JUDGMENT M. Seetharama Murti, J. 1. This Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, 'the Code') by the unsuccessful defendants 2 and 8 is directed against the judgment and decree dated 25.03.2009 of the learned V Additional District & Sessions Judge (Judge, Fast Track Court), Guntur passed in A.S. No. 109/2006 whereby the learned Additional District Judge while dismissing the said First Appeal had confirmed the decree and judgment dated 13.04.2006 of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Gurazala, Guntur District made in O.S. No. 98/2002 filed by the plaintiffs/respondents 1 to 3 herein, for grant of a decree against the defendants 1 to 6 for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 29.03.1978 directing the said defendants to execute a regular registered sale deed in respect of 3/4th share of the property viz., vacant site and three shops bearing door Nos. 13 and 14 in 14th ward of Piduguralla village, Palnad Taluk of Guntur District, which is more fully described in the schedule annexed to the plaint. At the time of admission of the Second Appeal, this Court had taken note of the substantial questions of law urged in the grounds 1 to 3 and the said substantial questions of law are as under: (1) Whether the courts below are right in granting a decree against the defendants 4 to 6 when the judgment of the trail Court is very clearly shows that the suit against the defendants 4 to 6 was abetted? (2) Whether the courts below is right in granting the decree in favour of the plaintiffs 2 and 3 by the defendants 1 to 6 who are the defendants 4 to 7 were admittedly no more as on the date of the judgment and that their legal heirs were not brought on record? (3) Whether the trail court has framed all the issues raises from out of the pleadings between the parties to the suit? (Reproduced verbatim) 1. (a) Further at the time of hearing, the following additional substantial questions of law were framed: (1) Whether the relief of specific performance based on the suit agreement of sale is barred by law of limitation? (2) Whether the delay in seeking the relief of specific performance is fatal to the case of the plaintiffs? 2. Submissions of the party-in-person/second appellant/defendant No. 8 were heard. (2) Whether the delay in seeking the relief of specific performance is fatal to the case of the plaintiffs? 2. Submissions of the party-in-person/second appellant/defendant No. 8 were heard. No submissions were made by the party-in-person/first appellant/second defendant. Submissions of the learned counsel for the contesting respondents/plaintiffs were heard. I have carefully perused the material record. 2. (a) Hereinafter, the parties in this second appeal shall be referred to as 'the defendants 2 and 8/appellants' and 'the plaintiffs/contesting respondents'. 3. To answer the substantial questions of law and the additional substantial questions of law and to adjudicate the lis, it is necessary to refer to the pleadings of both the parties. 3. (a) The plaint averments, in brief, are as follows: "The plaint schedule property originally belonged to K. Abraham. During his lifetime, the said Abraham made the property into seven shares and settled the same by way of registered partition deed dated 19.03.1957. The said Abraham, his wife and children viz., the defendants 1 to 4 and 6 had entered into a contract of sale with the plaintiffs 2 and 3 and the father of the first plaintiff by name Narayana. The said unregistered agreement of sale dated 29.03.1978 was entered into for a valuable consideration of Rs. 93,000/- and under the said agreement the defendants 1 to 4 and 6 and their parents have received Rs. 18,000/- as advance sale consideration and had agreed to register the regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs as and when the balance sale consideration is paid. Though the plaintiffs are ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, the defendants 1 to 4 and 6 and their parents had postponed the matter with ulterior motive. While so, Katam Venkateswarlu, who is the husband of the seventh defendant herein, had filed a suit against the plaintiffs and the defendants 1 to 4 and 6 claiming that the first defendant had sold her 1/4th share of the schedule property to him after receiving part payment of sale consideration and that he was inducted into possession of the said 1/4th share out of the schedule mentioned property. In the said suit in O.S. No. 411/1978 on the file of the Court of the learned Principal District Munsiff, Gurazala, the husband of the seventh defendant had sought specific performance and the said suit was decreed in his favour with certain conditions. In the said suit in O.S. No. 411/1978 on the file of the Court of the learned Principal District Munsiff, Gurazala, the husband of the seventh defendant had sought specific performance and the said suit was decreed in his favour with certain conditions. The fifth defendant was added as a second defendant in the said suit being the legal representative of late Abraham. In the written statement filed in the said suit on behalf of the father of the defendants 1 to 4 and 6, it is admitted that the schedule mentioned property