Judgment : RanjitMore, J. 1. By this petition, filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the of India, the petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus to quash and set aside the appointment order dated 13th December, 2006. The petitioner has also claimed a writ of mandamus, commanding the respondents No.1 and 2 to appoint him as a Junior Engineer (Mechanical) with effect from December, 2006 with all consequential benefits. 2. The petitioner's case, in short, is as follows: In the year 2003, the respondents No.1 and 2 in order to fill up the existing vacancies for the post of Junior Engineer (Mech.) and other Junior Engineers, formulated a scheme to select suitable candidates, train them and then to employ them subsequently in the existing vacancies. The petitioner, accordingly, on recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee, underwent one year apprenticeship training in the Public Works Department, Altinho, Panaji,Goa. An advertisement came to be published by respondents No.1 and 2 in the daily "The Navhind Times" on 23.11.2005 for filling up five posts of Junior Engineer in the Department of Respondent No.1. The petitioner claiming himself to be eligible, applied for the said post of Junior Engineer (Mech.). Pursuant to a call letter, the petitioner also appeared for the interview which was held on 17th April, 2006. Since the petitioner was not informed of the result of the said interview, the petitioner visited the Office of respondent No.1 on 26/10/2006 to enquire about the result of the interview. On inquiry, he learnt that respondent No.1 has prepared a list of selected candidates and his name did not figure in the selected list of candidates. The petitioner, thereafter, in the reply given pursuant to his application dated 27th October, 2006 made under Right to Information Act, 2005, found that initially applications were invited for selection of five posts, however, 9 posts of Junior Engineer (Mech.) have been filled in. The petitioner found that respondents No.8 to 10 did not possess either Diploma or Degree in Mechanical Engineering and therefore, they were not eligible for selection. The petitioner found that respondents No.1 and 2 have allocated 55 marks out of 100 for the basic qualification of Diploma/Degree. The petitioner found that respondents No.8 to 10 did not possess either Diploma or Degree in Mechanical Engineering and therefore, they were not eligible for selection. The petitioner found that respondents No.1 and 2 have allocated 55 marks out of 100 for the basic qualification of Diploma/Degree. He further found that if a candidate is first class or distinction, additional 5 marks were allocated, for having Diploma in Computer additional 5 marks were allocated, for representation in sports at the State/National level 5 marks were allocated, for experience only 5 marks were allocated and for oral interview 15 marks were allocated. It is the case of the petitioner that effectively, while making selection, only 45 marks out of 100 allocated for selections, since 55 marks are allocated to the basic qualifications which are required under the Recruitment Rules. The petitioner contends that out of these 45 marks, which the Selection Committee had discretion to allot, 15 marks are reserved for oral interviews. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments: (1) In the case of Mohd. Sartaj and another vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 315 ; and (2) In the case of Director General., Indian Council for Agricultural Research and others vs. D. Sundara Raju reported in (2011) 6 SCC 605 . 3. Respondents No.1 and 2 contested the petition by filing reply. It is the case of the said respondents that the petitioner is not entitled to claim preference in employment merely because he had completed apprenticeship training with respondents No.1 and 2. It was further pointed out that initially there were 5 vacancies, however, since these vacancies increased, 9 posts were filled up which is perfectly legal. Respondents No.1 and 2 also pointed out that the qualification of respondents No.8 and 10 is equivalent to Diploma in Mechanical Engineering. The respondents further pointed out that 5 marks were allotted to respondents No.3 to11 as they participated in sports, either at the State or National level. Lastly, it is contended that allotment of 15 marks for viva voce cannot be said to be arbitrary. The learned Government Advocate has relied upon the following judgments: (1) In the case of AnzarAhmed vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in AIR 1994 SC 141 ; (2) In the case of KiranGupta and others etc. etc. Lastly, it is contended that allotment of 15 marks for viva voce cannot be said to be arbitrary. The learned Government Advocate has relied upon the following judgments: (1) In the case of AnzarAhmed vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in AIR 1994 SC 141 ; (2) In the case of KiranGupta and others etc. etc. vs. State of U.P. and others etc. reported in AIR 2000 SC 3299 . 