and the learned Judge has passed orders directing the Commissioner to take fresh measurements, but the Commissioner failed to take fresh measurements. Since the Advocate Commissioner's report is incomplete and the Advocate Commissioner is not examined, it is clear that the Advocate Commissioner's report is inadmissible. Referring Arredla Ram Reddy's case (supra), in case between Gangavarapu Hanumantha Rao's case (supra), in case between Puttappa's case (supra), in case between Chinnathambi's case (supra) and also in case between Makupalli Lakshmamma's case (supra), whether affidavit of DW 1 can be looked into? Normally an affidavit of a party cannot be looked into as evidence. But, when the person who has given sworn affidavit is examined before the Court and when he is confronted with his affidavit and when the person admits that he has given sworn affidavit, such affidavit can be looked into. Moreover, in this case, the affidavit given by P.W. 1 before this Court in CMP No. 7568 of 1997 in CRP No. 2055 of 1997 has been marked as Ex. A49. Therefore, such affidavit can be looked into. Since it becomes a relevant fact as to whether such witness has given such sworn affidavit or not and whether the contents of affidavit are true or not. It is also relevant to examine what is the previous statement of such witness and whether he is changing his version from time to time. Thus, to decide credibility of a witness and to analyze his evidence, an affidavit which is admittedly given by such witness can be looked into. In this case, i.e., in one of the proceedings of this case P.W. 1 had given an affidavit and it is marked as Ex. A49. Therefore, has become part of evidence. 20. The point that arises for consideration is whether any substantial question of law arise in this appeal? 21. In this case, i.e., in one of the proceedings of this case P.W. 1 had given an affidavit and it is marked as Ex. A49. Therefore, has become part of evidence. 20. The point that arises for consideration is whether any substantial question of law arise in this appeal? 21. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy has also relied on judgments in case between Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal, (2002) 1 SCC 134 , in case between Nasib Khan and others v. Colonel Surat Singh and others, 2013 (3) ALD 25 (SC) : (2013) 5 SCC 218 and in case between Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitri Bai Sopan Gujar and others, 1999 (4) ALD 57 (SC) and submitted that where the Courts have recorded finding of fact, no interference can be made in second appeal. His main submission is that the High Court cannot appreciate the evidence in second appeal merely because another view is possible on appreciation of evidence. In the light of decisions relied by Sri B.V. Subbaiah in case between Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation's case (supra), it appears where the findings are found to be perverse the High Court can interfere in second appeal. Now it has to be seen whether the findings of the appellate Court are perverse. The apex Court in case between Maria Margarida's case (supra), observed as follows: "The truth should be the guiding star in the entire judicial process. Truth alone has to be the foundation of justice. The entire judicial system has been created only to discern and find out the real truth. Judges at all levels have to seriously engage themselves in the journey of discovering the truth. That is their mandate, obligation and bounden duty. Justice system will acquire credibility only when people will be convinced that justice is based on the foundation of the truth." 22. The question of title can be gone into for deciding the prima facie case. Of course, the title of party cannot be decided in a suit for injunction. Nevertheless title is also one of the important factor to consider the balance of convenience. 23. Now it has to be seen who has title to the property or who has prima facie case and balance of convenience. Of course, the title of party cannot be decided in a suit for injunction. Nevertheless title is also one of the important factor to consider the balance of convenience. 23. Now it has to be seen who has title to the property or who has prima facie case and balance of convenience. A reading of the entire material prima facie gives an impression that the plaintiff has no title to disputed site of 1994 square yards towards north of its property. There is nothing on record to show that any vacant space is left by Chitti Butchi Narsamma on northern side of the plaint schedule property as alleged in the plaint. P.W. 1 admitted that Ex. B1 is the copy of the sale deed under which the plaintiffs firm purchased 4211 square yards. He further admitted that in Ex. B1 northern boundary is mentioned as the land sold to K. Subba Rao by the vendor. He further admitted that Ex. B5 is the legal notice got issued to the defendant and it is mentioned