was sold to the plaintiffs 2 and 3 and one Narayana under the agreement of sale dated 29.03.1978. The defendants 2 and 3 herein have adopted the written statement of their father in the said suit. The agreement of sale in this suit is true correct, valid and binding on the executants of the agreement and they are estopped from questioning the suit agreement dated 29.03.1978 with the plaintiffs 2 and 3 and one late Narayana, the father of the first plaintiff. While so, the said Narayana, during his life time, in a sound and disposing state of mind, had relinquished his right in the agreement schedule property in favour of the first plaintiff. Since the suit in O.S. No. 411/1978 was decreed in favour of the husband of the defendant No. 7 with some conditions, he had preferred an appeal in A.S. No. 14/1982 on the file of the Court of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Narasaraopet. The said First Appeal was allowed modifying the judgment in the suit O.S. No. 411/1978 holding that he was entitled to 1/4th share in the schedule mentioned property pursuant to the agreement of sale in respect of 1/4th share of the first defendant herein. The plaintiffs herein filed a second appeal against the judgment in A.S. No. 14/1982 before this Court but, the Second Appeal was dismissed by this Court as there was inordinate delay in filing the petition to bring the legal representatives of K. Venkateswarlu on record. Thus, the Second Appeal in S.A. No. 344/1990 was dismissed by the High Court without going into the merits of the case. The defendant No. 7 herein is the legal representative of the said K. Venkateswarlu. Thus, the Second Appeal in S.A. No. 344/1990 was dismissed by the High Court without going into the merits of the case. The defendant No. 7 herein is the legal representative of the said K. Venkateswarlu. The defendants 2 and 3, who have admitted the genuineness of the suit agreement, cannot question the validity of the agreement and they are estopped from doing so. The plaintiffs had orally demanded the defendants 2, 3 and others to receive the balance sale consideration and execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. But, they had postponed the same by giving lame excuses and on one pretext or the other. Behind the back of the plaintiffs, the defendants 1 to 3 are trying to alienate the property in favour of the defendant No. 8 with a view to cause loss to them and make a wrongful gain for the defendants 1 to 3. During the pendency of the civil suit referred to supra, the defendants 2 and 3, with impunity, have constructed three shops in item No. 1 of the schedule mentioned property and gave the shops to the defendants 8 to 10 on monthly rents. Having received the advance of Rs. 30,000/- from them, the defendants 2 and 3 had wrongfully gained Rs. 8,100/- per month as rents. Hence, the suit is filed for specific performance of the suit agreement of sale against the defendants 1 to 6 in so far as the 3/4th share out of the schedule mentioned property since a decree was already obtained in OS. No. 411 of 1978 in respect of the remaining 1/4th share and the said decree had become final." 3. (b) The averments in the written statement of the second defendant, in brief, are as follows: "Most of the material allegations in the plaint are not true. The suit is not maintainable. The relief sought in the suit was based on the certified copy of the alleged agreement dated 29.03.1978 and the names of the parties do not tally with the names in the alleged agreement of sale. The suit is barred by time as the agreement is a conditional agreement and was terminated by the date 15.06.1978 as the parties did not show their readiness and willingness to execute the registered document for part of the property. The suit is barred by time as the agreement is a conditional agreement and was terminated by the date 15.06.1978 as the parties did not show their readiness and willingness to execute the registered document for part of the property. The plaintiffs did not serve any registered notice or send any mediators prior to the filing of the suit. The plaintiffs are not entitled to the equitable relief. The second defendant had gifted her property to the eighth defendant by a valid registered gift deed and the defendant No. 8 has been in possession and enjoyment of the property since the said date. The plaintiff No. 1 is not entitled to claim as legal heir of Maddali Narayana and his contention is suspicious. The boundaries of the schedule of property are incorrect. The plaintiffs without being ready and willing and without giving prior notice had approached the Court, at a belated stage, with a mala fide intention and with fictitious documents to make an unlawful gain." 3. (c) The averments in the written statement of the defendant No. 8, in brief, are as follows: "The defendants 1 to 3 are sisters and the second defendant is the mother of this defendant. The defendants 1 to 3 along with their father and brother shared their property and had acquired rights by virtue of a registered partition deed dated 19.03.1957. Further, the first defendant in the suit is the maternal aunt of this defendant. The share that was allotted