ORDER R. Kantha Rao, J. 1. Since common issue is involved in all these miscellaneous petitions, they are disposed of by a common order. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as arrayed in the writ petitions. 3. The writ petitions four in number are filed under Article 226 of the constitution of India seeking a Mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in transferring the petitioners from Engineering College to Schools as arbitrary, illegal and to direct the respondents to take back the petitioners to their original posts. 4. The petitioners filed the miscellaneous petitions seeking interim relief in the nature of the direction to the respondents to permit them to discharge duties in the Engineering College from the academic year 2013-14 by suspending the proceedings issued in the year 2011 and 2012 respectively by the respondents whereunder the petitioners were transferred from the Engineering College to Schools. 5. The learned single Judge of this Court by a common order dated 20.06.2013 granted interim relief prayed for suspending operation of the respective orders issued by the 3rd respondent and directing the respondents 2, 3, 4 and 5 to allow the petitioners to function as Lab Supervisors and Lab Technicians Grade-I, as the case may be in the 4th respondent college with effect from 24.06.2013, in substance, directing the respondents to retransfer the petitioners to the original posts. The learned single Judge passed the order ex parte. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents/Vacate Stay petitioners filed appeals in W.A. Nos. 924, 928, 929 and 930 of 2013 and the Division Bench of this Court disposed of the said appeals with a direction to file vacate stay petitions before the learned single Judge, and pursuant to the said directions, the respondents/vacate stay petitioners filed these vacate stay miscellaneous petitions. 6. The brief facts essential for considering the present vacate stay miscellaneous petitions may be stated as follows: "The petitioners are the Lab Supervisors and Lab Technicians in the College of Engineering and Technology run by the 3rd respondent Society. They were transferred to the School run by the 4th respondent Society by proceedings separately issued in the year 2011 to each of the petitioners. They were transferred to the School run by the 4th respondent Society by proceedings separately issued in the year 2011 to each of the petitioners. The grievance of the petitioners is that the posts to which they were transferred are below in rank to the posts which they were holding earlier and by virtue of the impugned transfers' they were reduced in rank and thus, the transfers are wholly unjustifiable and illegal and therefore, they filed the writ petitions" seeking indulgence of this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. They submitted in their respective affidavits that by virtue of Sec. 79(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") an order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of any teaching or member or non-teaching staff, employed in any private educational institution, cannot be passed except holding an enquiry, and also without obtaining prior approval from the competent authority. According to the petitioners, though the aforesaid transfers were not as a result of any disciplinary action initiated against them, virtually by means of the said transfers, they were reduced in rank and therefore, they have to be retransferred to their original posts. The learned single Judge acceded to the submissions made by the petitioners and granted the interim order as prayed for." 7. The version of the respondents 3 to 5, as disclosed from the counter affidavit filed by them, is that the transfer orders were passed in the year 2011; the petitioners filed W.P. Nos. 15302, 15303, 15304 and 15305 of 2011 before this Court and the same were disposed of on merits, and the learned single Judge of this Court on a detailed consideration of rival submissions, vide common order dated 12.07.2011 dismissed the writ petitions holding that the transfer orders passed by the respondents Society do not warrant any interference as there is no violation or infringement of any mandatory statutory provision. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners preferred appeals in W.A. Nos. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners preferred appeals in W.A. Nos. 662, 666, 667 & 685 of 2011 and the same were withdrawn by the petitioners on 26.08.2011 seeking liberty to pursue the remedies available under A.P. Education Act, 1982; pursuant thereto, the petitioners approached the 2nd respondent questioning the transfer orders passed by the respondent society; upon hearing the petitioners, the 2nd respondent examined the respective cases in according with the provisions under Section 79 of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 and also the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481 passed orders dated 29.10.2011 holding that the transfer orders passed by the respondent society do not warrant any interference. Challenging the said orders, the petitioners preferred appeals to the 1st respondent, and the 1st respondent vide orders dated 27.12.2012 confirmed the orders of the 2nd respondent. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners filed the present writ petitions. 8. The version of the respondents is that the 3rd respondent has been conducting its affairs and managing the institutions strictly in accordance with various laws and bye-laws of the Society; the transfer orders passed by the respondent society are only on administrative grounds without any change in pay emoluments, service conditions and other benefits and therefore, the petitioners cannot question the transfer orders. The respondents referred to G.O.Ms. No. 23, dated 10.03.1999 according to which the Management of Minority Educational Institution can transfer teaching staff in non-aided posts from one institution to another institution within the same management, without the permission of any governmental authority. They also submitted that the rights of administration in respect of minority institutions are statutorily protected under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. They further contended that the petitioners who are the employees in the institution run by the 3rd respondent society have no right to contend that they must continue only in a particular institution and that the management may transfer them to any institution run by the 3rd respondent society and the impugned transfers did not vary the cadre or service conditions of the petitioners. They denied the allegations that the service conditions of the petitioners have been adversely affected and they have been pushed to a disadvantageous position. They denied the allegations that the service conditions of the petitioners have been adversely affected and they have been pushed to a disadvantageous position. The principal contention of the respondents is that since the main relief itself is granted by virtue of an interim order, the same is not sustainable in law and is liable to be vacated. 