in Ex. B5 that Durga Complex is the owner of the site to the north of the theatre (1994 square yards). He further admitted that the said site is included in the plaint schedule. He further admitted that the site purchased from Muthilingam consists of theatre and lodge and in addition to theatre and lodge some site is left to the extent of 15 ft width on the northern side. He has also admitted that the defendant applied for permission of construction of compound wall on behalf of Durga Complex. He further admitted that it was proposed to construct a mini theatre of Durga Enterprises in the site of Durga Complex and the 15 ft., width of plaintiff together. The above admissions prima facie show that the plaintiff has no title to the disputed site of 1994 square yards towards north of the site purchased by the plaintiff and the plaintiff site is only 4211 square yards including the site of Balaji Restaurant and Lodge. 24. Now it has to be seen when the plaintiff has no prima facie title to the disputed site, whether it is in possession of the disputed site. 24. Now it has to be seen when the plaintiff has no prima facie title to the disputed site, whether it is in possession of the disputed site. The plaintiff has specifically averred in the plaint that the suit property is covered by compound wall and there are two gates fixed to the property and that for the purpose of theatre the plaintiff got erected three bore wells for the supply of water and fixed a motor for drawing the water in the vacant site situated to the north of the above theatre and that the plaintiff constructed a cycle stand, septic tank and erected water supply pipeline besides water pipeline sanctioned by the Notified Area, Kothagudem. 25. A careful reading of the written statement makes it clear that though the defendant has denied the contentions of the plaintiff, but there is no specific denial with regard to the compound wall, gates, bore wells and motor for drawing water and construction of cycle stand, septic tank and erection of water supply pipelines. According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has made these erections and constructions for the purpose of running the theatre M/s. Sri Durga Kalamandir. Exs. A35 to A46 are the photographs and negatives of the suit schedule property. Ex. A34 is the notice on sanction of water tap connection dated 21.12.1989. According to DW 1, the defendant was examined as DW 1. He deposed as follows : "It might be true that the theatre M/s. Durga Kalamandir was built in 1973, it might be true that the drainage pipeline might be in the site towards north of the theatre. He further deposed that he does not know when they were put up and again says that such pipes are not existing in their site. He denied the suggestion that the drainage pipelines, cycle stand and septic tank are in the site of 1994 square yards. He further deposed that he does not know if the above structures were in existence by the date of his purchase. He further admits that the septic tank was built by Durga Kalamandir. This witness filed an affidavit before this Court in CMP No. 7568 of 1997 in CRP No. 2055 of 1997 which is marked as Ex. A49. He further deposed that he does not know if the above structures were in existence by the date of his purchase. He further admits that the septic tank was built by Durga Kalamandir. This witness filed an affidavit before this Court in CMP No. 7568 of 1997 in CRP No. 2055 of 1997 which is marked as Ex. A49. In his affidavit he stated that oral permission given by his predecessor in title to the plaintiff firm to temporarily erect the cycle stand and sunk a bore well and septic tank for the enjoyment of the plaintiff firm cinema theatre and these structures are existing hardly in an area of 130 square yards out of 1994 square yards. Thus, there is material on record to show that the plaintiff has erected the cycle stand and sunk a bore well, septic tank and it was orally permitted by the predecessor in title of the defendant. The defendant has purchased the property from the vendor on 7.5.1980. As seen above the defendant admitted that the theatre was constructed in the year 1973. So it appears that the plaintiff has made construction in or around 1976 as claimed by it. