JUDGMENT : Per Ravindra V. Ghuge, J. :- 1. Heard the learned advocates for the respective sides. 2. Rule. 3. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally with the consent of the parties. 4. The petitioner, by this petition, seeks to challenge his termination by order dated 29th of May 2014 passed by the 2nd respondent - Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Mumbai. By the impugned order dated 29th of May 2014, the services of the petitioner on probation have been terminated on account of unsatisfactory work. 5. The petitioner contends that he came to be appointed as a Stenographer (Lower Grade), with the Labour Court at Thane. His order of appointment is dated 10th of September 2012. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was on probation for a period of one year. It is also not in dispute that his services, as a probationer, could be terminated without prior notice and without assigning any reasons. 6. The petitioner submits that his services were transferred, by order dated 17th of January 2003 by the respondent No. 2, from Thane to Ratnagiri citing administrative exigencies. He was relieved from his posting at Thane by order dated 21st of January 2013. He joined duties as per the transfer order with the respondent No. 3 Labour Court at Ratnagiri. It is noteworthy that the communication dated 17th of January 2013 issued by the competent authority to the petitioner evidences the fact that he was transferred on his request and he was given an ultimatum to improve his performance as a stenographer and typist. He was intimated that he was being given a last opportunity for improving his performance. 7. The petitioner submits that by the impugned order dated 29th of May 2014, the competent authority terminated his services on grounds of unsuitability / unsatisfactory work. He was relieved from his employment, as a probationer, with effect from 31st of May 2014. The petitioner, therefore, submits that his termination is stigmatic. The impugned termination order attributes a stigma to his performance. 8. In the above backdrop, the petitioner contends that his termination amounts to dismissal from service without conducting any disciplinary enquiry against him. He had been working with the 2nd respondent as a stenographer in an efficient manner. He was not issued with any memo or show cause notice on account of any shortcomings or a misconduct. 8. In the above backdrop, the petitioner contends that his termination amounts to dismissal from service without conducting any disciplinary enquiry against him. He had been working with the 2nd respondent as a stenographer in an efficient manner. He was not issued with any memo or show cause notice on account of any shortcomings or a misconduct. He had accepted his transfer without any protest and had reported for his duties with the 3rd respondent. 9. The petitioner therefore submits that having been appointed as a probationer for one year on 10th of September 2012, he had completed his probation period successfully on 10 September 2013. He therefore contends that having completed one year's probation period and having been continued even thereafter, he had attained the deemed status of a permanent employee. According to him, his services stood confirmed with effect from 10th of September 2013. As such, having attained the deemed status of a permanent employee, he could not have been terminated, by the impugned order, without issuing any charge sheet or show cause notice. The impugned termination order therefore suffers from illegality, primarily on the ground of being a stigmatic order and also on account of the respondents failing to conduct a disciplinary proceeding against him in order to prove the charge of unsatisfactory performance. 10. The petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of V.P.Ahuja Vs. State of Punjab and others ( AIR 2000 SC 1080 ). It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has viewed the termination of a probationer for unsatisfactory work as being a stigmatic order. 11. It is therefore submitted that the impugned termination order is rendered illegal and unsustainable. The respondents are at liberty to issue a charge sheet to the petitioner for having allegedly performed in an unsatisfactory manner and the petitioner is prepared to face a disciplinary proceeding as well as the consequences flowing therefrom. It is emphatically submitted that this petition deserves to be allowed in this backdrop and the petitioner deserves to be reinstated and declared as being a permanent employee. 12. The respondents have filed an affidavit in reply. It is contended that the petitioner was appointed as a probationer Stenographer (Lower Grade). There is neither any Rule nor any statute which will entitle the petitioner to claim the deemed status of a permanent employee. 12. The respondents have filed an affidavit in reply. It is contended that the petitioner was appointed as a probationer Stenographer (Lower Grade). There is neither any Rule nor any statute which will entitle the petitioner to claim the deemed status of a permanent employee. Permanency/ regularisation can be granted only in accordance with the law and by issuing an express order. There cannot be deemed confirmation of a probationer. 13. The respondents, in view of the petitioner having filed this petition, have placed on record certain details that have been considered while arriving at a conclusion that the services of the petitioner were unsatisfactory. 