9. I have heard Sri K.S. Murthy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned senior Counsel appearing for the respondents. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that though the transfer orders were not passed as a measure of punishment pursuant to any disciplinary enquiry, virtually they reduced the petitioners in rank, and they being contrary to the provisions of Section 79 of the Act, the learned single Judge is justified in passing interim order suspending the proceedings issued by the respondents in the year 2011 and also further directing the respondents to ensure that the petitioners are permitted to function as Lab Supervisors or Lab Technicians Grade-I in the 4th respondent College of Engineering and Technology. 11. On the other hand, Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents 3 to 5 would contend that the issue involved in the present writ petitions has been finally adjudicated by the learned single Judge of this Court in the earlier round of litigation in W.P. Nos. 15302, 15303, 15304 and 15305 of 2011 and thus, though the Division Bench in the W.A. Nos. 662, 666, 667 & 685 of 2011 directed the petitioners to approach the authorities under the Act, the interim orders as prayed for by the petitioners ought not to have been passed since the petitioners had lost in the earlier writ petitions and also before the authorities concerned. 12. The main contention of the petitioners is that by virtue of their transfers practically they are reduced in rank and they are getting less amount of salary than which they were getting in their original posts and therefore, the interim order has rightly been passed in their favour. The contention of the respondents is that though the petitioners were transferred to Schools they were not reduced in rank and there is no change in their salaries and their pay is protected which fact is seriously disputed by the petitioners. The contention of the respondents is that though the petitioners were transferred to Schools they were not reduced in rank and there is no change in their salaries and their pay is protected which fact is seriously disputed by the petitioners. The petitioners, however, are entitled to get the same emoluments despite their transfer to the Schools and the respondents have to protect their pay notwithstanding the respective contentions in the present writ petitions. 13. The crucial question which requires to be addressed in these vacate stay miscellaneous petitions is whether the interim order which according to the respondents in the nature of granting of the main relief itself can be sustained or liable to be vacated? 14. In the first place it has to be born in mind that the interim order passed ex parte relates to transfer of the petitioners made under the proceedings issued by the respondents in the year 2011. Normally, if the transfer is made on administrative grounds, this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be slow in granting an interim order reversing the transfer order. However, in the present case the contention of the petitioners is that the transfer is prompted by mala fides, therefore an interim order suspending the transfer proceedings can be granted and it was rightly granted by the learned single Judge. The main relief prayed for in the writ petitions is to suspend the transfer proceedings issued by the respondents and to retransfer the petitioners to the respective posts which has been granted by means of interim order commonly passed in all the miscellaneous applications. 15. The main relief in the writ petitions will be granted after adjudicating the rights of the parties finally. Interim relief is only ancillary to the main relief and it would be granted only in the aid of the main relief. When the parties have been placed in a settled position, the Court would grant the interim relief to maintain status quo before their rights are determined finally. Therefore, in usual course the directions, which would be granted at the time of disposing of the writ petition finally would not be granted as an interim measure on an interlocutory application. 16. When the parties have been placed in a settled position, the Court would grant the interim relief to maintain status quo before their rights are determined finally. Therefore, in usual course the directions, which would be granted at the time of disposing of the writ petition finally would not be granted as an interim measure on an interlocutory application. 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a large number of judgments expressed the view that the final relief sought for in the writ petition shall not be granted as an interim measure. 17. In The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta AIR 1952 SC 12 the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down categorically that Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be used for giving interim reliefs and the interim reliefs can be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to main relief which may be available to party on final determination of rights in suit. Having regard to the facts before it, the Supreme Court observed as follows; "If the Court was of opinion that there was no other convenient or adequate remedy open to the petitioners, it might have proceeded to investigate the case on its merits and come to a decision as to whether the petitioners succeeded in establishing that there was an infringement of any of their legal rights which entitled them to a writ mandamus or any other direction of a like nature; and pending such determination it might have made a suitable interim order for maintaining the status quo antes. But when the Court declined to decide on the rights of the parties and expressly held that they should be investigated more properly in a civil suit, it could not for the purpose of facilitating the institution of such suit, issue directions in the natures of temporary injunctions, under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion, the language of article does not permit such an action." 