to her in the partition was sold, for a valid and lawful consideration, by her to this defendant by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 27.06.2002. The defendant No. 3, who is another maternal aunt of this defendant, had gifted the share that was allotted to her in the partition to the second defendant by way of a registered gift deed dated 03.07.2002. On the same day, the second defendant had gifted her share as well the share, which was gifted to her by the third defendant, to this defendant. Thus, this defendant has got absolute right, title, possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. On the same day, the second defendant had gifted her share as well the share, which was gifted to her by the third defendant, to this defendant. Thus, this defendant has got absolute right, title, possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. This defendant learnt through defendants 1 to 3 that the second plaintiff and two others have not evinced any interest to purchase the property in spite of the registered notice dated 16.06.1978 through which co-operation and willingness were shown to perform the part of the contract on behalf of the executants. So it shall be deemed to be a refusal. The alleged conditional agreement dated 29.03.1978 was barred by limitation. The certified copy of the agreement dated 29.03.1978 filed along with the plaint was not the copy of the agreement. The plaint averments that the defendants 1 to 6 received advance consideration of Rs. 18,000/- under the alleged agreement dated 29.03.1978 and had further agreed to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs as and when the balance sale consideration is paid and that the plaintiffs are ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and that the defendants 1 to 4 and 6 had postponed the matter with ulterior motive are all false and invented. The suit is filed with a view to knock away the property and make an unlawful gain as the market value of the property had increased and it has become an eyesore. The present litigation is vexatious. The suit based on time barred conditional agreement of sale is untenable and is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed as having no merit." 3. (d) In the additional written statement filed, with the permission of the Court, by the defendant No. 8, it was inter alia contended that the trial Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit for specific performance and that the alleged suit agreement of sale dated 29.03.1978 is concocted. 3. (e) The averments in the written statement of the defendant No. 9, in brief, are as follows: 'He had taken on lease a shop from the second defendant on a rent of Rs. 1,000/- about five years prior to filing of his written statement and that he is in possession and enjoyment of the shop as a tenant since then. (e) The averments in the written statement of the defendant No. 9, in brief, are as follows: 'He had taken on lease a shop from the second defendant on a rent of Rs. 1,000/- about five years prior to filing of his written statement and that he is in possession and enjoyment of the shop as a tenant since then. The defendant No. 8 has got absolute right, title and interest over the properties having acquired possession and enjoyment of the properties from the defendants 1 to 3. The defendant No. 8 had become the absolute owner of the property since the year 2000. Since then this defendant is paying rents to the defendant No. 8. The boundaries mentioned in the plaint schedule are incorrect.' 3. (f) The defendant No.10 had adopted the written statement filed by the defendant No.9. 4. Taking into consideration the above pleadings, the trial Court had framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the agreement of sale dated 29.03.1978 is true, valid and binding on the defendants? (2) Whether D10 is the lessee of D8? (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of specific performance of contract of sale dated 29.3.78 against D1 to D6, in the absence of prayer for alternative relief? (4) To what relief? 5. During the course of trial, the first plaintiff and his supporting witnesses were examined as PW s. 1 to 4. The second defendant, one Tannuru Gopal and the defendant No. 8 were examined as DWs. 1 to 3. Exhibits A1 to A3 and B1 to B11 were exhibited. The trial Court had answered all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs 2 and 3 and decreed the suit with costs as prayed for and directed the defendants 1 to 6 to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs 2 and 3 and had granted two months time for doing so. It is pertinent to mention that in the first appeal preferred, the appellate court had framed only one omnibus point which is as follows:- Whether the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge is sustainable under law? As already noted, the Court of First Appeal had confirmed the decree and judgment of the trial Court by dismissing the first appeal. Therefore, the aggrieved defendants 2 and 8 had preferred the present Second Appeal. 6. As already noted, the Court of First Appeal had confirmed the decree and judgment of the trial Court by dismissing the first appeal. Therefore, the aggrieved defendants 2 and 8 had preferred the present Second Appeal. 