Judgment Sureshwar Thakur, J. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, rendered on 13.6.2002, in Civil Appeal No.99-CA/13 of 2001, by the learned District Judge, Sirmaur at Nahan, H.P., whereby, the learned First Appellate Court while allowing the appeal, preferred by the appellants/respondents, set aside the judgment and decree, rendered by the trial Court on 14.9.2001. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs/appellants have filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants/respondents from raising any construction in any manner over and upon their land comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 499 min/665, Khasra No. 73 min measuring 1-0 bigha situated in Mauza Devi Nagar, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur. It is alleged that there is a path in the aforesaid land and the respondents/defendants have no right title or interest in this land. It is also alleged that the defendants/respondents are trying to raise the construction on the path aforesaid and are not ready to stop the construction despite repeated requests. 3. The defendants/respondents contested the suit by filing written statement wherein they have admitted the fact that they have no right title and interest over and upon the land in question but however they claim that they are using the path existing thereon. They further denied that they are causing interference in the land in question. 4. The plaintiffs/appellants did not choose to file the replication to the written statement of the defendant/respondent. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court struck following issues inter-se the parties in contest:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction, as claimed? OPP 2. Relief. 5. On appraisal of the evidence, adduced before the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs/appellants, to the extent that the defendant/respondents were restrained from raising any type of construction over khasra No. 499/665 and over path in the aforesaid Khasra Number. In appeal, preferred before the learned first Appellate Court, against the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, by the respondents/defendants, the learned first Appellate Court allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment of the learned trial Court. 6. Now the plaintiff No.1/appellant has instituted the instant Regular Second Appeal before this Court, assailing the findings, recorded by the learned first Appellate Court, in, its impugned judgment and decree. 6. Now the plaintiff No.1/appellant has instituted the instant Regular Second Appeal before this Court, assailing the findings, recorded by the learned first Appellate Court, in, its impugned judgment and decree. When the appeal came up for admission on 25.7.2002, this Court, admitted the appeal, on, the hereinafter extracted substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the learned District Judge has erred in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs for permanent prohibitory injunction after holding the plaintiffs have proved their legal rights in the suit land but the plaintiffs have not proved the threatened acts of defendants No. 1 to 5 on the suit land when it is pleaded case of defendants No. 1 to 5 in the written statement that they have right of passage on the suit land? 2. Whether the learned District Judge has misconstrued, misinterpreted and misapplied the pleadings and evidence on record in reversing the judgment, decree dated 14.9.2001 of learned Sub Judge and the view taken by the learned District Judge is not possible on the basis of material on record? Substantial questions of Law No. 1 and 2. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff No.1/appellant has contended with force and vigour that the learned first appellate Court while having held that the plaintiffs/appellants are vested with a valid and subsisting right to use the suit land, it, was then legally insagacious, for the learned first appellate Court while reversing the judgment and decree of learned trial Court rendered in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants to hold that for want of proof of actual or threatened invasion qua the rights of the plaintiffs/appellants over/upon the suit land, the suit of the plaintiffs/appellant necessitated dismissal. He further canvasses that the said reasoning as adopted by the learned first appellate Court to reverse the findings recorded in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants by the learned trial Court too is infirm as a perusal of the testimony of plaintiff No.1/appellant surges forth an inference that hence material and potent proof demonstrative of the factum of the respondents/defendants having indulged in acts of interference over/upon the settled rights of the plaintiff No.1/appellants in the suit land, had emanated. 8. 8. On the other hand the learned counsel appearing for the defendants/respondents has fervently strained himself to canvass before this Court that the judgment and decree rendered by the first appellate Court has both legal force as well as is meritorious, hence necessitates vindication. 9. Preeminently, even if the plaintiffs/appellant may have proven the acts of invasion or threatened invasion, if any, attributed to the defendants/respondents and their resulting in the rights of the plaintiffs/appellants qua the suit land having come to be upsurged, nonetheless the gaze of both the Courts below ought to have centralized or focused upon the fact that the suit land which bears Khasra No. 73 Min. whereupon the acts of invasion or threatened invasion purportedly perpetrated at the instance of the defendants/respondents sequelling accrual of action in favour of plaintiffs/appellants, is recorded in the classification column in Jamabandis for the years 1963-64, 1994-95, to be “Abadi Deh”. In the ownership column of the apposite Jamabandies the entry of “Abadi Deh” exists, hence conveying the fact that the suit property is recorded in the ownership of the village proprietary body. Concomitantly, with the ownership of the suit land vesting in the village proprietary body and when it has not been portrayed or proven by potent evidence that the defendants/respondents did not have a compatible right with the plaintiffs/appellants in commensuration with their rights therein to possess it by rearing a construction thereon. Consequently, omission of above evidence, on record, constrains this Court to conclude that hence the respondents/defendants too alongwith the plaintiffs/appellants had a right to possess the suit property recorded in the Jamabandis as ‘Abadi Deh’. Obviously, when the connotation of the classification column of the Jamabandis apposite to the suit land while depicting it as ‘Abadi Deh’ is of it hence being the “site of village” or where the villagers have raised their residential houses, as a corollary then the respondents/defendants are to be concluded to have also raised their residential houses thereon. The raising of residential houses on the ‘Abadi Deh’ by the respondents/defendants has not been proved by the plaintiffs/appellants to be over and upon an area in excess to their share in the ‘abadi’. In sequel thereto as such the claim of the plaintiffs of the respondents having invaded or threatened to invade their rights over/upon the suit land gets benumbed. In sequel thereto as such the claim of the plaintiffs of the respondents having invaded or threatened to invade their rights over/upon the suit land gets benumbed. The plaintiffs/appellants too have a right in the ‘Abadi Deh’ and too appear to have given the aforesaid connotation to the phrase “Abadi Deh” existing in the remark column qua the suit land in the apposite jamabandis, raised their houses thereon. Consequently, the acts of invasion or threatened invasion as attributed to the defendants/respondents by the plaintiffs/appellants while purportedly unsettling their possessory rights over and upon the suit land de-hors the fact that the plaintiffs/appellants may have proven the fact of invasion or threatened invasion having taken place at the instance of respondents/defendants in derogation to the rights of plaintiffs/appellant qua their possession in the ‘Abadi Deh’ too besides necessitated adduction of potent evidence comprised, in adduction into evidence of a Tatima delineating with specificity, exactitude and precision the exact area over and upon which the defendants/respondents had commenced or initiated their intrusion or invasion, either threatened or actual. The aforesaid best evidence as comprised in a Tatima, being appended alongwith the plaint and subsequently proved during the course of the recording of the deposition of plaintiff before the learned trial Court and its adequately demonstrating with precision the area over and upon which the acts of invasion either threatened or actual, at the instance of defendants/respondents commenced, in derogation to the rights of plaintiffs/appellant, hence, necessitating or warranting theirs being thwarted by this Court by rendering a decree of injunction in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants, is wanting. Omission of the aforesaid best evidence constrains this Court to conclude that the plaintiffs/appellants have not been able to prove with exactitude and precision the exact location in the suit land where acts of invasion either actual or threatened were committed or perpetrated by the respondents/defendants. Consequently, for lack thereof, this Court is constrained to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff. In sequel the appeal is dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree are maintained and affirmed. Both the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the defendants/respondents and against the plaintiffs/appellants. No costs.