18. From the judgment of the Constitution Bench, referred to above, it is clear that the Court has to adjudicate the rights of the parties and dispose of the suit or proceeding. If it is not possible, the Court can pass interim orders, which are in the aid and ancillary to the main relief and to maintain status quo. From the judgment of the Constitution Bench, referred to above, it is clear that the Court has to adjudicate the rights of the parties and dispose of the suit or proceeding. If it is not possible, the Court can pass interim orders, which are in the aid and ancillary to the main relief and to maintain status quo. But the main relief itself cannot be granted as an interim measure in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226. 19. In State of U.P. v. Ram Sukhi Devi (2005) 9 SCC 733 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "Whether the writ petitioner was entitled to any relief in the writ petition has to be adjudicated at the time of final disposal of the writ petition. This Court has on numerous occasions observed that the final relief sought for should not be granted at an interim stage. The position is worsened if the interim direction has been passed with stipulation that the applicable Government Order has to be ignored. Time and again this Court has deprecated the practice of granting interim orders which practically give the principal relief sought in the petition for no better reason than that of a prima facie case has been made out, without being concerned about the balance of convenience, the public interest and a host of other considerations." 20. In Public Services Tribunal Bar Assn. v. State of U.P. (2003) 4 SCC 104 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "Transfer is an incident of service and is made in administrative exigencies. Normally it is not to be interfered with by the courts. The Supreme Court consistently has been taking a view that orders of transfer should not be interfered with except in rare cases where the transfer has been made in a vindictive manner. Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently been of the view that by way of an interim order the order of suspension, termination, dismissal and transfer etc. should not be stayed during the pendency of the proceedings in the court." 21. In the instant case, the petitioners questioned the transfer orders passed by the respondents. Though they attribute mala fides to the respondents, so far no material has been placed on record showing that the transfers are prompted by mala fides or that they are vindictive. should not be stayed during the pendency of the proceedings in the court." 21. In the instant case, the petitioners questioned the transfer orders passed by the respondents. Though they attribute mala fides to the respondents, so far no material has been placed on record showing that the transfers are prompted by mala fides or that they are vindictive. However, this is a question, which requires to be addressed while disposing of the main writ petitions by hearing both the parties. For the present, there is no prima facie material showing that the transfer orders passed by the respondents are vindictive in nature or prompted by mala fides. 22. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme (Court in Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 4 SCC 697 and endeavoured to impress upon this Court that in rare cases this Court can grant the interim relief to the party though it is in the nature of granting the main relief itself. In the said case, the Supreme Court held as under; "An order of interim relief may or may not be a reasoned one but the factors of prima facie case, irreparable injury and balance of convenience do work at the back of the mind of the one who passes an order of interim nature. Ordinarily, the Court is inclined to maintain status quo as obtaining on the date of the commencement of the proceedings. However, there are a few cases which call for the Court's leaning not in favour of maintaining the status quo and still lesser in percentage are the cases when an order tantamounting to a mandamus is required to be issued even at an interim stage. There are matters of significance and of moment posing themselves as moment of truth. Such cases do cause dilemma and put the wits of any Judge to test. Situations emerge where the granting of an interim relief would tantamount to granting the final relief itself. And then there may be converse cases where withholding of an interim relief would tantamount to dismissal of main petition itself; for, by the time the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to be allowed as relief to the petitioner though all the findings may be in his favour. And then there may be converse cases where withholding of an interim relief would tantamount to dismissal of main petition itself; for, by the time the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to be allowed as relief to the petitioner though all the findings may be in his favour. In such cases the availability of a very strong prima facie case--of a standard much higher than just prima facie case, the considerations of balance of convenience and irreparable injury forcefully tilting the balance of case totally in favour of the applicant may persuade the Court to grant an interim relief though it amounts to granting the final relief itself. Of course, such would be rare and exceptional cases. The Court would grant such an interim relief only if satisfied that withholding of it would prick the conscience of the Court and do violence to the sense of justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the end the Court would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. Obviously such would be rare cases accompanied by compelling circumstances, where the injury complained of is immediate and pressing and would cause extreme hardship. The conduct of the parties shall also have to be seen and the Court may put the parties on such terms as may be prudent." 