6. Now the substantial questions of law and the additional substantial questions of law are taken up. 6. (a) The defendant No. 8, the party in person, had contended that decree of the trial Court and the decree of the court of first appeal, which were granted against dead persons without application of mind and without regard to the facts and the evidence and the equitable principles of law and justice are unsustainable and he had urged that the second appeal be allowed. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/contesting respondents had supported the decree and the judgment of the court below and had contended that on all issues, concurrent findings were recorded by the Courts below and that no question of law much less a substantial question of law was involved in the second appeal and that the execution of the suit agreement of sale was admitted not only in a former proceedings but also in this proceeding and that the issue of bar of limitation which is a mixed question of fact and law, cannot be raised for the first time in the second appeal and that because of pendency of the former suit by the husband of the 7th defendant for a portion, i.e., 1/4th portion of the agreement schedule property, the present suit for specific performance could not be filed and that after the finality of the decree in the former suit, the plaintiffs had filed the present suit and that therefore, there is neither bar of limitation nor delay in filing the suit seeking specific performance. I have carefully gone through the pleadings, the evidence on record, the exhibits and the material on record including the written submissions filed on behalf of the appellants. 6. (b) Taking up first the first substantial (additional) question in regard to the bar of limitation it is necessary to mention that a specific contention was raised before the trial Court that the suit agreement dated 29.03.1978 is barred by law of limitation. It is borne out by record that the suit is filed in the year 2002 seeking specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 29.03.1978. It is borne out by record that the suit is filed in the year 2002 seeking specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 29.03.1978. It is urged in the defence that the suit is filed to make an unlawful gain as the price of property has gone up and as the same has become an eyesore and that therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of specific performance as the agreement is a conditional agreement and as the same was terminated as the parties are not willing to perform the contract for part of the property and that though the executants were ready the agreement holders were never ready and willing to obtain a sale deed. Despite the fact that such a defence was taken in the written statement, no issue on the bar of limitation was framed by the trial court and the aspect of the plaintiffs' entitlement to the equitable relief of specific performance was also not considered. As already noted, the appellate court which had only framed an omnibus point did not also consider the issue of bar of limitation. The law is well settled that the trial court must critically examine the pleadings before framing issues and the court must also have recourse to procedure under Order X Rule 2 and orally examine the parties before framing proper and appropriate issues. Therefore, as rightly contended by the defendants 2 and 8, the Trial Court and the Court below had failed to frame an important and an appropriate issue/point for determination on the aspect of bar of limitation, though a specific defence was raised on the said aspect and it is evident from the undisputed facts that the suit for specific performance was filed belatedly in the year 2002 based on an agreement of sale of the year 1978. Be that as it may. However, there is no need to further dilate on this aspect of bar of limitation in this second appeal as this court is precluded in this second appeal from going into the said aspect of bar of limitation when no issue was framed for determination on that aspect and the courts below have not adverted to the said aspect in the judgments. However, this aspect is to be borne in mind while dealing with the other questions and for arriving at a just decision in this second appeal. 6. However, this aspect is to be borne in mind while dealing with the other questions and for arriving at a just decision in this second appeal. 