JUDGMENT Sanjay Karol, J. State has appealed against the judgment dated 24.3.2008 of the learned Special Judge, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, passed in Sessions Trial No.21-S/7 of 2007, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Vijay Singh alias Rinku, challenging the acquittal of respondent Vijay Singh alias Rinku (hereinafter referred to as the accused), who stands charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the NDPS Act). 2. It is the case of prosecution that on 20.12.2006, police party, comprising of SI Varinder Chauhan (PW-9) accompanied by police officials ASI Chet Ram, Roshan Lal, Kulbir Singh (PW-1), was present on Rivoli Road, in connection with FIR No.297/06, dated 20.12.2006. They saw the accused coming from the side of Lakkar Bazaar Bus Stand. Seeing the police party, he tried to escape, but on suspicion apprehended. On the basis of consent (Ex. PW- 1/A) of the accused, Varinder Chauhan searched the accused. From his personal search one packet containing Charas was recovered. Scale and weight were brought from the shop of Dalip Singh (PW-2); charas was weighed on the spot and found to be of 600 grams. Two samples of 50 grams each were drawn. Remaining bulk parcel as also samples were sealed with seal impression 'A'. On the basis of Ruka (Ex.PW-6/A), which was sent through Kulbir Singh, FIR No.298, dated 20.12.2006 (Ex.PW-6/C), under the provisions of Section 20 of the NDPS Act, was registered at Police Station Sadar, Shimla. The sealed sample was sent through Narinder Singh (PW-4) to CFSL Chandigarh for chemical analysis. Report of the CFSL (Ex.PZ) was taken on record by the police. With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the NDPS Act. to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses and statement of the accused under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took the following plea: "On 20.12.2006, I was taken by the police from Hotel Harbans. 4. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses and statement of the accused under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took the following plea: "On 20.12.2006, I was taken by the police from Hotel Harbans. I had gone to Hotel Harbans to return Rs.2000/- to Bishamber. I and contacted Manger Vijay Ram in the hotel and I returned the money to Bishamber and the police came there and they took me with them and the police also got signatures of Vijay there in the hotel. Vijay told me that go along with police to sign as witness in some case and Vijay along with police officials went to P.S. Sadar and there police told me that you have been arrested in connection with Charas. I am innocent." Accused also examined two witnesses in his defence. 5. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and the material on record, trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offence. Hence, the present appeal by the State. 6. We have heard Mr. B.S. Parmar, learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Mr. J.S. Guleria, Assistant Advocate General, on behalf of the State as also Mr. Manish Sharma, Advocate, on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. In Prandas v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 36 , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under: "(6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under Section 417, Criminal P.c., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in - 'Sheo Swarup v. Emperor', AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) at pp.229, 230 (A), in these words: "Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice." " 9. Varinder Chauhan has proved consent Memo (Ex.PW-1/A). Noticeably, in the said Memo, accused was not informed of his right, as is mandatorily required under the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, of being searched in the presence of police official present on the spot or a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. Even in the Court, neither of the prosecution witnesses, categorically and unambiguously have deposed of informing the accused of such right. 10. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, 1999(6) SCC 172 , has clearly held that accused has a right to be made aware of his right of getting searched before a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. Having regard to the Miranda clause as enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States of America in Miranda v. Arizona [384 US 436], the Constitution Bench held that, although, such communication itself may not necessarily be made in writing but, as far as possible, such communication should be made in the presence of some independent and respectable persons witnessing the arrest and search. It was thereafter held as follows: "57 On the basis of the reasoning and discussion above, the following conclusions arise: (1) That when an empowered officer or a duly authorised officer acting on prior information is about to search a person, it is imperative for him to inform the person concerned of his right under sub-section (1) of Section 50 of being taken to the nearest gazetted officer or the nearest Magistrate for making the search. However, such information may not necessarily be in writing. (2) That failure to inform the person concerned about the existence of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or Magistrate would cause prejudice to an accused." (emphasis supplied) 11. A three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat 2007 (1) SCC 433 noticed the aforementioned dicta laid by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh (Supra) and in no uncertain terms opined that accused must be told of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate. 12. A three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat 2007 (1) SCC 433 noticed the aforementioned dicta laid by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh (Supra) and in no uncertain terms opined that accused must be told of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate. 12. Thereafter, the Apex Court in Man Bahadur v. State of H.P. JT 2008 (10) SC 518 after taking note of judgments held that not only consent of the accused should be taken but he must also be informed of his right of getting himself searched in the presence of the Magistrate. 13. This Court in Ashok Kumar v. State of H.P. Latest HLJ 2009 (HP) 557 has clearly held that if consent memo does not record that accused was informed of his right of being searched before a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer, search is not in conformity with Section 50 of the Act. 14. In Ashok Kumar Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 2 SCC 67 , the apex Court held as under: "8. We may, in this connection, also examine the general maxim "ignorantia juris non excusat" and whether in such a situation the accused could take a defence that he was unaware of the procedure laid down in Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Ignorance does not normally afford any defence under the criminal law, since a person is presumed to know the law. Indisputedly ignorance of law often in reality exists, though as a general proposition, it is true, that knowledge of law must be imputed to every person. But it must be too much to impute knowledge in certain situations, for example, we cannot expect a rustic villager, totally illiterate, a poor man on the street, to be aware of the various law laid down in this country i.e. leave aside the NDPS Act. But it must be too much to impute knowledge in certain situations, for example, we cannot expect a rustic villager, totally illiterate, a poor man on the street, to be aware of the various law laid down in this country i.e. leave aside the NDPS Act. We notice this fact is also within the knowledge of the legislature, possibly for that reason the legislature in its wisdom imposed an obligation on the authorised officer acting under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to inform the suspect of his right under Section 50 to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate warranting strict compliance of that procedure." [Also see: Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 1 SCC 609 (Constitution Bench); and Myla Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P., (2012) 5 SCC 226 ] 15. In view of the law laid down, accused must also be informed about his right and since this was admittedly not done even orally, there is violation of mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the Act, rendering the prosecution case to be fatal. 16. Not only that, we find that accused was apprehended in broad day light in a busy Bazaar. Independent witnesses Dalip Kumar (PW-7) and Subhash (PW-8) have not supported the prosecution case at all. Despite their extensive cross-examination, nothing fruitful could be elicited from their testimony and testimony of police officials who conducted the search and seizure operations are absolutely uninspiring in confidence. We need not dilate on the same in view of our earlier discussion. 17. Hence, it cannot be said that prosecution has been able to prove its case, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence so as to prove that the accused was found in conscious and exclusive possession of Charas. 18. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the parties. 19. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. 18. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the parties. 19. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (2010) 1 SCC 94 , it cannot be said that the Court below has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice. No ground for interference is called for. The present appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any. Appeal Disposed of.