14. It is submitted that while he was working with the Labour Court Thane, it was noticed that his grammar was weak. He was committing mistakes in typewriting. He could not type / record the deposition of witnesses. The Judicial Officer had to himself record such deposition in his own handwriting. He was incapable of taking print out of documents. He was given few memos by the Labour Court which he did not reply to. 15. He was issued with a memo dated 3rd December 2012 giving him a last opportunity to improve his performance. He responded by making a request vide his letter dated 4th January 2013 that he be transferred to the 3rd respondent. He was continued in employment as a probationer even beyond his probation period since it was desired to test his suitability. By doing so, he was given an opportunity to improve his work and thereby his suitability. When it was noticed that he could not improve, that the respondent No. 2 competent authority issued the impugned order of termination. 16. It is further submitted that the impugned order merely indicates to the petitioner that his probation period is being brought to an end only on account of his unsatisfactory performance. It is an innocuous order which does not attach any stigma to the petitioner. The competent authority could not have issued a termination order without mentioning that his services were found to be unsatisfactory and unsuitable. The petitioner was aware that he was a probationer and he was being tested for his suitability. By the few memo issued to him, he was made aware that he was expected to improve his performance. 17. The competent authority could not have issued a termination order without mentioning that his services were found to be unsatisfactory and unsuitable. The petitioner was aware that he was a probationer and he was being tested for his suitability. By the few memo issued to him, he was made aware that he was expected to improve his performance. 17. It is further submitted that the 3rd respondent confidentially conveyed to the competent authority that the performance of the petitioner was very poor and unsatisfactory. This communication by one judicial officer to an another judicial officer does not create any right in the petitioner to demand a copy of such a confidential letter. By the said letter, the 3rd respondent merely conveyed to the competent authority that the petitioner was not working in a satisfactory manner. Copies of the said memos have been placed on record. 18. The respondents further submitted that by a communication dated 4th January 2013, the petitioner informed the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court at Thane that he was not able to perform his work properly since he was inexperienced. He assured that he would make every effort to improve his performance. He then requested for being transferred to another place where he would make an effort to improve his performance. The said letter is on record. As such, by letter dated 17th of January 2013, the competent authority informed the petitioner that his request for transfer to the respondent No.3 Court at Ratnagiri was being accepted and he was being given a last opportunity of improving his performance. He was also informed that if his performance remains unsatisfactory, further action would be taken by the competent authority. 19. The respondent therefore contends that the petitioner never raised the plea that he had attained the deemed status of permanency and that the competent authority could not issue him such letters whereby it was conveyed that he should improve his performance. The confidential letter written by the 3rd respondent to the competent authority is also placed on record and which clearly speaks only about the weak performance of the petitioner. It does not refer to any misconduct or any such act which could be termed as a misdemeanor. 20. The respondent therefore submitted that the whole effort was to enable the petitioner to improve his performance, based on which the competent authority was to consider his suitability. It does not refer to any misconduct or any such act which could be termed as a misdemeanor. 20. The respondent therefore submitted that the whole effort was to enable the petitioner to improve his performance, based on which the competent authority was to consider his suitability. The petitioner was aware that he was being tested for his suitability. 21. The respondents therefore submit that the claim of the petitioner is wholly misconceived and unsustainable. The petitioner was engaged as a Lower Grade Stenographer in a judicial establishment and his unsuitability could not have been countenanced. The Rules do not prescribe for deemed permanency and any such conclusion is likely to seriously affect the working of the Courts. 22. The respondents have relied upon the following reported judgments:- 1 Progressive Education Society and another Vs. Rajendra and others 2008 (2) LLN 729 – SC 2 Kunwar Arun Kumar Vs. Uttar Pradesh Hill Electronics Corporation Ltd. And others – 1997 (1) LLN 570- SC 3 K. V. Kirshnamani Vs. Lalit Kala Academy – 1996 AIR (SC) 2444 4 Ram Gopal Chaturvedi Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh – 1970 AIR (SC) 158 5 Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore vs. Pandurang Godwalkar – 1993 AIR SC 932 6 T.G.Pillai Vs. Indian Institute of Technology, Gani, Madras – 197 AIR (SC) 1811 7 State of Orissa Vs. Jyoti Ranjan Kar – 1995 (Supp.4) SCC 651 and 8 T.B.Thomas Vs. Indian Rare Earths Ltd. - 2010 (1) LLN 558. 23. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective sides, we have gone through the petition paper book with their assistance. 24. It is undisputed that the petitioner's probationary services have been terminated by the impugned order which clearly indicates unsatisfactory work by the petitioner. Contention of the petitioner is that even mentioning in the termination order that his services are unsatisfactory, would tantamount to a stigmatic termination. According to the petitioner, saying that the services of the petitioner were unsatisfactory would cast a serious doubt on his ability. Such a doubt would therefore amount to an allegation of misconduct. Any such allegation needs to be enquired into and the respondents were at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. We are unable to accept such a submission. According to the petitioner, saying that the services of the petitioner were unsatisfactory would cast a serious doubt on his ability. Such a doubt would therefore amount to an allegation of misconduct. Any such allegation needs to be enquired into and the respondents were at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. We are unable to accept such a submission. It is trite that termination of the services of a probationer upon being found unsatisfactory or unsuitable would not mean that the employer had levelled a charge against a probationer. 