6. (c) In the next place, it is to be noted that the main contention of the defendants 2 and 8, as raised in the first and second substantial questions of law in this appeal is that there is non-application of mind by the Courts below to the facts and that the Courts below had committed grave error in granting decree for specific performance against dead persons and against whom the suit stood abated for non-impleadment of the legal representatives. It is further urged on their behalf that the decree for specific performance granted against dead persons is a nullity and that when the legal representatives of the deceased parties/ defendants 4 to 6 were not brought on record and the suit against the said defendants stood abated, the courts below ought to have dismissed the suit but instead the courts below had granted decree for specific performance against dead persons and that therefore, the decree, which is a nullity, is liable to be set aside and the appeal deserves to be allowed. In fact, the plaintiffs/contesting respondents have no answer to meet these decisive contentions raised on behalf of the defendants 2 and 8/the appellants herein. What is to be noted is that in the introductory portion of the judgment of the trial Court, it is clearly stated that the suit against the defendants 4 to 6 stood abated. Thus, from the very judgment of the trial Court, it is clear that the defendants 4 to 6 had died and for not bringing on record the legal representatives of the said defendants, the suit stood abated against the said defendants. The plaintiffs' sought specific performance of the suit agreement of sale in respect of 3/4th portion of the agreement schedule property against the defendants 1 to 6. The trial Court had decreed the suit against the defendants 1 to 6 and had directed them to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs 2 and 3 though it is a fact borne out by record that the defendants 4 to 6 had died and the suit against them stood abated. The trial Court had decreed the suit against the defendants 1 to 6 and had directed them to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs 2 and 3 though it is a fact borne out by record that the defendants 4 to 6 had died and the suit against them stood abated. Further, in the material papers of the First Appeal and also in the cause title prefixed to the judgment of the court of first appeal it is mentioned that the suit against the respondents 6 to 8 stood abated as the legal representatives of the said respondents are not brought on record. The respondents 6 to 8 in the First Appeal are the defendants 4 to 6 in the suit. Despite the said specific fact, which is also within the knowledge of the first appellate Court, it had also erroneously confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court while dismissing the First Appeal though the defendants 4 to 6 had died and the suit against them stood abated for not bringing their legal representatives on record. Therefore, the decrees and judgments of the Courts below granting the relief of specific performance against those dead persons and against whom the suit stood abated are a nullity. The defendants 1 to 3 are not the owners of the entire suit schedule property. Therefore, without the legal representatives of the defendants 4 to 6 joining the execution of the regular registered sale deed no valid title would pass to the plaintiffs 2 and 3, even if they are otherwise entitled to a decree for specific performance. Viewed thus, this Court finds that the second appeal deserves to be allowed on this ground alone. Therefore, the appellants are entitled to succeed in this second appeal on this substantial question. 6. (d) Coming to the remaining substantial question as to the plaintiffs' entitlement to the equitable relief of specific performance, it is pertinent to note that the original agreement of sale dated 29.03.1978 was not exhibited and only a certified copy of the same was exhibited. In addition to the certified copy of the suit agreement of sale, the certified copies of the judgments in O.S. No. 411/1978 and A.S. No. 14/1982 are exhibited as Exhibits A2 and A3. In addition to the certified copy of the suit agreement of sale, the certified copies of the judgments in O.S. No. 411/1978 and A.S. No. 14/1982 are exhibited as Exhibits A2 and A3. O.S. No. 411/1978 is a suit by one Katakam Venkateswarlu (the husband of the defendant No. 7 in this suit) against some of the defendants in the present suit and others for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 21.02.1978 executed by the first defendant herein in respect of her 1/4th share in the instant agreement schedule property; the said suit was decreed by the trial Court with conditions. Therefore, the said plaintiff K. Venkateswarlu had preferred an appeal in A.S. No. 14/1982 and the said Appeal Suit was allowed. The Second Appeal preferred by the plaintiffs herein was dismissed. In the said former suit proceedings initiated by Katakam Venkateswarlu it was held that the agreement of sale dated 21.02.1978 executed by the first defendant herein in favour of the said Katakam Venkateswarlu in respect of her 1/4th share of the suit house is true and valid. Hence, admittedly the present suit agreement to sell had become unenforceable in respect of the entire agreement schedule property. Therefore, the plaintiffs had restricted the present suit claim to the 3/4th portion of the agreement schedule property and had filed this present suit in the year 2002 though the suit agreement is of the year 1978. The main contention of the plaintiffs herein is that in the former suit there is an admission that the subject property was sold to the plaintiffs herein who are the defendants 6 to 8 therein. The present suit agreement of sale was exhibited as Exhibit B1 in the former suit is not in dispute. A perusal of Exhibits