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff had been in possession of the disputed site at least in some extent of disputed site. The trial Court extracted the admission of the plaintiff which is as follows: "It is true that there is no document to say that the plaintiff is in possession of northern vacant site except the 15 feet". The learned Senior Civil Judge observed that this admission is fatal to the plaintiff's claim of possession of the site. What P.W. 1 deposed is that there is no document to show its possession. Being in possession is one thing having documentary evidence to prove its possession is another thing. Merely because P.W. 1 stated that there is no document to show that it is in possession, by this admission it cannot be concluded that the plaintiff is not in possession and it is fatal to the plaintiff's claim of possession. There cannot be any doubt to say that the possession of the vacant site follows the title. But, here the site is not vacant. Cycle stand, septic tank, bore wells and a motor for drawing the water are existing in the site. There cannot be any doubt to say that the possession of the vacant site follows the title. But, here the site is not vacant. Cycle stand, septic tank, bore wells and a motor for drawing the water are existing in the site. We are of the view that it cannot be treated as vacant site particularly when the plaintiff is claiming to be using the bore wells, motor and cycle stand. So, the normal principle that possession would follow title may not arise in this case. Thus, finding of the Courts below with regard to possession appears to be perverse. 26. The trial Court observed that the defendant stated that structures are located within a distance of 15 feet from the present cinema theatre Durga Kalamandir, but reading of entire material evidence gives an impression that the defendant never stated in his pleading or in his evidence that the structures are located within a distance of 15 feet from the present cinema theatre. Thus, this finding of the trial Court also appears to be perverse. 27. The documents filed by the defendant go to show that the defendant has prima facie title to the disputed site of 1994 square yards. When the defendant has title and the plaintiff is in possession, whether the plaintiff can seek injunction against the true owner? The straight answer is no. 28. A reading of the entire material gives an impression that the plaintiff has been in possession of the disputed site, and Durga Complex represented by the defendant is the owner of the said site. In fact, the plaintiff ought to have made Durga Complex as a party to the suit. Though, it is a suit for injunction the title has to be looked into to decide the prima facie case and balance of convenience. Since, Durga Complex being represented by the defendant appears to be true owner of the disputed site, it appears that the plaintiff is not entitled for injunction. 29. Once it is held that the defendant has title to the property, the plaintiff cannot seek injunction. Of course, when a person is claiming to be in possession of the property as care taker or as an agent, such person cannot be permitted to claim possession. Of course, the defendant is not an agent and cannot be treated as a care taker. Of course, when a person is claiming to be in possession of the property as care taker or as an agent, such person cannot be permitted to claim possession. Of course, the defendant is not an agent and cannot be treated as a care taker. But, however, the prime question is whether can he seek injunction against the true owner. The law appears to be very clear. The apex Court in case between Maria Margarida's case (supra), the apex Court held that no injunction can be issued against the true owner. The apex Court further observed as follows: "Possession is important when there are no title documents and other relevant records before the Court, but, once the documents and records of title come before the Court, it is the title which has to be looked at first and due weight age be given to it. Possession cannot be considered in vacuum. The person averring a right to continue in possession shall, as far as possible, give a detailed particularized specific pleading along with documents to support his claim and details of subsequent conduct which establish his possession. It would be imperative that one who claims possession must give all such details as enumerated hereunder. They are only illustrative and not exhaustive. (a) who is or are the owner or owners of the property; (b) title of the property; (c) who is in possession of the title documents (d) identity of the claimant or claimants to possession; (e) the date of entry into possession; (f) how he came into possession-whether he purchased the property or inherited or got the same in gift or by any other method; (g) in case he purchased the property, what is the consideration; if he has taken it on rent, how much is the rent, licence fee or lease amount; (h) if taken on rent, licence fee or lease then insist on rent deed, licence deed or lease deed; (i) who are the persons in possession/occupation or otherwise living with him, in what capacity; as family members, friends or servants etc.; (j) subsequent conduct, i.e., any event which might have extinguished his entitlement to possession or caused shift therein; and (k) basis of his claim that not to deliver possession but continue in possession. In pleadings, whenever a person claims right to continue in possession of another property, it becomes necessary for him to plead with specificity about who was the owner, on what date did he enter into possession, in what capacity and in what manner did he conduct his relationship with the owner over the years till the date of suit. He must also give details on what basis he is claiming a right to continue in possession. Until the pleadings raise a sufficient case, they will not constitute sufficient claim of defence." 