23. From the afore-referred judgments, it cannot be said that under no circumstances interim relief, which would tantamount to granting the final relief itself cannot be granted. Though the interim relief in the nature of granting the main relief itself can be granted in very rare and highly exceptional cases, for that, the court has not only to see that a very strong prima facie case has been made out, but it has take into consideration in whose favour the balance of convenience lies and also the factor that unless the relief is granted it would result in irreparable injury to the party applied for the relief. It is in the afore-stated legal background the issue in the present case relating to granting of the interim relief has to be considered. 24. According to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, the posts which were originally held by the petitioners and the posts to which they were transferred are not transferable inter se. It is in the afore-stated legal background the issue in the present case relating to granting of the interim relief has to be considered. 24. According to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, the posts which were originally held by the petitioners and the posts to which they were transferred are not transferable inter se. The learned counsel submits that the posts of the petitioners to which they were transferred are lower in rank and also covered lesser pay scale. The said fact is seriously disputed by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the 3rd respondent society can transfer its employees to any of its institutions according to the bye-laws of the society and the posts to which the petitioners were transferred and they are presently holding are of the same cadre and they are getting the same emoluments what they were paid in the posts held by them earlier. According to the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, the respondents would ensure that in the present posts held by the petitioners, the petitioners be paid the same salaries in the same pay scale which they were paid earlier in the college of the 3rd respondent society, if really it is found to be less in the present posts. However, the said question has to be adjudicated upon considering the entire materials placed by both the parties. The crucial question requires to be considered in the present vacate stay miscellaneous petitions is whether the interim order retransferring the petitioners to their original posts can be passed. 25. Here the important aspect which has to be kept in mind is that the petitioners initially filed writ petitions which were disposed of by the learned single Judge holding that the impugned transfer orders are not in violation or infringement of any rights of the petitioners or of any mandatory statutory provision and consequently held that the writ petitions are devoid of any merits. Against the said final adjudication, the petitioners preferred writ appeals and withdrew them stating that they would pursue their remedies before the authorities. Accordingly, the petitioners have pursued the remedies before the authorities but they were unsuccessful. Thereafter, they filed the instant writ petitions. 26. The transfer orders were passed in the year 2011. Against the said final adjudication, the petitioners preferred writ appeals and withdrew them stating that they would pursue their remedies before the authorities. Accordingly, the petitioners have pursued the remedies before the authorities but they were unsuccessful. Thereafter, they filed the instant writ petitions. 26. The transfer orders were passed in the year 2011. The writ petitions initially filed by the petitioners were dismissed on 12.07.2011. Obviously therefore the transfer orders were effected and there is no dispute about the said fact and the transfers became effected in the year 2011 itself. The instant writ petitions have been filed in the year 2013 whereunder the learned single Judge granted interim order retransferring the petitioners to their original posts, which is in the nature of granting the main relief in the writ petitions. 27. As per the ratio laid down in Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra (supra) to grant an interim relief in the nature of main relief, a strong prima facie case has to be made out, the court has to see the balance of convenience and also whether irreparable injury would be caused if the relief is refused to the party applying for the same. Since the transfers were effected in the year 2011, the earlier writ petitions were dismissed on merits in 2011 and as the petitioners withdrew the writ appeals stating that they would pursue the remedies before the authorities, and lost before the authorities I do not think that they have made out any strong prima facie case in their favour to grant interim relief in the nature of main relief in the writ petitions filed in the year 2013. It is not the case where the petitioners are removed or discharged. If they satisfy this Court in the main writ petitions about infringement of their right, they can as well be transferred to their original posts. It is certainly not a case where if the petitioners are not retransferred, it would result in irreparable loss to them. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the interim order ought not to have granted directing retransfer the petitioners to their original posts as an interim measure since it is nothing but granting the main relief in the writ petitions. 28. For the foregoing reasons, these vacate stay miscellaneous petitions are allowed and the interim order dated 20.06.2013 is hereby vacated. 28. For the foregoing reasons, these vacate stay miscellaneous petitions are allowed and the interim order dated 20.06.2013 is hereby vacated. Post the writ petitions after Sankranti Vacation, 2015 for final hearing.