A2 and A3, the judgments in the former suit by Venkateswarlu, would show that there is no mention of the present suit agreement of sale with date in the pleadings extracted in the judgments from the written statement of K. Abraham. The written statement filed by the said Abraham in the former suit is not exhibited in this suit. The present suit is filed by three plaintiffs namely Maddali Venkata Subbaiah, son of Subbaiah, Tanguturi Venkata Subba Rao, son of Lakshmi Narasaiah and Yeluri Kotaiah, son of Venkatappaiah. The written statement filed by the said Abraham in the former suit is not exhibited in this suit. The present suit is filed by three plaintiffs namely Maddali Venkata Subbaiah, son of Subbaiah, Tanguturi Venkata Subba Rao, son of Lakshmi Narasaiah and Yeluri Kotaiah, son of Venkatappaiah. Nevertheless, the certified copy of the suit agreement of sale i.e., Exhibit A1 on a perusal would show that the same was executed in favour of M. Narayana, who is said to be the father of the first plaintiff herein, and one Tanguturi Kotaiah, son of Lakshmi Narasaiah. Therefore, a plain reading of Exhibit A1 would make it manifest that none of the plaintiffs are parties to the suit agreement of sale. Further, in the plaint it is stated that Narayana, who was one of the two holders of the suit sale agreement, had died and that during his lifetime the said Narayana had relinquished his rights in the agreement schedule property in favour of the first plaintiff, and that therefore, the first plaintiff had joined the other plaintiffs in bringing the suit for specific performance. But, no document evidencing such relinquishment by Narayana in favour of the first plaintiff is filed. Even the date of such relinquishment is not pleaded. Therefore, the locus standi of the first plaintiff to seek specific performance also remains unexplained. None of the legal representatives of Narayana joined as plaintiffs in the suit for specific performance, though it is admitted by PW 1 that Narayana has got two children. Further, as already noted, the suit agreement of sale was executed in favour of the said Narayana (since died) and one Kotaiah, son of Tanguturi Lakshmi Narasaiah, whereas the description of the third plaintiff is Yeluri Kotaiah. The second plaintiff is not a party to the suit agreement of sale. Even the third plaintiff is not a party to the suit agreement of sale. In the cross-examination, PW 1, the third plaintiff, had admitted that the suit sale agreement Exhibit A1 does not disclose the names of the plaintiffs and that he did not mention in the plaint that his younger brother had relinquished his right in the schedule property. Even the third plaintiff is not a party to the suit agreement of sale. In the cross-examination, PW 1, the third plaintiff, had admitted that the suit sale agreement Exhibit A1 does not disclose the names of the plaintiffs and that he did not mention in the plaint that his younger brother had relinquished his right in the schedule property. Therefore, in this backdrop of factual matrix and evidence on record, it remains unexplained as to how the plaintiffs have got locus standi to seek specific performance of the agreement of sale when none of them are parties to the suit agreement of sale. Both the Courts below did not advert to any of these crucial aspects which go to the root of the matter. 6. (e) On the aspect of the plaintiffs' entitlement to the equitable relief, there is one more aspect which deserves consideration. The suit agreement was executed by K. Abraham, who is said to be the original owner of the property, his wife Kodamala Gnanamma and his daughters Kodamala Parvathamma (defendant No. 2), Kodamala Kamalamma (defendant No. 3), Kodamala alias Kesana Santhamma (defendant No. 1) and his sons Kodamala Eesabu (defendant No. 6) and Kodamala Soloman (defendant No. 4). In other words, the suit agreement of sale was executed by K. Abraham, his wife, three daughters and two sons. The total sale consideration was mentioned in the agreement as Rs. 93,000/-. Under the said agreement of sale, Rs. 18,000/- was paid as advance consideration/earnest money and the balance sale consideration was agreed to be paid before 15.06.1978 and it was further agreed that on such payment the executants of the agreement shall execute a registered sale deed. Thus, there is no recital in the suit agreement of sale that the regular registered sale deed shall be executed in favour of the plaintiffs as and when the balance sale consideration is paid. On the other hand, there is a clear recital in the suit agreement of sale that the balance sale consideration is payable before 15.06.1978. The said fact is suppressed and not averred in the plaint and that on the other hand averments to the contra and to the effect that 'it was agreed to register regular sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs as and when the balance of sale consideration is paid' were made in the plaint. The said fact is suppressed and not averred in the plaint and that on the other hand averments to the contra and to the effect that 'it was agreed to register regular sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs as and when the balance of sale consideration is paid' were made in the plaint. Thus, the plaintiffs who are seeking an equitable relief of specific performance have not come to Court with clean hands. 