30. The apex Court in case between in Sopan Sukhdeo's case (supra), held that it is settled law that no injunction can be granted against the true owner at the instance of person in unlawful possession. 31. Now it has to be seen whether the plaintiff has come to the Court with clean hands. P.W. 1 admitted that Muthilingam is one of the partners and original documents are with Muthilingam. According to P.W. 1, Muthilingam constructed a compound wall on northern side. He further deposed that no other person is having any right in the disputed site. He admitted that Ex. B1 sale deed through which the plaintiff's firm purchased the property. He further admitted that in Ex. B1 northern boundary is shown as the land of K. Subba Rao. Thus, on the date of purchase of the property under Ex. B1, the plaintiff knows that K. Subba Rao is the owner of the land on northern side of its property. P.W. 1 has also admitted that in Ex. B1 fencing is shown as its border on northern side. Thus, it is clear that compound wall on northern side is not shown as border. P.W. 1 further admitted that Ex. B5 is the legal notice issued to the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff. In Ex. B5 it is mentioned that Durga Complex is the owner of the site on the northern side of the theatre i.e., disputed site of 1994 square yards. It is also clear that when the defendant applied for permission before the Joint Collector, the plaintiff filed objections. It is also an admitted case that there was a proposal to construct a mini theatre by the newly formed firm. P.W. 1 himself admitted that it was proposed to construct a mini theatre in the site of Durga Complex and 15 feet width of the plaintiff. It is also an admitted case that there was a proposal to construct a mini theatre by the newly formed firm. P.W. 1 himself admitted that it was proposed to construct a mini theatre in the site of Durga Complex and 15 feet width of the plaintiff. The admissions made by the plaintiff and the recitals of the document clinchingly establish that K. Subba Rao was the owner of the disputed site when the plaintiff's firm has purchased the property under Ex. B1. It appears that Subba Rao was resident of Vijayawada and he was not residing at Kothagudem where the disputed property is situated. It has to be seen that Subba Rao purchased a property in 1961, the plaintiff purchased the property in 1973, Subba Rao sold the property to Venkata Krishnaiah in 1966 on 21.3.1966. It is also clear that Venkata Krishnaiah sold the property to Durga Complex and Durga Complex is the owner of disputed site of 1994 square yards and DW 1 is the Managing Partner of Durga Complex. Ex. B5 is the legal notice dated 12.5.1996. In Ex. B5 the plaintiff having admitted that the defendant is the owner of 1994 square yards and the plaintiff's firm and Durga Complex have entered into a new firm in the name and style of M/s. Durga Enterprises on 12.11.1980 ought to have pleaded these facts in his plaint. It is crystal clear that the plaintiff knows K. Subba Rao is its adjacent owner, and the fact that Subba Rao sold the disputed site in favour of Venkata Krishnaiah and subsequent sale by Venkata Krishnaiah in favour of Durga Complex and about the constitution of Durga Enterprises. Having issued a legal notice in Ex. B5 narrating all these facts, the plaintiff tried to mislead the Court by saying that Muthilingam has kept some vacant site to the north of the property purchased by the plaintiff. The plaintiff knows very well that Muthilingam is no more owner of the property from 1961 onwards. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff is guilty of suppression of facts and I am of the considered view that the plaintiff is entitled for discretionary remedy of injunction. 32. It is not the case of the plaintiff that Subba Rao who was the original owner of the property when the plaintiff purchased the property permitted them to make some constructions in his land. 32. It is not the case of the plaintiff that Subba Rao who was the original owner of the property when the plaintiff purchased the property permitted them to make some constructions in his land. Though, it appears that the plaintiff was in possession of the property on the date of filing of the suit, but it is not entitled for injunction and no injunction can be issued against the true owner. 33. I am of the view that there is no need to discuss the other points raised in this appeal. In view of the above discussions, I hold that the appeal has to be dismissed. 34. Accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.