4. Respondents No.3 to 11 adopted the arguments advanced by on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2. 5. In short, the petitioner challenges appointment of respondents No.3 to 11 on the following grounds: (I) The selection process is vitiated inasmuch as 33% marks are allocated for viva voce; (II) The petitioner ought to have been given preference over the respondents No.3 to 11 as he had undergone apprenticeship training in Mechanical Engineering with respondents No.1 and 2 for a period of one year. (III) Although respondents No.1 and 2 advertised 5 posts, in effect filled in 9 posts. (IV) Respondents No.8 and 10 were holding Diploma in Production Engineering and not in Mechanical Engineering and therefore, were not eligible to be appointed as Junior Engineer (Mech.). (V) 5 marks were illegally allocated to respondents No.3 to 11 when in fact they did not represent in sports, either at the State or National level. 6. At the outset, we would consider the petitioner's contention that allotment of 15 marks for viva voce is illegal. The petitioner has contended that out of 100 marks, respondents No.1 and 2 have allocated 55 marks for basic qualification of diploma/degree and the remaining 45 marks allocated for selection. Out of these 45 marks, the selection committee had discretion to allot 15 marks for viva voce. Thus, in fact, 33% marks are allocated for the oral interview which, according to the petitioner, is contrary to law and illegal. The respondents No.1 and 2, however, supports the allocation of 15 marks for viva voce. 7. The question, whether law laid down by the Apex Court regarding fixation of marks for interview in selection would apply to a case where there is no written test and selection made on the basis of academic performance and interview, fell for consideration before the Apex Court in AnzarAhmed vs. State of Bihar and others (supra). 7. The question, whether law laid down by the Apex Court regarding fixation of marks for interview in selection would apply to a case where there is no written test and selection made on the basis of academic performance and interview, fell for consideration before the Apex Court in AnzarAhmed vs. State of Bihar and others (supra). In that case, the Division Bench considered the earlier decisions of the Apex Court in R. Chitralekha and anr. vs. State of Mysore, [1964] 6 SCR 368; A. Peeriakaruppan, Etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu and ors. [1971] 2 SCR 430, Nishi Maghu Etc. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and ors. [1980] 3 SCR 1253, Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujid Sehravardi & On. Etc. (1981) ILLJ 103 SC and Koshal Kumar Gupta and ors. v. State of Jummu & Kashmir and ors. [1984] 3 SCR 407, Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan and ors. (1981) IILLJ 297 SC and Ashok Kumar Yadav and ors. etc. etc. v. State of Haryana and ors. etc. etc. [1985] Suppl. 1 SCR 657, and held that there is no hard and fast rule regarding the precise weight to be given to the viva voce test, as against the written examination. It was further held that the question of weight to be attached to viva voce would not arise where the selection is to be made on the basis of interview only. The Apex Court ultimately upheld the allocation of 50% marks for viva voce. The facts of the present case and the facts of the case before the Apex Court in AnzarAhmed vs. State of Bihar and others (supra) are similar in as much as here was no written examination and the selection was on the basis of oral interview only. 8. Another Division Bench of the Apex Court in KiranGupta and others etc. etc. vs. State of U.P. and others etc.(supra), while considering the justifiability of allocation of more than 15 % marks for interview, made the following observations in para 22 of the judgment. “22. It is difficult to accept the omnibus contention that selection on the basis of viva voce only is arbitrary and illegal and that since allocation of 15% marks for interview was held to be arbitrary by this Court, selections solely based on interview is a fortiori illegal. “22. It is difficult to accept the omnibus contention that selection on the basis of viva voce only is arbitrary and illegal and that since allocation of 15% marks for interview was held to be arbitrary by this Court, selections solely based on interview is a fortiori illegal. It will be useful to bear in mind that there is no rule of thumb with regard to allotment of percentage of marks for interview. It depends on several factors and the question of permissible percentage of marks for an interview test has to be decided on the facts of each case. However, the decisions of this Court with regard to reasonableness of percentage of marks allotted for interview in cases of admission to educational institutions/ schools will not afford a proper guidance in determining the permissible percentage of marks for interview in cases of selection/appointment to the posts in various services. Even in this class, there may be two categories: (i) when the selection is by both a written test and viva voce; and (ii) by viva voce alone. The courts have frowned upon prescribing higher percentage of marks for interview when selection is on the basis of both oral interview and a written test. But, where oral interview alone has been the criteria for selection/appointment/promotion to any posts in senior positions the question of higher percentage of marks for interview does not arise.” From the perusal of these decisions, it is clear that where oral interview has been the criteria for selection, the question of higher percentage of marks for interview does not arise and the same may even exceed 15%. 