25. The petitioner has placed reliance upon the V.P.Ahuja case (supra) to support his contention that unsatisfactory work amounts to a charge. We have gone through the facts set out in the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court. It is noted in paragraph 2 of the said judgment as under :- "ORDER Sh. V.P. Ahuja, S/o Late Sh. H.N. Ahuja was appointed on probation for 2 years as Chief Executive of the Coop. Spg. Mills Ltd., vide orders No. Spinfed/ CCA/ 7844-45 dated 29.9.98 and posted at Bacospin. However, he failed in the performance of his duties administratively & technically. Therefore, as per Clause-I of the said appointment order, the services of Sh. V.P. Ahuja are hereby terminated with immediate effect. Sd/- (Managing Director) SPINFED" 26. It is clear that in the said case, the employer had stated in the order of termination that the employee had failed in the performance of his duties administratively and technically. We find that the language used in the said termination order clearly indicated the failure of the employee to perform his duties, both administrative as well as technical. The said words indeed have their own implication and meaning. We also find the same to be stigmatic. 27. However in the case at hand the competent authority has merely stated that his work was unsatisfactory. It would only mean that the performance of the petitioner did not satisfy his employer. Needless to state, this indicates an element of dis-satisfaction on the part of the employer. We therefore find that the satisfaction of an employer would not necessarily attribute a charge of misconduct on an employee. 28. In the case of Kunwar Arun Kumar (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has noted in paragraph number 5 as follows:- “5. The petitioner challenged the order of termination in the High Court. We therefore find that the satisfaction of an employer would not necessarily attribute a charge of misconduct on an employee. 28. In the case of Kunwar Arun Kumar (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has noted in paragraph number 5 as follows:- “5. The petitioner challenged the order of termination in the High Court. The High Court without going into the question whether or not it is stigma, came to the conclusion that the respondents had totally lost confidence in the appellant and that he was totally unsuitable to the job for which he was employed and, therefore, he was found not entitled to any enquiry. Consequently, it dismissed the writ petition. Shri Sehgal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, contends that the finding recorded amounts to a stigma; action taken without conducting enquiry and giving an opportunity to the petitioner, is violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the rules made thereunder. Therefore, he is entitled to an opportunity of being heard and be dismissed only on the ground of misconduct and not by termination simpliciter. We do not agree with the learned counsel. The order may be a motive and not a foundation as a ground for dismissal. During the period of probation, the authorities are entitled to assess the suitability of the candidates and if it is found that the candidate is not suitable to remain in service they are entitled to record a finding of unsatisfactory performance of the work and duties during the period of probation. Under these circumstance, necessarily the appointing authority has to look into the performance of the work and duties during the period of probation and if they record a finding that during that probation period, the work and performance of the duties were unsatisfactory, they are entitled to terminate the service in terms of the letter of appointment without conducting any enquiry. That does not amount to any stigma. If the record does not support such a conclusion reached by the authorities, different complexion would arise. In this case, they have recorded the finding that the petitioner was regularly absent on one ground or the other. Under these circumstances, the respondents terminated his services. We do not find any illegality in the action taken by the respondents.” 29. If the record does not support such a conclusion reached by the authorities, different complexion would arise. In this case, they have recorded the finding that the petitioner was regularly absent on one ground or the other. Under these circumstances, the respondents terminated his services. We do not find any illegality in the action taken by the respondents.” 29. In the case of K.V.Krishnamani (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has noted in paragraph number 4 as follows :- “It is contended by the appellant that since the averments made in the counter would constitute foundation for dismissal for misconduct, an enquiry in this behalf was required to be made. On the other hand, it is contended by the respondent that during the probation the appellant did not acquire any right to the post. If on being found suitable he was regularised, only then he would have acquired the right to continue in the post. During probation, it was found that his services were not satisfactory and reasons were given in support thereof. Thus they do not constitute foundation but motive to terminate the services. We find force in the contention of the respondent. They have explained that the driving of the staff car was not satisfactory and that, therefore, they