6. (f) The further aspects which are relevant for consideration in a suit of this nature are as under:- 'The suit agreement of sale is dated 29.03.1978. The balance of sale consideration was agreed to be paid on or before 15.06.1978. PW 1 had also testified as follows: 'It is true that we have to obtain registered sale deed on or before 15.07.1978'. Admittedly the balance sale consideration was not paid within the stipulated date. Though the suit was decreed by the trial Court, there is no direction in the decree in regard to payment of balance of sale consideration. Further, Exhibit A1 agreement was signed by one K. Subbaiah, as the fifth executant, on 30.03.1978 whereas the defendant No. 4 had signed the said agreement on 29.03.1978 as executant No. 6. On this aspect, PW 1 in his cross examination had stated that D6 had signed Exhibit A1 on 30.03.1978 whereas D4 had signed the Exhibit A1 on 29.03.1978. According to the admission of PW 1, Narayana, the first agreement holder, and the plaintiffs 2 and 3 had got issued a legal notice dated 12.06.1978 demanding specific performance and that on receipt of the said notice K. Abraham, the first executant of the agreement, and his wife Gnanamma, the second executant of the agreement, and the defendants 1 to 3 and 6 had approached the counsel, who had got issued the notice, and had given an undertaking to perform their part of the contract on 15.06.1978. His admission in this regard in his deposition reads as under:-'It is true my brother Narayana and the plaintiffs 2 and 3 got issued a legal notice through the office of Sri J. Janaki Ramarao on 12.06.1978 demanding to perform their part of the contract. His admission in this regard in his deposition reads as under:-'It is true my brother Narayana and the plaintiffs 2 and 3 got issued a legal notice through the office of Sri J. Janaki Ramarao on 12.06.1978 demanding to perform their part of the contract. It is true on receipt of the notice Abraham, his wife Gnanamma the defendants 1 to 3 and D6 approached my counsel and gave an undertaking to perform their part of the contract on 15.06.1978.' The served copy of the said notice dated 12.06.1978 is exhibited as Exhibit B1. In his further cross-examination, when it was suggested to him [PW 1] that K. Abraham and his wife and the said defendants 1 to 3 and 6 waited at the Registrar Office, Piduguralla on 15.06.1978 from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. and that they had obtained a receipt to the said effect, he had denied the said suggestion as 'not true'. It is of relevance to note that the said receipt/endorsement issued by the Sub-Registrar, Piduguralla dated 15.06.1978 is Exhibited as B5. The same on a perusal would show that on 15.06.1978 from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. Abraham, his wife and the above said defendants had waited in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Piduguralla pursuant to the notice dated 12.06.1978 for the purpose of executing a registered document. Thus, this receipt would show that despite the fact that the executants of the suit agreement of sale are ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, the agreement holders having got issued a notice through their counsel did not come to the Registrar Office and had failed to perform their part of the contract. Hence, it can safely be concluded that the plaintiffs, even if they are to be considered to be having locus standi to file the suit, still they are not entitled to the equitable relief as they were never ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and for the reasons assigned. Be that as it may. Hence, it can safely be concluded that the plaintiffs, even if they are to be considered to be having locus standi to file the suit, still they are not entitled to the equitable relief as they were never ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and for the reasons assigned. Be that as it may. In the case on hand, there was abnormal delay in seeking specific performance and this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that there was a manifold increase of prices of immovable properties and that therefore, granting of the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 29.03.1978 pursuant to the suit filed in the year 2002 would cause prejudice to the defendants and granting such a relief is inequitable. 