9. In the light of the above decisions of the Apex Court, we do not find any merit in the petitioner's grievance that more than 15% marks were allocated for oral interview. The petitioner in this regard relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of the Apex Court in Director General., Indian Council for Agricultural Research and others vs. D. Sundara Raju (supra). The said decision would not be applicable to the facts of the case in hand, inasmuch as the Apex Court was considering the selection process by way of promotion of Senior Scientist to next higher grade of Principal Scientist. 10. This takes us to consider the other objections of the petitioner to the selection process. The said decision would not be applicable to the facts of the case in hand, inasmuch as the Apex Court was considering the selection process by way of promotion of Senior Scientist to next higher grade of Principal Scientist. 10. This takes us to consider the other objections of the petitioner to the selection process. The petitioner claims preference over the respondents No.3 to 11 since, according to him, he has completed one year apprenticeship training with respondents No.1 and 2. In our view, the petitioner cannot claim preference in this regard as he was specifically made aware at the time of engaging, by order dated 29.10.2003 that it would not be binding for the respondents to appoint the petitioner against a regular post. 11. As regards the petitioner's grievance that 9 posts were filled up though only 5 posts were advertised is concerned, we do not find any merit inasmuch as the advertisement itself had made it clear that the vacancies were likely to be increased and since vacancies were increased, 9 posts were filled up. In any case, the petitioner cannot be said to have been prejudiced by filling up 9 posts of Junior Engineers. 12. The petitioner also raised a grievance about selection of respondents No.8 and 10 on the ground that they were holding Diploma in Production Engineering and as such not eligible to be appointed as Junior Engineers (Mech.). Respondents No.1 and 2, in this regard, have specifically contended that the Diploma in Production Engineering is at par with the Diploma in Mechanical Engineering and in this regard relied upon a letter dated 30th July, 2007 of the Director, Directorate of Technical Education, Porvorim, Goa. The petitioner relying upon a decision in the case of Mohd. Sartaj and another vs. State of U.P. and others (supra), submitted that a certificate subsequent to the selection process cannot be relied upon. In our considered view, the decision in the case of Mohd. Sartaj and another vs. State of U.P. and others, has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case, the degree of Moallim-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh was granted equivalence with that of Basic Teacher's Certificate (BTC) in the year 1994; whereas the selection was made in the year 1985. However, in the present case, the Diploma in Production Engineering and the Diploma in Mechanical Engineering are at par since inception. In that case, the degree of Moallim-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh was granted equivalence with that of Basic Teacher's Certificate (BTC) in the year 1994; whereas the selection was made in the year 1985. However, in the present case, the Diploma in Production Engineering and the Diploma in Mechanical Engineering are at par since inception. The Director of Technical Education has merely given a certificate on 30th June, 2007. That does not mean that equivalence is granted by the said certificate. In fact, this equivalence was prevailing even prior to the time when the selection process was in progress. 13. So far as the grievance of the petitioner that 5 marks were wrongly allotted to respondents No.3 to 11 on the ground that they represented in the sports either at State or National level is concerned, we do not find any substance. The petitioner claims that he is also in possession of certificate similar to those produced by respondents No.3 to 11. Had the petitioner produced such a certificate at time of interview, the same would have not made much difference inasmuch as the petitioner was placed at Sr. No.104 in the merit list. 14. Taking overall facts and circumstances into consideration, we do not find any merit in this writ petition. The same is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.