have terminated the services of the appellant during probation. They very object of the probation is to test the suitability and if the appointing authority finds that the candidate is not suitable, it certainly has power to terminate the services of the employee. Under these circumstances, it cannot but be held that the reasons mentioned constitute motive and not foundation for termination of service. Therefore, we hold that the High Court has not committed any error of law.” 30. In the case of Ram Gopal (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has observed in paragraph number 8 and 9 as follows :- “8. It was next argued that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment without giving the appellant an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action and was therefore violative of Art. 311 of the Constitution. In this connection, counsel It for the appellant drew our attention to the statement of case filed on behalf of the respondent. It was next argued that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment without giving the appellant an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action and was therefore violative of Art. 311 of the Constitution. In this connection, counsel It for the appellant drew our attention to the statement of case filed on behalf of the respondent. It appears that there were complaints that the appellant was associating with a young girl named Miss Laxmi Surve against the wishes of her father and other members of her family. The Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh made inquiries into the matterand on February 19, 1954 he admonished the appellant for this disreputable conduct. On his return to Jabalpur on February 28, 1964 the Chief Justice dictated the following note: "During my recent visit to Gwalior, I probed into the matter of Shri R. G. Chaturvedi, Special Magistrate (Motor Vehicles), Gwalior, giving shelter to a girl named Kumari Laxmi Surve, the daughter of a Chowkidar employed in the J. C. Mills Gwalior. The enquiry made by me revealed that Shri Chaturvedi has been associating with this girl for over a year and his relations with her are not at all innocent. He is sheltering and supporting Miss Surve against the wishes of her father and other members of her family. This is evident from the fact that on 14th December 1963, when the girl was at the residence of Shri Chaturvedi and when her younger brother came to take her back, his house was stormed by a mob of 300 to 400 persons. A report of this incident was also recorded in the Roz- namcha-Am of Lashkar Kotwali. The statement published by Miss Surve in some newspapers published from Gwalior explaining his action and her relation with her parents is significant. In that statement Miss Surve gave her address as 'C/o. Shri Chaturvedi. That the statement is one inspired by Shri Chaturvedi is obvious enough. Shri Chaturvedi is still maintaining the girl. Shri Chaturvedi did not enjoy good reputation at Morena and Kolaras where he was posted before his posting at Gwalior. In that statement Miss Surve gave her address as 'C/o. Shri Chaturvedi. That the statement is one inspired by Shri Chaturvedi is obvious enough. Shri Chaturvedi is still maintaining the girl. Shri Chaturvedi did not enjoy good reputation at Morena and Kolaras where he was posted before his posting at Gwalior. Shri Bajpai, District Judge, Gwalior, also informed me that Shri Chaturvedi was not honest and that in collaboration with the Traffic Inspector he has taken money from accused persons in many cases under the Motor Vehicles Act." No charge-sheet was served on the appellant nor was any departmental inquiry held against him. On March 10, 1964 the Madhya Pradesh High Court passed a resolution that the State Government should terminate the appellant's services. Having regard to this resolution the State Government passed the impugned order dated March 25, 1964. On the face of it, the order did not cast any stigma on the appellant's character or integrity nor did it visit him with any evil consequences. It was not passed by way of punishment and the provisions of Art. 311 were not attracted. 9. It was immaterial that the order was preceded by an informal inquiry into the appellant's conduct with a view to ascertain whether he should be retained in service. As was pointed out in The State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur ( AIR 1968 SC 1089 ):- "An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution." 31. In the case of Pandurang Godwalkar (supra) the Honourable Supreme Court has noted in paragraph numbers 7, 8 and 9 as follows :- “7. When an appointment is made on probation, it presupposes that the conduct, performance, ability and the capacity of the employee concerned have to be watched and examined during the period of probation. He is to be confirmed after the expiry of probation only when his service during the period of probation is found to be satisfactory and he is considered suitable for the post against which he has been appointed. He is to be confirmed after the expiry of probation only when his service during the period of probation is found to be satisfactory and he is considered suitable for the post against which he has been appointed. The principle of tearing of the veil for finding out the real nature of the order shall be applicable only in a case where the Court is satisfied that there is a direct nexus between the charge so levelled and the action taken. If the decision is taken, to terminate the service of an employee during the period of probation, after taking into consideration the overall performance and some action or inaction on the part of such employee then it cannot be said that it amounts to his removal from service as punishment. It need not be said that the appointing authority at the stage of confirmation or while examining the question as to whether the service of such employee be terminated during the continuance of the period of probation is entitled to look into any complaint made in respect of such employee while discharging his duties for purpose of making assessment of the performance of such employee. 