7. In the light of the reasoned discussion, it is manifest that as rightly contended by the defendants 2 and 8/the appellants, there is non-application of mind to the facts and evidence on record by the courts below. It is necessary to restate some of the important aspects to sum up the discussion. Firstly, the suit was decreed by the trial court against dead persons viz., defendants 4 to 6 against whom the suit stood abated and the said decree was confirmed by the court of first appeal. Secondly, the courts below failed to examine the suit agreement with regard to the aspect of the parties to the agreement and the locus standi of the plaintiffs to file the suit. Had the courts below perused the Exhibit A1 it would have come to the notice of the courts below that none of the plaintiffs are the agreement holders. Despite the said fact, a decree was granted in favour of plaintiffs 2 and 3 who are not parties to the suit agreement of sale. Thirdly, the fact that after a notice dated 12.06.1978 demanding specific performance, the first executant Abraham and his family members having informed the advocate who had issued the notice and having expressed their willingness to execute the sale deed had waited at the Sub Registrar's Office, Piduguralla on 15.06.1978 but as the agreement holders did not turn up, they had returned back by obtaining an endorsement from the Sub Registrar. Fourthly, the balance of sale consideration payable before 15.06.1978 was not paid even by the date of notice or by the year 2002 in which the suit was instituted. However, while decreeing the suit there was no direction in the decree in regard to the payment of balance of sale consideration. Fifthly, having issued a notice on 12.06.1978, and having made the first executant Abrahim and his family members to wait at the Registrar's office, the agreement holders did not go forward for obtaining a sale deed. They did not even come to court within a reasonable time thereafter and the present suit by the persons having no locus standi was filed in the year 2002 after an inordinate and abnormal delay. Lastly, when defendants 4 to 6 had died and for not bringing on record their legal representatives, the suit stood dismissed as abated against the said defendants, it is not equitable to decree the suit partly as the equity jurisdiction cannot be exercised in favour of the parties who are not diligent and as it is well settled that he who comes to equity must do equity. All these and other important aspects are simply ignored by the courts below would show that there is non-application of mind and that the courts below had failed to deal with the matter in a manner expected of them by law. A plain reading of the judgments of the courts below thus would make it clear that there is non-application of mind and there is lack of diligence on the part of the learned Judges of the courts below. Viewed thus, this Court finds that both the Courts below fell in serious error in granting a decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs 2 and 3, though the said plaintiffs have no locus standi to seek specific performance and the suit against the defendants 4 to 6 stood dismissed as abated. The law is well settled that though it is lawful to grant specific performance, the Court is not bound to grant the relief when it is found that granting such a relief is inequitable under facts and in law. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellants/defendants 2 and 8 holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of specific performance. 8. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellants/defendants 2 and 8 holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of specific performance. 8. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs/contesting respondents had placed reliance on the following decisions Govind Das vs. Kanhiya Lal, (2000) 9 SCC 219 ; T. Jagannadham (died) per L.R. vs. A. Radhakrishna, 1997 (3) ALT 661 (DB); Anamika Roy vs. Jatindra Chowrasiya, 2013 (4) SCJ 792: (2013) 6 SCC 270 and M. Nadar Kesavan Nadar vs. Narayanan Nadar Kunjan Nadar, (2000) 10 SCC 244 and had contended that the Courts below had recorded concurrent findings of fact on all the issues and that therefore there is no question of law much less substantial question of law involved in the second appeal and hence, the second appeal, which is devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed. The party-in-person had also relied upon certain precedents. I have gone through all the decisions relied upon by both the sides. It is no doubt true that under Section 100 of the Code unless there is justification and a substantial question of law is involved, this Court will not interfere with concurrent plausible findings of fact. It is also true that when time is not the essence of contract, a suit for specific performance will not be dismissed on the ground of bar of limitation. Suffice if it is mentioned that interference with the decrees and judgments of the courts below is justified and is called for in this second appeal in the light of the findings recorded supra, having regard to the facts peculiar to the case and the settled legal principles applicable to the case on hand and the substantial questions of law involved and answered in favour of the appellants. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree dated 25.03.2009 in A.S. No. 109/2006 on the file of the Court of the learned V Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Guntur confirming the judgment and decree dated 13.04.2006 in O.S. No. 98/2002 on the file of the Court of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Gurazala, Guntur District, are set aside and the said suit is dismissed with costs throughout. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Second Appeal shall stand dismissed. Appeal dismissed.