8. Even it such employee while questioning the validity of an order of termination simpliciter brings on the record that some preliminary enquiry or examination of some allegations had been made that will not vitiate the order of termination. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Dr. Mohd. S. Iskender Ali where it was pointed out that a temporary employee is appointed on probation for a particular period only in order to test whether his conduct is good and satisfactory so that he may be retained. It was also said that even if misconduct negligence inefficiency may be the motive or the influencing factor which induced the employer to terminate the service of the employee which such employee admittedly had under the terms of the appointment such termination cannot be held to be penalty or punishment. Same view has been reiterated in connection with appointment on temporary or ad hoc basis in the cases of Ravindra Kumar Misra v. U.P. State Handloom Corpn. Ltd,; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, and Triveni Shankar Saxena v. State of U.P. 9. Same view has been reiterated in connection with appointment on temporary or ad hoc basis in the cases of Ravindra Kumar Misra v. U.P. State Handloom Corpn. Ltd,; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, and Triveni Shankar Saxena v. State of U.P. 9. On behalf of the respondent reliance was placed on the case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India. In that case the service of the appellant had been terminated during the period of probation. On the materials on record it was held by this Court that the order of termination really amounted to punishment because the real foundation of the action against the appellant was the act of misconduct on June 22, 1981. The aforesaid judgment is of no help to the respondent because in that case a clear finding was recorded by this Court that the service of the appellant had been terminated because of a particular misconduct alleged against him which had never been enquired into. So far the facts of the present case are concerned the Governing Council examined the different reports in respect of the respondent during the period of probation and considered the question as to whether he should be allowed to continue in the service of the Institute. The decision appears to have been taken by the Governing Council on the total and overall assessment of the performance of the respondent, in terms of the condition of the appointment and Rule aforesaid.” 32. In the case of T.G.Pillai (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has noted in paragraph numbers 7 and 8 as follows :- “It is well settled that a probationer or a temporary servant can be discharged if it is found that he is not suitable for the post which he is holding. This can be done without complying with the provisions of Art. 311(2) unless the services are terminated by way of punishment. Suitability does not depend merely on the 560 excellence or proficiency in work. There are many factors which enter into consideration for confirming a person who is on probation. A particular attitude or tendency displayed by an employee can well influence the decision of the confirming authority while judging his suitability or fitness for confirmation. In the present case the Board of Governors consisted of a number of distinguished and well known academicians and teachers. A particular attitude or tendency displayed by an employee can well influence the decision of the confirming authority while judging his suitability or fitness for confirmation. In the present case the Board of Governors consisted of a number of distinguished and well known academicians and teachers. Although there is a mention in the resolution about the confidential reports by the head of the department and the Director but they have not been placed on the record. Even assuming that those reports were favourable so far as the academic work of the appellant was concerned the Board was entitled to take into consideration the other matters which have already been mentioned for the purpose of deciding whether he should be confirmed or whether he should be given a notice of one month as per the terms of the letter of appointment. The Board decided to adopt the latter course. By no stretch of reasoning can it be said that the appellant had been punished and that his services had been dispensed with as a penal measure.” 33. As such, taking into account the facts of this case and the law applicable, we are of the considered view that the impugned termination order of the petitioner does not amount to casting any stigma on the petitioner. It is evident from the impugned order that his termination has occurred merely on account of his unsatisfactory work. We find the said order to be innocuous and not stigmatic. 34. So far as the contention of the petitioner that having worked beyond the period of probation, entitles him to the deemed status of permanency is concerned, we are not impressed by the said contention. A deeming provision, in our view, has to necessarily flow from an act or statute. In short, a deeming provision is the creation of law. The petitioner has not pointed out any provision applicable, to suggest or indicate that the continuance of the petitioner beyond the probation period of one year would bestow upon him the deemed status of a permanent employee. 35. The Honourable Supreme Court has dealt with a similar situation in the case of Wasim Beg v State of UP and others - (1998) 3 SCC 321 . In paragraph numbers 15, 16 and 17, the Apex Court has noted as under :- “15. 35. The Honourable Supreme Court has dealt with a similar situation in the case of Wasim Beg v State of UP and others - (1998) 3 SCC 321 . In paragraph numbers 15, 16 and 17, the Apex Court has noted as under :- “15. Whether an employee at the end of probationary period automatically gets confirmation in the post or whether an order of confirmation or any specific act on the part of the employer confirming the employee is necessary, will depend upon the provisions in the relevant Service Rules relating to probation and confirmation. There are broadly two sets of authorities of this Court dealing with this question. In those cases where the Rules provide for a maximum period of probation beyond which probation cannot be extended, this Court had held that at the end of the maximum probationary period there will be deemed confirmation of the employee unless Rules provide to the contrary. This is the line of cases starting with State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh (1968 [3] SCR 1), M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank & Ors. (1987) Supp. SCC 643), Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow & Ors. (1986 Supp. SCC 95), State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh C. Bhargav & Ors. (1987 [4] SCC 482). 16. However, even when the Rules prescribe a maximum period of probation, if there is a further provision in the Rules for continuation of such probation beyond the maximum period, the courts have made an exception and said that there will be no deemed confirmation in such cases and the probation period will be deemed to be extended. In this category of cases we can place Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. (1974 [2] SCC 831) which was the decision of a Bench of seven judges where the principle of probation not going beyond the maximum period fixed was reiterated but on the basis of the Rules which were before the Court, this Court said that the probation was deemed to have been extended. A similar view was taken in the case of Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra (1991 [3] SCC 325). In Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. A similar view was taken in the case of Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra (1991 [3] SCC 325). In Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (1996 [1] SCC 560), although the Rules prescribed that the probationary period should not exceed two years, and an order of confirmation was also necessary, the termination order was issued within the extended period of probation. Hence the termination was upheld. 17. The other line of cases deals with Rules where there is no maximum period prescribed for probation and either there is a Rule providing for extension of probation or there is a Rule which requires a specific act, on the part of the employer (either by issuing an order of confirmation or any similar act) which would result in confirmation of the employee. In these cases unless there is such an order of confirmation, the period of probation would continue and there would be no deemed confirmation at the end of the prescribed probationary period. In this line of cases one can put Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab (1963 [1] SCR 416), State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akbar Ali Khan (1966 [3] SCR 821), Shri Kedar Nath Bahl v. The State of Punjab & Ors. (1974 [3] SCC 21), Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1985 [2] SCC 5) and Tarsem Lal Verma v. Union of India and Ors. (1997 [9] SCC 243), Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra (supra) and State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla (1996 [9] SCC 190). In the recent case of Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P. and Anr. ( AIR 1997 SC 3269 ) (to which one of us was a party) all these cases have been analysed and it has been held that where the Rules provide that the period of probation cannot be extended beyond the maximum period there will be a deemed confirmation at the end of the maximum probationary period unless there is anything to the contrary in the Rules.” 36. Similarly, the Honourable Supreme Court, in the case of Ali M.K.and others v State of Kerala and others - (2003) 11 SCC 632, while dealing with the term ‘deemed’, has observed in paragraph 15 and 16 as follows :- “15. Similarly, the Honourable Supreme Court, in the case of Ali M.K.and others v State of Kerala and others - (2003) 11 SCC 632, while dealing with the term ‘deemed’, has observed in paragraph 15 and 16 as follows :- “15. When a thing is to be "deemed" something else, it is to be treated as that something else with the attendant consequences, but it is not that something else (per Cave J., R. v. Norfolk County Court 60 L.J.Q.B.380)." When a statute gives a definition and then adds that certain things shall be 'deemed' to be covered by the definition, it matters not whether without that addition the definition would have covered them or not": (per Lord President Cooper in Ferguson v. McMillan, 1954, S.L.T.109). 16. Whether the word "deemed" when used in a statute established a conclusive or a rebuttable presumption depended upon the context (See St. Leon Village Consolidated School District v. Ronceray [1960] 23 D.L.R. (2 d) 32)."I....regard its primary function as to bring in something which would otherwise be excluded" (Per Viscount Simonds in Barclays Bank v. I.R.C.[1961] A.C.509). "Deems" means "is of opinion" or "considers" or "decides" and there is no implication of steps to be taken before the opinion is formed or the decision is taken." (See Rv. Brixion Prison Governor ex.p.Soblen (1962) 3 All E.R.)” 37. As such, we are of the considered view that unless the Rules provide for deemed confirmation in employment, the petitioner would not be correct in assuming the deemed status of permanency. 38. In the light of the above, we are unable to accept the submissions of the petitioner. We therefore find that this petition is devoid of merit. As such, the petition is dismissed. Rule stands discharged with no order as to costs.